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Abstract
This thesis applies a ‘europeanisation’ perspective to the analysis of the adoption of 
European Union (EU) regional and agricultural policy in the Czech Republic and 
Poland during the pre-accession period. EU regional and agricultural policy in the 
pre-accession period potentially challenged both the sectoral institutional 
arrangements and the wider executive structure in the Czech Republic and Poland. 
However, the degree of prescription varied between policy sectors. Temporal factors 
and policy factors meant that in the regional policy cases the challenge to the 
executive structure was largely mediated. On the other hand, EU agricultural policy 
had a high level of prescription. In the case of a fundamental ‘misfit’ between the EU 
requirements and the domestic set-up, the research, following neo-institutional 
perspectives, expects limited adaptation on the sectoral and executive levels. This is 
the case in Polish agriculture. In the case of Czech agriculture, sectoral reform should 
be seen in the context of agricultural policy reform started in 1997. In regional policy, 
the neo-institutional perspective works less well. Here, the thesis proposes an actor- 
based perspective to explain sectoral adaptation. This sectoral adaptation, such as the 
alignment of administrative procedures, remains within the range permitted by the 
national executive structure. The effects can be found mostly on the sectoral level. 
The main effect of the EU pre-accession process on executive structure is the 
institutional enhancement of certain national executive actors. Only, the Polish case 
shows an unexpected change of the executive structure. This change can be explained 
by endogenous reform of the institutional configuration. This research makes two 
main contributions to the literature. First, it is one of the first studies to apply 
systematically a ‘europeanisation’ perspective to the Eastern enlargement. Secondly, 
empirical evidence on East and Central Europe, based on the ‘europeanisation’ 
perspective, has been limited. In this way, the thesis will contribute to extending 
‘europeanisation East’ and hope to produce a better conceptualisation of the EU pre­
accession process and domestic factors mediating the impact of the EU.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The question this research poses is how domestic administrations in the post­
communist candidate countries are shaped by the European pre-accession process.
The research will look at how the administrative requirements of specific European 
Union (EU) policies affect both the macro-institutional configuration or the national 
executive structure and the sectoral institutional arrangements that govern the 
management of sectoral policy. The first issue is how to place the question in the 
existing literature looking at the impact of the EU in the candidate countries.
Secondly, one has to operationalise the analysis. Finally, it is important to outline the 
choice of policies, countries, and time periods in the comparative framework.
1. The Analysis as ‘Europeanisation’
First, a distinction needs to be made between enlargement studies and those studies 
analysing the domestic impact of EU accession. Enlargement literature focuses on the 
decision to enlarge, enlargement preferences in the member-states and EU 
institutions, and the consequences of enlargement for EU institutions and policies (see 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002b). In this literature, the domestic level has been 
mainly discussed in how it informed the shaping of the EU pre-accession process (see 
for instance Lippert et al 2001).
The analysis of the domestic impact of EU accession in the post-communist candidate 
countries shows three main approaches: 1. an approach that sees enlargement as part 
of transition (see Mattli and Plumper 2004); 2. an approach that focuses on 
institutional weakness in the candidate countries (see Goetz 2002a); and 3. 
conditionality views (see Grabbe 2003). All these approaches have particular 
weaknesses and limitations. First, transition literature by definition is temporally 
confined to a certain period. For the first-wave candidate countries, it can be argued 
that ‘europeanisation’ falls outside the period of transition. For these countries most 
institutional choices have been made before the intensification of relations with the 
EU in the period of 1996 to 1997. Further, the transition perspective sees Europe as a
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context that enables domestic reform. This ‘enabling constraint’ view has been 
criticised, as domestic contestation on EU membership has increased in light of the 
costs of membership close to accession. Secondly, the assumption of institutional 
weakness might not be a helpful generalisation on the level of institutional 
development in the post-communist candidate countries. Concepts, such as the 
absence of administrative capacity and institutional voids, might be inaccurate 
depictions of the true core executive and sectoral institutional configurations. The 
research rather stresses the ‘difference’ or ‘specificity’ of the institutional 
configuration in these candidate countries. Third, conditionality research by its own 
admission produces shallow and short-term effects linked to mediating factors such as 
uncertainty. Such studies seem indeterminate and negative in showing what the 
possible impact of the EU in the post-communist candidate countries might be.
By focusing on the ‘specificity’ of the institutional configuration rather than 
‘institutional weakness’ in the post-communist candidate countries, it seems logical to 
use ‘europeanisation’ literature.
2. Operationalising ‘Europeanisation’
In research design, the thesis adopts the empirical questions set out by Dyson and 
Goetz (2003) in their volume on ‘europeanisation’, which are similar to those posed 
by Featherstone and Radaelli (2003). These questions have five dimensions: 1. the 
‘what’ question or what form has ‘europeanisation’ taken; 2. the ‘who’ question or 
who are the domestic and EU actors affected by or shaping the pre-accession process;
3. the ‘how’ question or what are the mechanisms of ‘europeanisation’; 4. the ‘when’ 
question or whether we can distinguish different stages in the ‘europeanisation’ 
dynamic in the given countries; and 5. the ‘why’ question or what are the causal 
triggers of ‘europeanisation’.
On the ‘what’ question, it is necessary to distinguish between general and specific 
forms of ‘europeanisation’. On a general level in a comparative context, the research 
looks at ‘convergence’ and ‘divergence’ in the administrative organisation between 
countries and policy sectors. However, this kind of analysis on the impact of Europe
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has often been criticised for not being specific enough (see for instance Knill 2001, p. 
12). This specificity refers to establishing the degree of change. ‘Degreeism’ here 
exists for both the level and magnitude of change associated with ‘europeanisation’. 
On a more specific level, ‘europeanisation’ studies should try to establish whether 
interaction with EU policy and administrative requirements has led to domestic 
accommodation, absorption, transformation or retrenchment (see Borzel and Risse 
2003 for this categorisation). Further, looking at the magnitude of institutional 
change, one could ask whether the change was in the institutional set-up of the 
executive in the candidate countries or whether it was more sectoral or marginal.
The second question refers to ‘who’ is involved with this interaction on the domestic 
and European levels. This research looks at two levels of domestic administrative 
actor: 1. the national executive level, which includes administrative actors such as the 
Prime Minister, the Council of Ministers, the line ministries and the central 
implementation agencies; 2. the sectoral and regional level, which includes the 
regions, regional development agencies, interest groups, sectoral agencies and sectoral 
beneficiaries. The next question is how to conceptualise actor behaviour. The research 
observes that administrative actors ‘instrumentalise’ Europe in the way the association 
with European policy coordination and implementation affects their institutional 
position. In a positive way, domestic actors, dependent on their institutional allocation 
of resources and competences (capacity), will attempt to enhance their institutional 
position. In a negative way when the EU signifies a domestic redistribution of 
resources and competences, domestic actors will attempt to resist or maintain their 
institutional position (for this point on agency behaviour in the Czech Republic see 
interview with Howard Harding: Prague, April 26 2002). This instrumental view (see 
also Sharf 1997, p. 64-65) counters both the ‘constructivist’ view on enlargement and 
the ‘cognitive exchange’ view’.
Secondly, this research, in chapter 4, looks at the way EU actors shape the pre­
accession template. Though the thesis is not concerned with the development of EU 
institutions, the interaction between EU actors affects the process of ‘europeanisation’ 
in the candidate countries in terms of the management of the pre-accession process, 
the building and the continuity of the pre-accession templates, and the role in the 
management of the new member-states after accession. These processes reflect on the
18
role of the member-states in reforming EU institutions and leading the negotiations 
with the candidate countries and the role of the European Commission in managing 
the pre-accession process and influencing internal institutional reform.
The ‘how’ question refers to the mechanisms of ‘europeanisation’. It seems obvious 
‘europeanisation’ in the post-communist candidate countries has to first and foremost 
be conceptualised as a hierarchical ‘top-down’ process based on the asymmetry of 
power between the EU and the candidate countries in the pre-accession period. The 
main mechanism of ‘europeanisation’ is the ‘downloading’ of EU templates. The 
institutional set-ups of the national executive and policy sectors are important in this 
analysis, as they will determine the ‘misfit’ with EU administrative and policy 
templates. This ‘misfit’ produces adaptive pressure at the domestic level (see also 
Borzel and Risse 2003). However, the administrative requirements also vary between 
the policy sectors in specificity and over time in the pre-accession period. This 
observation means that domestic actors can have discretion to shape the 
administrative outcomes in the domestic arena. Discretion tends to be higher for 
administrative requirements than policy requirements.
The ‘when’ question is particularly relevant in the pre-accession period. For the 
candidate countries, one cannot assume the presence of interaction at all points in 
time. The publication of ‘Agenda 2000’ in 1996 can be seen as the start of the 
intensification of the interaction between the EU and the candidate countries. Stages 
of ‘europeanisation’ are mostly linked to the ‘continuity’ of the EU pre-accession 
template. Section 3.3 in this chapter elaborates.
The ‘why’ question refers to the causal triggers for institutional change. In this 
research, it is necessary to use different levels of abstraction (similar to the different 
mechanisms listed in Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999). The thesis follows the framework 
set out by Knill (2001), with two important modifications. First, the thesis uses the 
national executive organisation as the macro-institutional context, rather than 
administrative traditions. Secondly, the thesis pays close attention, similar to Hughes, 
Sasse and Gordon (2004), on how European actors shape the pre-accession templates. 
Consequently, when one finds a large ‘misfit’ or a direct EU challenge to the 
domestic macro-institutional configuration, institution-based accounts are sufficient
19
for explaining the process of institutional change or persistence. However, such 
‘misfits’ are neither present for every policy sector, nor are they absolute. Here, the 
thesis will argue that where discretion is high or EU templates less prescriptive, 
institution-based approaches offer little explanatory value beyond the persistence of 
the domestic institutional arrangements. These accounts find it hard to explain 
changes within sectoral arrangements. Agency-based accounts might be better able to 
explain institutional change in these cases. In this approach, the domestic 
administrative actors use the European requirements and opportunities in a ‘bottom- 
up’ way to shape the domestic arena. This process will normally mean the 
enhancement of their respective institutional position.
3. Comparative Framework
3.1 Regional and Agricultural Policy
The research looks at the domestic adaptation in the regional and agricultural policy 
sectors. In the choice of policy areas, three factors play a role: 1. the existence of 
interaction in the chosen policy sectors in the pre-accession period; 2. the 
administrative requirements associated with the policy sectors; and 3. the extent to 
which the analysis can be extended to other policy sectors.
First, one cannot make an assumption of interaction between the EU and the candidate 
countries. In contrast to the member-states, one has to establish a pattern of 
interaction and consequently a base for the transmission of effects. Otherwise, this 
research could be describing temporary or transient effects. At worst, for a given 
policy area, the interaction might be minimal or non-existent.1 Both regional and 
agricultural policy involved a path towards accession unique to this current 
enlargement, namely the pre-accession instruments. This path assumes: 1. a greater 
intensity of EU interaction from the early pre-accession to the accession period with 
domestic administrative actors; 2. links between pre-accession management and EU
1 Some studies have sought to generalise on the ill-defined nature of the EU pre-accession process. 
Schimmelfennig (1999, pg. 16) or Sedelmeier and Wallace (1996) for instance claim there is ‘no path, 
programme, or timetable for accession’.
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funds management; and 3. a basic willingness of domestic actors to participate in EU 
policy.
Secondly, in looking at domestic administrative adjustment, it is important to choose 
policy areas that include administrative requirements. The main problem in the study 
on the impact of Europe on domestic administration has been the notion that the 
European Union does not have an administrative template to transpose to the member- 
states. Indeed, there is no common administrative policy in the EU. Coordination and 
implementation should be seen in the national context. Therefore, the study of the 
impact of Europe on domestic administration seems to have clear limitations.
Sverdrup (2000) for instance argues for Nordic countries that European integration 
produces a passive and reluctant response in domestic administrations. The study of 
linkage units would be an example of more concentrated and limited effects of Europe 
on administration. Such reasoning has also infiltrated studies on administration- 
building in the post-communist candidate countries, where authors emphasise the 
vagaries and absence of an EU template (see Dimitrova 2002; Grabbe 2001a).
On this point, the thesis argues, similar to Knill (2001), that such arguments overlook 
the administrative impact in terms of the coordination and implementation of EU 
policy. There is a direct relationship between policy content and the required 
administrative arrangements in some policy areas. This relationship exists in policy 
areas where the EU is expanding its competences, the core policy areas of the EU, and 
policy areas where the EU has a strong regulatory focus.
For regional and agricultural policy there are direct links between policy and 
administrative management. The EU template can challenge sectoral institutional 
arrangements. Moreover, these challenges to sectoral institutional arrangements can 
also affect or challenge the macro-institutional configuration at the domestic level.
The sectoral institutional arrangements refer to the changes in administrative 
procedures that govern the management of development and intervention policy 
(coordination, implementation, and financial control). The macro-institutional 
configuration means the horizontal or vertical organisation of the executive 
administration. This thesis will build an explanatory framework in chapter 3, based on
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the type of challenge the EU poses. Finally, the thesis looks briefly at whether policy 
adaptation is consistent with the adaptation of sectoral institutional arrangements.
The difference in the underlying policy and temporal factors (see section 3.3 of 
chapter 3) between policy sectors provides an interesting comparative context in 
establishing the patterns of domestic adaptation, as the adaptation pressure and the 
domestic discretion in shaping administrative outcomes and arrangements will vary 
between the policy sectors.
Thirdly, regional and agricultural policies present an ‘extreme case* in European 
policy adoption in the candidate countries. Interaction in these policy areas, unlike in 
most other EU policy areas, can be traced back through the pre-accession instruments. 
Moreover, EU funds management, which is linked to the pre-accession instruments, is 
an integral part of these policy areas. This incentive to domestic actors makes sectoral 
accommodation of EU requirements more likely. Finally, these core policy areas have 
particular and extensive policy and administrative requirements. The degree of 
institutional adaptation at the domestic level for other EU policy areas would likely be 
‘less’ or ‘different’.
3.2 Countries
The selection of countries in the shape of the Czech Republic and Poland allows us to 
compare the role of the domestic institutional frameworks in the process of 
adaptation. As these countries would emerge from the communist period, trends and 
choices in the institutional set-up in these countries were similar. Indeed, the 
institutional configurations of the Czech Republic and Poland have commonalities. 
After the initial transition period, both had a territorially centralised administration 
and a decentralised executive, in terms of ministerial autonomy and the proliferation 
of central and quasi-govemmental agencies. On a sectoral basis, regional policy was 
part of a wider industrial policy in both countries, a legacy of the communist past.
However, the Czech Republic and Poland also show important differences in the 
development of institutional configurations. The core executive developed differently
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in both countries from the middle of the 1990s onwards. Poland aimed to strengthen 
the core executive, while the Czech Republic continued to show ministerial autonomy 
within the executive. In agricultural policy, there were important differences in the 
administrative structure and policy between the countries. These differences were 
related to the communist legacy and the structure of agriculture in the respective 
countries.
These distinctions allow the research to link domestic institutional arrangements in 
the national executive and the policy sectors to the possible differences in adaptation 
or institutional change between the countries. Moreover, the research will aim to 
develop comparisons to be drawn between this group of post-communist countries 
and groups of member-states such as the core members, Nordic member-states, and 
Southern member-states.
It is important to note that this analysis mostly applies to the ‘first-wave* candidate 
countries. There are two reasons for this choice. First, it is easier to argue that 
transition is over in these countries. Further, adaptation requires an intensification of 
interaction between the candidate countries and the EU. This process took place 
earlier in the first-wave candidate countries. This last point deals with the importance 
of ‘time periods’ in the research.
3.3 EU Templates over Time
It is important to raise the temporal factor in the interaction between the EU and 
candidate countries. This thesis identifies three time periods, which follow the 
developments in the EU pre-accession instruments: 1. early pre-accession up to 1996, 
where these instruments were predominantly aid instruments (1992-1996); 2. the pre­
accession period post-Agenda 2000, when negotiations commenced and where pre­
accession instruments focused on the adoption of the ‘acquis’ (1997-2002); and 3. 
early accession, where these instruments evolved into transition facilities aimed at the 
implementation of EU Structural, Cohesion and agricultural funds (2003-).
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The focus of the research is on the period from 1997 to 2002. The main reason is that 
this period represents the intensification of the relations between the EU and the 
candidate countries. It would be difficult to ascertain any distinct patterns of 
institutional adaptation before 1996, given the more discretionary and unstructured 
EU involvement. Further, it would also open up the analysis to the ‘transition 
perspective’.
The pivotal point in the analysis is the PHARE (Poland and Hungary Assistance to 
Economic Restructuring) Management Reform of 1997, which coincided with the 
publication of ‘Agenda 2000’. These reforms aimed to raise the efficiency and 
effectiveness of implementation close to accession. These reforms ended the 
vertically and horizontally fragmented implementation and coordination of PHARE. 
PHARE Reforms had a procedural and structural impact. The reforms meant a focus 
on centralised coordination, consolidated implementation and financial control. 
Moreover, PHARE aimed to build a bridge to the ‘acquis’ and funds management. 
Finally, the PHARE Reforms introduced budgetary frameworks, which put limits on 
the overall spending. Any redirection of resources to specific sectors would come at 
the expense of other administrative units.
The reason why the research further subdivides the period of 1997-2002 into ‘pre­
accession’ and ‘early accession’ is to stress the continuity or lack of continuity in the 
EU pre-accession templates. There are two aspects to continuity in the EU templates: 
1. the stability of the template over time in the pre-accession period; and 2. the 
relationship between the pre-accession template and the ‘acquis’. Though EU policy 
templates after the reforms of 1997 form the base for the pre-accession templates, 
these pre-accession templates often incorporate specific domestic conditions such as 
problems in the absorption of funds (for PHARE Management Reforms see for 
instance EC 1997b). This incorporation formed part of an ongoing debate between 
‘administrative compliance’ and ‘administration-building’, which shaped the EU pre­
accession templates. Continuity affected the domestic discretion of actors to shape the 
institutional outcomes.
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4. Chapter Structure
In chapter 2 ,1 explain how and why ‘europeanisation’ analysis should be extended 
East. This chapter will also indicate the contribution the research aim to make to the 
academic literature. Chapter 3 will outline the general analytical framework 
introduced above and explain the methodology used in the research. Chapter 4 will 
show: 1. the changes in the pre-accession approaches in terms of the procedures and 
allocation of finances; and 2. how the EU has internalised enlargement in terms of 
policy reform, the budgetary framework, and transition periods. This last point is 
important in establishing what kind of EU the candidate countries are joining.
Chapters 5 and 6 will aim to develop an analysis of: 1. how the institutional set-up for 
regional policy has developed in the Czech Republic and Poland; 2. how the European 
templates challenge this set-up; and 3. how the EU pre-accession instruments are 
integrated, accommodated, or resisted in the institutional set-up. Chapters 7 and 8 will 
do the same for agriculture. Chapter 9 will outline: 1. the empirical observations on 
temporal and policy factors in EU templates; 2.1ink the degree and magnitude of 
institutional change to the different causal mechanisms; 3. draw conclusions on which 
aspects of administration are strengthened and outline divergent or convergent 
outcomes. In Chapter 10, the research will make some observations on the differences 
between the candidate countries and the member-states, the likely effects of 
enlargement on the European Union, and draw conclusions on what the analysis 
means for the wider ‘europeanisation’ literature.
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Chapter 2: ‘Europeanisation Goes East’
1. Introduction
In this chapter, I will explain why and how extending ‘europeanisation’ literature to 
the Central and East European Countries (CEECs) is worthwhile. First, this extension 
means a critique of existing ways of looking at the impact of the EU in Eastern 
Europe. Secondly, the chapter will look at ‘europeanisation’ literature and see how it 
could apply to these countries. This section will focus on the complementary uses of 
institution-based and actor-based institutional perspectives. Finally, I will outline the 
contributions the research aims to make.
2. ‘Europeanisation’ Goes East
The impact of the EU in the candidate countries of Eastern Europe has been 
conceptualised in three main ways. The dominant views have been: the ‘transition’ 
perspective, which has interpreted European accession as a context for domestic 
reform; institutional weakness views, which argue against the expansion of ‘neo­
institutionalist’ theories to Eastern candidate countries; and ‘conditionality’ views, 
with roots in hierarchical ‘top-down’ perspectives on the accession process. The next 
sections will outline the respective weaknesses of these approaches.
The Transition Perspective
The transition literature was late in acknowledging the EU as a factor in domestic 
transformation. Transition studies have mostly taken a domestic view to issues of 
institution-building. Most studies have shown the unique path of post-communist 
transition, rather than viewing transition as a wholesale adoption of institutional 
models of other countries (see Elster et al 1998). Studies primarily deal with the path 
of transition and the stability of the institutional outcome. Many domestic 
determinants of the path of transition have been studied. Some point to the role of 
national political systems and domestic politics (see Bruszt and Stark 1998; Elster et 
al 1998; O’ Donnell et al 1986). Others emphasise the historical and institutional
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legacies (see also Dawisha and Parrott 1997). Actor constellations, levels of civil 
society, the role of economic crisis, policy networks (Bruszt and Stark 1998), levels of 
socio-economic development have been studied (for an overview see Mattli and 
Plumper 2004). There was also a debate in the literature between those commenting 
on the relative success and failure of institutional consolidation in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) (See for instance Heilman 1998a), which often had a ‘normative’ 
dimension through the linkage between a particular institutional configuration and 
policy outcomes (see Heilman 1998b; de Melo et al 1996; Kitschelt 1999).
The role of the EU in the process of institutional change in CEE was seen as 
contextual (see Mattli and Plumper 2004). ‘Europeanisation’ was thus placed 
comparatively next to other patterns of development (see for instance Goetz 2001b, 
who also looks at ‘latinization’ and ‘modernization’ of administration and Goetz and 
Wollman 2001). The EU is seen as an incentive to push domestic reform. Nunberg 
comments on the ‘back-bumer’ efforts at reform in Poland as receiving a major boost 
from the political support derived from Poland’s imminent accession to the EU 
(Nunberg et al 1998). Similarly, in the Czech case, the pressure of the EU was intense 
on a system that up until 1998 was incapable of developing a single body to 
coordinate the relations with the EU (see Smejkal 1998), but whose government in 
August 1998 announced a policy statement to improve public administration.
The traditional ‘constructivist’ perception of enlargement has been that domestic and 
EU actors have ‘internalised’ in their political and organisational culture that 
European Union membership is desirable to achieve greater economic performance at 
home, to provide national security, and ultimately legitimise and stabilise the budding 
political traditions (Mayhew, 1998). The benefits of EU membership, as perceived in 
many post-communist societies, focus on these issues: stability of institutions 
(legislative, executive, and judiciary); a possible counterweight of extremist 
tendencies at home; the integrity of the state; greater political legitimacy for the elites; 
economic performance; and the possibility of using the EU for undertaking difficult 
reform (Mayhew, 1998). These views are ‘enabling constraint’ views in the way the 
discipline and incentive of impending EU membership will produce transition and 
consolidation of democratic structures, modernisation of society and marketisation in
27
the CEECs.2 The appearance of consensual societal and political support for EU 
accession in the CEECs also strengthens this approach (for Poland see Szczerbiak 
2002). Moreover, many leading politicians in the candidate countries saw the EU as a 
wider opportunity to legitimate reform rather than a constraint.3
Three main criticisms exist of this approach. A first consideration is to determine 
what conceptual limits the ‘europeanisation’ process is likely to encounter. Grabbe 
(2003) in her conclusion, copying from Sartori, warns of the need for ‘degreeism’ in 
the conceptualisation of ‘europeanisation’ as the main driver of reform, given the 
salience and overuse of EU enlargement by both domestic and EU actors in the 
candidate countries. ‘Europeanisation’ is not equivalent to the enlargement process 
and needs to be distinguished from modernisation and globalisation ongoing in the 
CEECs. Transition studies therefore are on different planes and in different time 
frames than ‘europeanisation’ studies.
Secondly, following from the previous point, one can argue that transition falls 
outside the temporal scope of this research. As indicated in the introduction, it is 
poindess to study ‘europeanisation’ unless one can establish clear interaction between 
the EU and candidate countries for the given policy sectors. The period of pre­
accession started in earnest in 1996-1997 with the publication of ‘Agenda 2000’. By 
1997, most institutional choices had been made in the Czech Republic and Poland. 
Institutional choices were made at the time of regime change in 1989-1990. The 
reform of the core executive of 1996 and 1997 in both the Czech Republic and Poland 
was a response to particular domestic conditions, the economic crisis in CEE, and the 
continuation of public administration reform set out in the early 1990s. Regional and 
agricultural policy sectors showed continuity in the administrative set-up and policy 
style from the period of 1989-1990 until 1997. Institutional choices were often quite 
stable. Thus, the identification of the EU as a context for transition seems at least 
‘temporally’ flawed for these ‘first-wave’ accession countries.
2 A model for constructivist views on enlargement is presented in Schimmelpfennig (1999) and 
Sedelmeier and Schimmelfennig (2002).
3 This is a point raised by for instance Ioakamides who for Greece equates ‘europeanisation’ with 
‘modernisation’ (similar to Lippert et al [2001]) in the volume on Southern states edited by 
Featherstone and Kazamias (2001).
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Third, a more contentiousness outlook among domestic actors has been found in the 
empirical evidence. Opposition might come in terms of the vested interests associated 
with enterprises, civil servants, political elites and political parties, certain lobby 
groups such as peasant groups, or the general voting public (Mayhew 1998, p. 201). 
An effect of the realisation of the costs of membership has been how political actors 
use the imminence of EU accession ‘strategically’ in party politics' This observation 
shows the potential for the emergence of cleavages on EU accession or on specific 
policy issues in the Czech Republic and Poland (Kopecky and Mudde 2002). 
Featherstone and Kazamias (2001) point here to the cleavage in the domestic response 
to the EU between ‘reformers’ and ‘traditionalists’ in their volume on Southern states. 
The formation of European networks seems to build and reinforce a cleavage between 
those participating and gaining, and those on the fringes. Finally, even among the 
‘winners’ in the process of European integration, there are clear limitations in 
cognitive exchange and the formation of ‘policy communities’ in CEE. Domestic 
perceptions and goals of EU policy experts in the candidate countries are still 
different from those of EU officials (see Marta von Mauberg: Warsaw January 23 
2002). These points were raised in interviews with Twinning officials (see interviews 
with Jan Cermak: Prague April 22, 2002 and James Hunt: Prague April 24, 2002)4. 
There are limits to the internalisation of EU beliefs and values in the national 
administrations, even in administration characterised by a strong interaction with the 
EU (see also Papadimitriou and Phinnemore 2002).
Institutional Weakness
A second view pertains not to the process of domestic reform, but to the strength of 
institutional outcomes. These approaches have focused on: 1. institutional 
underdevelopment in the CEECs; and 2. weakness in administrative capacity.
The first observation has been the overall institutional underdevelopment of the 
candidate countries. The question as in Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2002a, p. 3)
4 James Hunt, for instance, provides anecdotes of colleagues (fellow ^winners’) attending operational 
meetings that were held in Czech, even though they did not speak the language, and colleagues being 
placed in back offices in annexes of the relevant ministry. Both Hunt and Cermak indicate that 
domestic resistance in both project selection and project process were factors in limiting exchange of 
ideas and practices.
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remains whether the absence of ‘institutional inertia’, an important factor in reducing 
the impact of Europe in the member-states, reduces or increases the impact of Europe 
in the CEECs. This debate also focuses on the relative strength and weakness of 
institutional arrangements in the post-communist countries of CEE. Whereas the 
original core member-states at the centre of the initial phases of European integration 
had stable institutional settings and developed public policies, it has been argued that 
for the southern wave of enlargement as well as the coming eastern enlargement EU 
membership will be more ‘institutionalisation ab ovo', rather than institutional 
change’ (Dyson and Goetz 2003, p. 17). Goetz (2002a), in a recent study, argues that 
the neo-institutional perspective, which is dominant in Western ‘europeanisation’ 
perspectives, works less well in a less established and evolving setting of CEE, where 
the inherited structures have lost legitimacy and institutional frameworks are 
developing.5 Radaelli (2003) makes a similar point for ‘fragile’ institutions. Goetz 
(2002a) continues that these settings put a premium on ‘reversibility’ and 
‘provisionally’.
Secondly, a component of the debate on strength or weakness of institutions is the 
administrative capacity of the state to undertake domestic reform or implement EU 
policy. Capacity has been in the spotlight due to the salience given by the European 
Commission to ‘institution-building’ in the pre-accession process. Studies have either 
focused on the EU’s attempt in the pre-accession period to aid in building 
administrative capacity (Papadimitriou 2002; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore 2002) or 
have commented on the problems of administrative capacity in the CEECs (for 
instance Nunberg 2000; Verheijen 2000; Verheijen and Kotchegura 1999)6. The 
obvious thesis is that low administrative capacity is a hurdle to the implementation of 
EU policy and associated administrative requirements. Therefore, given the 
administrative weakness, the overall impact of the EU might be limited.
5 This point qualifies the reasoning of Knill that strong administrative traditions and institutional 
configuration in West European countries prevent adaptation to EU pressure (Knill 2001). In absence 
of such traditions and strong institutions in the CEE, the question is asked what patterns of adaptation 
one is likely to see.
6 The Regular Reports have indicated on several occasions concerns about the administrative capacity 
to take up the ‘acquis communautaire’ (see e.g. EC, ‘Regular Report on the Czech Republic’s Progress 
towards Accession’, 1999 pg. 59). Other reports have highlighted problems with the general absorption 
of pre-accession aid (see EC, ‘New Phare Orientations for Pre-Accession Assistance’ of 1997; and 
more recently EC, ‘Phare 2000 Review: Strengthening Preparations for Membership’ of 2000).
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These assumptions of institutional weakness, weak administrative capacity, and 
public policy voids basically raise questions on the relative importance of the 
institutional configuration as a determinant in the ‘europeanisation’ dynamic within 
the candidate countries. In this work, I question the validity of the assumption that 
institutions in the post-communist candidate countries are weak or indeterminate. 
Rather, the institutional configuration is ‘different’ or ‘specific’. There are two 
reasons for this approach. First, the persistence of institutional arrangements seen in 
the empirical evidence would indicate stability rather than a weakness of the 
institutional configuration. Secondly, differences in the institutional configurations 
have been acknowledged for the current member-states and associated countries. 
Goetz (2002b), for instance, writes about ‘four worlds of europeanisation’, classifying 
different groups of countries affected by the EU. Featherstone and Kazamias (2001) 
emphasise the importance of distinct institutional settings on the periphery, especially 
when divergence from the core is great. They stress ‘fragmentation, asymmetry, and 
dynamism’ in describing ‘europeanisation’ effects in the Southern periphery. 
Similarly, studies on CEECs have started to acknowledge the difference of 
configurations, rather than the indeterminate nature of them. Ferry (2003) relates how 
the CEECs due to institutional legacies have a different configuration of institutions, 
actors and interests from the core member-states. Ferry stresses the relevance and 
persistence of national institutional frameworks and domestic interest mediation and 
their role in shaping European accession.
The focus on the ‘difference’ or ‘specificity’ of institutional configurations is also of 
importance in the conceptualisation of ‘europeanisation’. Few studies have 
determined: how capacity can be determined; what lack of administrative capacity 
means; or what effects lack of administrative capacity has. In terms of research 
design, this can be problematic. First, administrative capacity and strength of 
institutions are better conceptualised in terms of mapping what competences and 
resources are assigned within the institutional framework or executive configuration 
(similar to Knill 1999) and within the persistence and stability of this macro- 
institutional framework. Secondly, this approach, similar to studies of 
‘europeanisation’ in the member-states, will allow for a more systematic analysis of 
the impact of the EU.
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Qualifying Conditionality
As the pre-accession process was formed in 1997, a ‘top-down’ and vertical approach 
emerged. This approach came out of the ‘classical community method’ examined by 
Preston (1995), with a strong focus on the applicant’s acceptance of and compliance 
with the ‘acquis communautaire’. At the centre of ‘europeanisation’ effects in the 
CEECs, is the downloading by the candidate countries of the ‘acquis communautaire’. 
Adoption of the ‘acquis’ also means the establishment of a suitable legal and 
institutional framework for the implementation of the ‘acquis’. The pre-accession 
process is seen as a technical process. Intrinsically, the relationship between the EU 
and the candidate countries is seen as an asymmetry o f power, whereby the EU 
represents a relatively unified front7 in the bilateral negotiations. These negotiations 
around the adoption, implementation, and enforcement of the ‘acquis’ offer limited 
opportunities at ‘opting out’ or ‘uploading’. Grabbe (2003, p. 313) also makes this 
point. Moreover, Mayhew (1998) remarks that the involvement of the EU in the 
preparation of the candidate countries is particular to this wave of enlargement. 
Mayhew (2000) points to the distribution of resources through the pre-accession 
programmes and a verification process that determines whether the conditions for 
accession have been met.
This gave rise to the identification of a variety of ‘top-down’ conditionality tools. 
Grabbe identifies five mechanisms for ‘europeanisation’ in the pre-accession period:
1. institutional models; 2. aid and technical assistance; 3. benchmarking and 
monitoring; 4. advice and twinning; 5. gate-keeping (Grabbe 2001b). These 
mechanisms offer different degrees of prescription and indeed adaptive pressure. The 
intervening variables are the asymmetry of power between the EU and candidate 
countries and the dimension of uncertainty that is present in the enlargement decision­
making8, programmatic process, and in policy and institutional reform on the EU side. 
Some studies have emphasised the existence of a ‘moving target’, as the European
7 Even though negotiations showed divergent views and interests between the member-states and 
between the member-states and the EC on enlargement (see also Szamuely 1999).
8 Grabbe (2003) identifies five levels: 1. uncertainty over policy agenda; 2. uncertainty over hierarchy 
of tasks; 3. uncertainty over timing of reforms; 4. uncertainty over whom to satisfy (Council, member- 
state, or European Commission); 5. uncertainty about what constitutes meeting norms and standards.
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Union reforms key policy areas such as CAP and regional policy (see Tangermann 
1997 on CAP; and Hughes et al 2004 on regional policy).
There is a temporal dimension to conditionality. Lippert et al (2001) divide the overall 
period from the early interaction to accession in about five periods of differential 
pressures and differential adaptation effects: ‘first contacts; the Europe Agreements; 
pre-accession; negotiations; and post-accession’. In essence, it is an overview of the 
different foci the EU presents at different times in the pre-accession process.
Similarly, Grabbe and Hughes (1998) make a distinction between the technical pre­
accession strategy and the highly political negotiations and decision to enlarge.
Further, authors distinguish between types of conditionality. Hughes, Sasse, and 
Gordon (2004, p. 2) make a distinction between ‘formal conditionality’, which 
includes the ‘acquis’ and the stated preconditions for enlargement and ‘informal 
conditionality’, which refers to all other expressions of preferences on the EU side. 
Vachodova (2002) distinguishes between the ‘passive’ leverage, namely the attraction 
of membership to the elite, and ‘active’ leverage, namely the deliberate conditionality. 
She sees ‘passive’ leverage in the initial phases reinforcing the neo-liberal post­
transition reform and ‘active’ leverage from 1996 having a differential effect between 
‘nationalist’ and ‘liberal’ pattern states. However, Vachodova (2002) did not 
specifically look at the policy or an institutional impact, but rather the 
complementarity with domestic reform.
The main problem with these approaches is that it is very difficult to attach general 
direct and indirect effects to the ‘europeanisation’ mechanisms, which vary over time 
and are mediated by uncertainty, domestic credibility (see Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2002b), and the relative openness (or lack of resistance in adaptation) of 
the CEECs, given the post-communist transition. The wide range of conditionality 
approaches9 almost pre-determine the impact of Europe as exceptional, random and 
shallow, even more so when studies use ‘convergence’ as an assumption to measure 
the effects of ‘europeanisation’. Dimitrova (2002) sees little administrative
9 The most ambitious design for measuring the domestic impact was made by Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier (2002a). However, the model considering all kinds of approaches and literatures and has 
not been operationalised.
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convergence because of the adoption of EU requirements, given that EU ‘institution 
building’ does not have clear institutional templates in the ‘acquis’. Further, she says 
that the institutionalisation of EU governance based on conditionality is highly 
problematic. Hughes, Sasse and Gordon (2004) show the limited impact of the 
conditionality tools in regional policy and in the formation of territorial administration 
in the CEECs.
Conditionality by definition is also transient. Checkel (2000) argues that 
conditionality studies are problematic, because reform is often not associated with 
domestic ‘legitimacy and ownership’. Grabbe (2001a) argues that for the acceding 
countries conditionality produces shallow and short-term effects and is unlikely to 
promote deep and lasting institutionalisation. So, conditionality tools seem to have a 
limited impact. This observation falls in line with other observations on adaptation in 
CEE. In terms of the impact of Europe, Radaelli (2002) describes a range of voluntary 
adaptation. Goetz (2001a) describes adaptation effects in the domestic administrations 
of CEE as ‘anticipatory’ and ‘anticipated’.
The usefulness of ‘uncertainty and variability’ in such ‘top-down’ analysis is 
questionable. These concepts leave a fragmented independent variable in the shape of 
the European pre-accession approaches with little possibility to compare the impact of 
Europe across sectors or countries, let alone make generalisations or derive theoretical 
implications outside of the limited or disparate impact of Europe. Such research 
design would mean a great singularity of results. Any subsequent research design 
requires either a better identification of the EU template and defined trends within the 
EU template underlying the ‘top-down’ approach, or alternatively the 
conceptualisation of ‘europeanisation’ as a bottom-up process, in which the EU 
operates as an intervening variable. Further, ‘uncertainty’ and ‘credibility’ only exist 
in the context of eventual EU accession, a prospect that for the first-wave candidate 
countries accession was a certainty. Gate-keeping, benchmarking, and progress 
monitoring therefore seemed to be less determinate in a causal framework and 
subordinate to what was essentially a political decision (see also Grabbe and Hughes 
1998). This observation not only questions the importance of the effects associated 
with conditionality mechanisms, but also the overall applicability of conditionality 
tools over time.
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Finally, the question needs to be asked whether ‘europeanisation’ is so different for 
the candidate countries than for the member-states. The variation of European 
templates, the ongoing reform of the EU templates, and the ‘differential’ impact of 
Europe have been well documented for the member-states. Dyson and Goetz (2003, p. 
16) for instance comment that ‘EU legal frameworks, institutions and public policy 
have no absolute existence’. ‘Europeanisation’ studies have also adopted ‘bottom-up’ 
perspectives on analysing the domestic impact.
3. Narrowing down ‘Europeanisation’
The overview above is relatively negative in outlining the limitations of several 
approaches that study the impact of the EU. This section aims to more positive by 
demonstrating the analytical advantage of extending the ‘europeanisation’ literature to 
the CEECs. First, this extension involves a discussion on the current conceptualisation 
of process and effect in the ‘europeanisation’ literature and its applicability for the 
Czech Republic and Poland. In discussing how the ‘europeanisation’ literature could 
be extended, it is important to: 1. conceptualise ‘europeanisation’; 2. debate the 
mechanisms of ‘europeanisation’; 3. identify the motivations of actors in 
‘europeanisation’; and 4. conceptualise the impact of ‘europeanisation’. The section 
above had three main findings: 1. the importance of ‘degreeism’ and temporality in 
studying ‘europeanisation’; 2. the logic of focusing on the ‘difference’ or ‘specificity’ 
of institutions in the first-wave CEECs rather than the weakness; and 3. the limitations 
of conditionality tools.
3.1 Conceptualisation
This rapidly developing ‘Europeanisation’ literature attempts to describe not only 
different processes of member-state and EU interaction, but also a wide range of 
effects on the member-states and on European institutional development. Dyson and 
Goetz (2003, p. 13) list six main uses in literature for ‘europeanisation’: 1. institutions 
of governance developing at the EU level; 2. the export of EU models; 3. the 
achievement of political union; 4. domestic politics becoming subject of EU policy; 5.
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domestic politics using the EU to form strategic decisions; and 6. the effect of 
particular modes of EU governance on domestic politics. Featherstone (2003, p. 14) 
sees three levels of ‘europeanisation’ in literature: 1. in its relationship to 
globalisation; 2. institution-building at the EU level; and 3. the impact on the 
member-state. In all, this literature is quite diverse and falls short of a theoretical 
framework. It grows from complex interactions on various levels (sectoral, regional, 
national, and supra-national) between actors and institutions. Indeed, it poses several 
direct problems to the researcher. Problems with ‘concept-stretching’ have been 
prominent in many ‘europeanisation’ studies (see also Radaelli 2003). Further, as 
noted earlier, any research has to incorporate ‘degreeism’ and distinguish between 
‘europeanisation’ and ‘globalisation’.
First, it is necessary to distinguish between the process of European integration and 
the impact of integration on the member-state. European integration studies have 
limited capacity for explaining domestic adjustments. Studies saw new political 
opportunity structures developing in European integration that affected the 
distribution of power in terms of competences and resources within the European 
Union. Some saw a strengthening of the autonomy of the state (executive) in the case 
of intergovemmentalist analyses (for an overview Moravcsik 1999). Others saw the 
development of a European way of governance, which actively challenges national 
policy-making as featured in Bulmer (1997), the description of supra-national 
governance by Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1998), the view of the EU as a ‘regulatory 
state’ by Majone (1994), or the development of a multi-level style of governance 
through cooperation and coordination (Hooghe and Marks 2001; Kohler-Koch and 
Eising 1999; Goldsmith and Klausen 1998; Kohler-Koch et al 1998; Ansell, Parsons, 
and Darden 1997). In short, these studies did not provide a systematic analysis on the 
effect of Europe at the domestic level. Knill (2001, p. 12) notes that the pre­
occupation in these studies with the distribution of power between the domestic and 
European levels rather than the intra-domestic level is a major shortcoming.
The thesis here follows the logic that ‘europeanisation’ is first and foremost the study 
of the impact of the EU at the domestic level. This view of ‘europeanisation’ focuses 
on ‘downloading’ or the ‘reception’ of EU legal frameworks, institutional templates, 
and policy at the national level, rather than the process of European integration or
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‘uploading’. Most definitions follow this line. Meny, Muller, and Quermonne (1996) 
argue that the emergence of a bundle of common norms beyond the control of a single 
member-state creates a ‘permanent challenge to national political systems’. Borzel 
(1999, p. 574) defines ‘europeanisation’ as a ‘process’, by which domestic policy 
areas become increasingly subject to European policy-making.’ Radaelli (2000a, p. 3) 
points out that ‘common sense indicates that ‘europeanisation’ has something to do 
with the ‘penetration’ of the European dimension in national arenas of policy and 
politics.’ Ladrech (1994, p. 69) makes a further refinement in this definition of 
‘europeanisation’ as a process. Ladrech sees Europeanisation as ‘an incremental 
process re-orienting the shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic 
dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national politics and policy­
making.’
3.2 Mechanisms of ‘Europeanisation
3.2.a ‘Top-down’ and ‘Bottom-up’ Views
Within the conceptualisation of ‘europeanisation’ as ‘downloading’, there are two 
approaches to ‘europeanisation’. The ‘top-down’ way of looking at ‘europeanisation’ 
sees the relationship between the EU and national governments as a vertical 
hierarchical relationship, in which the member-states react to ‘adaptive pressure’ 
coming from above. These are institution-based views that emphasise institutional 
compliance of the member-states with EU requirements. The second approach is the 
‘bottom-up’ approach, whereby EU policy or templates are used strategically by 
actors at the domestic level (see for instance Hix and Goetz 2000) or affect the 
cognitive dimension of domestic actors. These actor-based views indicate that 
European integration changes the equilibria in the domestic opportunity structures or 
actors’ beliefs
An important analytical tool in the process of domestic adaptation in ‘top-down’ 
approaches is the notion of ‘inconvenience’, ‘misfit’, ‘mismatch’ or ‘goodness of fit’ 
(see e.g. Green Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse 2001; Borzel and Risse 2000; Borzel and 
Risse 2003; and Radaelli 2003). The basis for adaptation is an incompatibility 
between domestic policy or the institutional configuration and policy and institutional
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arrangements at the supra-national level. A lower compatibility will lead to a higher 
pressure at the domestic level to adapt (for this logic see Borzel and Risse 2003, p.
61). If this incompatibility does not exist, no adaptation is required. If the mismatch 
was too large, no adaptation would take place because domestic resistance would be 
too high. In this case, actors evade or resist adaptation (see Knill and Lenschow,
1998; Knill 2001).
The notion of ‘mismatch’ has evoked much response. Studies showed that ‘goodness 
of fit’ does not explain a whole range of voluntary adaptation, domestic adaptation 
independent of EU pressures, or adaptation when pressure was deemed to high for 
adaptation. This last case in the field of environmental policy is part of a comparative 
study by Haverland (1999) on the importance of institutional veto points in explaining 
adaptation.
In this context, approaches focusing on ‘mismatch’ have been expanded conceptually 
to see a ‘mismatch’ as a precondition for adaptation, but not solely as a predictor for 
the quality of adaptation. Green Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse (2001) link adaptation 
to the multiple veto points of the domestic opportunity structure, similar to Tsebelis 
(1995), mediating formal institutions, the differential empowerment of actors, and the 
existence of a cooperative culture (similar to Borzel 2002b). Steunenberg and 
Dimitrova (2000) point to the mediating factor of ‘national agreement’ in predicting 
cross-national convergence due to European pressures. Borzel and Risse (2003) 
differentiate between the conceptualisation of ‘europeanisation’ in rationalist and 
sociological perspectives. In rational choice accounts, veto points and formal 
institutions are mediating factors. In sociological accounts, ‘norm entrepreneurs’ and 
the political culture mediate domestic adaptation. Moreover, they state both forms of 
institutionalism often occur together in adaptation. Borzel (2002b, p. 27) also uses a 
mix of ‘agency’ and ‘structure’ approaches in her volume on the ‘europeanisation’ of 
the territorial administration in Germany and Spain, by modifying resource 
dependency theory into institution dependency. ‘Misfit’ views increasingly 
incorporate domestic institutional, cultural, and cognitive factors.
Bottom-up views have directly challenged the assumptions of ‘misfit’ analyses in 
terms of: a. the existence of a stable body of European Community legislation and
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policies; and b. the strictly vertical relationship between the supra-national and 
national levels. They focused on the evolution and variability of EU institutions and 
policies, and the influence of member-states through the uploading of preferences. For 
them, the EU is increasingly becoming a system, whereby the member-states often co­
operate on a horizontal level or where new pillars of European policy emerge, which 
Certain member-states can opt out of. Enlargement and institutional reform in the 
European Convention, in the shape of deepening and widening the institutional set-up, 
are likely to increase the diversity between the member-states and the breadth of 
coordination and cooperation. Indeed, tools of coordination and co-operation have 
evolved considerably to systems that are described as ‘softer’ forms of integration. 
Moreover, European Community legislation is often open to interpretation and the 
enforcement of this common law has also been variable. The ‘acquis communautaire’ 
is vague, evolving, and incomplete in various policy areas (see Heritier 2001c). The 
generalisation of EU law and policy as fixed downplays the various European 
institutions, which can affect the law and its enforcement as well as the national 
governments’ ability in ‘uploading’ national preferences10. Dyson and Goetz (2003, p. 
15) see the EU more as an ‘arena’ than a superior legislator.
Radaelli (2003, p. 51) argues that a ‘top-down’ perspective in ‘europeanisation can 
‘produce serious fallacies.. ..when its only aim is to find out domestic effects of 
independent variables defined at the EU level.’ He sees this as adopting a ‘chain of 
command’ style logic. Instead, he proposes an ‘inside-out’ and bottom-up 
conceptualisation of ‘europeanisation’, where the EU plays a role in the domestic 
choices made in policy reform or institutional adjustments. In several cases, ‘bottom- 
up’ studies have shown that domestic factors outweigh the European Union legal and 
policy constraints. Radaelli (2003), for instance, lists domestic regulatory competition 
as a stimulus to change. Kerwer and Teutsch (2001) acknowledge the ‘robust level’ of 
governance the EU provides, but for the liberalisation of road haulage seem to find 
that abandonment of policy traditions in Germany, France, and Italy had more to do
10 Kassim (2002, pg. 85-87) lists five factors in the variability of the EU templates in ‘downloading’: 1. 
the fluidity and evolving structure of the structure of the EU which is not built on a single treaty or 
vision; 2. the openness of policy processes and therefore the various sources which contribute to the 
policy agenda; 3. the institutional complexity of the EU and the lack of division of powers; 4. 
organisational density and institutional fragmentation or segmentation; 5. the variation of the EU 
between policy sectors and variations between policy sectors of distributive, re-distributive, and 
regulatory policy styles.
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with domestic factors as the European factors did not significantly curtail national 
policy-making autonomy.
Dyson and Goetz (2003, p. 15), in discussing bottom-up ‘europeanisation’, see this 
mechanism as a ‘circular’ dynamic, by which the national governments ‘upload’ 
preferences and ‘download’ laws and policies. Through ‘uploading’ of national 
institutional models and policy preferences, domestic actors shape the ‘misfits’ or 
create the ‘misfits’ at the domestic level. ‘Downloading’, though still separate in 
definition from ‘uploading,’ does not exist in isolation from ‘uploading’. This view is 
also given in Hix and Goetz (2000 p. 10). Their definition of ‘europeanisation’ means 
the ‘delegation of policy competences to the European level and the resulting political 
outcomes constrain domestic choices, reinforce certain policy and institutional 
developments, and provide a catalyst for change in others.’ Further, European 
integration means ‘the establishment of higher level governance provides new 
opportunities to exit from domestic constraints, either to promote certain policies, or 
to veto others, or to secure informational advantages.’ Domestic actors use the EU 
requirements and recommendations to shape the domestic opportunity structure.
Moreover, this ‘bottom-up’ approach does not only have a strategic dimension. A 
cognitive dimension also exists in the way domestic actors legitimate domestic 
reform. Page (2003, p. 166) lists mechanisms such as ‘imitation’, a more pro-active 
rather than coercive view on policy transfer, and polydiffusion, whereby ‘a variety of 
actors and institutions [are] involved in the transfer of ideas and cognitive practices in 
different ways’ as modes for ‘europeanisation’. These mechanisms are often 
associated with exchange between different policy communities at various levels 
within the EU.
In both the ‘top-down’ approach and the ‘bottom-up’ approaches, the debate centres 
on how to contextualise European effects. Is Europe merely an intervening variable in 
domestic processes as in bottom-up approaches? Is Europe as in ‘top-down’ views an 
independent variable affecting domestic adjustments? These represent somewhat 
contrasting views on whether ‘institution-based’ views or ‘actor-based’ views are 
more worthwhile in studying ‘europeanisation’ (for an overview see for instance 
Checkel 1999 or Knill and Lenschow 2001a). Any analysis has to take into account
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the importance of the European templates and factors such as domestic reform 
processes and institutions. Dyson and Goetz (2003) remark that ‘top-down’ 
approaches might be better suited for prescriptive EU templates. Knill and Lehmkuhl 
(1999) show this differentiation and identify three mechanisms of ‘europeanisation’:
1.‘positive integration’, which involves the ‘top-down’ downloading to the domestic 
level of EU institutional templates; 2.‘negative integration’, which is a more ‘bottom- 
up’ perspective whereby the EU changes the opportunities and constraints of the 
domestic actors and consequently their strategic options; and 3. ‘framing integration, 
which again is more a ‘bottom-up’ dynamic and involves the adjustment of beliefs 
and perceptions of domestic actors.
These mechanisms also speak to different theoretical approaches and ‘logics of 
behaviour’ in institutional analysis, the ‘logic of appropriateness’ in sociological 
institutionalist theories and ‘logic of consequentialism’ in rational choice accounts. 
Featherstone and Kazamias (2001) associate the ‘top-down’ approach of downloading 
institutional templates with an historical institutionalist approach (see Thelen and 
Steinmo 1992); ‘negative integration’ with multi-level bargaining and thus a rational 
choice perspective; and the ‘framing integration’ with a sociological institutional 
approach.
However, studies of ‘europeanisation’ have also combined different neo-institutional 
perspectives to build analytical models. Knill and Lenschow (2001a) show how 
different mechanisms and neo-institutional perspectives can be used next to each 
other and combined to analyse the process of ‘europeanisation’.
3.2.b Mechanisms in Candidate Countries: Using Institution-based and 
Actor-based Perspectives
How does this debate inform the study of ‘europeanisation’ in the Czech Republic and 
Poland? It is clear that for candidate countries, such as the Czech Republic and 
Poland, ‘europeanisation’ is first and foremost a ‘top-down’ process given the 
‘asymmetry of power’ between the EU institutions and the acceding countries and the 
focus on the adoption of the ‘acquis’ in the pre-accession period. The EU in 
negotiations tends to perform in a homogenous and prescriptive way aimed at
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institutional compliance. This process is very much in line with the mechanism of 
‘positive integration’ coined by Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999). The candidate countries 
can also not directly ‘upload’ preferences and therefore create or manipulate ‘misfits’. 
The nature of the EU challenge depends on the ‘misfit’ between the EU requirements 
and the domestic institutional configuration. This ‘misfit’ determines the adaptive 
pressure (see Borzel and Risse 2000; 2003). In this way, ‘misfits’ seem a precondition 
for analysing ‘europeanisation’ effects in the CEECs.
However, similar to the member-states, one can assume ‘misfits’ for the candidate 
countries are not absolute. In this research, this distinction plays out in sectoral policy. 
Different policies have different requirements, which inherently have different levels 
of specificity and can evolve over time. Also, as chapters 3 and 4 will show in more 
detail, a characteristic of the pre-accession process has been that the pre-accession 
templates have internalised domestic conditions. Policy reform within the EU has 
anticipated enlargement (see also Friis and Murphy 1999). Policy factors and 
temporal factors, associated with the pre-accession templates, have given domestic 
actors discretion in shaping outcomes in regional and agricultural policy.
These observations bring the following differentiation, which comes from the 
categorisation of mechanisms above in Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999). When actors have 
little discretion and EU requirements present a fundamental challenge to the domestic 
institutional set-up, ‘top-down’ perspectives taking an institution-based perspective 
might explain adaptation better. When actors have much institutional ‘discretion’ in 
shaping the administrative outcome or when the EU does not fundamentally challenge 
the domestic institutional set-up, adaptation can be better explained through ‘bottom- 
up’ perspectives with a more prominent role for domestic actors.
The approach used in this thesis, similar to Knill (2001), merges an historical 
institutionalist view (see Thelen and Steinmo 1992) with an agency-based approach. 
However, the approach differs from Knill (2001) on two main levels. First, the thesis 
does not use national administrative traditions as the macro-institutional context. 
Rather, the thesis refines this concept and focuses on the organisation of the executive 
and the institutional relationship between the national executive and sectoral actors. 
The organisation of the national executive set-up confines sectoral choices and indeed
42
the institutional position of sectoral actors. However, similar to Knill (2001, p. 60), 
the national executive organisation does not determine the form of sectoral adaptation. 
Various sectoral options are possible within the macro-institutional set-up. EU 
requirements that challenge the macro-institutional context or the organisation of the 
national executive challenge the core administrative structure of the state. There are 
two main reasons for refining Knill’s concept of administrative tradition. First, 
observations from the empirical evidence and literature (see for instance Hausner and 
Marody 2000) indicate that first and foremost the central state (or the core executive 
and specific line ministries) is the main architect of change and of adaptation to EU 
requirements. At this level, most interaction on the coordination and implementation 
set-up takes place. This point underlines the importance of the organisation of the 
executive as the main determinant in the administrative adaptation in the pre­
accession period. This approach is somewhat similar to studies that look at how the 
member-states coordinate and participate in EU decision-making (see for instance 
Kassim 2003). However, in this work the focus is clearly on implementation. 
Secondly, the concept of national administrative tradition is in some ways not easy to 
define or conceptualise. This seems especially the case in the post-communist 
countries, which have undergone a major transition in their respective institutional 
set-ups in the early 1990s. The newness or ongoing formation of administrative 
traditions in the post-communist candidate countries make the identification of core 
and sectoral administrative traditions and culture difficult and would lead us to an 
approach or observation that this chapter criticised earlier, namely institutional 
underdevelopment or administrative weakness. This seems especially the case in 
sectoral institutional arrangements, which developed quickly from the transition 
period to the pre-accession period. However, this observation is of course not the 
same as saying legacies and administrative traditions do not play a part in the 
organisation of the executive. In a sense, they are implicit in the structure of state 
administration.
Secondly, the approach acknowledges the importance of inherent policy factors and 
specific temporal factors in the pre-accession process, which mediate the 
‘prescription’ of the EU templates and consequently the pressure to adapt emanating 
from EU requirements. The analysis of such temporal factors is one of the main 
novelties in the analysis. Temporal and policy factors vary between the policy sectors.
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So, the presence of temporal and policy factors in the EU templates help determine 
how much discretion administrative actors have in shaping adaptation or whether the 
EU presents a core challenge to the domestic institutional set-up. ‘Discretion’ and the 
‘core challenge’ also determine the theoretical approach to ‘europeanisation’.
Moreover, another innovation in this work is the analysis of actors, not only at the 
domestic, but also at the European level. In chapter 4, the thesis discusses how 
European actors shape the pre-accession template. Though the thesis is not concerned 
with the process of European integration, the interaction between EU actors affects 
the process of ‘europeanisation’ in the candidate countries, in terms of the 
management of the pre-accession process, the building and the continuity of the pre­
accession templates, and the role in the management of the new member-states after 
accession.
In institution-based accounts, a level of predetermination is present. By hypothesising 
that adaptation occurs according to historically grown ‘paths’, this approach 
anticipates that institutional change will be limited. It can be expected that an 
exogenous process, such as European accession, would have limited effects on the 
national executive institutional set-up. Institutional adaptation will only be dramatic in 
cases of a sudden systemic change or collapse (see Krasner 1988). Thus, institution- 
based approaches have a weakness. They would not directly explain sectoral change, 
where the ‘adaptational requirements’ from the EU do not directly change or 
challenge the macro-institutional configuration (Knill 2001, p. 31). However, change 
and sometimes substantial institutional change can be observed, even when EU 
prescription is limited.
In this case, agency-based views would have to be used to explain sectoral changes. 
Institutional change, associated with agency-based ‘europeanisation’, comes from 
how actors use the EU requirements to shape the domestic opportunity structure. It 
describes not only how actors interacting in the domestic opportunity structure affect 
adaptation, but also how actors attempt to shape adaptation. The problem of actor- 
based approaches is that they tend to overestimate institutional adaptation, as they 
overlook the persistence or even presence of the wider or macro-institutional 
configuration. Their foci are on the gain of efficiency (Hall and Taylor 1996) or the
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gain of power in the domestic opportunity structure (Dunleavy 1991). Moreover, 
hypotheses-building in light of dynamic actor-based models is difficult, as preferences 
and strategies tend to vary and different environments occur over time. The easiest 
way to counter this analytical weakness of agency-based approaches is to start from a 
historical institutionalist perspective and determine the specific conditions under 
which agency-based accounts should be used in the analysis.
The differentiation between ‘agency’ and ‘structure’ also has consequences for the 
conceptualisation of institutions. The question is whether institutions function as an 
independent variable for institutional change in institution-based accounts (Thelen 
and Steinmo 1992; Pierson 1996), or whether institutions function more as an 
intervening or mediating variable in actor-based accounts (Schepsle and Weingast 
1989; North 1990).
3.3 Actors in ‘Europeanisation’
An analysis of ‘europeanisation’ incorporating an actor perspective also requires a 
generalisation on the motivation of actors. On the European level, actor behaviour in 
the Commission, Council, and member-states has to be seen in the context of 
enlargement. European actors will aim to keep the costs of enlargement low by: 1. 
tying in policy areas and institutional reform before accession (see for instance 
Mayhew 2003); and 2. preparing candidate countries in the pre-accession process. 
Further, the widening of the European Union, associated policy reform, and the 
evolution of the pre-accession process also mean a redistribution of competences 
among supra-national institutions and between supra-national institutions and 
member-states. Though this thesis is not directly concerned with the development of 
European institutions, these developments also affect the process of ‘europeanisation’ 
in the candidate countries in terms of the management of the pre-accession process, 
the continuity of the pre-accession templates, and the inclusion of the new member- 
states in EU institutions after accession.
At the domestic level, ‘europeanisation’ can produce a differential empowerment of 
actors (see for instance Green Cowles et al 2001, p. 229). Featherstone and Kazamias 
(2001, p. 17) noted both a cleavage between ‘traditionalists’ and ‘modernisers’ in
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their volume on Southern states and ‘diffused’ and ‘differentiated’ empowerment 
among domestic actors. This thesis takes a rational approach in light of the limitations 
of the ‘constructivist’ and ‘cognitive’ views listed in section 2.
It is important to determine the motivation of administrative actors. Following Scharf 
(1997, p. 64-65), administrative actors have a principal interest in maintaining 
institutional survival and expanding organisational capacities, influence and budget 
(see also Dunleavy 1991 on budget-enhancing behaviour). This statement has two 
components. First, administrative actors have an interest in maintaining their 
institutional position. Domestic actors will try to avert the ‘costs of adaptation’ 
associated with the European Union templates, which potentially shift resources and 
competences at the domestic level. It is logical to assume that these shifts affect 
foremost those actors that have resources and competences to lose. In a centralised 
state such as the Czech Republic and Poland, it is logical to assume that national 
executive actors will safeguard their institutional position and resist decentralisation 
of competences and resources (mostly implementation) associated with EU templates. 
Borzel (2002b) makes a similar point for regions in Spain and Germany, which faced 
a centralisation of ‘decision-making’ in EU regional policy. Here, the motivation of 
actors is synonymous with the persistence of the macro-institutional configuration. 
Borzel (2002b) calls such actor behaviour ‘institution-dependent’.
Secondly, actors can use the EU requirements and funds management opportunities to 
enhance their institutional position and shape the domestic opportunity structure. The 
reason why this dynamic is prevalent in these policy sectors is because: 1. EU policy 
templates do not always challenge the domestic polity; and 2. there is a willingness of 
actors to participate in EU funds given the opportunities in terms of financial 
resources, competences and legitimacy offered by the EU. EU funds management is 
likely to be accommodated in some way, rather than resisted. This second motivation 
is consistent with ‘bottom-up’ and ‘agency-based’ views.
46
3.4 The Impact of Europe on Public Administration
Finally, the thesis has to conceptualise the impact of the EU on domestic 
administration. This analysis, as stated earlier, takes place on the macro-institutional 
and sectoral levels. Measuring change in domestic institutions has three components. 
First, on a general level one has to establish whether cross-national and cross-sectoral 
convergence or divergence occurs. Secondly, one has to determine the specific degree 
of change. This involves determining whether administrative adjustments are sectoral 
or whether adjustments affect the macro-institutional configuration or executive 
structure. Third, one has to determine the stability or magnitude of this change. These 
last two points also speak to the need to establish sectoral changes often overlooked in 
‘institution-based’ accounts mentioned in 3.2.b. Finally, it is important to take into 
account different levels of investigation. Here, one needs to differentiate between 
‘projection’ and ‘reception’ in administrative effects.
First, the debate on impact often takes place between those seeing some form of 
‘convergence’ in domestic administrations, and those who emphasise the differential 
impact of Europe.
In terms of convergence, some authors argue that a commonality in the EU body of 
laws and policies could lead to a commonality in the national responses. Wessels and 
Rometsch (1996a; 1996b) refer to this cross-national institutional ‘fusion’ in national 
and supra-national bureaucracies. Radaelli (2000b) sees a possibility of 
‘isomorphism’ through policy transfer. Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) see policy transfer 
on: policy substance, structure and goals; institutions; ideas, ideology; and the policy 
framework and administration. This convergence has theoretical underpinnings. 
Dimaggio and Powell (1991) and Hall and Taylor (1996) indicate that institutions 
functioning in a similar environment should start to look alike after a while. Hall and 
Taylor (1996) argue this point from the perspective of ‘rational choice 
institutionalism’, whereby institutions operating in a similar environment would 
increasingly look alike out of efficiency and optimisation by the member-states. 
Dimaggio and Powell (1991) see a commonality in responses, from the application of 
new institutionalism on organisations. They see commonality through coercion and
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mimicry depending on ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ rules (also formal and informal institutions). 
Others, like Harmsen (1999), point to ‘socialisation’, whereby increased interaction 
between national actors leads to a commonality of outcomes.
However, theory and empirical evidence increasingly question the ‘convergence’ 
hypothesis. March and Olson (1989) argue based on ‘sociological institutionalism’ 
that organisations adapt to external pressures in terms of pre-existing structures and 
beliefs. They see this internalisation of rules and norms and their reproduction as the 
‘logic of appropriateness’. Historical institutionalism (see Thelen and Steinmo 1992, 
p. 9) comes to similar conclusions. Bulmer and Burch (1998) argue for the relevance 
of the domestic institutional ‘paths’ in the shaping of national coordination systems.
These theoretical perspectives have been integrated in empirical studies. The 
differential impact of the EU is apparent in various policy areas such as transport and 
the environment (Heritier et al 2001; Knill and Heritier 2000; Knill 2001; Borzel 
2002b). Peters et al (2000), in terms of coordination systems in the member-states, 
looked at ‘convergence’ of national responses operating in similar institutional 
environments. In their observations, the differences between national responses are 
pronounced, even though important similarities exist, mainly in the rules and routines 
of the national coordination of the EU policy process. They link this national 
differentiation to particular aspects of the domestic polity: ‘political opportunity 
structure’, ‘administrative opportunity structure’; and the choice of coordination 
(Kassim 2003, p. 103). Wright and Hayward (2000) look at different types and styles 
of coordination. Page (2003) concludes that there is no real evidence to suggest 
‘europeanisation’ equates to homogenisation, but rather emphasises ‘national filters’, 
such as path dependency, administrative philosophy, actor constellations and political 
interests. These factors produce variable national outcomes. Goetz (2003), in 
addressing the ‘fusion’ of Wessels and Rometsch (1996a) in the case of German 
bureaucracy, distinguishes between ‘administrative fusion’ and ‘governmental 
bifuracation’ based on the shaping of incentives by institutional opportunity structures 
and the dual nature of the executive.
Studies on ‘convergence’ and ‘differential impact’ are of course not mutually 
exclusive. Commonality can exist next to differential effects in a given country (see
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also Peters et al[2000]). However, it seems clear that using convergence as a working 
hypothesis11 is too narrow a way to look at the overall impact o f Europe.
Secondly, it is important to determine the degree of change. Borzel and Risse (2000, 
p. 10) identify three degrees of domestic change in the member-states; absorption; 
accommodation; and transformation. This distinction is similar to Heritier (2001) and 
Radaelli (2003). Absorption refers to an ability to incorporate European policies.
Here, the member-states adjust institutions without substantially modifying existing 
processes, policies, and institutions. Accommodation refers to the adaptation of 
policies and institutions without changing their essential features. For instance, one 
could place new institutions on existing ones without changing them (Heritier, 2001). 
Transformation refers to fundamentally changing existing policies, institutions, and 
processes by new ones.
Further, as Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2002b) point out, many studies have 
shown much change in domestic structures without focusing on the institutionalisation 
of EU rules and structures. This point refers to the magnitude or stability of 
institutional change.
Finally, there is a difference between studies looking at the interaction between 
domestic administration and the supra-national level or ‘projection’ of national 
preferences (Wessels and Rometsch 1996a; Page and Wouters 1995) and those studies 
looking at policy implementation and domestic administrative compliance or 
‘reception’ (Knill 2001).
This last paragraph is important for studies looking East. The candidate countries are 
almost uniquely ‘policy-takers’ in the pre-accession period. The differentiation 
between ‘projection’ and ‘reception’ also underlines a wider gap in the literature.
With the exception of Knill (2001) and Borzel (2002b), few studies have developed 
an analytical and theoretical model to analyse the impact of Europe on domestic 
administration and in particular implementation and ‘reception’. Where analytical
11 Mair and Zielonka (2002) have suggested this working hypothesis for the candidate countries.
models exist as with Borzel and Risse (2003), empirical evidence on administrative 
adaptation has been scarce.
4. Contribution to the Literature
This research makes two main contributions to the literature. First, it is one of the first 
studies to apply systematically a ‘europeanisation’ perspective to the Eastern 
enlargement. There is a growing literature analysing the impact of Europe in the 
CEECs. However, as indicated in section 2, studies have suffered from several 
conceptual limitations. Moreover, empirical evidence has been limited. In this way, 
the thesis will contribute to extending ‘europeanisation East’ and hope to produce a 
better conceptualisation of the EU pre-accession process and domestic factors 
mediating the impact of the EU. On the EU level, such analysis requires a 
specification of the mechanisms of ‘europeanisation’.
Extending ‘europeanisation East’ also involves asking questions whether the fact 
these countries are not yet member-states limits or enhances domestic adaptation of 
EU templates. This analysis also includes whether domestic actors see the EU as an 
enabling constraint for domestic reform or whether for domestic actors EU 
membership is becoming a topic of contestation.
Secondly, the thesis will contribute to ‘europeanisation’ literature by showing how 
Europe interacts with the first-wave post-communist candidate countries. This 
interaction is not with countries with a weak institutional configuration, but with 
countries with a specific institutional set-up. This configuration shows similarities and 
differences with those of core member-states, Nordic member-states, and Southern 
member-states. This interaction will allow us to reflect on the future development of 
the process of European integration and differences in ‘europeanisation’ experiences 
between groups of member-states.
A final aim is to reduce the ‘exceptionalism’ attached to the post-communist 
candidate countries. By focusing on transition, the institutional weakness of the 
candidate countries, and the conditional nature of the pre-accession process, some
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studies seem to preclude that it is difficult to compare the candidate countries with the 
member-states. However, the future of the study of the CEECs is within a 
comparative analysis that shows the differences and commonalities between the 
member-states and the candidate countries. The final discussion centres on whether 
these candidate countries make up a new ‘world of europeanisation’ (for an overview 
of th e ‘four worlds of europeanisation’ see Goetz 2002b).
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Chapter 3: Theory and Methodology
This chapter will set out the analytical framework based on the questions posed in 
section 2 of the introduction.
1. Analytical Framework
1.1 Introduction
The analytical framework in this thesis is based on Knill’s (2001) framework with 
some important modifications. Knill in his analysis of the ‘europeanisation’ of 
national administrations looks at the effects of Europe on both administrative 
structure and policy style. He looks at specific regulatory policy areas, which have an 
administrative impact or implications for the domestic administrative organisation. 
The effects he finds are then linked back to explanatory mechanisms (see Knill 2001, 
p 201-212). Knill concludes that sectoral ‘fits’ and ‘misfits’ are not sufficient to 
explain domestic adaptation. Any sectoral change should be seen in the context of 
core administrative traditions. Where sectoral adjustments challenge these core 
traditions, domestic sectoral arrangements are likely to persist. The reverse is also 
true. This is by and large a neo-institutionalist approach. Furthermore, for the cases 
that he cannot easily explain within this framework, he proposes a dynamic view with 
two components. The first is possible ongoing reform of the state administration, 
which would alter the challenge of the EU to the core administrative traditions, as 
they are subject to change. A second component is the role of sectoral actors, be it 
administrative actors, political actors, or sectoral lobby groups, whose preferences 
might have changed. Their actions can produce sectoral adaptation, even when one 
would not expect it (for instance in the case, where the EU template challenges core 
administrative traditions).
This thesis makes two important modifications to this framework. First, this thesis, 
similar to Knill, finds that sectoral ‘fits’ or ‘misfits’ do no adequately explain the 
observed institutional adaptation and the differences between countries and policy
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sectors. Secondly, the incentive of EU funds does not explain sectoral adaptation 
either. For similar incentives, institutional patterns in these policy sectors and 
countries vary. Especially, sectoral institutional resistance is hard to explain in light of 
the incentive of EU funds. Therefore, sectoral changes should be placed in a macro- 
institutional context. The research does not use the concept of administrative 
traditions like Knill. For reasons explained in section 3.2.c of chapter 2, the thesis 
uses the organisation of the national executive as the macro-institutional context. By 
the organisation of the executive or the macro-institutional configuration, I mean the 
organisation of the national executive on both horizontal and vertical levels. Section 2 
in this chapter will elaborate on the definition of the organisation of the executive and 
the characteristics of the executive structure in the Czech Republic and Poland. It is 
important to distinguish between the macro-institutional context and sectoral 
institutional arrangements. It is possible that different sectoral institutional 
adjustments are accommodated within this macro-institutional context. Consequently, 
sectoral adjustments do not necessarily imply a challenge to the macro-institutional 
context, as long as they are within a range permitted by the macro-institutional 
context. This is a slight modification of Knill’s framework.
A second modification is a closer analysis of the EU templates. The strength of the 
EU challenge depends on the level of prescription by the EU in its policy templates 
and secondly the incompatibility of such prescription with the domestic institutional 
configuration. Importantly, this analysis also incorporates how EU actors shape the 
EU templates (see chapter 4). Section 3 in this chapter will elaborate on the analysis 
of the EU templates and how temporal and policy factors shape the incompatibilities 
in these policy areas and countries. A differentiation in the level of incompatibility 
also leads to a differentiation in the mechanisms of ‘europeanisation’. This research 
acknowledges the different mechanisms of ‘europeanisation’, outlined by Knill and 
Lehmkuhl (1999). I distinguish between three dynamics in institutional change with 
particular explanatory capacity: 1. a fundamental EU challenge to the domestic 
macro-institutional set-up; 2. a moderate EU challenge to the domestic macro- 
institutional set-up; and 3. the absence of a challenge to a domestic macro- 
institutional configuration. In a fundamental ‘misfit between the domestic 
configuration and the EU template, domestic sectoral adaptation to the EU template 
can challenge the macro-institutional context. In a moderate misfit, the EU challenge
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pertains mostly to sectoral institutional arrangements. This potential sectoral 
adaptation does not directly affect the macro-institutional context. In this dynamic, the 
incentive of EU funds implementation plays a role in actor behaviour. Finally, in 
some cases, the EU template provides no challenge at all.
Further, I propose, similar to Knill (2001), to look at institutional change through 
different levels of explanatory abstraction. By this, I mean that the explanatory 
capacity of the first two dynamics, which are applicable to this research, can be 
enhanced. I propose to do this, by looking at two main subsections of the first two 
dynamics listed above: 1. domestic reform ongoing in the candidate country; and 2. 
the evolution of the EU templates after the pre-accession period. These subsections 
are important in linking the full extent of the empirical evidence presented in 
subsequent chapters to the theoretical framework.
1.2 Three Dynamics of Institutional Change
1.2.a A Fundamental Challenge to the Domestic Institutional 
Configuration
A challenge to the macro-institutional set-up foremost indicates that the EU prescribes 
a policy template with administrative requirements to the candidate countries. 
Secondly, this EU drive towards sectoral institutional compliance in the policy areas 
shows incompatibilities with the domestic configuration, in particular with the 
organisation of the national executive. This approach is an institution-based account 
using the ‘goodness of fit’ hypothesis. ‘Misfits’ produce adaptive pressure, which is 
resisted or accommodated to varying degrees at the domestic level. The concept of a 
‘misfit’ operates under the assumption: the greater the ‘misfit’, the greater the 
potential for institutional change at the domestic level (see Borzel and Risse 2003). In 
a fundamental challenge to the domestic institutional configuration, it is likely that a 
redistribution of competences and resources would be resisted (institutional positions 
are maintained). Institutional change and sectoral adaptation would be limited, 
accommodated in a limited way on the sectoral level, or isolated within the existing 
macro-institutional set-up. On the whole, the executive set-up and the sectoral
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institutional arrangements would persist. This analysis will look at patterns of 
resistance and domestic retrenchment in light of EU challenges. Such patterns of 
resistance could also be shaped by the presence of specific veto players and 
facilitating formal institutions (see Green Cowles et al 2001, p. 226).
1.2.b A Moderate Challenge to the Domestic Institutional Configuration
Secondly, the EU’s ability to prescribe varies between policy areas and over time in 
the pre-accession period. A ‘misfit’ therefore is not an absolute concept with
1
continuous clear ‘prescriptive’ properties as noted in Dyson and Goetz (2003, p. 16). 
As sections 3.2 and 3.3 in this chapter will show, there are inherent policy and 
temporal factors in the EU templates in these policy areas. Temporal factors refer to 
the process of incorporation of specific domestic conditions in the ‘top-down’ EU 
approaches of the pre-accession process in the EU templates.
In a moderate ‘misfit’, the key point is that in terms of the ‘misfit’ between the EU 
template and the domestic institutional set-up and the consequent adaptive pressure on 
the candidate countries, the sectoral institutional changes required by the EU are in 
the range permitted by the national executive structure. The EU template in this case 
is less likely to challenge the macro-institutional configuration, governing sectoral 
policy implementation and coordination.
What does this mean for the theoretical framework? In the most extreme cases, where 
both temporal and policy factors mean substantial institutional discretion, the EU 
challenge to the macro-institutional context would largely dissipate. In these cases, 
institution-based accounts would predict little change on the macro-institutional level. 
However, this approach might fail to capture important sectoral institutional change, 
such as changes in sectoral administration and the type of intervention. In order to 
escape institutional determinism, it is necessary to complement institution-based
12 In line with this view on ‘misfit’, David Hudson, a European Commission official, acknowledges 
that for the candidate countries the European Commission might comment on, influence and monitor 
the national choice, but the EC often does not want to mandate this choice in the determination of the 
implementation agencies or policy coordination (Interview with David Hudson: Brussels, August 29 
2001).
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views with approaches focusing on domestic actors and in particular on how domestic 
actors use EU requirements and opportunities from the bottom-up.
The prospect of sectoral institutional change is strengthened by the basic willingness 
at the domestic level to participate in and absorb EU funds, given the wider benefits 
of EU funds. Both EU actors and certain domestic political and administrative actors 
have a rational interest in ensuring that absorption of funds occurs. In this sense, 
domestic support in specific actor groups in the domestic constellation is important in 
determining whether institutional change occurs. Sectoral actors extend beyond 
administrative actors and include the beneficiaries of EU funds and interest groups. 
Section 4 in this chapter will elaborate on the motivation of actors.
The next question is what shape institutional change is likely to take. In promoting 
absorption from both the EU and domestic perspective in the pre-accession period, 
‘administration-building’ was often more important than ‘administrative compliance’. 
‘Capacity’ as determined by the resources and competences of administrative actors 
was the main factor in how actors could take advantage of EU funds opportunities 
(similar to Borzel 2002b, p. 32) and shape the domestic opportunity structure. Mostly, 
actors with ‘capacity’ would aim to maintain and strengthen their respective 
institutional positions through the management of EU funds. Section 5 in this chapter 
will discuss the degree and magnitude of institutional change.
1.2.c A Low Challenge to the Domestic Institutional Configuration
In the case of a low challenge to the domestic institutional configuration, the EU 
template does not require changes in either the macro-institutional or the sectoral 
institutional arrangements. The reason for this could be that the EU procedures are 
easily absorbed within the domestic arrangements, or that the EU does not have a 
distinct template and allows national practices to persist.
In this case, the EU reinforces the executive structure and the sectoral arrangements of 
the candidate country. The main effects of ‘europeanisation’ in this dynamic relate to 
the impact of ‘europeanisation’ on the beliefs and knowledge of domestic actors.
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It is important to note that this category does not appear in this research. The research 
argues that in both policy areas a fundamental to moderate challenge exists between 
the EU templates and the institutional configurations of the candidate countries.
1.3 Explanatory Subsections
1.3.a Domestic Reform
The first explanatory subsection differentiates between reform of the national 
executive structure and sectoral reform. As stated earlier, the macro-institutional 
context limits sectoral outcomes. However, as the case of agricultural reform in the 
Czech Republic shows, sectoral outcomes can take on several forms within this 
context.
A Challenge to a Domestic Institutional Configuration undergoing Endogenous Macro- 
institutional Reform
First, it is important to consider the pattern of institutional change in the context of 
ongoing endogenous administrative reform of the executive structure. Endogenous 
reform here is used to explain institutional change of the executive structure that can 
not be accounted for in ‘europeanisation’-based perspectives. This statement could 
refer to two types of change processes. First, administrative reform could explain 
change in the executive structure, where ‘europeanisation’-based accounts would only 
expect limited change. This would be the case in a fundamental ‘misfit’. Ongoing 
reforms of the executive structure can alter the ‘misfit’ and the nature of adaptation 
pressure. On the other hand, a lower prevalence of endogenous reform in the 
executive structure obviously indicates a more stable domestic institutional 
configuration. This could strengthen institutional resistance.
Secondly, ongoing endogenous reform of the executive structure could explain a 
change in the macro-institutional context, where ‘europeanisation’-based accounts 
would only expect a change in sectoral institutional arrangements or no institutional 
change at all. This would be the case with a ‘moderate misfit’. An example is the
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reform of the executive structure in Poland, which started in 1996-1997 and was 
continued by the government of Leszek Miller in 2001.
Sectoral Institutional Change in the Case of a Fundamental Challenge
Third, a fundamental challenge to the macro-institutional context does not mean 
sectoral institutional change cannot occur. This seems especially the case when 
endogenous sectoral institutional change preceeds the challenge posed by the EU 
templates. As stated earlier, it seems several forms of institutional arrangements are 
possible within the executive set-up. Such reform could also offer new opportunities 
to interest groups. However, similar to Knill (2001, p. 208), this observation does not 
indicate that sectoral changes lead to changes in the executive set-up over time. In 
fact, such sectoral institutional change could strengthen the executive set-up. Czech 
agriculture will be the example in this research.
1.3.b A Variation in the EU Challenge over Time
Fourth, as indicated earlier and stated in studies on the pre-accession period (see 
Grabbe 2003; Lippert et al 2001), the temporal factor is important in determining the 
EU challenge and consequent pressure to adapt at the domestic level. The temporal 
factor, indicated in section 3.3, is different from the policy factor in mediating the EU 
pressure to adapt. The policy factor is inherent in the EU ‘acquis’, whereas the 
temporal factor by definition is variable over time. Of course, the policy factor can 
change, as the ‘acquis’ changes. However, the temporal factor, in terms of the 
transition periods and the continuity of the pre-accession template, has more 
determinate and predictable timelines.
Considering that temporal factors in the pre-accession period have been incorporated 
in the dynamics listed above, temporality here refers to changes or possible changes to 
the EU template after accession. These future changes, though sometimes speculative, 
could have two consequences. First, in institution-based accounts, they could mediate 
or strengthen the ‘misfit’. Further, in actor-based accounts, possible changes in the 
EU template allow for domestic actors to look at future developments strategically.
58
Actors can anticipate how they would use EU requirements and opportunities in the 
future.
2. Domestic Institutional Arrangements
In expanding the framework, it is first necessary to talk about domestic institutional 
arrangements. The domestic institutional configuration and institutional patterns to 
emerge from the configuration determine ‘europeanisation’ in two basic ways. First, 
the institutional configuration will in ‘top-down’ institution-based ‘europeanisation’ 
determine the degree of ‘misfit’ with EU requirements and templates. Secondly, the 
domestic institutions in terms of administrative procedures, the constitution, 
budgetary rules, and legal norms will determine the ability of domestic administrative 
actors to take advantage of the opportunities and EU requirements to shape the 
domestic polity. This point is also made in Borzel (2002a). For instance in centralised 
states, regions will have less capacity (resources and competences) to exploit funds 
opportunities. As stated earlier, capacity was of importance both to the domestic and 
European actors. There can in other words be a link between an institutional position 
and the capacity to act. First, it is of importance elaborate on the macro-institutional 
configuration, introduced in section 1. A subsequent section will show how these 
determinants differ between countries and policy sectors over time.
2.1. Institutional Determinants
This work takes the organisation of the national executive or the relationship between 
the national executive and sectoral actors as the core macro-institutional context. I 
identify two dimensions of institutional arrangements that define this context: 1. the 
level of horizontal centralisation in the executive; and 2. level of vertical 
centralisation in the national executive and territorial administration. Horizontal 
centralisation has two aspects, the degree of segmentation within administration and 
the degree of coordination in the core executive. Segmentation can exist between 
special purpose administration such as foundations and government agencies in the 
policy sectors, on one hand, and the core executive, line ministries and regions, on the 
other. Segmentation could not only potentially fragment policy implementation, but
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reduce the core executive’s capacity to coordinate. The level of horizontal 
decentralisation also varies between the types of specialist administration. For 
instance, government agencies often have a close ministerial linkage, whereas 
foundations do not (see Hausner and Marody 2000). The degree of coordination here 
means the ability of the core executive to coordinate policy and sectoral actors and 
allocate implementation competences. Vertical decentralisation encompasses how 
regional bodies, both state administration and regional development agencies, are 
integrated in the executive, and also the institutional relationship between the 
executive and regional and local self-government.
2.2 Variation between the Czech Republic and Poland
Between Poland and the Czech Republic, there are similarities in the institutional set­
up of the executive, which emerged after transition in the early 1990s. Both countries 
from transition onwards had vertically centralised but horizontally decentralised 
executives. However, Poland in 1996 developed a stronger coordination role for the 
core executive. This development led to differences between the countries in the 
institutional patterns of executive coordination and implementation.
In looking at coordination, the post-1996 development of formal coordination at the
core executive level or in inter-ministerial bodies in Poland allows for a more stable
allocation and delineation of competences in the executive. This reform was a
response to the need to raise administrative effectiveness, but also to reduce the
correlation between intra- and inter-political splits and executive coordination
(Szlachta 1999). In Poland, this centralising tendency is also due to the growing
importance of the position of Prime Minister in the executive (see for instance Zubek
2001). In the Czech Republic, more informal coordination arrangements exist,
whereby ministries have discretion in determining their competences and allocation of
resources. This informality produced a segmented coordinative culture, where policy
coordination was driven by the respective ministries, with limited central direction
1 ^and information exchange between departments . Reform was limited. In 1998, the 
Zeman government introduced a new Deputy Prime Minister, who would oversee the
13 This weakness of linkage was also noted in Goetz and Margetts (1999). They describe core 
executives in the CEECs as ‘solitary centres’.
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coordination of efforts to prepare the Czech Republic for EU membership. This post, 
close to the Prime Minister, was quickly abandoned in favour of a structure, in which 
the Foreign Minister again coordinated overall relations with the EU and a Deputy 
Finance Minister was the contact point for financial assistance. The elevation of the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Finance to Deputy Prime Ministers 
again emphasised ministerial autonomy.
The institutional patterns of implementation in the Czech Republic and Poland 
followed the difference in the ability of the core executive to coordinate in respective 
countries. After 1996, Poland saw a push towards ‘consolidation * of strategically 
important administrative implementation responsibilities close to the core executive 
and associated line ministries and agencies. In the Czech Republic, the pattern 
remained a ‘sectoralisation ’, whereby administrative implementation was conducted 
by national administrative actors, such as line ministries and central agencies. 
Implementation tasks in the absence of formal coordination were often contested 
between national executive actors.
However, several factors affect the capacity to coordinate. First, Kassim (2003) notes 
that non-majoritarian governments, such as in Poland and the Czech Republic, 
produce less ‘positive coordination’ in state administration. The prevalence of 
coalition governments and the frequency of political turnover in both the Czech 
Republic and Poland can affect the stability of the alignment of competences and the 
distribution of resources by decreasing the capacity of the Prime Minister and the core 
executive to coordinate in the cabinet. Secondly, the ability of the executive to control 
the legislature through political management affects coordination of policy. For 
instance, splits within the parliamentary caucus of the AWS in 1997 in Poland and 
between this caucus and the executive meant that the position of government was 
weak and policy-setting occurred in parliament. Third, interest group mediation was 
important in particular policy areas such as agriculture. In Poland, agricultural lobby 
groups were highly effective in determining intervention policy, which undermined 
the ability of the core executive to coordinate development and intervention policy. 
Fourth, a semi-presidential system as in Poland meant a sharing of certain 
coordinative powers in defence and foreign policy between the Prime Minister and 
President. Cohabitation made such sharing more challenging.
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Further, the segmentation within administrations is relevant in determining the 
horizontal organisation of the domestic administration. After transition, both Poland 
and the Czech Republic relied on special purpose administrations. Such 
administrations provided ‘specialised administrative capacity’14 in these countries and 
led to an additional fragmentation in the executive set-up.15 Special purpose 
administrations have been seen both as a product of the politicisation of state 
administration (see for instance Goetz and Wollman 2001) and an attempt to escape 
the politically influenced state administration as in the Czech Republic (Interview 
with Ctibor Kocman Prague: April 23 2002) (see Goetz and Wollman 2001 ).16 This 
point indicates that differences exist in the extent of segmentation of these 
foundations.
Territorial decentralisation, given the fact the Czech Republic and Poland have a 
traditionally centrist unitary political and administrative culture, has meant a low level 
of cooperation and sharing of competences between the regional level and central 
state. Moreover, in both countries there was no clear delineated allocation of 
competences and resources to the regions. Regions in the Czech Republic had been 
disbanded at the time of transition. In Poland, regions were maintained, but were 
extensions of state administration. Though in both countries there existed a stipulation 
in the respective constitutions on regionalisation, reform at he time of transition had 
focused on municipalities and reforming state administration at district levels. This 
regional vacuum in both countries meant a greater role in regional policy for the 
national executive through ministries and a proliferation of government agencies and 
foundations at the regional level. Though regional reforms in Poland and the Czech 
Republic in 1998 and 1997 respectively were a fulfilment of the respective 
constitutions, they provided limited actual decentralisation of decision-making, 
implementation, and budgetary resources.
14 Their competences primarily centred around: a. the management of economic transformation 
stemming from transition; b. the promotion and economic development; c. management of external 
funds; and d. the minimisation of social costs on societal groups stemming from this economic 
transformation.
15 Hausner and Marody (2000) refer to these as an element in the development of ‘quasi-govemment’.
16 This independence often meant that staff members of special purpose administration were not subject 
to civil service law.
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In conclusion, the main variance between the Czech Republic and Poland, given that 
both are centralised states, lies in the organisation of the national executive, in 
particular the organisation of the core executive and its ability to coordinate policy 
and sectoral actors.
2.3 Sectoral Variations in Regional and Agricultural Policy
In regional development policy in both countries, regional policy was part of national 
industrial policy. Intervention was planned and coordinated at the national level with 
little regional input or consultation. Implementation was scattered in various regional 
and national bodies across territorial administration. The main difference in 
implementation post-1995 was the ‘sectoralisation’ of implementation in the Czech 
Republic and the ‘consolidation’ in Poland.
In agricultural policy, there were fundamental differences in the institutional set-up 
between Poland and the Czech Republic. These differences reflected the different 
structural issues that existed at the time of transition. Poland had an extensive and 
cosdy interventionist policy with formalised interest mediation. This policy resulted 
in several agencies being formed to administer intervention. These agencies have a 
large degree of institutional autonomy in the executive set-up. This autonomy also led 
to these agencies being politicised (see Jablonski 2000), given the political salience of 
agricultural policy. Moreover, farmers’ groups were formally consulted in 
intervention conducted by the agencies. Intervention was often ad hoc. These 
arrangements decreased the ability of the core executive to coordinate or consolidate 
implementation in the agricultural sector. In the Czech Republic, a liberal agricultural 
policy meant a less extensive interventionist policy and less decentralisation in the 
executive institutional set-up.
3. Mechanisms of ‘Europeanisation’ over Time
The second modification to Knill’s (2001) framework, developed in this thesis, is a 
close analysis of EU templates. The question is how mechanisms of ‘europeanisation’ 
can be linked to clear EU templates and ‘prescription’. Here it is necessary to look at
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the mechanisms in regional and agricultural policy more closely, at how the pre­
accession period affected such templates, and at the evolution of the templates over 
time.
3.1 Mechanisms of ‘Europeanisation’
On a modal level, the main mechanisms of ‘europeanisation’ in the pre-accession 
period in regional and agricultural policy are: 1. the ‘downloading’ of programming 
and policy templates; and 2. the allocation of resources in pre-accession funding. 
Downloading of EU templates consists of: a. the adoption at the national level of the 
‘acquis’ and operational templates governing management and payment functions; 
and b. the benchmarking and monitoring at the European Commission level and inter- 
institutional level to make sure that the domestic administration follows EU 
procedures and regulations. Secondly, the EU affects the national distribution of 
resources through the allocation of funds.17 The EU controls the substance and 
direction of the distribution of resources.18
Control over programming at the EU level resides in: 1. the ex-ante standards and 
regulations, 2. ex-ante, rolling, and ex-post evaluations and monitoring; and 3. 
substance and direction of resources. These points refer to the three main tools of 
procedural control in EU programming: approval; monitoring; and audit and financial 
control.
3.2 EU Challenges to the Domestic Institutional Configuration
The EU, through ‘downloading’ and the allocation of resources, challenges the 
sectoral institutional arrangements in both policy sectors. However, even though in all 
cases presented in this research sectoral ‘misfits’ are high and similar, different 
patterns of institutional adaptation emerge. On a further level of analysis, this thesis
17 It is clear that the allocation of resources is conditional on the domestic administration adopting EU 
templates and gaining positive evaluations through monitoring and accreditation. However, I 
differentiate between these factors, as accreditation alone does not determine the specific targeting, 
overall direction, and degree of resources allocated.
18 This refers to overall direction per instrument. National governments through the drafting of the 
National Development Plan have some discretion on funding per priority axis.
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has to look at the challenge that potential sectoral adjustment to EU templates might 
pose to the macro-institutional configuration. These challenges seem to exist for the 
Czech Republic and Poland in both policy areas. The adoption of a re-distributive EU 
regional policy implies: 1. a decentralised implementation according to NUTS 
requirements; and 2. a specific national implementation administration and domestic 
resources to coordinate, manage and draft regional policy (and eventually Structural 
Funds). For agriculture, the adoption of CAP and SAPARD type intervention mean:
1. the formation of ‘specific administration’ at the national level to initially implement 
and coordinate rural development and later direct payments (and IACS), market 
intervention, and associated veterinary and phytosanitary regulations; 2. the transfer 
of competences to the European Commission.
3.3 Policy and Temporal Aspects to ‘Europeanisation9 Mechanisms
However, the EU templates are not absolute. This thesis establishes two categories of 
mediating factors in the EU templates towards the candidate countries: 1. the 
differences between policy sectors; and 2. the evolution of the pre-accession template 
over time. These factors show that for regional policy, the challenge to the macro- 
institutional configuration can be mediated. This places EU regional policy pressures 
in the ‘moderate challenge to the domestic institutional configuration’ category. 
Adoption of agricultural policy constitutes a more ‘fundamental challenge’.
3.3.a Policy Factors
On point 1, there are three main policy factors in regional and agricultural policy 
templates:
1. the density and clarity of the ‘acquis’ in the given policy sector19;
2. the fact whether the policy is beneficiary-oriented20 in terms of the specificity 
of procedures;
3. whether template is cross-sectoral or confined to one sector;
19 Jacoby (2002) lists the density of the ‘acquis’ as a factor in how elites in the CEECs attempt to 
emulate EU policy.
20 By beneficiaries, I mean parties outside of the central and regional state administration such as 
municipalities, farmers, railways, and companies among others.
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Comparing agricultural policy and regional policy according to this categorisation 
shows a great deal more discretion in shaping administrative outcomes at the domestic 
level in regional policy than in agricultural policy. The agricultural ‘acquis’ compared 
to the regional policy ‘acquis’ is considerably denser. This density means procedures 
and regulation will be more specific and more extensive. Higher density will mean 
less domestic discretion to shape administration. Further, a beneficiary-oriented 
programme will have more specific procedures on management and payment, because 
of the European Commission’s focus on efficiency and effectiveness in programming. 
As beneficiaries are more atomised as in agricultural policy, the EU procedures also 
tend to be more dense and extensive. Third, a cross-sectoral programme implies a 
greater number of administrative actors involved both at the European level and 
within the domestic administration. In a cross-sectoral policy environment such as 
regional policy, the template would be less specific and more diverse with different 
stakeholders and implementation possibilities than agricultural policy, which is 
largely confined to one sector. This diversity would again increase the domestic 
discretion to shape the administrative outcomes.
3.3.b Temporal Factors
Secondly temporal factors mediate the EU challenge. The pre-accession templates had 
a dual focus: 1. administration-building; and 2. administrative compliance. This 
duality indicates a potential for a clash of priorities. In certain cases, the European 
Commission and its Delegations in the candidate countries sought less to address 
compliance in administrative structure and policy, but rather boost the domestic 
administrative capacity or the efficiency of absorption and implementation. As 
accession neared, ‘administration-building’ often meant relying on administration in 
the candidate countries that had expertise and capacity to implement (Interview with 
Etienne Claeye: Brussels, October 25 2001). This could change the challenge the EU 
poses the domestic institutional configuration.
There are two temporal factors in the EU templates:
4. the transition periods and other transitional measures;
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5. continuity of the pre-accession template.
Transition periods mostly occur where the ‘acquis’ is dense as in agricultural policy. 
Derogations allow EU actors to tie in EU policy and to strategically give some 
domestic discretion in the administrative organisation and policy adaptation. 
Transition periods are part of the enlargement bargain. Transitional measures weaken 
the EU policy templates for a specific time, as in for instance the direct payments of 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In the transition period, domestic discretion 
in the shaping of the management of a policy sector increases. Continuity stresses 
both the procedural links of the pre-accession template with the ‘acquis’ and the 
variability of the EU pre-accession template in the pre-accession period. Lack of 
continuity is associated with less specific and clear policy requirements, as in regional 
policy. Reforms of the EU templates and redirections of EU resources tend to be more 
frequent. This frequency also reflected the freedom of the European Commission to 
promote absorption and focus less on administrative compliance. Lack of continuity 
means more domestic discretion in shaping the domestic administrative outcomes. As 
chapter 4 will show, ‘continuity’ in the pre-accession period affected the EU regional 
policy template.
It is important to note that, due to the large degree of homogenisation of the accession 
process by the EU institutions (see for instance Rowinski in Hunek and Rowinski 
2000), most temporal factors are the same for Poland and the Czech Republic across 
policy areas.
3.3.c Stages in the Pre-accession Process
While looking at temporal factors in the EU mechanisms, it is useful to identify 
different stages in the pre-accession process. Lippert et al (2001) identify 5 periods of 
different EU foci with regard to the candidate countries in CEE. I propose three 
phases in this thesis: 1. the early pre-accession period, where the initial contacts were 
made and the pre-accession aid had the purpose to aid the transition to democracy and 
a market economy (1992-1996); 2. the pre-accession period, where the negotiations of 
accession started and pre-accession aid became acquis-based (1997-2002); 3. the early 
accession period (2003-), where the negotiations finished and pre-accession
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instruments were remodelled to accommodate Structural Funds and agricultural 
payments. This research, as it concerns the pre-accession period, deals mainly with 
the second period.
These periods reflect the changes in the prioritisation within European administration. 
The internalisation of enlargement among the EU actors occurred on two concurrent 
levels: 1. the reform of the EU pre-accession templates; and 2. the reform of EU 
policy and institutions. It is important to stress the concurrent nature of internal 
reform and the reform of the pre-accession templates, because otherwise an additional 
temporal variance would exist within this research. In regional policy, PHARE reform 
was synchronised with the reform of Structural Funds. However, the legacy of 
PHARE as an aid instrument administered by the Directorate-General of Enlargement 
meant: 1. frequent reforms after 1997 to produce convergence with Structural Funds 
management; and 2. an end to PHARE after a two-year transition period after 
accession. In regional policy, a lack of continuity of the EU pre-accession templates 
was a clear factor in the ‘downloading’ of the templates and the allocation of 
resources in the different stages of the pre-accession period. In agricultural policy, the 
reform of the CAP was integrated in both the transition periods and the introduction 
of S APARD (Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural development) 
and was consistent with the rural development policy agreed to in 1999 at the Berlin 
Council, which was subsequently amplified in the Luxembourg Council of 2003. The 
pre-accession templates showed clear convergence with CAP and the reform of CAP. 
Chapter 4 will elaborate on these reform processes.
4. Actors in ‘Europeanisation’
The motivations of actors are important in two ways. First, the preferences of EU 
actors shape the pre-accession templates and the reform of EU common policy. 
Secondly, when applying actor-based accounts in the analytical framework, it is 
important to conceptualise the behaviour of domestic actors.
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4.1 European Actors
The thesis makes three observations on the behaviour of EU actors: 1. the European 
Council has an interest to tie-in policy areas and maintain current budgetary
91frameworks ; 2. the European Commission has an interest in the pre-accession period 
in ensuring a degree of preparedness in the candidate countries to safeguard European 
institutional arrangements and policies; and 3. the widening of the EU meant a 
redistribution of management competences from the European Commission to the 
member-states in the given policy areas.
The tendency of the EU to tie in policy preferences and templates before accession 
seems geared to provide continuity in core policy areas such as EMU, regional policy 
and agricultural policy and ensure the normal functioning of EU institutions, 
sometimes for lengthy periods. The transition periods in regional policy and 
agricultural policy have mostly served to preserve the current modus operandi or 
allow for policy and institutional changes only after enlargement (for such an 
argument on agricultural policy, see for instance Mayhew [2003]). The financial 
frameworks for both Structural Funds and agricultural funding ensure at least funding 
at current levels for all the member-states until 2006. This intransigence is also due to 
the bilateral or ‘nested’ (see Friis 2002) nature of negotiations, the homogenous 
treatment of the various candidate countries by the European institutions, and the 
limited cooperation between the CEECs in the pre-accession period.
Secondly, the ‘internalisation’ of accession in the member-states means an 
‘anticipation and preparation’ for enlargement (see Friis and Murphy 1999). This 
internalisation means that both policy and institutional reforms have been undertaken 
before enlargement. Also, this internalisation meant a process preparation of the 
candidate countries to lessen the impact these countries could have on the European 
institutional set-up. Preparation driven and managed by the European Commission 
produced a focus on administrative compliance and administrative capacity building
21 This approach by EU actors is also visible in the European Parliament where the six months before 
accession saw a record number of co-decision reports. Normal translation delays were avoided through 
the use of core languages.
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00to efficiently and effectively implement the ‘acquis’ . These foci on compliance and 
capacity building included the development of instruments such as PHARE, ISPA, 
and SAPARD.
Third, enlargement would also mean a change in the management of EU templates. 
The role of the European Commission changed after accession. Management would 
shift from the Directorate-General of Enlargement and the European Delegations to 
the Directorate-Generals of Regional Affairs and Agriculture. However, this shift was 
not only intra-institutional. Policy reform before accession had been linked to the 
preparation for enlargement. Both in regional and agricultural policy the management 
role of the European Commission towards the member-states has been reduced in 
several reform processes. The European Commission aimed itself to reduce some 
competences in CAP, due to lack of capacity to deal with a wave of new member- 
states (see interview with Alan Wilkinson: Brussels August 29 2001).
For the candidate countries, the behaviour of the European actors meant the candidate 
countries had limited opportunity to affect budgetary and policy frameworks during 
the pre-accession period and upon accession. This limited impact on EU policy by the 
‘periphery’ states has also been noted by Featherstone and Kazamias (2001, p. 12) in 
their volume on the Southern states. Secondly, though the new member-states would 
be freed from direct and specific European Commission management in the 
Delegations and Directorate-General of Enlargement upon accession, there were 
additional responsibilities and adaptive pressures for domestic administration (for 
CAP see Pezaros 1999a). The transfer of responsibilities to the domestic level and 
promoting the robustness of domestic administration had already been an integral part 
of the pre-accession instruments. In the pre-accession period after 1996, the European 
Commission did not attempt to transfer competences to Brussels or maintain its own 
management position in these policy sectors, but increasingly promoted ‘domestic 
ownership’.
22 This point also reflects on the great pressure in the Commission to increase efficiency and 
effectiveness in pre-accession aid (for this point see interview with Jean-Marc Trarieux: Warsaw 
September 27 2001).
70
4.2 Domestic Actors
At the domestic level, there are two levels of actors affected by ‘europeanisation’ of 
regional and agricultural policy: 1. the national executive level, which includes 
administrative actors such as the Prime Minister, the Council of Ministers, the line 
ministries and the central implementation agencies; 2. the sectoral and regional level, 
which includes the regions, regional development agencies, interest groups, sectoral 
agencies and sectoral beneficiaries.
As stated in chapter 2, the thesis assumes domestic actors behave rationally. Where 
the European Union negatively challenges the domestic resources and competences of 
actors, these actors will aim to avert or reduce the costs of redistribution. Actors will 
aim to maintain their institutional position. Part of maintaining the respective 
institutional position is also to control future redistribution of resources and 
competences. Goetz (2002a) points to the aversion of domestic actors to incurring 
‘sunk costs’ in institutionalisation, given that they are likely to achieve a stronger 
position within the EU after accession. This resistance could be amplified by veto 
points in the domestic institutional configuration. As stated earlier, such patterns of 
locked-in behaviour would be consistent with institution-based accounts.
However, two factors mediate the assumption of institutional persistence. First, the 
EU policy templates do not always challenge the domestic macro-institutional 
configuration. Secondly, given the incentive of EU funds, there is a willingness in 
certain parts of domestic administration to participate. This willingness takes into 
account the overall costs to society of not absorbing EU funds. This point emphasises 
the importance of funds implementation to politicians, administration and wider 
society. Non-absorption could affect the prospect of EU accession as well as have 
direct domestic costs.23 Further the administrative actors and sectoral bodies have a 
direct incentive to participate in EU funds and can enhance their institutional position.
23 Kaczorowska (Warsaw Voice, 16/12/2001) comments on the pressure on the administration in 
Poland to improve PHARE implementation. Both lack of uptake in PHARE and SAPARD was 
angering potential beneficiaries. Improving absorption was not only a focus for the European 
Commission but became a salient political issue.
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This more ‘agency-based’ approach shows how the domestic actor constellation can 
influence the process of institutional change.
5. The Substance of ‘Europeanisation’
Finally, in establishing an analytical framework for looking at institutional change, it 
is important to determine what the likely impact of ‘europeanisation’ on domestic 
administration in regional and agricultural policy would be.
The thesis splits institutional change in two categories: 1. the degree and magnitude of 
institutional change; and 2. the cross-sectoral and cross-country comparative 
‘europeanisation’ effects.
First, it is not sufficient to say that the effects of the EU are limited or substantial. 
Following Radaelli (2003), an analysis of ‘europeanisation’ requires not only an 
attribution of the effects to certain mechanisms and intermediate variables, but careful 
definitions of what adaptation means. First it is important to see how administrative 
responsibilities are integrated in domestic administration. To borrow from Heritier 
(2001) and Borzel and Risse (2000; 2003) or similar to Radaelli (2003), are EU- 
related administrative procedures absorbed within existing administration as they are 
indeed similar to domestic procedures; are such procedures accommodated within 
existing administration next to domestic administrative procedures; is administration 
transformed as a result of the new administrative tasks or indeed created specifically 
to perform them; or has administration refused to change and adopt new EU-related 
procedures or frameworks (retrenchment).
Further, it is important to look at the magnitude of institutional change. It is important 
to see whether ‘europeanisation’ has affected the vertical and horizontal organisation 
of the executive or whether ‘europeanisation’ has more marginal effects. These effects 
can relate to sectoral administrative changes that do not affect the organisation of the 
executive. Sectoral adjustments could be changes in the distribution of sectoral 
administrative competences and in how policy is administered.
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Finally, the research attempts to establish whether on a comparative basis cross- 
sectoral and cross-national convergence takes place in administrative outcomes. Here, 
the research tests whether national administrations operating in a similar supra­
national environment will eventually look alike, or whether domestic institutional 
persistence will point more to divergence. Again, it is important in this analysis to 
distinguish between the national executive and sectoral levels.
6. Research Methodology
The administrative requirements stemming from EU regional and agricultural policy 
are the same for both the Czech Republic and Poland. The pre-accession process has 
produced a noticeable homogenisation of EU approaches to the candidate countries. 
For agricultural policy, Janusz Rowinski commented that the opinions of the 
candidate countries were completely ignored (Rowinski in Hunek and Rowinski
2000). The EU preferred to treat candidate countries as a homogenous bloc regardless 
of the systemic features of respective agricultural and regional sectors and timing of 
accession. This homogenisation was strengthened by the absence of inter-country 
coordination and cooperation among the candidate countries of CEE. It was also a 
function of the asymmetry of power between the candidate countries and the 
Presidency of the European Union, which presided over negotiations. Rather, these 
countries more often than not competed for an advantage in the process of accession 
negotiations and monitoring of accession progress by the European Commission. 
Their common positions with perhaps the exception of the final agricultural 
negotiations in the Copenhagen and Brussels Summits of 2002 were largely absent.
A comparison can take place on two levels. On the one hand, one could take the 
European template as a given and compare the impact of the template and process of 
adaptation between countries. On the other, one could take two or more different 
policies and compare the impact of the administrative requirements of such policies 
on a specific country. This is a comparison between policies. In this research, I 
undertake a comparison between policy sectors and between countries. One of the 
problems of ‘europeanisation’ studies has been the small number of cases in the 
analysis (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002b). The reason seems to be that
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‘europeanisation’ researchers prefer an in-depth analysis instead of more extensive 
models that require a greater degree of abstraction and generalisation at the expense 
of the particularities of the specific case. The weakness of the approach with fewer 
cases might be that such studies over-determine the results and provide a poor base 
for generalisation about the impact of the EU or the process or mechanism of 
‘europeanisation’: This work would fall into the last category. How do we then 
address the concerns associated with small numbers in this approach? Przeworski and 
Teune (1970, chapter 2) propose the ‘most similar case’ design. The selection of 
Poland and the Czech Republic involves two first-wave post-communist candidate 
countries. These countries are undergoing similar processes of domestic 
transformation including institution-building. During the pre-accession process, they 
face identical EU approaches that occur in the same timeframes. In terms of domestic 
transition, these processes included democratisation, privatisation and economic 
liberalisation and stabilisation. Poland and the Czech Republic started the process of 
transformation from similar socio-economic (economic ‘zero hour’) and political 
conditions (communist leadership with a degree of civil society opposition) and 
initially pursued similar economic policies in transition24. In this way, Poland and the 
Czech Republic provide a level of similarity.
Moreover, there are important similarities between the Czech Republic and Poland in 
the administrative organisation. In the executive set-up, the Czech Republic and 
Poland both had a decentralised executive after accession. In terms of regional policy, 
Poland’s legacy of limited decentralisation stands against the Czech Republic’s 
experiences as part of a federal structure. Nonetheless, both countries had a strongly 
centralised polity in which regions had a limited role in implementation and regional 
policy coordination. The study of these candidate countries can therefore also show 
comparisons between post-communist first-wave candidate countries and groups of 
member-states. On the other hand, Poland and the Czech Republic also differ in terms 
of administrative arrangements in the post-transition institutional framework, both on 
the level of the development of the executive and sectoral arrangements of 
implementation. This variation is important in explaining patterns of adaptation.
24 For an overview structural reform in response to structural deficiencies see for instance Gomulka 
1994; Komai 1994; Blanchard 1996; Blanchard et al 1992; Schliefer and Vishny 1994.
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Further, the thesis tries to overcome the issue of the small number of cases by 
discussing two EU policy sectors. These policy sectors are similar. Both policy 
sectors are core policy sectors, have re-distributive effects, and include pre-accession 
instruments. As explained earlier, these pre-accession instruments are important in the 
examination, as they provide a continuous interaction across the pre-accession period 
after 1996. This interaction does not exist in other policy sectors. In this way, the 
policy sectors are ‘extreme cases’. The degree of institutional adaptation in these core 
policy areas at the domestic level would likely be ‘different’ for EU policy areas, 
which either lack such interaction or have requirements that are less extensive. The 
analysis here could be informative for EU policy sectors such as EMU where 
interaction starts later.
However, these policy areas do not produce the same types of challenges to the 
domestic administrative actors. The main difference lies in comparatively different 
density of the ‘acquis’, different paths of reform of policy within the European Union 
(continuity), different paths in negotiations (transition periods and derogations), and 
different conceptions by the European Commission of templates in the pre-accession 
period (beneficiary-oriented or not; cross-sectoral or sectoral).
By choosing two policy sectors with different administrative requirements, the 
research increases the number of cases. Seeing how different policies impact a 
candidate country, also fits into the case analysis put forward by Collier (1991). The 
analysis works on two levels. First, the analysis in our country comparison should 
reveal which explanatory factors in administrative arrangements for implementation 
for the same European policies drive domestic adaptation or persistence. Secondly, 
one can look at how policies with different administrative requirements produce 
different patterns of adaptation within a specific candidate country.
The qualitative analysis in this research uses a wide range of primary sources 
including publicly available government documents, internal government documents, 
independent research and evaluations, structured interviews with key officials, 
surveys of implementation and coordination administration, newspapers and 
magazines. Secondary literature was used to build a context for the empirics and 
check evidence emerging from empirical evidence. The period studied in this work
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runs from approximately 1992 to 2003. However, the weight of the thesis concerns 
the period from 1996 to 2003, the period after Agenda 2000. In all, I conducted close 
to 90 interviews with public officials, academics, and development officials attached 
to regions and municipalities of which 62 are referenced in the thesis and listed in the 
bibliography. In all, about 30 of these interviews were with Commission officials 
inclusive of national ‘twinning’ advisers and members of the European delegations in 
Prague and Warsaw, 40 interviews with national officials including members of the 
respective missions to the European Commission in Brussels and some academics, 
and 20 interviews with regional officials. All interviews were conducted in either 
English or German. Transcripts and qualitative analysis are based on notes taken 
during the interviews. This analysis also aimed to verify comments and trends 
indicated in the interviews through statements made by an additional source. 
Interviews with European Commission officials took place from September 2000 to 
October 2001, with some follow-up interviews in October 2003. Interviews with 
Polish and Czech officials took place between September 2001 and August 2002. The 
main scope of this fieldwork was to cover central coordination units, ministerial units, 
implementation agencies, regional government, regional state authorities, and regional 
development agencies. In Poland, this interview work took place primarily in 
Warsaw, Lublin, and Krakow. In the Czech Republic, I visited Prague, Plzen, and 
Ostrava. In terms of choice of regions, the Eastern regions of both countries received 
special attention under PHARE as they had the largest cohesion deficits. In such 
areas, the implementation and patterns of implementation of pre-accession 
instruments were easier to determine. Though Plzen is in the West of the Czech 
Republic, it again had direct interaction with pre-accession instruments through 
PHARE Cross Border Cooperation. Nonetheless, the narrative will not go into detail 
about specific regional developments, but draw out a general dynamic from these 
regional observations for the policy management in the country.
As developments in the EU and the post-communist candidate countries are 
continuing rapidly, I have made a concerted effort to keep the work as actual as 
possible. However, I cannot fully account for some effects that might prove 
transitional in the future, once structures have consolidated further. Similarly, I have 
used the conclusion of accession negotiations at the end of 2002 and the signing of the 
Accession Treaty in July of 2003 as the cut-off points for the research.
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Chapter 4: The European Union and Pre-accession 
Programming
1. Introduction to the Pre-accession Period
In this chapter, I will look at the requirements and preferences of European actors in 
the pre-accession templates over time. This analysis will also draw conclusions on the 
temporal factors in the EU templates, namely the continuity of the template and 
transition periods within the templates. I will look at these topics in terms of 
‘proceduralisation’ and allocation of resources, the two components of the EU 
approach outlined in chapter 3 .1 use the three stages in the pre-accession process, 
mentioned in chapter 3, to differentiate between stages of EU interaction: 1. the early 
pre-accession period (1992-1996); 2. the pre-accession period (1997-2002); and 3. 
the early accession period (2003-). This research, as explained earlier, focuses on the 
second period.
The role of EU actors is important in the evolution of these EU templates. This 
chapter does not aim to explain how and why the agenda is set in the Commission, 
nor how member-states ‘upload’ national preferences to the supra-national level. 
Rather, this chapter aims to show patterns in the preferences of the European 
Commission that shaped the pre-accession process and additionally the internal 
reform processes that shaped EU templates. These preferences of EU actors are 
derived from elite interviews, official primary documents, and secondary sources.
Section 2 deals with the evolution of thinking on pre-accession instruments within the 
European Commission. This evolution took the European Commission from a system 
of fragmented and diffuse implementation under PHARE before 1997, which was also 
based on a desire in the European Commission to push for territorial decentralisation, 
to a far more centralised management system after the PHARE Reforms. Territorial 
decentralisation would increasingly take a backseat to these PHARE Reforms, which 
were aimed at improving efficiency in the pre-accession programming, increasing the 
absorption of funds, and the preparation for the arrival of Structural Funds. Both the 
procedures for the management of funds (see section 2.1) and the allocation of
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resources were redirected (see section 2.3). Though there was a general push from all 
Commission actors towards vertical and horizontal centralisation in the management 
of EU funds, disagreements existed between the European Commission and its 
Delegations on the ground on the way domestic administration should be organised. 
For instance, the Commission in Brussels favoured the use of a limited number of 
independent implementation agencies, which at accession would have to be integrated 
in the national executive The Delegations favoured the use of ministerial agencies, a 
set-up more consistent with Structural Funds implementation in the member-states. 
This tension between ‘administrative compliance’ and ‘administration-building’ to 
promote the absorption of funds was important in the formation of EU templates. It 
also comes out in the frequent changes in the management of PHARE and changes in 
the direction of the allocation of funds (see section 2.3). Moreover, whereas the 
agricultural and the cohesion components of the pre-accession instruments had 
successor funds after accession, PHARE would disappear and be replaced by 
Structural Funds. Thus, the management of PHARE, in a short period of time, would 
have to evolve to the structures required for the implementation of Structural Funds. 
Ultimately, the domestic set-up that would emerge from these reforms would form the 
basis for the implementation of Structural Funds (see section 2.2). The European 
Commission needed to make sure that the domestic administration could do the job of 
absorption and comply with Structural Funds regulations at the same time.
Secondly, both the reform of regional and agricultural policy reduced the role of the 
European Commission in policy management and increased the role and discretion of 
national governments in the management of policy. In regional policy, the role of the 
European Commission had only been established in 1988. This process was an 
ongoing reform, but was hastened close to accession, as the member-states anticipated 
the impact of accession on European institutions and policy. These reforms outline 
what kind of European Union the candidate countries would be joining and under 
which budgetary conditions. Importantly, the reform of EU policy ran parallel to the 
reform of the pre-accession templates. In other words, the reform of pre-accession 
instruments was compatible with the reform of EU policy.
In the next sections, I will look at the evolution of the pre-accession funds through: a. 
the Management Reform of the pre-accession programmes in 1997-1998; and b. the
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adjustment of the procedures of the pre-accession instruments to the point of 
accession. Secondly, I will look at the allocation of resources and foci in the pre­
accession templates over time. Third, I will look at how member-states tie in policy 
areas through the evolution of the financial and institutional framework for EU 
policies in light of enlargement, and the outcome of negotiations.
2. The Evolution of the Pre-accession Funds from 
‘Pre-accession’ to ‘Early Accession’
The first two sections serve to give an overview of the reforms of the pre-accession 
instruments. A third part of section 2 will focus on the allocation of pre-accession 
funds.
2.1 PHARE Management Reforms of 1997-1998
2.1.a Introduction
Starting in 1993, subsequent European councils began outlining the pre-accession 
strategies and the accession criteria.25 The Copenhagen European Council of 1993 
produced two important results. The first was the establishment of the criteria for 
accession (the so called Copenhagen criteria26). Secondly, the result of the 
Copenhagen summit was the impetus towards the pre-accession focus developed in 
the Council of Essen of 1994. The objective of the Council of Essen was to develop a 
pre-accession strategy. The strategy focused on processes aimed at associated 
countries joining the internal market, the development of assistance, and a plan for the
25 The enlargement process has its base in the ‘Europe Agreements’ proposed and signed in 1991 (in 
the Czech case in 1993). These agreements were however far more instruments of association rather 
than membership, as they incorporated only parts of the ‘acquis’. The initial ‘Association Agreements’ 
focused on issues such as free trade, economic and technical assistance, and political and cultural co­
operation to develop among other things infrastructure and to promote democratic consolidation and 
economic reform (Senior Nello and Smith 1997, annex 1).
26 The Copenhagen criteria as set out by the European Council in 1993 state:
•  “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect 
for and the protection of minorities”
• “the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the ability to cope with 
competitive pressures and market forces within the Union”
• “the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of 
political, economic, and monetary union” (www.europa.eu.int)
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incorporation of the three pillars of the Maastricht Treaty (education and 
environmental policy, Justice and Home Affairs, and the Common Security and 
Foreign Policy) (Mayhew 1998, p. 165). The initial process for accession would be set 
out in 1995 and 1996 by the ‘White Paper on the integration of the CEECs in the 
internal market’ (Cannes European Council) and ‘Agenda 2000’. In addition, the 
Madrid summit in late 1995 established a reporting system, whereby the European 
Commission had to systematically assess candidate countries through ‘monitoring’ 
and verification (Mayhew 1998). This summit also was the starting point for the 
opening of the negotiations. Whereas the Copenhagen criteria and the European 
Council at Essen had given the broad framework for enlargement and the pre­
accession strategy, the chapter by chapter negotiations27 and the national programmes, 
started officially on March 31 of 1998, aimed at the adoption of the ‘acquis 
communautaire’.28 This procedural path was also stressed in the ‘Accession 
Partnerships’, which were signed between the European Union and Poland and the 
Czech Republic in 1998 and 1999 respectively (Cox and Chapman 1999, Ch. 6). The 
partnerships obliged the candidates to draw up National Programmes aimed at the 
Adoption of the ‘Acquis’ (NPAA). The countries were asked to address deficiencies 
outlined in the opinions of the Commission and the ‘Accession Partnerships’.
The new focus in 1997 meant that the pre-accession instruments would be ‘acquis’- 
based programmes (see EC 1997b; EC, 1997c updated in SEC[1999] 1596 final). 
Initially, PHARE was designed to offer support in the economic restructuring and 
political change occurring in Poland and Hungary. In the period from 1989-1991, 
PHARE offered mainly humanitarian aid. From 1991-1993, the assistance focused on 
training and consulting. In 1993, following the Copenhagen Council, PHARE support 
was re-oriented, with a particular increase in EU support for infrastructure and 
regional investments. The focus of PHARE in 1997-1999 aimed to support the 
implementation of the ‘acquis’ in the accession countries and was divided in an 
Economic and Social Cohesion component (also included was Cross Border 
Cooperation [CBC]), support for investments in regulatory infrastructure required to 
ensure compliance with the ‘acquis’, and institution-building (‘Twinning’ and
27 For an overview of the 31 chapters and the conclusion of negotiations of specific chapters in specific 
candidate countries see http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlareement/negotiations/ach en.html#5 
(March 2004). Negotiations were concluded at the end of 2002.
28 The Czech Republic had in 1996 officially applied for Accession. Poland had applied in 1994.
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technical regulatory investment) components. John O’ Rourke states that 
programming after the PHARE Management Reforms were ‘defined in detail’ and 
‘procedural’ rather than loosely phrased ideas or programmes, which existed before 
1997. Moreover, the European Commission would place less emphasis on territorial 
decentralisation in the candidate countries (Interview with John O’Rourke: Warsaw, 
January 21 2002). PHARE programming after 1997 had 7 main conditions: 1. it has to 
be a catalyst for change; 2. it can only co-finance up to 75%; 3. it has to be co­
ordinated with other aid and EU programmes; 4. it cannot replace domestic funding of 
programmes; 5. projects come at a minimum of 2 million euro; 6. a project must be 
sustainable beyond the date of accession; and 7. all projects must be tendered in a 
competitive process (EC 2002b).
A final component of the PHARE Management Reforms was the development in 
1999 of specific instruments by the European Commission in particular policy areas 
such as environment and transport (ISPA) and agriculture (SAPARD).
In part, this change of focus during the pre-accession period was a reaction to what 
Heilman (1998) would dub the problem of ‘partial reform’ in the post-communist 
societies. However, the programmatic adjustment was meant more to address an 
omission in the strategy of the European Union. Preston commented in 2000 on the 
need for a wider involvement of the European Union in the pre-accession process:
‘The acquis communautaire does not guide applicants on how to integrate 
EU priorities into their own domestic reform programmes. Thus, while legal 
harmonisation work is well advanced issues of implementation and 
enforcement still remain to be tackled in the context of administrative and 
institutional reform (Preston in Gower and Redmond 2000, p. 41).’
The absorption of pre-accession aid had become a major focal point for administrative 
reform (see e.g. EC 1997b). The impact of programming became more important 
closer to accession (Interview with Etienne Claeye: Brussels, October 25 2001). 
However, the impetus for change did not solely come out of an identification of the 
need for more focused programmes. The Commission was unhappy about the 
efficiency and management of its programmes (Interview with Etienne Claeye: 
Brussels, October 25 2001). Moreover, the European Court of Auditors (ECA) had for
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the period of 1994-1998 found a very limited impact of CBC programmes in the 
candidate countries, mainly due to the ‘limited harmonisation’ with the Community 
Initiative, INTERREG (DG Enlargement PHARE 2000 Review 2000, p. 3). 
Efficiency, impact, and absorption became keywords dominating the EU pre­
accession publications.
The PHARE Management Reforms had the following components: 1. increasing the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the programmes through the rationalisation of 
administration and the emphasis on financial control; 2. new programmatic impulses 
such as institution-building; and 3. the creation of domestic ownership and the priority 
of making domestic administration more ‘robust’.
2.1.b Efficiency and Effectiveness
The rationalisation of the domestic ‘partner’ administration started with the 
management of the project cycle. The project cycle consists broadly of programming, 
tendering, evaluation, monitoring and audit. Each ministry had a Project Management 
Unit (PMU), which would select projects relevant to their competences, check them 
against the requirements of Brussels, present them to Brussels in the PHARE 
Management Committee, and decide on the implementation path (which agencies). 
Monitoring and evaluation would happen in the European integration sections of the 
line ministries, at the European Commission in Brussels, in the Management 
Committees of the Commission, and at the European Court of Auditors in Brussels. In 
1995, the Commission was working with several line ministries and a large number of 
different implementation agencies in each country. The sectoral approach to 
programming through the line ministries had led to a fragmentation of coordination 
and implementation.
This fragmentation had basically brought three main problems. First, there was a lack 
of administrative capacity in terms of personnel and expertise in the programme 
management units of the ministries and in the implementation agencies to deal with 
the demands from Brussels (Interview with Etienne Claeye, PHARE Coordinator and 
Deputy Head of Unit of Poland Team of DG of Enlargement: Brussels, October 25
2001). Secondly, fragmentation often meant no single body existed on the national or
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regional level to control, administer, and coordinate programmes between the 
ministries and the implementation agencies (Interview with Pawel Samecki: Warsaw 
September 28, 2001). Finally, the decentralised way of disbursing funds also meant 
financial control was difficult on the side of the European Union and on the side of 
the core executive in situ. Consequently, the monitoring and auditing of financial 
flows became fragmented in the ministries. In this sense, the overall direction and 
strategy of the European Union programmes suffered. Furthermore, there were 
widespread rumours of misuse of funds and corruption, both of which became sore 
spots for the European Commission in the administration of foreign aid programmes 
(Interview with Etienne Claeye: Brussels, October 25 2001). For the European 
Commission, this situation was crucial, given the internal emphasis on the soundness 
of its financing (Interview with Dirk Swillens: Brussels, April 11 2001).
The reform addressed this fragmentation. In terms of project management, the project 
cycle was organised in central implementation agencies, rather than the line 
ministries. The idea behind the reform was to improve coordination, improve 
specialist capacity, and reduce the number of administrative actors involved. Line 
ministries still identify projects through programme agents within the ministries for 
institution-building programmes. However, implementation agencies have taken over 
the management functions, in terms of processing, monitoring and evaluation. In most 
cases, the payment agency, in control of flows from the agency to the project, and the 
management agency are under one roof in one agency.
The EU templates tried to maintain a balance between promoting the absorption of 
funds and efficient programming and ensuring that pre-accession requirements would 
form a base for Structural Funds. This balance was not easy, mostly because of 
differing conceptions within the European Commission on what kind of partner 
administration for funds implementation should exist within the candidate countries. 
Also, problems with the absorption of funds persisted.
John O’Rourke comments that the reduction of the role of the line ministries 
programmes produced a lack of executive ownership over programming (in his case 
the Polish bureaucracy). Moreover, even though central agencies can pay higher 
salaries, a reduction in implementation capacity occurred as no new central agencies
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were created for the programmes in Poland (Interview with John O’Rourke: Warsaw, 
January 21 2002). A problem was that the increased size and responsibilities of the 
new agencies created ‘bottle necks’ in EU funds implementation (Interview with 
Etienne Claeye: Brussels, October 25 2001).
John O’Rourke further comments that the European Delegations in the candidate 
countries preferred the implementation agencies within the line ministries as a way to 
build up specialist knowledge within the ministries towards the implementation of 
Structural Funds. The line ministries were expected to play a substantial role in the 
management of Structural Funds. Some European Union officials in the candidate 
countries feared that the rationalisation of administration would reduce the overall 
capacity in the ministries (Interview with David Hudson: Brussels, August 29 2001). 
Some involvement by the line ministries in programming would also address the 
possible drop-off in the participation of the line ministries in the project cycle after the 
reform. The European Commission in Brussels decided against this option, because 
the European Commission wanted implementation in the candidate countries to be 
independent of the executive or direct political control. This approach meant a 
reliance in the implementation of EU programmes on the existing special-purpose 
administration in these candidate countries. Considering many of these types 
administration operated partially outside of the national budget, it also produced an 
inconsistency in the EU approach. Co-financing requirements (see section 2.1.d of 
this chapter), which re-classified EU funds as national items, meant that these 
agencies would have to be funded by the national budget. In this case, there existed a 
contradictory view inside the European Commission, which reflected the tension 
between compliance and efficient absorption. The integration of these implementation 
agencies in the executive or national budgetary resources, which was subsequently 
required, would become a salient point in administrative reform in agricultural policy 
(see chapters 7 and 8).
The number of implementation agencies was significantly reduced overall. In the case 
of PHARE in Poland, this shift has meant a reduction from around 40 agencies to just 
3 (Interview with Etienne Claeye: Brussels, October 25 2001). In Poland, a recent re­
organisation after the elections of September 2001 has created a new larger 
implementation agency, the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development (PAED). The
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PAED includes two previous agencies and centralises the implementation of the 
Economic and Social Cohesion component of PHARE under one roof. The other two 
agencies are the Central Finance and Coordinating Unit (CFCU) in the Cooperation 
Fund and the Agency for Cross Border Cooperation. In the case of the Czech 
Republic, the overall number of implementation units has been reduced from 21 
programme management units to broadly speaking 6 implementation agencies, 
namely the CFCU for institution-building, the Centre for Regional Development for 
economic and social cohesion programming, and the National Training Fund for 
labour issues and the development of small to medium-size enterprises (SMEs), with 
some roles for Czechinvest, Czechtrade and the Independent Foundation for the 
Development of Civil Society (NROS) (Interview with Howard Harding: Prague, 
April 26 2002).
The drive for efficiency also affected financial control procedures. The transfer of 
funds from the European to the national level was centrally negotiated between the 
European Commission and the national governments (with almost no input from the 
regions), which then dispersed the funds to the ministries, agencies and regional 
administrations. In Poland, PHARE funds became part of the state budget in 1998. In 
terms of financial control, the European Union in 1998 mandated the creation of a 
specific unit in the ministry of finance in all candidate countries with a separate 
manual accredited by the European Commission (Czech MoF, PHARE National 
Programme, 2001). This unit, called the National Fund, controls all present and future 
financial flows between the European Union and the candidate country. This move 
was significant given the ministry of finance had had no strong coordination role in 
programming up to this point. Structural aid in the form of Cohesion Funds and 
Structural Funds under the statutes of the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), the European Agricultural Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) will flow through the National Fund upon accession.29
In monitoring, the European Court of Auditors, the European Commission, and the 
national governments maintained their roles. The evaluation process of these funded
29 The ERDF promotes economic and social cohesion. The ESF aims at strategic objectives in 
employment policy. The EAGGF promotes structural reform of the agricultural sector. Similar to the 
EAGGF, the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FTFG) aims at the structural reform of the 
fisheries sector.
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programme centres on the impact of programming. Monitoring was formalised in the 
Joint Monitoring Committee in which representatives of national stakeholders and the 
EC sit (EC, Evaluation of Funded Public Administration Programmes March 1999, p. 
14). National and regional monitoring committees were formalised in the 
programming documents.
2.1.c Institution-building
In 1997, PHARE also developed anew focus on institution-building. PHARE 1999 
aimed to build the administrative capacity required in the candidate countries to 
absorb the pre-accession funds, while programming in PHARE 2000-2002 aimed to 
build the administrative capacity required to absorb Structural Funds. Though the 
administrative effects of ‘Twinning’ programming are hard to determine (see 
Papadimitriou 2002), its management structure followed the patterns for the 
management of pre-accession aid, set out in the PHARE Reform of 1997.
2.1.d Domestic Ownership
The promotion of domestic ownership in PHARE consisted of: a. domestic co­
financing and continuity of financing; b. the deconcentration of European 
programmatic involvement; c. partnership; and d. decentralised implementation.
In terms of co-financing, the candidate countries were required to finance on average 
25% of the total value of funding. This brought the pre-accession funds more in line 
with the financing practices of the Structural Funds. This co-financing and 
‘additionality’30 aside from having a budgetary significance for the candidate 
countries transferred ownership in programming. Whereas before ownership of the 
programmes and subsequently financing were primarily considered by the national 
administration to be ‘European’, the 25% co-financing rule meant the national 
administration or regional administration became a stakeholder in programming. It 
also meant that part of the risk of programming was transferred from the EU to the 
national level. Moreover, as stated earlier, these requirements also meant a public
30 Additionality in programming means the pre-accession funding cannot displace domestic funding, 
which might be or have been in place. In essence, the budgetary requirements for EU programming, 
especially in regional policy, meant national resources would focus increasingly on EU programming.
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finance reform in the candidate countries, as EU funds would have to be classified in 
a similar way to national funds (for an overview in the Czech Republic see section
2.2.a of chapter 5; for an overview on Poland see section 2.3 of chapter 6) .This was 
part of an overall reform of EU funding that focused on financial control and 
transparent procedures. This reform was also in line with the Maastricht Framework 
on public finance. The creation of the National Fund, as explained in section 2.1.a, 
was part of this reform.
New financial statutes were included in the new multi-annual financing agreements 
for SAPARD to regulate the financial flows between the candidate countries and 
Brussels. Multi-annual financing agreements meant that programmes and projects in 
rural development were agreed on for several years based on a development plan, 
rather than these programmes being subject to annual renewal (and the risk of 
abandonment). This change in the financing agreement meant that the candidate 
countries could rely on longer-term projects and did not have to run the risk that the 
reforms undertaken would be revised after the annual review (see e.g. EC 1997d and 
EC 1997e). Though PHARE and ISPA programming still operate on Financing 
Memoranda based on specific projects or clusters of projects, which have to be signed 
between the candidate country and the European Commission on an annual basis, 
there exist multi-annual indicative financial tables agreed by both parties anticipating 
needs and the allocation of funds.31 Policy documents, such as the National 
Development Plan (NDP) and the NPAA, form the basis for the extension of multi­
annual programming and the Community Support Framework (CSF) after accession.
On the side of the European Union, a process called ‘deconcentration’ occurred in the 
management reforms. Delegations of the European Commission within the candidate 
countries became responsible for monitoring during the project cycle and for the 
implementation of projects. Some ex-post evaluation functions were also transferred 
to the Delegation from Brussels. Programming and the approval of projects (ex-ante 
or ex-post) still occurred in Brussels. Nonetheless, this ‘deconcentration’ brought 
European Union policy makers much closer to the project cycle and improved the
31 Multi-annual programming is not undertaken in Twinning and investments in institution-building 
given the impossibility of forecasting all future needs ( see EC, ‘What is Phare?’, February 2003)
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cooperation and interaction between domestic actors and European Union officials 
(Interview with Dirk Swillens: Brussels, April 11 2001).
Two specific concepts have become central to the management reforms, namely 
‘partnership’ and ‘decentralised implementation’. ‘Partnership’ means that during the 
project cycle parties affected by the programming should be consulted, included, and 
involved in implementation (Interview with Etienne Claeye, PHARE Coordinator and 
Deputy Head of Unit of Poland Team of DG of Enlargement: Brussels, October 25 
2001).
Another dimension of ‘partnership’ is the identification of regional needs and projects 
by the regional and local self-government bodies. These linkages are to some extent 
formalised in the Regional and National Steering Committees (see e.g. EC 2000c and 
EC 2000d). Upon identification of the projects and consultation with regional 
partners, these project fiches are then forwarded to the implementation units, which 
give an opinion on them and upon consultation with the national ministries and 
coordination bodies forward them to Brussels for an ex-ante approval. This system 
operates for PHARE with the exception of institution-building and ISPA. Though 
consultation seemed formalised in the EU template, implementation afforded the 
candidate countries with discretion to organise consultation and involve regional 
partners (Interview with Marie Stankova: Prague April 26, 2002). Moreover, 
SAPARD has its own regional executive network and limits the role of the regional 
self-government in consultation. ‘Partnership’ therefore had clear limitations.
Decentralised implementation signified the European Commission’s desire to limit its 
role in the implementation process with an eye on the introduction of Structural and 
Cohesion Funds. The Decentralised Implementation System (DIS) introduced in 1990 
and revised in 1998 meant that the structure of implementation consisted of an ex-ante 
approval of the project cycle and then an ex-post control by Commission officials. 
Commission officials from Brussels and the delegation would also monitor during the 
project cycle. PHARE and ISPA work according to these principles. The Extended
32 The set-up of ISPA follows the structure of European Union Cohesion Fund. After the identification 
of projects using a standard project application form and process (for these standards see DG Regional 
Affairs ISPA Manual, 2000) by the countries through the relevant implementation agencies, DG
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Decentralised Implementation System (EDIS) relies on ex-post approval of projects. 
SAPARD functions according to this system.33 EDIS is compatible with the 
requirements for Structural Funds implementation and is supposed to be the stepping 
stone to the actual administration of Structural and Cohesion Funds (see EC DG 
Regional Affairs and DG Enlargement, 2001 and EC DG Regional Affairs and DG 
Enlargement 2002). There are nine steps to EDIS (EC, ‘What is PHARE?’, February 
2003):
1. ‘Framework Agreements will be revised and will spell out a clear separation of 
responsibilities between candidate country and Commission to underpin the decentralisation;
2. after Financing Memorandum signature, full financial responsibility will be transferred to the 
National Authorising Officer (NAO) for the implementation of funds and for the approval of 
all intermediate documents;
Regional Affairs prepares a financing proposal, which is then put in an inter-service consultation in the 
ISPA Management Committee. Upon the Committee Decision, funds are allocated and a financing 
memorandum is signed, whereupon an initial 10% of the funds are released (see EC, General Report on 
Pre-Accession Assistance in 2000,2002). Furthermore, funds are released throughout the project cycle. 
Like Cohesion Funds, ISPA co-financed more than any pre-accession instruments and Structural funds 
at 85 to 90%. The European Union aims to decentralise the ex-ante approval of the implementation 
decision to the Delegations. The ex-post control function remains in Bmssels through the ISPA 
Management Committee and the ECA. This decentralisation is contingent upon a certain degree of 
institutional development and administrative capacity (DG Regional Affairs ISPA Report 2000, pg. 5). 
Decentralisation is conditional. Conditionality in ISPA means the following (DG Regional Affairs, 
ISPA Mandate, Programming, and Implementation 2000, pg. 5):
-‘Demonstration of effective internal control including an independent audit function and an effective 
accounting and financial reporting system which meets internationally accepted accounting standards; 
-A reliable national financial control system over the Implementing Agency;
-Procurement rules which are endorsed by the Commission as meeting requirements of Title 9 of the 
Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities;
-Commitment by National Authorising officer to bear the full financial responsibility and liability for 
the funds’
33 Implementation agencies in SAPARD are responsible for: a. ensuring that calls for proposals have 
been made; b. checking that applications are eligible; c. carrying out spot checks; d. checking payment 
claims; e. ensuring timely payments to beneficiaries. The National Fund ensures the agency meets 
internationally accepted standards in administrative, payment and control, and accounting procedures.
A monitoring committee oversees the execution of the programme (EC, SAPARD Annual Report 
2000,2000 pg. 5). SAPARD financing is based on three principles: a. full decentralisation of 
programme management; b. the application of EAGGF clearance of accounts procedure (This 
procedure provides for an independent body to check the accuracy of the financial accounts during 
implementation.); and c. differentiated appropriations. ‘Differentiated appropriations’ is a term used to 
denote that payments do not have to be made and entered in the accounts, when appropriations are 
committed. Thus, funding can be taken up until two years after appropriation (similar to Structural 
Funds rales). SAPARD programming is based on a single agriculture and rural development plan 
covering the period 2000-2006. This plan is first evaluated through inter-service consultations with 
input from the candidate country before it is presented to the STAR (Committee on Agricultural 
Structures and Rural Development) Management Committee. Upon approval, a Commission Decision 
authorises the signing of a multi-annual financing agreement plus an annual financing agreement 
releasing the funds. After the management authorities or implementation agencies have been 
accredited, a first payment of up to 49% of total allocation is released to the country (also see EC, 
General Report on Pre-Accession Assistance in 2000,2002 pg. 11).
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3. management and paying functions will be clearly separated inside the National Fund and 
Implementing Agencies. This will include appointing managing and paying authorities in line 
with the approach followed for Structural Funds;
4. after a 20% advance on each annual programme, the NAO will request interim replenishments 
against actual payments made on the contracts financed by the Financing Memorandum. The 
last 10% will be paid only after the Commission has verified the accounts and discharged the 
NAO of his/her delegated financial responsibilities;
5. internal financial control will be assured by the National Fund and Implementing Agencies 
which will monitor, control and report on the use of PHARE and national funds down to the 
contract level;
6. audit will be undertaken by an independent body and an annual report will be produced by 
that independent body on the use of PHARE funds;
7. Commission controls will be exercised on an ex post basis through verification of accounts 
and operational evaluations. Any non-compliance with established rules -  individual 
irregularity or systematic errors - will result in financial corrections;
8. national procurement procedures will be used where consistent with the procurement 
provisions of Council Regulation (EC) 1266/99. However, if a country’s procurement system 
is not compliant in this regard, decentralisation can still occur but the Commission will require 
the recently updated DIS procedures and contract forms to be used;
9. the national monitoring and evaluation system must be able to provide reliable operational 
details of PHARE implementation.’
To summarise, the ex-post approval of the projects occurs within the relevant 
Management Committee of the European Commission. Once the implementation 
agency is accredited34, the onus of finding projects that will be approved (ex-post) by 
Brussels is on the national administration. Initially, Brussels releases only a small 
amount of financing (20%). Project financing has to come out of the national budget, 
until ex-post project approval in Brussels is granted. Then, the remainder of the 
European Union funds is gradually released until the expiry of the Financing 
Memorandum.
Some observers have noted that EDIS truly put the implementation structures in the 
candidate countries to the test and might prove a platform from which wider 
administrative changes occur, as these candidate countries take on the full
34 There are four stages to the accreditation process: 1. the identification of gaps in preparation for 
EDIS; 2. the filling of the gaps; 3. the compliance assessment which allows national authorities to 
make sure all pre-conditions are met for the application; and 4. the preparation for commission 
decision, which includes a verification and audit of the EDIS request by the National Authorising 
Officer (see EC 2002c, pg 10).
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responsibilities of the project cycle (Interview with Howard Harding: April 26 2002). 
Alan Wilkinson outlines that SAPARD was meant as a system to counterbalance the 
limitations at the domestic level in developing and designing administration, while 
giving the countries the political and administrative freedom to disperse funds with 
only ex-post controls (Interview with Alan Wilkinson: August 29 2001). This 
emancipation of domestic administration aimed to give domestic actors some 
flexibility in the administrative organisation of the EU funds and secondly transfer 
budgetary risk from the European Commission to the candidate country. There is a 
significant budgetary risk at the national level for not gaining ex-post European 
Commission approval. Therefore, officials wonder if an emphasis on emancipation 
and budgetary responsibility will not undermine programming and accession itself. As 
John O’ Rourke in early 2002 pointed out, the regions’ capability for implementation 
of DIS had not yet been tested (Interview with John O’ Rourke: Warsaw, January 21
2002). EDIS and DIS requirements might jolt national administration in the medium- 
term but might make implementation more difficult in the short-term. Moreover, these 
requirements might only encourage a particular type of administrative response in the 
candidate countries, namely the utilisation of administrative capacity where it exists at 
the central level, rather than actual administration-building in the regions. In fact, 
Jean-Marc Trarieux points out that many Commission officials were taking a more 
practical view. In his view, ‘making implementation work’ and improving absorption 
became the key priority areas (Interview with Jean-Marc Trarieux: Warsaw, 
September 27 2001). As Hausner and Marody (2000) comment, the procedures of 
EDIS and the focus on the absorption of funds might undermine the eventual 
distribution of Structural Funds at the regional level.
2.2 The Future of Pre-accession Programmes
Continuity was the main issue in the evolution of funds from the pre-accession period 
to the accession stage. Both SAPARD and ISPA showed continuity in their 
institutional set-ups. PHARE did not have a successor fund. After much internal 
wrangling between directorates, a platform emerged to use PHARE as a bridge to the 
management of the Structural Funds.
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The question is how the pre-accession templates change after accession or whether 
continuity in the templates is present. As the Commission in an internal review states, 
ISPA and SAPARD will after some light transitional measures be replaced by 
respectively the Cohesion Fund and the EAGGF, but ‘PHARE does not have a clear 
and direct successor (EC Communication on The Phasing-out of PHARE in Acceding 
Countries 2002, p. 2).’ PHARE 2003 with programmes until 2006 will be the last 
programming cycle. PHARE, though paving the way for the Structural Funds in the 
shape of the ESF and the ERDF, operates a different financial support system in terms 
of audit, financial controls and the system of co-financing (the budget of DG 
Enlargement rather than Structural Funds) from both Structural Funds. The managing 
authority over PHARE, the Directorate General (DG) for Enlargement, will not have a 
role in the future administration of funds beyond a transition phase after accession. 
Further, the DG for Enlargement does not have a Community fund under its 
management, which it could link PHARE as a programme to.35 The Commission has 
decided to phase out PHARE in the period of 2003-2006 in an ‘effective’, ‘efficient’ 
and ‘administratively simple’ way, compatible with the revised guidelines drawn up 
for PHARE (for an overview of the revised guidelines see EC, EC ‘Decision on the 
Review of The Guidelines for Implementation of the PHARE Programme in 
Candidate Countries for The Period 2000-2006’, 2002).
The option that the European Commission has chosen in this phasing-out process 
touches on four elements (for an overview on the phasing out plan see EC, ‘EC 
Communication on The Phasing-out of PHARE in Acceding Countries 2002’, p. 2). 
First, all the implementation agencies in the candidate countries will in the period of 
2003-2006 of PHARE programming adopt the EDIS mechanism rather than DIS. This 
adoption is verified through an accreditation process. Secondly, the EDIS mechanisms 
allow the European Commission to familiarise the administrations of the candidate 
countries with the Structural Funds procedures. The transitional PHARE 
programming period seems particularly aimed to increase the robustness of the
35 Among the discussed options, were the switching of PHARE ESC and CBC programmes from the 
DG for Enlargement to the Structural Funds DGs after accession and the switching of the PHARE 2003 
budget for ESC and CBC to early Structural Funds initiatives. Both options were discarded in favour of 
switching from DIS to EDIS under the management of the DG for Enlargement. Structural Funds 
projects were discarded, because it would require a re-visitation of the Financial Perspectives 
established at the Berlin Council of 1999 (EC Communication on The Phasing-out of PHARE in 
Acceding Countries 2002, pg. 8).
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PHARE implementation agencies. Third, the transition facility proposed the 
placement of management authorities closer to the ministries, which oversee 
operational programmes. This move is consistent with the administration of Structural 
Funds in the member-states, but a break with the pre-accession management where 
the central implementation units often combined their payment and management 
functions in the implementation of funds.36 Fourth, EDIS also requires less support 
staff on the ground in the European delegations.
For rural development and indeed the transition from SAPARD to Structural Funds 
under the EAGGF, the European Commission has decided for the period of 2004 to 
2006 on a new Temporary Rural Development Instrument (TRDI), funded by the 
Guarantee section of the EAGGF. This facility will run under the guidelines and 
regulations of the EAGGF and CAP. There are two components to this new facility. 
There are the negotiated transitional rural development measures in the Accession 
Treaty and the items available to the new member-states under the EAGGF, which 
were not available to them under SAPARD37 (EC, Guidelines for the Switch from 
SAPARD to Postaccession Rural Development Initiatives, 2003 p. 14). These 
measures are part of 29 measures in rural development planning, rather than the 15 
under SAPARD. That total is 7 more than for existing member-states (the difference 
is equal to the negotiated rural transition measures). John Lougheed (2003) comments 
on these new measures: 1. that it would be good to integrate this rural development 
strategy in the various programming documents; 2. that these measures may be too 
many and that the SAPARD objective 1 measures should be continued until 2006; and 
3. that SAPARD has pre-defined measures and an included annual financing plan per 
measure, whereas operational programmes under the EAGGF outline priorities on 
which financing takes place. In terms of policy continuity, the results were that; 1. 
operational programmes give a greater discretion to the new member-states to shape 
policy; and 2. a proliferation of measures. In this sense, SAPARD was more 
‘prescriptive’ than normal operational programmes.
36 It is important to note that for management functions, management authorities can devolve some 
management responsibilities to intermediate bodies, the old implementation agencies.
37 After the Berlin Summit of 1999, the Guidance section financed Objective 1 programmes and the 
Guarantee section funded programmes outside Objective 1 in rural development for member-states.
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On the administrative level, the transitional facility, given its short implementation 
cycle of two years from SAPARD to the EAGGF, attempts to build on the structures 
and programmes of SAPARD. At the moment, the SAPARD Agency fulfils three 
functions: programme implementation; payment; and control. Under the EAGGF, 
these functions would have to be expanded and split between the Guarantee and 
Guidance sections. Both the managing authority and payment authority will be 
running two systems. A main difference with SAPARD is the re-nationalisation of the 
certification of accounts. Under the EAGGF, the member-states are responsible for 
the accreditation of the payment agencies and the management agencies. Most 
acceding countries have chosen a centralised structure for the EAGGF 
implementation of their sectoral operation programme, whereby the Ministry of 
Finance is responsible for payment of all Structural Funds. Alternatively, payment 
authorities can be assigned for each programme. The responsibility of the SAPARD 
Agency, in the case of the regional operational programme, is as paying agency or 
final beneficiary and in the case of the sectoral operational programme, as 
implementing and intermediate body . The intermediate body can be responsible for 
the specific programming, the selection of projects, or the organisation of monitoring 
(EC, Guidelines for the Switch from SAPARD to Postaccession Rural Development 
Initiatives, 2003). The Czech Republic has decided to consolidate the payment 
authority for both sections of the EAGGF and operate a combined monitoring 
committee.
The main differences between the EAGGF and SAPARD implementation is a 
potential shift of payment and management authorities of the SAPARD Agency to the 
Ministry of Agriculture. This shift concerns especially the SAPARD Agency’s role in 
the selection of projects, its role in the payments to beneficiaries, and the potential 
setting up of payment authorities outside of the National Fund of the Ministry of 
Finance. Nonetheless, through its role as intermediate body domestic policy-makers 
have wide discretion to use the SAPARD set-up to support EAGGF implementation. 
In short, as the Report on ‘Guidelines for the Switch from SAPARD to Postaccession 
Rural Development Initiatives’ of 2003 says, ‘only minor adjustments to the existing 
SAPARD circuits will be necessary for operating the new rural development
38 An intermediate body is a body that takes on either part of the management of programming or 
payment of programming.
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Programmes’ (EC, Guidelines for the Switch from SAPARD to Postaccession Rural 
Development Initiatives, 2003 p. 23). In terms of financial procedures, the main 
difference between SAPARD and EAGGF is the financial corrections system, 
whereby the member-state assumes all responsibility for any systemic irregularities 
and the subsequent recovery of funds.
For ISPA, the transition period is relatively easy. ISPA 2003 is the last programming 
cycle. After accession, all ISPA projects will be integrated in the Cohesion Fund. 
ISPA regulations forbid any more funding after accession. So, the European 
Commission was obliged to include ISPA measures after accession in the Cohesion 
Fund regulations. Some differences remain: 1. the Cohesion Fund will mean on 
average a threefold increase in the Community funding for the new member-states; 2. 
ISPA provided 75% Community co-financing (higher in special cases), whereas the 
Cohesion Fund typically co-finances between 80 and 85% of the total project; 3. ISPA 
has a minimum of 5 million euro for projects, whereas the Cohesion Fund has a 
minimum of 11 million euro; 4. under the Cohesion Fund, the funding is eligible upon 
receipt of the application, whereas with ISPA eligibility is upon signing the Financing 
Memorandum; and 5. in ISPA, the European Commission has ex-ante control and can 
transpose EU preferences in the selection and administration of the projects, whereas 
with the Cohesion Fund this is an ex-post control supported by a national law on EU 
procurement directives (compiled from Walker 2003). It seems clear that given these 
differences, the transition from ISPA to the Cohesion Fund will demand a regulatory 
transition phase in the Cohesion Fund regulations on assistance, expenditure, and 
payments to deal with those ISPA projects implemented up until 2006. However, the 
administrative structure remains the same from ISPA to the Cohesion Fund. The main 
issues outstanding are the great increase in funds available for investment and the 
greater programmatic responsibility under EDIS.
2.3. Pre-accession Programmes: Focus and Allocation of Resources
The direction of programming, especially in the case of PHARE 2000-2002, tended to 
be changed often and per project cycle by the European Commission in the run-up to 
the accession of the candidate countries (Interview with Milena Vicenova: Prague, 
September 19 2001). This changeability was also a function of the various different
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bodies and directorates in the European Commission that were involved with the pre­
accession process. Both Iwona Lisztwan and Martijn Quinn in interviews commented 
on the difficulties of inter-departmental coordination within the European 
Commission, which leads to funds overlapping in programming or programming 
being poorly integrated into the priorities set out in the development plans (Interview 
with Martijn Quinn, Brussels: December 21 2000; Interview with Iwona Lisztwan, 
Brussels: October 15 2003).
These redirections, often consistent with overall institutional changes in the 
management system, also produce changes in the allocation of resources over time. 
The allocation of resources influences the budgets and consequently the involvement 
of certain administrative units, ministries, and regions. This redirection was especially 
important, given the ceilings placed on EU expenditure by the budgetary frameworks 
in 1997. The allocation of resources in ISPA and SAPARD tended to be more stable. 
In programming, the EC addressed not only the traditional EU focus areas (transport, 
environment, regional development, agriculture), but also had to take problems into 
account in the domestic absorption of funds, as in ISPA. Problems in this absorption 
could mean a redirection of resources outside of the intended allocation. This 
allocation favoured administration with the capacity to absorb. Another noticeable 
effect was the reduction of investment support for regional administration, which 
seems to indicate the more central approach taken after 1997.
2.3.a PHARE ESC and CBC
The main aims for PHARE in the pre-accession period are to: 1. support institution- 
building; 2. provide investments to strengthen the regulatory framework, and 3. direct 
investment towards social and economic cohesion (EC, Regular Report on Progress 
Towards Accession of the Czech Republic November 2000, p. 9). Underlying these 
aims, are further foci to implement or align to the ‘acquis’, to lower the deficit in 
Gross Domestic Product per capita (cohesion deficit) between the candidate countries 
and the EU average, and to prepare for EU Structural Funds (see for instance DG for 
Enlargement, 2002a; DG for Enlargement, 2002b). There are four components in 
PHARE programming: 1. Cross Border Cooperation; 2. Economic and Social 
Cohesion (ESC); 3. ESC pilot programmes; and 4. institution-building. In the period
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of 2000-2006, 35% of the budget would go to building of regulatory infrastructure, 
35% to investments in ESC, and 30% to institution-building (EC 1997e).
PHARE ESC pilot projects in PHARE 2000 focus on Structural Funds projects. 
PHARE ESC first focused on micro-regions in 1997. PHARE ESC underwent some 
important changes from 2000 to 2002. PHARE ESC 2000 and 2001 addressed 
regional operational programmes and targeted the most disadvantaged regions in the 
candidate countries. PHARE ESC 2002 and 2003, in line with Structural Funds, 
focused more on sectoral programmes and addressed only a joint regional operational 
programme. This focus on sectoral programmes from 2002 onwards was a significant 
departure from programmes that had previously been more region-based in the 
drafting of operational programmes and had specifically targeted regions.
It is the intention that from PHARE 2003 onwards all programmes will be cohesion 
programmes (Interview with Howard Harding: April 2002). For the period of 2000- 
2006, PHARE would aim in view of the Structural Funds to: a. reinforce the 
administrative and budgetary structures for Structural Funds; b. support initiatives in 
ESC that emulated Structural Funds initiatives; c. introduce National Development 
Plans; d. pilot grant schemes, which would familiarise the implementation agencies 
with Structural Funds; and e. test the capacity of implementation agencies and align 
CBC with the various INTERREG Community initiatives of the European 
Commission ( EC, Communication to the Commission on the Phasing-out of PHARE 
in Acceding Countries 2002, p. 7; EC, Decision on the Review of Guidelines for 
Implementation of the PHARE Programme in Candidate Countries for the Period 
2000-2006,2002 p. 7).
The priorities of the post-1997 PHARE programming are reflected in table 1 for both 
the Czech Republic and Poland. These lists are compiled from the ‘Regular Reports of 
Poland and the Czech Republic on Progress towards Accession’ of the European 
Commission (various years, p. 8-11). The expansion of the budget in the Czech 
Republic from 1999 to 2001 was a reaction to the poor marks the Czech Republic 
received in its Progress Reports. Additionally, the weight for agricultural projects and 
ESC in Poland in overall PHARE spending is greater than in the Czech Republic.
This difference is a reflection on the greater and wider sectoral problems in Poland.
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Overall funding, in accordance with the Berlin Framework of 1999, seems to be 
levelling off in 2002, after the high points in 2001. For both Poland and the Czech 
Republic, total PHARE funding decreased. The European Commission redirects 
priority areas within an existing budget, rather than expanding the budget for funding 
as a whole. This redirection was also linked to difficulties in the absorption of funds.
Another interesting point is the absence of funding for regional policy after 1999. 
Though ISPA in some ways filled a void in regional development policy, this absence 
also clearly shows the diminished importance of support for the regional 
administrations within the European Commission after 1997. Rather, this type of 
investment was directed towards SME development.
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Table 1: PHARE Annual Allocation per Country 1999-2002
MEUR in 1999 Prices Poland 1999 Poland
2000
Poland
2001
Poland
2002
CR
1999
CR
2000
CR
2001
CR
2002
The reinforcement of 
institutional and administrative 
capacity
20.5 65 45 61 5.8 7 4.75 2.7
Support for the capability of 
applying Internal Market rules 
and regulations
10.4 21 34 25 5.6 6.5 18.3
Establishment of the institutional 
arrangements required to 
implement the environmental 
norms of the ‘acquis’39
26.2 7 22 14 4.3 5.1 7.4
Restructuring of state industry 
and alleviation of social costs
31
Institution-building in agriculture 
to prepare for the adoption of the 
Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) (examples are 
phytosanitary and veterinary 
controls, registration systems, 
CAP preparation, and food 
safety)
27.55 42 33 35 6.2 8.28 12.4
The strengthening of cooperation 
in the fields of Justice and Home 
Affairs (border controls, 
organised crime, etc.)
17.5 89 50 4 12.6 13.25 18.7
Development of social and 
economic cohesion (examples 
are employment regulations, 
small to medium size enterprises 
[SME] development)
130 170 170 5.35 17.5 13.55 6.3
Programmes aimed at 
strengthening the democratic 
system (examples are civil 
society development, minority 
protection, establishment of 
human rights)
6 0.5 3 3
Participation in various 
community programmes such as 
Leonardo, Youth, and Socrates 
(cultural and scholarly exchange)
21.2 31 42 24 5 6.52 7 7.9
Regional Policy 12.15
Ensuring compliance with 
occupational health and safety 
standards of the ‘acquis 
communautaire’
1.75 7.4
Co-operation in various funded 
multilateral programmes and 
horizontal programmes (also 
Technical Assistance 
Information Exchange Office).
For all years 
and countries 
an amount is 
set aside 
each year
Transport (support for 
investments)
64 2 0.7
Total Excl. CBC 230 428 396 342.2 21 59 101 86.6
CBC 32 55 56 56 29.4 10 19 19
Source: EC Regular Reports various years for both countries, Own compilation.
39 Environment and transport projects implemented under PHARE would increasingly be replaced by 
ISPA programmes as well as coordinated with ISPA projects.
99
2.3.b Twinning and Administrative Capacity Building
Institution-building included few projects directed at the regional administrations. 
Prioritisation and problems of absorption40 have meant a bias towards projects in the 
national executive. Regional projects, instead, have taken on the form of workshops.
Table 2 shows the number of projects in Poland and the Czech Republic in broad 
compiled categories. A larger weight of projects resides in agriculture, regional 
policy, and environment and transport. This weighting was linked to the importance 
of these sectors in the EU budget and the structural problems in these sectors. For 
regional policy, it is important to note that about 80% of the projects supported the 
administration of SME projects, rather than regional administration. In fact, very few 
projects supporting regional administration seemed to take place. Workshops seemed 
to be the preferred tool to inform regional administration (Interview with Marta von 
Mauberg: Warsaw, January 23 2002). Again, this stresses the bias and the choice 
within the wider Commission to work with national partners.
On a more general level, the years 2000 and 2001 seem to be the high points of 
projects implemented, as the candidate countries lowered resistance to ‘Twinning’ 
and became more familiar with programming. A recent drop-off can be explained by 
the debate over the future of ‘Twinning’, the end of the role of the Delegation after 
accession, a stabilisation of the pre-accession budget, and the more limited and 
focused approach taken in ‘Twinning’ after 2000 (Interview with Marta von 
Mauberg,: Warsaw, January 23 2002). Poland tends to have a slightly higher budget 
per project at 1.1 million euro per project, whereas with a budget of 72 million euro 
over 90 completed projects the Czech Republic had an average project size of 0.8 
million euro (own compilation from information provided by Marta van Mauberg of 
the European Delegation in the Czech Republic).
40 James Hunt and Martha von Mauberg point out that problems with absorption range from funding 
through to finding adequate projects (Interview with Marta von Mauberg: Warsaw, January 23 2002; 
Interview with James Hunt: Prague April 24,2002).
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Table 2: Number of Twinning Projects (including light) per Country and Sector (1998-2003)
Twinning General Public Administration Labour
Environment/  
Transport Agriculture
Regional
Policy/SME JHA
Public
Finance
Poland (total per year)
# of projects 1998 (12) 0 0 1 3 6 2 0
# of projects 1999 (16) 2 3 2 3 0 3 3
# of projects 2000 (43) 6 2 4 9 17 4 1
# of projects 2001 (33) 8 0 6 7 2 3 7
# of projects 2002 (8) 1 0 1 3 0 2 1
# of projects 2003 (-) - - - - - - -
Total: 112 17 5 14 25 25 14 12
Total EU Budget (MioE) 22.128 4.31 19.448 30.906 26.665 22.051 14.335
Czech Republic
# of projects 1998 (6) 1 0 1 1 2 1 0
# of projects 1999 (13) 2 2 1 1 2 3 2
# of projects 2000 (20) 7 2 3 1 2 5 0
# of projects 2001 (25) 4 2 3 4 3 7 2
# of projects 2002 (24) 4 1 5 1 4 5 4
# of projects 2003 (16) 4 2 3 1 1 4 1
Total: 104 22 9 16 9 14 25 9
Source: Own Compilation from Ministry of Foreign Affairs Italy(2000); EC 
Delegation Warsaw (April 2004):
httn ://www. europa.delpol.pl/index .php?id=&samSession=f6d 19f37b 1 d 1163ca596e60 
d2ebf3011 ; EC Delegation Czech Republic (April 2004): http.V/www.evropska- 
unie.cz/download/eng/Linked/Twinning CR since 1998.pdf
2.3.c ISPA
Problems with absorption in ISPA programming would influence the direction of 
funds. In the environment sector, applications come mainly from the municipalities or 
municipal agencies, whereas in the transport sector the beneficiaries are the central 
implementation agencies, such as the highway agencies and national railroads. 
Applications for transport projects tended to better prepared than environmental 
projects. Moreover, they had a better prospect of successful implementation 
(Interview with Ctibor Kocman: Prague April 23, 2002). Though the European 
Commission mandates the even distribution of total funds (not number of projects) 
between transport and environmental projects, the allocation rule was changed. This 
amounted to a redirection of funds from environmental projects to transport projects.
An additional reason for this redirection was the fact that it was easier for the 
European Commission to administer transport projects. The bias within the 
Commission for transport projects had two reasons. First, the EU would get better
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value for money in transport projects, as the rate of EU co-financing was lower. For 
environmental projects, the European Commission would fund up to 85% of the cost 
of programming. For transport projects, co-financing is only 75%. Secondly, transport 
projects had a greater budget per project compared to environmental projects. This 
meant the European Commission had to oversee and monitor fewer projects (derived 
from an interview with Michal Lehocky: Prague April 24 2002).
Table 3 shows a budgetary allocation policy of 60/40 % in favour of transport 
projects, regardless of the number of projects that the EC has pursued (DG Regional 
Affairs ISPA Report 2000, 2001 annex 1). In general, ISPA programmes, in budget 
and scope, tend to be much larger than average PHARE or SAPARD projects. ISPA 
also provides technical assistance for the preparation and the management of projects 
in Poland and the Czech Republic. The total funding was 997 million euro for 75 
projects in 2000 at about an average of 13 million euro each (DG Regional Affairs, 
ISPA Report 2000, 2001). The indicative annual allocation for Poland is between 312 
and 348.8 million euro. The Czech Republic is in a range between 57.2 and 83.2 
million euro per annum.
Table 3: Total ISPA Projects per Country between 1/1/2000 and 31/12/2001
Total Projects/Budget (MEUR) Czech Republic (% of Total) Poland (% of Total)
# Projects in Environment (ENV) 6 (46%) 21 (62%)
# of Projects in Transport (TR) 7 (54%) 13 (38%)
Total: 13 34
EU ISPA Contribution ENV 67.38 (39%) 545.14(39% )
EU ISPA Contribution TR 103.34 (61%) 855.243 (61%)
Total 171.40 1402.01
Source: DG Regional Affairs (ISPA: Projects Signed) 2002 
2.3.d SAPARD
The SAPARD annual allocations are rather modest considering the weight of 
agricultural funds in EU funding (see table 2.2.C.1). Poland stands to receive about 
171.6 million euro annually (in 2000 prices). The Czech Republic stands to possibly 
receive 22.45 million euro annually out of a total programme value of 539.65 million 
euro (DG Agriculture, SAPARD Annual Report 2001, 2001 p. 8).
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Table 4: Indicative Annual Allocations for Pre-accession Funds from 2000-2006 in 
Poland and the Czech Republic 
In million euro PHARE Indicative SAPARD Indicative ISPA Minimum Indicative Total
and 2000 prices Annual Allocation Annual Allocation Annual Allocation
Poland 398 170 312 880
Czech Republic 79 22.1 57.2 158.3
Source: EC 2003, ‘Conclusions of Copenhagen Council’, and Own Compilation
3. Reform of EU Policies, the Development of a 
Financial Framework, and the Outcome of 
Negotiations in ‘Early Accession’
Whereas the previous section outlined the reform of the pre-accession template, 
concurrently the member-states had to accommodate accession within the policy, 
institutional, and financial frameworks of the European Union. The next section 
outlines policy reform in regional and agricultural policy and the framework for the 
allocation of finances. This is important in seeing what kind of EU the member-states 
would be joining. A final point is the outcome of the negotiations. These points are 
relevant to see what policy requirements the accession countries had to adopt and 
under which financial and procedural frameworks.
3.1 Reform and Structure of EU Funds before Accession
Structural Funds41 were reformed in 1988,1993, and 1999. The main gist of the 
reforms has been the balance of partnership between the Commission, the member- 
state governments, and the regions. In 1988, the European Commission extended its
41 Structural Funds can be given out on the five following areas: 1. Business Support; 2. Human 
Resources Development; 3. Infrastructure Development; 4. Improvement of the environment; 5. 
Agriculture and rural development. All funds are available in NUTS (Nomenclature des Unites 
Teritoriales Statistiques) terms to the Objective 1 areas. These are areas with a development below 
75% of the EU average. ERDF and ESF are also available to Objective 2 areas. These are areas facing 
structural difficulties be it urban, industrial, or rural normally characterised by high unemployment. 
ESF is also applicable to Objective 3 areas. These are areas with human resource problems. Funds are 
also embedded in special initiatives such as the ERDF in Interreg 3 and Urban 2. These are Community 
initiatives that respectively strengthen inter-regional development and promote development of 
troubled urban districts. The EAGGF has LEADER, an initiative aimed at encouraging the 
‘implementation of integrated, high-quality and original strategies for sustainable development’. The 
ESF funds a Community Initiative called Equal tackling discrimination and inequality in the 
workplace.
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role in regional policy-making. Whereas formally Community aid42 went to areas 
designated by the member-states, now the Commission gained a say in designating 
the eligible regions (Objective 2 and 5b), over how money was spent, and over the 
management of projects under the newly installed Community initiatives. The 
‘partnership’ principle drew in regional sub-national actors, who for the first time 
could apply for funds outside of their respective national governments and found a 
consultative role in the project cycle. In programming, the multi-annual financing 
increased the continuity of programming. Nonetheless, given the limited means for 
redistribution at the EU level and the discretion of central governments in shaping 
concepts such as ‘partnership’ and ‘additionality’, these national governments could 
determine the type of regionalisation, control Objective 1 funding, and retain control 
over the Commission in terms of the oversight and national discretion in policy­
making.
The 1993 reforms aimed to consolidate a rather diffuse Community policy. Reform of 
the designation of the objective areas meant the consolidation of these areas. The 
Community initiatives were scaled back in budget (from 10% of the total EU budget 
in 1989-1993 to 9% in 1993-1997) and number (Sutcliffe 2000). The initiatives would 
also be supervised by a management committee, consisting of member-state
42 ERDF supports:
• productive investment leading to the creation or maintenance of jobs;
• infrastructure;
• local development initiatives and the business activities (see Council Regulation (EC) No 
1783/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 1999 on the European 
Regional Development Fund [Official Journal L 213,13.08.1999]).
ESF supports:
• development of active labour market policies to combat and prevent unemployment, to avoid 
long-term unemployment, to facilitate the reintegration of the long-term unemployed and to 
support integration into the labour market of young people;
• promotion of equal opportunities for all in terms of access to the labour market, with 
particular attention to persons at risk of social exclusion;
•  promotion and improvement of vocational training, education in the context of a lifelong 
learning policy;
• promotion of a skilled, well-trained and flexible workforce, innovative and adaptable forms of 
work organisation, and entrepreneurship;
• specific measures to improve access and active participation of women in the labour 
market(see Regulation (EC) No 1784/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 July 1999 on the European Social Fund)
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representatives monitoring the Commission’s work. However, as Pollack (1995) 
points out, this move did not effectively alter the role of the Commission in policy­
making. This role consisted of: the administration of Community initiatives; the 
verification of ‘additionality’; a role in the drafting of ‘single programming 
documents’; the drafting of ‘operational programmes’; and a role in the designation 
(based on population) and selection of the regions. The Commission encouraged sub­
national participation, but acknowledged that the central governments could select the 
regions to participate within the policy.
The 1999 reforms further consolidated Community initiatives in number from 13 to 4 
and limited the budget to 6% of total structural funding. Further, the designation of 
objective areas was simplified from 5 to 3 (DG Regio, Regional Policy and 
Enlargement, 2002). The aim of the 1999 reforms, also with enlargement in mind, 
was to clarify the roles of the various institutional actors in the administration of 
funds. It was decided that the Commission would increase its role in the ‘setting of the 
overall priorities for structural funds assistance’, the member-states and regions would 
assume a role in monitoring and the implementation of funds, and the Commission 
would perform the ex-post evaluation with the member-states performing the ex-ante 
assessment (Sutcliffe 2000, p. 302). ‘Partnership’ was expanded to include regional 
organisations, but national discretion in the selection of regional partners was 
retained. These reforms were also aimed to raise the impact of programming and to 
produce a wider redistribution of Community Funds to address the ‘cohesion deficit’ 
across the EU (see De Rynck and McAleavey 2001). The drive towards creating 
specific national administration and fostering domestic ownership in the PHARE 
reforms seems consistent with the Structural Funds’ reforms of 1999.
3.2 A Financial Framework for Funds
A second aspect of the internalisation of enlargement was the determination of a 
financial framework. The Berlin financial framework for the period of 2000-2006 
aimed to keep the overall spending under control and maintain levels of spending on 
the existing member-states. This meant only a gradual reduction of expenditure on the
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‘old’ member-states until 200643 (see table 7). The Council set several spending 
limits. Spending on Structural Funds should not exceed 0.46% of total EU GDP44. 
Total commitments for enlargement were about 40 billion euro, with total payments 
to the candidate countries at 25 billion euro (EC, Reform of Structural Funds 2000- 
2006 1999). Total expenditure for the EU should not exceed 1.27% of EU GDP. The 
Berlin framework aimed to stay well below this level. From 2004, about a third of 
total structural spending would apply to the new member-states, or 13.7% of total EU 
spending in 2006 (see table 7). Pre-accession aid over this period would be doubled to 
about 3 billion euro on an annual basis. The total transfer of EU funds to a member- 
state should not exceed 4% of domestic GDP, a level historically never attained for 
any member-state. Payments would evolve from 1.95% of average candidate country 
GDP in 2004 to 2.2% in 2005 and 2.7% in 2006 (Swinnen 2003). The Council’s 
enlargement funds would be ring-fenced (no additional transfer of funds from another 
heading could take place). The candidate countries were also expected to contribute as 
members upon accession. Subsequently, the European Commission moderated this 
position within the Berlin Framework by seeking extra financing for rural 
development initiatives, limiting the amount of domestic co-financing45, declaring 
that no candidate country should be a net contributor to the EU budget upon 
accession, and the creation of a budgetary compensation reserve (Mayhew 2003).
It was necessary to stick to the Berlin framework in the negotiations with the 
candidate countries as a deviation would require unanimity from the Council of 
Ministers and the European Parliament. The Brussels and Copenhagen Councils in 
2002 remained within the Berlin framework. Brussels slightly lowered the funds 
available for structural action from 25.5 billion to 23 billion euro, mostly thought of 
as a tactical move in the last months of negotiations (Mayhew 2003). Copenhagen at 
the conclusion of negotiations produced three important budgetary results (European 
Council 2002): 1. the possibility of undetermined lump-sum transfers to specific 
candidate countries in order to alleviate the obvious budgetary problems in the 
candidate countries (to add to temporary compensations); 2. a concession to both 
Poland and the Czech Republic, which allowed them the option of transferring
43 There was also a Commission proposal to eliminate structural spending completely on areas with per 
capita GDP above 75%.
44 Agriculture has its own agricultural spending guidelines.
45 This made cohesion funds more prominent in Structural Funds (33% of structural action).
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Structural Funds monies to national budgetary subsidies in 2005-2006 (1 billion and 
300 million euro respectively from 2004-2006); and 3. extra-budgetary resources for 
border strengthening (for a breakdown of the payments and contributions of Poland 
and The Czech Republic see Table 5). In all, the Copenhagen framework was more 
modest and cautious than the Berlin framework with total payment commitments 
down several billion (see table 7), though discretionary transfers added some 
flexibility (the payments minus the contributions mean net payments from the EU to 
acceding countries of 13 billion euro).
Table 5: EU Appropriations of Payments to Czech Republic and Poland/ Domestic
Contributions to EU Budget 2004-2006
EU Appropriations 
M EU R1999 prices
Agriculture Structural
Funds46
Internal
Policies
Budgetary
Compensation
Payment to 
EU Budget
Czech Republic 975.1 950.4 247 746.3 2571
Poland 9804.6 3871.3 1190.8 1442.8 6500
European Council (2003), ‘Act on Conditions of Accession’ ; European Delegation in the 
Czech Republic (2004)
The preference of the core member-states was clearly to continue under the same 
spending limits, with a similar distribution between the existing member-states and 
the acceding countries. So, until 2006, most candidate countries will continue under 
similar financial frameworks as before accession.
The cautious post-accession financial framework has three effects. First, the limited 
transfers put pressure on the domestic budget in the candidate countries. Rollo (2003) 
points out that full implementation of the acquis would cost the new member-states on 
average 5-9% of existing government expenditure, without even the addition of the 
co-financing requirement in EU programming. An additional factor was the structural 
delay in the transfers to the national budget of both Structural Funds (there is a 7% 
advance for Structural Funds and a 20% advance for Cohesion Funds-complete 
transfers are normally made within 2 years), of the direct payments (up to a year), and 
of the market intervention instruments (2 months). Secondly, as table 5 indicates, EU 
membership implies a redistribution of national budgetary resources to the 
agricultural and regional development sectors under a limited overall improvement of 
the domestic budgetary situation. Third, relevant to the period after accession, the
46 In the Czech Case 20% was appropriated for Cohesion Funds with the rest for Structural Funds. In 
the Polish Case this ration was 18% to 82%.
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cautious financial framework questions the continuity of the current CAP and regional 
policy frameworks under current expenditure levels (see Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon 
2004, p. 9; Grosse and Olbrycht 2003b). Section 3.3 discusses the reform of CAP and 
the inclusion of the candidate countries within CAP.
3.3 The Evolution of CAP and Agricultural Funds
For CAP, the debate between European actors centred on how to reduce the overall 
costs of agricultural policy and include the candidate countries within CAP. These 
discussions intensified from the Berlin Council in 1999 onwards.
The MacSharry reforms of 1992 formed a basis for further reform.47 In 1997 after the 
Madrid Summit paved the way for enlargement, the Commission submitted a new 
series of guidelines to the Council focusing on: 1. the improvement of the 
competitiveness of European agriculture; 2. the reduction of the risk of expensive 
surpluses; 3. food safety and environmental concerns; 4. integrating rural 
development policy within CAP and within the agricultural budget; 5. the defence of 
the EU mode of agriculture in the next round of the WTO; and 6. the accommodation 
of new members within the existing regulations and budget (Pezaros, 1999).
However, the main factor in the proposals was a move started by MacSharry for 
further price cuts and a shift from a price support system towards a system of 
compensatory and production-linked direct payments. The argument between the 
Council and Commission was over the extent of the price cuts and indeed the levels of 
direct support.
The Berlin Summit of 1999 adopted the spirit of these proposals but limited the price 
cuts (especially in the arable crops, dairy, and beef sectors). It proposed to save by 
limiting subsidies to farmers’ incomes in the shape of compensatory payments (CP) . 
These CP came from the EAGGF. A proposal to have the member-states co-finance 
these payments was rejected. The Summit also did not cut the overall budget for CAP,
47 For further reading on the working and history of CAP and the MacSharry reforms see for instance 
Pelkmans 1997. On future reforms see for instance Swales 2002 and Thurston 2002. On CAP and 
development policy see Schmieg 1997
48 CP were given out to subsidise farmers’ income affected by price cuts in his particular production 
area. CP take up 50% of the EAGGF budget.
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but decided on the concept of stabilisation, whereby the agricultural budget remained 
stable adjusted for inflation until 200649. The candidate countries under this proposal 
would not receive any CP. The argument was that considering prices are lower in the 
candidate countries, such payments would not apply. It has to be noted that the 
amounts set aside for market measures and rural development during Berlin in the 
accession countries were rather small. Janusz Rowniski commented that the opinions 
of the candidate countries were completely ignored (Rowinski in Hunek and 
Rowinski 2000). The EU preferred to treat the candidate countries as a homogenous 
bloc, regardless of the systemic features of the respective agricultural sectors and the 
timing of accession. It also hardened the negotiating stance of the CEECs. Poland in 
particular stated that the ‘readiness to implement [CAP] ...depends on providing 
Polish Agriculture with access to all Common Agricultural Policy Instruments 
(including direct payments) (Chancellery of the Prime Minister of the Republic of 
Poland 2000a, p. 94)’. This was a specification of the unconditional adaptation and 
harmonisation proposed by the Polish Government in 1998.
An innovation in Berlin was the introduction of national envelopes, which represented 
a decentralisation of the disbursement of CP to the member-states. The member-states 
could also pick priorities and their criteria for disbursement within EC regulations. 
This has also been called a potential re-nationalisation of agricultural policy. The idea 
is to give the member-states and farmers incentives by linking CP to environmental 
goals (cross-compliance) and rural employment targets (modulation). Modulation will 
mean the gradual reduction of direct payments to larger farms. Modulation will begin 
in 2005 at 3% and rise to 5% in 2007. Pezaros (1999) notes that the administrative 
requirements for this new system in the member-states are extensive.
In rural development, the Berlin Summit made rural development policy applicable in 
all rural areas of the EU and it brought together the previous nine instruments into a 
single legal framework for rural development (Council Regulation(EC) No 
1257/1999). The increased financial resources would primarily come from the 
resources in the budget that are saved through cutbacks in CP and through 
modulation. The EU aims to use the funds saved by this modulation to support a new
49 Before enlargement market intervention takes up 12% of the total EU budget, direct payments 30%, 
and rural development 5% (source: DG Agriculture 2003).
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and strengthened rural development initiative, agreed to in the Luxemburg Council of 
June 2003 (see EC, CAP Reform: Presidency Compromise, 10961/03 2003). 
Moreover, the funding guidelines and monitoring were ‘simplified’ by 50%, so the 
member-states could adjust programming in the middle of a cycle (DG Agriculture
2003). An important ramification of this development was the increased discretion of 
the member-states in agricultural funds distribution. The member-states draw up their 
rural development programmes and are responsible for their implementation and co­
financing, depending on the type of region and type of measure. The Commission and 
the member-states then cooperate in ensuring the monitoring of the implementation of 
rural development policy (DG Agriculture 2003).
Though the Berlin Summit proposed some major philosophical departures from the 
basic price support under CAP, the outcomes were disappointing in terms of the cuts 
in support and the preparation for enlargement. The current Mid-Term Review for 
CAP reform, first proposed by the European Commission in July of 2002 and ratified 
in June of 2003, set out a common negotiating position for the introduction of direct 
payments in the candidate countries in terms of the system, the allocation, and the 
phasing-in of payments. The Review also broke the link between payments and 
production that the Berlin Summit had evaded (see EC, Cap Reform: Presidency 
Compromise, 10961/03 2003)50. The CAP Reform of June 2003 introduces single 
payments to the EU farmers that are not linked to production. It is a decouplement 
initiative, styled by the European Commission to give incentives to farmers to 
produce for the market rather than for a direct payment. Rollo (2003, p. 5) points out 
such decoupling is changing subsidies from ‘workfare’ to ‘welfare’. The new system 
will be introduced on 1 January 2005, but the member-states will have until 2007 to 
gradually decouple. Aside from single payments, there will be more emphasis on 
cross-compliance and modulation, as introduced in the Berlin Summit.
This latest CAP reform had direct implications for the candidate countries. First, the 
process for the phasing-in of direct aid was established in the Copenhagen Council, 
after being agreed to in principle at the Brussels Council (for amounts see table 6). 
Though Berlin eliminated direct payments for farmers in the candidate countries, the
50 The Mid-Term Review was a concession gained by the European Commission in Berlin and affirmed 
in Thessalonica in June 2003 over French objections.
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position proved untenable after further Commission analysis. The debate on the 
extension of the direct payments in the Brussels Council of 2004 pit the chief 
architects of reform in the CAP and perversely the major supporters of enlargement 
(the Netherlands, the UK and Sweden) against the major recipients of funds, France, 
Germany, and Spain (Mayhew 2003). A minimum target of 25% of EU payments 
given to the member-states was affirmed for 2004. This payment increases 5% of total 
payments per year until 2013 (see table 8). The candidate countries can top this 
amount up by 30% of the total EU payments to the ‘old’ member-states per year 
through either topping-up out of their EU rural development allocation and/or the 
national budget. However, this support cannot exceed on average 20% of the overall 
rural development funds allocated to a specific ‘new’ member-state. Similarly, the 
candidate countries can top these amounts up through their national budget, as long as 
support does not exceed the maximum direct payment under CAP in the EU 
(expressed as % of EU support average). From 2006, all top-up amounts in the ‘new’ 
member-states will be from the national budget. The candidate countries will be 
immediately eligible for market measures in CAP, such as intervention buying.
This system addressed the questions on how enlargement would be facilitated left 
unanswered in Berlin. However, both the Berlin and Copenhagen Summits evaded the 
exact breakdown of allocations to the member-states after the 2006 period. Also, it 
does not account for the escalation of direct payments to the acceding countries. 
Enlargement had to fit into the Berlin financial framework. It means, despite the 
budgetary margin shown in table 7 until 2006, that without an expansionary budget 
from 2006 (>=1.27% of EU GDP) CAP will have to be reformed either through: 1. an 
extended modulation linking payments to farm size (continued from the proposals at 
the Berlin Summit); 2. increasing or introducing co-financing requirements for the 
member-states; or 3. a ‘degressivity’ or reduction of existing support (Swinnen 2003). 
In this sense, the limits on direct payments to the new member-states are not only a 
result of a restrictive financial framework and a lack of ‘fairness’ in the negotiations 
with the acceding countries but also an anticipation of future reforms aimed at 
capping these direct payments driven by the Netherlands , Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom in particular. Both ‘degressivity’ and co-financing are in the transitional 
periods already applied to the acceding countries. In this sense, policy to the new
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member countries is a forerunner for CAP reform, much like similar correlated reform 
of pre-accession funds and regional funds.
Secondly, the CAP adjustment for the candidate countries built on proposals in the 
Berlin Summit that devolved many responsibilities for the administration of CAP and 
even financing to the national and regional levels. For the candidate countries, the 
option existed, instead of applying the standard direct payment system, to grant their 
farmers a decoupled area payment as a transition measure. Guba notes on the 
difference between the schemes that:
‘Under the standard system currently applied in the EU, the level of direct 
payments depends on the arable land area, head of cattle and production 
volume. Under the simplified system, the overall financial envelope 
negotiated for the entire country would be divided between farms 
proportionally to the size of arable land, regardless of the type of agricultural 
production carried out thereon. A farm would not have to be engaged in 
production to receive simplified payments and neither would there be a 
requirement to set aside a part of arable land (currently 10%) by large farms 
(with over 92 tonnes of potential cereal output) (Guba 2002, p. 1).’
In the candidate countries, more discretion for the national governments places more 
emphasis on the control of physical lands and financial control through the Internal 
Accounting and Control System (LACS) and the direct payment initiatives. This is 
similar to the EDIS mechanisms discussed earlier. Any direct payments scheme needs 
to be assessed initially after three years to ensure compliance with EU standards with 
the option of annual renewal for two more years.
Table 6: Allocation per Country in mio euro under Conclusions of Copenhagen 
Summit
Poland Direct Payment Market Measures Rural Development Policy
2004 135.2 781.2
2005 557 349.8 853.6
2006 675 376.5 908.2
Czech Direct Payment Market Measures Rural Development 
Republic Policy
2004 45 147.9
2005 169 109 161.6
2006 204 111 172
Source: EC 2002
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Table 7: Total Expenditures under Berlin Framework (in 1999 prices)
Appropriations (in bio. euro) 2003 2004 2005 2006
Direct Payments and 
Market Intervention
39.430 38.410 37.570 37.290
Rural Development 4.340 4.350 4.360 4.370
Structural Funds 27.670 27.080 27.080 26.660
Cohesion Funds 2.615 2.515 2.515 2.515
Pre-Accession Aid 3.120 3.120 3.120 3.120
Total Accession Payments 
to Accession Countries
6.710 9.090 11.440 14.220
Agriculture Commitment for Accession 1.890 3.746 4.145
Structural Commitment for Accession 6.123 6.984 8.882
Administration Commitment for Accession 1.471 1.441 1.385
Budgetary Compensation 1.273 1.173 9.39
Total Payments (total EU budget) 101.450 100.610 101.350 103.530
Ceiling on Payments (% of GDP) 1.19 1.15 1.13 1.10
Overall Ceiling (% of GDP) 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.27
Margin (% of GDP) 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.17
Source: EC 2003, ‘Conclusions of Copenhagen Council’, and Own Compilation
Table 8: Schedule br Direct Payments in CEEC-8 after Accession
Year EU Budget From National Budget(maximum top-up) Total
2004 25% 30% 55%
2005 30% 30% 60%
2006 35% 30% 65%
2007 40% 30% 70%
2008 50% 30% 80%
2009 60% 30% 90%
2010 70% 30% 100%
2011 80% 20% 100%
2012 90% 10% 100%
2013 100% 0 100%
Source: European Commission 2003
3.4 The Outcome of Negotiations on Enlargement
As stated earlier, an important outcome of negotiations was the direct payment 
scheme. This scheme also had to be consistent with the conclusions of the Presidency 
and the internal considerations of the Council of Ministers. Reference quantities of 
agricultural production based on recent production were agreed upon focusing on 
reference yields, quotas, national guaranteed quantities, compensation aid, processing 
aid, premiums. For rural development, a temporary rural development measure from
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2004-2006 would mean (Compiled from EC Report on the Results of the Negotiations 
2003):
• Differentiated appropriations to allow more time between rural development 
commitments and payments on the model of structural funds;
• Increased co-financing in Objective 1 areas up to a maximum of 80%;
• A temporary income support for semi-subsistence farms (a maximum of 1000 
euro per farm-in Poland 1250 euro). Eligibility will be dependent on the 
submission of a business plan (aid up to 5 years with a review after 3);
• Support to encourage the setting-up, and to facilitate the administrative 
operation of producer groups (5 years);
• A temporary measure to aid farmers for the period 2004-2006 to meet EU 
environmental, hygiene, welfare, food safety, and occupational safety 
standards;
• Technical assistance under EAGGF to ensure a smooth transition from 
SAPARD to the rural development ‘acquis’;
• A slow escalation of payments to allow for better absorption;
• Certain rural development measures will be adapted for new Member- States 
(such as LEADER).
For regional policy and Structural Funds, negotiations determined which areas were 
eligible under which EU classification. These negotiations had no transitional periods 
and determined only the approximate percentages of commitments available to the 
acceding countries. The negotiations did mention specifically that the distribution of 
funds was contingent on these countries meeting the administrative capacity 
requirements of the EU (EC Report on the Results of the Negotiations 2003, p. 41;
EC, Accession Treaty, 2003).
4. Conclusion
What do the reforms of the pre-accession templates mean in terms of the EU 
challenge to the domestic administration in regional and agricultural policy? To 
answer this question, it is first important to look at the patterns in the administrative 
requirements within the EU templates and the allocation and the direction of
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resources. Secondly, it is important to look at pre-accession templates, in terms of 
their continuity over time and their consistency with ongoing reform of policy in the 
EU.
Administrative Requirements and the Direction of Funding
Before 1997, PHARE was predominantly an aid programme. The European 
Commission had emphasised a wide involvement of national and regional partners in 
programming. This approach meant that national actors, such as line ministries and 
regional development agencies, could apply to the European Commission for funding, 
and upon approval these funds would be distributed directly to them (see for instance 
interview with John O’Rourke: Warsaw, January 21 2002). This approach meant that 
coordination and implementation of programming were fragmented in the executive 
and across the territorial administration. Furthermore, the European Commission still 
favoured territorial decentralisation in Central and Eastern Europe. To this end, many 
pilot projects focused on ‘bottom-up’ initiatives, which relied on regional partners.
The PHARE Reforms of 1997 involved a programmatic and financial 
proceduralisation of implementation (see also Glowacki 2002; interview with David 
Hudson: Brussels August 29 2001). This reform in the European Commission, as 
stated earlier, was driven by: a. efficiency and effectiveness considerations to 
decrease waste and raise the impact of programming; b. a focus on increasing the 
‘robustness’ of administrative capacity and absorption rates of funds in the candidate 
countries; and c. an emphasis in the pre-accession period on building specific 
procedural and administrative links to CAP and Structural Funds.
The PHARE Management Reforms would mean the horizontal and vertical 
centralisation of the management of EU pre-accession instruments. First, in 1997, the 
European Commission mandated the reduction of implementation agencies, changed 
the involvement of line ministries in implementation, and instituted stricter systems of 
financial control and monitoring. Secondly, The European Commission promoted 
‘domestic ownership’. Though the transfer of management responsibilities to the 
domestic level at first sight would seem to increase the domestic discretion in the 
organisation of the management of EU funds, EU requirements on co-financing and
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overall management limited the type of administrative bodies that could participate in 
EU funds management. Moreover, these requirements were a hurdle for participation 
of domestic administration in EU funds, in terms of the capacity required to deal with 
the complex EU management systems that controlled the transfer of competences to 
the domestic level (for instance DIS and EDIS).51
In terms of co-financing, the national co-financing requirement (on average 25%) 
created direct domestic ownership over programming. Aside from the demands of 
programming on the national budget, the co-financing requirement placed some 
operational risk with the national executive. This raised the stakes at the domestic 
level to improve financial management of programmes and the system of public 
finance as a whole, given the strained national budgets in the Czech Republic and 
Poland. Moreover, the irregularity report and financial corrections system, required 
under Structural Funds and operated in SAPARD, further increased the operational 
risk of programming at the domestic level. Thus, it was paramount to the domestic 
executive to have capable administrative units that performed financial control and 
implementation. This mostly meant a centralisation of management competences in 
central units like the National Fund, central coordination units, and a select number of 
implementation agencies. Finally, the co-financing requirement limited the type of 
administrative bodies that can implement to those funded by the national budget or 
affiliated to networks supported by budget-funded agencies, regional self-government, 
and the ministries.
In terms of the overall management of EU pre-accession funds, the European 
Commission relied on management systems such as DIS and EDIS. The complexity 
of these systems, in terms of the management and payment procedures, would test the 
robustness of domestic administration and consequently would limit the 
administrative bodies that could participate. This was especially the case in policy 
areas that used EDIS before accession, such as SAPARD, or had complex 
administrative requirements like IACS, such as CAP.
51 These systems also meant that the European Commission retained control over the project cycle on 
an ex- ante and/or ex-post basis through monitoring, steering, and final audit.
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The stated preference in the European Commission to rationalise domestic 
administration and to rely on specific domestic administration with a capacity to 
implement was not always consistent with its own financial requirements. As stated in 
section 2.1.b, differing opinions in the European Commission highlighted the 
difficulty in finding a balance between improving absorption (administration- 
building) and compliance. The reliance on special-purpose administration would put 
pressure on domestic executives to integrate these administrations in the national 
budget. This would be a major challenge to the executive set-ups in the Czech 
Republic and Poland.
In terms of the involvement of regions in programming, the EU’s preferences in 
programming show that monitoring, control functions, and payment procedures have 
to be performed at the national level. As Kazmierczak explains European officers 
prefer centralised reporting on programming and the control of programming 
(Interview with Agnieszka Kazmierczak: Warsaw, January 22 2002). Listzwan (2003, 
p. 258) comments on the Directorate General for Agriculture as ‘having a primary 
interest in simplicity, financial accountability and the compliance of the programme 
with the acquis, especially [with] [considering] the views of the Member-states. 
Although, strictly speaking regionally-neutral, the Commission’s emphasis on 
“simplicity”, financial accountability and transparency of procedures tends to favour 
central solutions’. In short, from a relatively diffuse implementation in the early pre­
accession period, from 1997 onwards the organisation of both implementation and 
coordination was increasingly shaped by the national executive. Moreover, the notion 
of ‘partnership’, aside from project identification, was vague on the involvement of 
regions in implementation. This role became more consultative. Though PHARE 
programming would still require regional structures and input, PHARE Reforms had 
mediated the initial EU pressure on the candidate countries to decentralise territorial 
administration.
The allocation of resources seems to confirm the pattern of centralisation noted above. 
First, the allocation of finances showed a rigid overall framework. This rigidity meant 
that for Poland and the Czech Republic budgetary problems would remain after 
accession. Lump-sum payments and advances on Structural Funds are probably too 
limited to offset the additional administrative demands and difficult domestic
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budgetary situation. Given the overall ceiling on EU expenditure, the effective 
targeting and efficient absorption of existing resources became even more crucial. The 
focus under PHARE ESC starting with PHARE 2001 and PHARE 2002 was on SME 
development, the development of human resources, and training (through Twinning). 
These programmes favoured those types of central administrative units with 
experience in these types of activities. Straightforward regional policy initiatives were 
scaled back under PHARE 2000 (see table 1). PHARE 2002 would reduce regional 
programmes into one joint operational programme and rely more heavily on sectoral 
programmes to be administered by the national executive. Similarly, there was a 
limited provision of funds for the regional administration in both PHARE and 
‘Twinning’. Aside from a bias towards centrally administered projects, the 
Commission would also favour projects with a higher prospect of implementation in 
ISPA. The ISPA Management Committee agreed the up to 60% of resources allocated 
to the candidate countries would go to transport projects, due to the poor quality of 
environmental projects (see table 3).
Continuity over Time and Consistency with Ongoing Reform of EU Policy
The strength of the EU challenge to the domestic polity also depends on the continuity 
of the EU templates over time and their compatibility with ongoing reform of EU 
policy.
The continuity of the pre-accession template over time was a factor in the 
implementation of EU funds and especially PHARE. The domestic administration had 
to cope with new institutional templates associated with the agricultural payments, 
Cohesion Funds, and Structural Funds. The 1999 ‘sector letter’ on PHARE by the 
Court of Auditors criticised the disruption caused in the candidate countries and the 
Commission by the frequent changes in PHARE management and in the direction of 
programming. Some of which had not been worked out in advance and limited the 
impact of programming (cited in DG Enlargement, PHARE 2000 Review, 2000). This 
situation was also a function of the institutional set-up at the European level. The 
research has mentioned the sometimes poor coordination within the European 
Commission before. The EU guidelines in this way could be changeable, vague, and 
paradoxical.
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However, steps were also taken to address this weakness. For instance, the 
introduction of the multi-annual indication in pre-accession programming aimed to 
limit the provisionally of programming, which was previously conditional on annual 
renewal. The absorption of ISPA into the Cohesion Fund upon accession without a 
transition facility is the most direct example of linked programming. SAPARD also 
shows a great continuity in its administrative set-up from the pre-accession period to 
CAP via a transition facility. Further, SAPARD programming is even more 
prescriptive than the operational programmes in CAP (see section 2.2). Only, in 
‘twinning’ and PHARE was there no clear continuity between the pre-accession and 
the post-accession templates (see section 2.2). Clearly, this was also a function of a 
less dense ‘acquis’ in regional policy compared to agricultural policy. However, CAP 
with a dense ‘acquis’, as described in section 3.3, produced more transition periods 
than regional policy, offering national actors some flexibility. The system for direct 
payments is an obvious example. A lack of continuity or the presence of some 
flexibility in the template gave the domestic administration discretion, as chapters 5-8 
will show, to avert EU pressure to adapt or shape the administrative organisation.
The reform of the pre-accession templates was compatible with the reform of 
Structural Funds and CAP in 1999. These reforms aimed to resolve the multi-level 
division of competences in the administration of funds. This meant devolving certain 
competences associated with its supra-national governance back to the national level. 
Modulation and cross-compliance in CAP are examples of this point, as are increasing 
rates of domestic co-financing in Structural Funds after the reforms of Funds in 1999. 
Much of this reform was ongoing, but the imminent enlargement clearly sped up 
reform. This enlargement not only heightened the debate on the capacity of the 
Commission to deal with the complex programming of EU funds, but also led directly 
to new procedures in which the Commission performs ex-post control. EDIS also 
gives flexibility in how member-states organise implementation. Programming 
became even more region-based (national), with less emphasis on the Community 
Initiative. Rural development policy, such as SAPARD, would become far more 
prominent in CAP (Interview with Etienne Claeye: Brussels October 25 2001). 
Reforms of CAP, rural development, and Structural Funds seemed to assign fewer 
competences to the European Commission and asserted the role of national
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governments in the management, the payment procedures, and the direct national 
financing of traditional EU policy areas. However, similar to PHARE, the transfer of 
management competences to the domestic level (or ‘domestic ownership’) would also 
increase the administrative and regulatory burden on the member-states.
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Chapter 5: The Management of Regional Policy and 
the Administration of the EU Pre-accession 
Instruments in the Czech Republic
1. Regional Policy in the Czech Republic
The European pre-accession process after 1997 would challenge the Czech state in 
terms of three ‘misfits’: 1. the formation of a regional policy; 2. the introduction of a 
middle-tier of administration; and 3. the presence of effective administration capable 
of coordinating and implementing regional policy. The first point implies an 
important change to sectoral institutional arrangements (high ‘misfit’). The last two 
points are instances, where sectoral adoption of EU regional policy provides 
challenges to the macro-institutional context. Territorial decentralisation is a 
challenge to the vertically centralised executive in the Czech Republic. Point 3 could 
imply an assertion of central coordination units in an executive system in which 
ministerial autonomy was high.
However, the EU requirements based on a shallow ‘acquis’ and through temporal 
factors such as the PHARE Reforms allowed considerable discretion to the domestic 
administrative actors to avert the costs of adaptation and shape the domestic polity. 
The first section of this chapter will look at reform of administration from 1992 to 
2002, the formation of regional policy, and the financing of the regions. The second 
part of the chapter will look at the implementation of the pre-accession funds.
1.1 Initial Reforms in 1989 and the Early 1990s
Communism had produced a strongly centralised planning system dominated by 
single national plans. These plans were administered by hierarchically organised 
National Committees, which represented the state power at the district and municipal 
level (Blazek and Kara 1992; Sykora 1999). Adjustments in the system were made in 
the 1960s and 1970s, as the focus shifted away from wholemeal industrialisation, the 
centralisation of the distribution of resources and economic growth targets.
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The implementation of this decentralisation ended when the political transformation 
occurred in 1989. In 1990 under the Pithart government dominated by Civic Forum, 
the ‘Municipalities Act and District Office Act’ created a new system of local 
government by which the Regional National Committees were abolished. Ministerial 
offices remained at the sub-national levels of territorial administration. Reschova 
(1993, p. 1) comments on the proposals that the ‘reform was undertaken hastily and 
the original concept of local/central relations was unbalanced.’ Although the reforms 
reflected a political desire to establish liberal self-government at the municipal level, 
it was difficult to identify the balance between the autonomous and delegated powers 
of the municipalities in the absence of intermediate levels of self-government and due 
to the authorities of the state in the region (Reschova, 1993). District National 
Committees were replaced by District Offices, which became the extensions of the 
state (under the Ministry of the Interior with district departments under the respective 
line ministries). On the sub-regional level, municipalities became the basic units of 
self-government (Dostal and Kara 1992). Regional self-government consisting of 7 
regions had been abandoned by the republican government.
In regional policy, the ‘Municipal and District Office Act’ seemed to signify an 
abandonment of planning (MRD 1999c). The end of communism had bred a 
widespread contempt for economic planning. Nonetheless, the essence of intervention 
stayed the same. State intervention continued to be considered the best solution for the 
transformation of the Czech economy into a market economy (Cemoch and Jacoby, 
2002). Regional problems would fit into the larger economic policy. The ‘Regional 
Policy Act from 1991’ is an example of this approach.
The neglect of regional policy has a variety of causes52. First, Blazek points out that 
regional disparities at the time of transition were relatively low (Blazek 2000). 
Czechoslovakia in effect was a country that had a relatively even regional 
development. This situation changed in the middle of the 1990s. Interregional 
disparities had been growing since the start of economic transition (Blazek, 1997;
52 Lao Paul (1995, pg. 40) argues in looking at regional policy in Central and Eastern Europe that the 
‘intcrrelativeness of economic, legal, and political reforms’ should be kept in mind. He sees seven 
groips as influencing regional development policy: the political context, international organisations, 
macroeconomic reforms, foreign investors, local initiatives, regional policy and geographical location’.
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Blazek 2000, p. 373). Rising unemployment was a potentially debilitating political 
problem for the national political actors in a budding democracy. In certain areas such 
as North Bohemia and Northeast Moravia, regional actors started to put pressure on 
the government to address regional development and especially job creation. Blazek’s 
argument that regional disparities might have significantly contributed to the break-up 
of Czechoslovakia shows to some extent the grave consequences regional imbalances 
could have (Blazek, 1996). Ironically, the Czech government’s response to the 
growing regional problems was to increasingly rely on the ‘old socialist logic’ of state 
intervention (Cemoch and Jacoby 2002). Regional development policy would take a 
backseat to industrial policy at the national level (MRD 1999c).
Secondly, regional offices as an extension of the centralist former communist 
government were seen as centres of influence of the communist cadres. Blazek (1997, 
p 43) points out that the elimination of regional structures was mainly justified by ‘the 
profiles of the regional leaders and the majority of its staff. Such elimination fit into a 
process of reducing the size of government as a whole, an important point on the 
agenda of the Klaus government after 1992.
Third, regional policy suffered under what Cemoch and Jacoby label ‘the uncertainty 
about the durability of the state’ (Cemoch and Jacoby, 2002). The events leading up 
to the ‘velvet divorce’ in 1993 meant no government would systematically design a 
regional policy as long as question marks existed over the future of the Czechoslovak 
federation. Vaclav Klaus’ ‘one country’ idea fit right into the centralist thinking of the 
political elite in 1993.
1.2 The Klaus Years: 1992 to 1997
The coalition governments under Prime Minister, Vaclav Klaus, consisting of his 
Civic-Democratic Party (ODS), The Christian Democratic Party (KDS)53, the 
Christian and Democratic Union and Czechoslovak People’s Party (KDU/CSL) and 
the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) continued on the path of centralisation. This 
path had two main characteristics. First the prevention or undermining of the
53 The KDS would merge with the ODS in 1995.
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formation of bodies on the regional and central levels, which could coordinate and 
administer regional policy, meant an incomplete institution-building at the regional 
level (Cemoch and Jacoby 2002, p. 5) and lack of coordination among ministries on 
the central level (MRD 1999c). Secondly, the inflation of the numbers of bodies 
engaged in regional policy at the central level undermined and fragmented the 
authority of regional bodies and in particular municipal self-government.
The attitude of the Klaus government also was in violation of the spirit of Article 99 
of the Czech Constitution of 1992, which included a reference to the creation of a 
middle-tier of regional government in the territorial administration of the Czech 
Republic. This ‘new’ layer of government went beyond the already existing district 
offices, which represented the state government on the district level. The idea behind 
Article 99 of the Constitution was to loosen the grip of the central authorities and 
produce diffusion of authority through the regional governments, as well as to create 
additional implementation infrastructure to promote the integration of the Czech 
Republic in the European Union. However, the attitude of the ODS to territorial 
reform was summed up by Klaus in 1996: "After having successfully abolished 
regions in 1990, do we really want a new regional bureaucracy?” (Klaus quoted in 
Beckman 1999) Further, in 1992, the ‘Act on Principles of Government Economic 
Policy’ strengthened the notion that regional policy was seen mostly in support of the 
development of a market economy.
After the re-election of the ODS-led coalition government under Klaus in 1996, a 
cabinet reshuffle produced the abolition of the Ministry of Economy. A quite minor 
Ministry for Economic Competition was also abolished. There were a variety of 
reasons to break up the Ministry of Economy. The exclusive central role for the 
Ministry of Economy in economic policy was a product of the consolidation of 
economic policy in the early 1990s driven by the de-federalisation of Czechoslovakia, 
the abolition of communist-era central planning structures such as the State Planning 
Commission, and the needs of economic transition. In 1996, at a time of economic 
crisis, Klaus proposed a more diversified economic policy. There existed a desire for 
specialised ministries to deal with industry and trade policy. Also, splitting the 
Ministry of Economy would inadvertently strengthen the hand of the Ministry of 
Finance, a ministry crucial to the neo-liberal reforms and largely designed by Klaus
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after 1989. The incorporation into the Ministry of Finance of the Ministry of National 
Property Administration signified a trend towards the consolidation of specific 
privatisation competences established at transition in one ministry. Authorities over 
economic policy were divided among the Ministry for Industry and Trade, the 
Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications, the Ministry of Finance, and a newly 
created Ministry for Regional Development.
The Ministry for Regional Development was charged in the ‘Powers and Functions’ 
Law No. 272/1996 Coll. with the coordination of the implementation of state regional 
policy and the administration of funds. However, the ministry for Regional 
Development was seen as a junior player in the cabinet54. The existence of the 
Ministry for Regional Development owed more to Klaus’ desire to break up the 
Ministry of Economy than to a newly found interest in regional policy. The only 
policy area the Ministry for Regional Development had any authority over was 
housing. It quickly was dubbed the ‘housing ministry’ (Cemoch and Jacoby 2002, p,
8). Secondly, the ministry did not design or apply any regional policy programmes 
until 1999 (Sykora 1999). Its 1997 policy draft on the principles of regional 
government was not adopted by the government. The Ministry neither managed to 
fulfil its original mandate in administering funds (MRD 2002). Its limited budget 
basically meant few regional investments on behalf of the ministry could be made. In 
essence, regional policy remained an ‘ad hoc response’ to economic crises and 
provided limited support to small to medium-size companies (Sykora, 1999).
The management of regional development policy shows the importance of policy 
coordination in the cabinet. This coordination is directly related to the role of the 
Prime Minister in the executive. According to the Constitution, the Prime Minister 
organises government activities, acts on its behalf and coordinates the ministries. The 
Prime Minister does nominate the ministers in the cabinet, but does not have formal 
powers to control their ministerial work. They are appointed and dismissed, as is the 
Prime Minister, by the President. The ministries themselves are established and their 
competences determined by an Act of Parliament (SIGMA 1999, p. 8). Ministries are 
also responsible for the determination of their own internal organisation. Similarly,
54 The post of Minister of Regional Development was given to a junior coalition partner, the KDU- 
CSL.
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the Prime Minister does not have any direct control over coordination committees, 
councils, and advisory bodies. The post of Prime Minister remains under­
institutionalised. This weak institutionalisation can lead to either a strong Prime 
Minister with much executive discretion in policy areas as in the case of Klaus, who 
dominated economic management and abolished Deputy Prime Ministers in 1993 or a 
weaker one as in the case of Milos Zeman, who needed to be more consultative with 
his party and cabinet. Similarly, ministerial and prime ministerial discretion can 
increase the centralisation of policy coordination. Under the Zeman and Spidla 
administrations, coordination would be decentralised in what SIGMA categorises as 
advisory, consultative, and truly inter-ministerial committees (SIGMA 1999, p. 11; 
OECD 2001). The members of the advisory bodies are appointed by a government 
resolution signed by the Prime Minister. The consultative bodies are mostly ad hoc 
committees chaired by a respective minister, who also appoints the members of the 
committee. Inter-ministerial coordination is normally conducted on Deputy Minister 
level. The committees are chaired by the Deputy Minister of the leading ministry and 
incorporate all Deputy Ministers and heads of central state agencies. These bodies 
coordinate and prepare cabinet decisions.
At the core executive level under Klaus, the government’s office supported the Prime 
Minister and provided technical and administrative support for the cabinet. Under the 
government of Prime Minister Zeman, the government’s office pursuant the ‘Act of 
Competencies’ was expanded to include the secretariats of the newly appointed four 
Deputy Prime Ministers and the organisation of councils and committees. This 
appointment in a way acknowledged the ministerial autonomy in its relationship to the 
core executive. The nomination of these Deputy Prime Minister also had effects for 
the management of relations with the EU. After an initial experiment with a Deputy 
Prime Minister responsible for the overall coordination of the preparation for EU 
membership reporting to the Prime Minister, these plans were abandoned. The 
Minister of Foreign Affairs retained overall responsibility for the relationship with the 
EU. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was subsequently upgraded to Deputy Prime 
Minister. Brusis and Dimitrov (2001, p. 903) point out the reintroduction of Deputy 
Prime Ministers ‘served to weaken rather than strengthen the Prime Minister, as the 
Prime Minister had to balance rivalries between these Deputy Prime Ministers’. This
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weakening also served to increase the discretion of the line ministries in economic 
management.
1.3 European Union and the Zeman Administration from 1998 to 
2002
1.3.a A New Regional Policy
Two main changes occurred in the year from 1996 to 1997. In January 1996, the 
Czech Republic applied for European Union membership. European scrutiny exposed 
the ‘misfit’ between the EU template and Czech template in regional policy, namely 
the highly centralised approach in policy administration and the lack of territorial 
decentralisation. The European Commission first pressurised the Czech government 
to formulate a regional policy and set out regional development priorities. Secondly, 
the Czech government needed to find regional partners to draw up these priorities and 
implement them. The first European Commission opinion on the Czech Republic’s 
application for membership of the European Union was quite frank. It stated ‘the 
Czech Republic lacks an independent regional policy’ and ‘financial resources at the 
disposal of regional policy should be increased and efficient instruments need to be 
created’ (EC, Regular Report 1997, p. 84). This point particularly addresses the 
weakness of the Ministry of Regional Development as a national coordinator and also 
criticises the practice of dividing regional policy according to sectoral lines, rather 
than developing an integrated approach with direct operational input from the regions. 
On the topic of creating a framework, the European Commission mentions ‘the Czech 
Republic needs to establish a legal, administrative, and budgetary framework for an 
integrated regional policy and ensure its compliance with EU rules’ (EC, Regular 
Report 1997, p. 84).
The second component to the changing dynamic was the resignation of the Klaus 
government in November of 1997. There were three main factors behind this 
resignation. First, the re-emergence of the Social Democrats (CSSD) as a party- 
political force in the elections of 1996 meant that the broad Klaus coalition had a 
minority by one seat in the lower chamber, whose chairman in a complicated co­
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existence with the executive was the CSSD chairman. Secondly, the 1997 currency 
and economic crisis played in the hands of opposition parties, as it undermined Klaus’ 
reputation on economic management. Thirdly, a scandal emerged concerning ODS’ 
party financing. Consequently, the KDU-CSL and ODA resigned from the ruling 
coalition in November 1997. A caretaker government under Josef Tosovsky, governor 
of the Czech National Bank, was appointed by President Vaclav Havel until the 
general elections in April 1998. This government set out to manage some reforms in 
regional policy and public administration. The main accomplishment at the end of 
1997 was the ‘Constitutional Act no. 347 on the Formation of Higher Territorial 
Units’. This act was very much in line with Article 99 of the constitution and set out 
to form a middle-tier of government, which would be the higher regional tier of 
government. As Illner (1998) points out, without this level any reform of territorial 
administration was incomplete. The Act, passed by both houses of parliament, would 
come into effect on January 1, 2000.
The election in June of 1998 produced a Social Democratic minority government led 
by the CSSD chairman, Milos Zeman. The CSSD would govern the Czech Republic 
in an unexpected ‘opposition pact’ with the ODS of Vaclav Klaus until May 2002.
The ODS agreed to tolerate a minority government and gained the chairmanship of 
both houses of parliament (Kostelecky 2002). Zeman directly linked the establishment 
of a middle-tier administration to the EU by stating in parliament that the EU 
requirement was the logic behind the creation of the regions (Beckman 1999). 
Moreover in the Zeman government, as Rovna (2002, p. 201) notes, ‘Europe’ became 
a domestic issue rather than a ‘foreign policy question’.
The logic for territorial reform further grew out of the constraints placed on the 
minority government. Territorial reform was not only a product of the CSSD election 
platform to fulfil the Constitution, but also a way, as a bulletin of the Ministry of the 
Interior points out, to improve the management of socio-economic development (see 
C A R O L I N A  report No 298, Friday, July 31,1998 and Beckman, 1999). Further, 
it was one of the few policy areas in which the government could follow its own 
agenda for reform. The opposition pact with the fiscally conservative ODS limited the
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budget deficit the government could run at a time of budgetary crisis.55 56 Also, there 
was pressure from the European Commission to moderate fiscal policy. These factors 
constrained spending policy and investments within the ministries at a time of 
economic downturn. Additionally, the CSSD was internally split between the left 
leaning Minister for Labour and Social Affairs, Vladimir Spidla and the more fiscally 
conservative Minister of Finance, Pawel Mertlik. They were both Deputy Prime 
Ministers in the administration. Spidla57 was in favour of expanding social spending,
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whereas Mertlik was strengthened by, but at the same time beholden to, the 
agreement with the opposition.
1.3.b Territorial Administration and Public Administration Reform
The first step was to formally set out to change the territorial administration to 
provide an organisation consistent with the requirements for the implementation of 
EU Structural Funds. This reform would increasingly run parallel to the changes in 
territorial administration envisioned in Article 99 of the Constitution and the 
Constitutional Act of late 1997. The ODS had repeatedly vetoed such a bill since the 
initial proposal in 1994 citing its lack of limits on regulations the regional assemblies 
might impose on the core executive and the creation of unnecessary administrative 
divisions in the country (Pitkin, 2000)59.
The Formation of Krajs
55 The Pact also meant a say for the ODS in reform of the constitution and electoral law. The ODS and 
CSSD had undertaken that ‘long-term political stability’ required changes in the constitution to lower 
the power of the president and a change in electoral law by reducing the role of smaller parties in the 
lower house (Hanley, Election Briefing 2002).
56 In 1999, the opposition agreement was amended to produce more collaboration on EU accession, 
mostly in response to criticisms on progress in the ‘Regular Reports’ (Rovna 2002).
57 Vladimir Spidla replaced Milos Zeman as chairman of the CSSD in April of 2001 and became Prime 
Minister of a CSSD and KDU/CSL coalition government in May 2002 (see Pehe RFE/RL 21/8/2002).
58 Mertlik, under pressure from the left in the CSSD and Opposition Pact, would resign in April 2001. 
For an overview of the fiscal executive configuration, see Bmsis and Dimitrov (2001).
59 Beckman (1999) argues that most parties in parliament had been lukewarm on devolution, either on 
how the regions should be constituted or what kind of competences they should have. This also 
included the KDU-CSL, traditionally a promoter of civil society and decentralisation of the state.
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The Constitutional Act of 199760 established 14 regional self-governments (krajs61) 
within the Czech Republic . There were two components in the establishment of the 
competences of regional administration: 1. a ‘top-down’ decentralisation of 
administration from the national executive level; and 2. a ‘bottom-up’ disbandment of 
district offices. The Ministry of Regional Development (MRD) comments the 
‘regional bodies will constitute the basic unit for planning and implementing regional 
development in the CR, coordinate the development of their territories, cooperate with 
central administration authorities, and coordinate the interests of municipalities’
(MRD 2002, p. 19). Two main forces shaped decentralisation. First, the national 
ministries, with great autonomy in the executive configuration, sought to maintain 
their competences and power. Secondly, the choice of 14 regions had been basically 
pushed through by the major cities, which wanted to cement their place at the centre 
of local government (Interview with Pavel Cemoch: Prague April 22 2002). The 
formation of regions around urban centres was also a process driven by the ODS in 
opposition.63
From a top-down perspective, a decentralisation of competences occurred. The MRD, 
the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Environment closed their sub-national 
offices, and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs was due to do so in 2001. Their 
territorial competences were changed to be in line with the newly created regions. In
60 In 2000, the Constitutional Act no. 347 of 1997 on the Formation of Higher Territorial 
Administration Units was implemented. The ‘Act on the Regions’ (no. 129) of 2000 outlined the 
establishment of the regions as basic units of regional development. The Act also divides the powers 
between municipal councils and the regions’ assemblies. Art 104(2) of the Constitution subrogates the 
authority from the municipal council to the regional assembly and outlines the independence of regions 
in managing its budget and assets. The regional assembly has authority in a. co-ordination of 
development of territory, programming, and monitoring b. approval of zoning document c. election of 
representatives to regional councils in cohesion regions (NUTS 2) d. definition of scope of transport 
services to provide e. decisions on cooperation with other regions e. approval of the regional budget 
(MRD 2002, pg. 28).
61 The kraj structure was first introduced in 1919 to balance the influence of the Slovaks and Sudeten 
Germans in the Czechoslovak federation (Interview with Pavel Cemoch: Prague, April 2002).
6215 if you include the capital city area of Prague as a self-governing area.
63 Suggestions have been made that the decentralisation of government was pursued by the CSSD to 
produce electoral gains. Evidence does not seem to suggest this point. The ODS took the regional 
election by winning seven out of 13 contested electoral regions and winning 27.41% of the total 
mandates contested (Czech Electoral Commission 2002). This also reflects on the ODS strategy in the 
regional reform of 1998 of basing regions around major urban centres. The KDU-CSL won in five 
regions with an average share of mandates close to 23%. The Communist Party (KCSM) won the 
remaining region and came second in seven others. The CSSD won about 16 to 17% of the mandates. 
The defeat in the 2000 regional elections can directly be linked to two main factors: 1. the low turnout 
between 20 to 40% in most regions favouring the KDU-CSL and the communist party; and 2. the 
electorate’s growing disaffection of the ‘opposition pact’ the CSSD had signed in 1998 with the ODS 
(see also Pitkin 2000; Horakova and Hrobsky in Radio Prague, 4/11/2002).
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terms of staffing, the regions recruited one half of their new public servants. The other 
half came from transfers of the ‘deconcentrated’ central administration (OECD 2001). 
However, this decentralisation was checked. The Constitution stipulated that the 
central government through the Ministry of Interior and the relevant sectoral ministry 
can influence regions’ activities to safeguard its statutory rights and obligations. In 
terms of delegated competences, the regions remained subordinate to the sectoral 
central ministries. The Ministry of Interior coordinated and controlled issues of 
delegation. As section 1.3.d shows, the line ministries also maintained control over 
the decentralisation of resources.
From a bottom-up perspective, the elimination of the district offices under 
Government Resolutions No. 258 of 1999 and no. 511 of 1999, can be seen as a 
transfer of state competences to the local and regional levels. The district offices were 
the state offices on the district level. District offices were very popular among Czechs. 
Cemoch calls them ‘one aspect of Czech administration that works’ (Interview with 
Pavel Cemoch: Prague April 22 2002). In the process of distributing the authorities of 
district offices, mostly to municipalities (80% of competences of districts would be 
transferred to the municipal level [Josef Postranecky, Deputy Minister of the Interior 
in Czech in MRD 2003]), the ability of municipalities to implement is dubious (see 
also Filip de Rynck in Czech MRD 2003). In 1989, due to the aversion of the 
centralised form of administration under the communist regime, some 2000 new 
municipalities were introduced under the Municipal Act of 1990, of which a 
substantial number have a population under 200 (Blazek 1997, p. 43). Many of these 
municipalities are too small to provide effective local government, with problems in 
financing and poor management of public services.
The transfer of the competences of the district authorities, as stipulated in Act no. 147 
of May 2000 on District Authorities, has at the time of publication not been 
concluded. With a deadline of January 1, 2003 having passed, it appears the 
government is looking for a triple structure in terms of the organisation of 
municipalities. To counter the problem of ineffective municipal administration, the 
government proposes to have municipalities with different authorisation. This 
authorisation is based on size, geographic criteria and also the opinion of the 
municipal authorities. The idea behind this structure is to have the larger
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municipalities take over the functions of the district offices and distribute some 
authorities to the second degree municipalities (Interview with Jiri Blazek: Prague 
April 23 2002)64. However, the transfer of responsibilities to Land Register Offices is 
mostly seen as way to maintain certain competences on the district level under the 
supervision of the central state. It is also still unclear where the functions of 
verification and expert activities of districts in pre-accession programming such as 
S APARD will take place (Kamila Matouskova in Czech MRD 2003). Still, the 
abandonment of district offices is mostly seen as a victory for the larger 
municipalities or provincial cities, which form the geographic basis for krajs 
(Interview with Pavel Cemoch: Prague April 22 2002). Thus, such ‘krajs’ 
strengthened their competences. However, the line ministries through their agencies 
and regional offices indirectly took over competences, as newly created self- 
government bodies on the kraj level were often incapable of guaranteeing the full 
functioning of their regional authorities (MRD, 2002).
Cohesion Regions
Due to the lack of capacity in the regions, a thin EU regional policy, the constitutional 
control on delegation and fluid distribution of competences, the line ministries could 
maintain or enhance their competences in territorial administration (Interview with 
Pavel Cemoch: Prague April 22 2002). This statement would also be a characteristic 
of how the implementation of Structural Funds was organised and specifically how 
the ‘cohesion regions’ were set up. The set-up for Structural Funds at the regional 
level in terms of the ‘cohesion regions’ was provisional. These regions would only 
operate for the duration of the Czech Republic maintaining objective 1 status. The line 
ministries would retain most operational responsibilities in implementation.
Moreover, the ‘cohesion regions’ would suffer from krajs trying to assert themselves 
in the institutional set-up. The ‘cohesion regions’ functioned mostly on a consultative 
level and had a role in project selection.
Government Resolutions no. 417 of June 1998 no. 707 of October 1998 aimed to 
provide the organisational changes required for Structural Funds. These changes
64 Diner (1998) argues that middle-tier regional reform was difficult without the stabDisation and 
amalgamation of local government.
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involved setting up overall coordination on the central state level in the shape of 
National Programming Committees and Monitoring Committee for Economic and 
Social Cohesion, and constituting territorial units according to NUTS (la 
Nomenclature des Unites Territoriales Statistiques) at the regional level. Moreover, 
committees consisting of the respective departments within the ministries would 
prepare the most important programming documents such as the sectoral operational 
programmes and the regional development plan (RDP).
On the NUTS requirement, it was important for the Czech government to design 
territorial statistics in compliance with EUROSTAT requirements65. The classification 
of NUTS areas is based on the number of inhabitants and the square area of a region. 
These 14 regions or krajs however were too small according to EUROSTAT 
requirements66 for ‘cohesion region’ designation on which structural funds are based. 
The solution was to amalgamate several of the 14 provinces or krajs into the NUTS 2 
‘cohesion regions’. The results were that Karlovarsky and Ustecky Krajs would form 
the Northwest cohesion region, the Plzensky and Jihocesky Krajs would form the 
Southwest cohesion region, Vysocina and Jihomoravsky Krajs would form the 
Southeast cohesion region, the Liberecky, Kralovehradecky, and Pardubicky Krajs 
formed the Northeast cohesion region, and the Olomoucky and Zlinsky Krajs formed 
the Central Moravia cohesion region. Only the Stredocesky Kraj and Moravska- 
Slezsky Krajs are compatible with the requirements for cohesion regions. They would 
form the Central Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia cohesion regions respectively.
The relative newness of the regional self-governments in 2000 and the emergence of 8 
‘cohesion regions’ put forward the idea that parallel regional structures would 
develop, rather than a structure in which the ‘cohesion regions’ channelled the 
interests of the 14 krajs incorporated within them. This idea was further strengthened 
in 1999, when the 14 Regional Coordination Committees set up to programme and
65 Though Hughes, Sasse and Gordon (2004) question the firmness of such requirements by naming 
adoption the fulfilment of a ‘gentleman’s agreement’, certain criteria on size were indeed firm.
66 The whole of the Czech Republic would be the NUTS 1 area and objective 1. Objective 1 means an 
area with a GDP below 75% of the European Union average. The ‘cohesion regions’ would be NUTS 2 
areas. The new regions (krajs) devised by the Constitutional Act of 1997 would be the NUTS 3 areas 
with the districts NUTS 4 areas and the municipalities NUTS 5 areas. The role of the state at NUTS 1 
level is policy-making and to support regional development including the provision of the state budget 
and adequate legislative measures (MRD, 2002). The ‘cohesion regions’ prepare the regional 
programmes.
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monitor regional development policy in the Czech Republic under the principles of 
Structural Funds would be replaced by 8 Regional Management and Monitoring 
Committees (MRD 1999c). Interviews with Jiri Eisenhammer and Jiri Blazek show 
some confusion at the state level over the actual distribution of responsibilities 
between the state and the regions and between the ‘cohesion regions’ and the 14 self- 
government regions (Interviews with Jiri Eisenhammer: Prague April 23 2002, and 
Jiri Blazek: Prague, April 23, 2002). However, the interviewees both feel that the 
development of parallel structures on NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 levels is less likely than 
the line ministries asserting more authority over the Structural Funds implementation 
set-up.
In the cases where the cohesion region is compatible in size and area with the kraj or 
‘region’, there is no noticeable problem in agenda-setting in the Regional Council.
The Regional Council of the cohesion region would consist of 10 to 12 
representatives elected by the regional assembly on NUTS 3 level (Interview with Jiri 
Blazek: Prague April 23 2002). In the case of Ostrava and the Central Bohemia, the 
NUTS 2 area is identical to the NUTS 3 area and the regional authorities fulfil the role 
of the Regional Council (this is the general rule in the ‘Act on Support for Regional 
Development’) (Interview with Jiri Blazek: Prague, April 23 2002). However, there 
are indications that potentially the Regional Councils consisting of 2 to the 3 krajs 
(here the 12 seats would be divided over the 2 or 3 krajs with every kraj receiving 
even representation [so 6 each in the event of 2 krajs or 4 each in the event of 3 krajs]) 
might become deadlocked over certain issues. Conflicts over a major road artery in 
the North-East cohesion region consisting of the Liberecky, Kralovehradecky, 
Pardubicky Krajs potentially shows a situation where a necessary transport connection 
in Liberec is held up by the objections of the two Krajs not benefiting from such a 
transport connection directly (Interview with Michal Lehocky: Prague April 24 2002).
1.3.C Drafting Regional Development Policy
Regional development planning in the early 1990s remained in a culture of ad hoc 
state intervention in terms of regional development policy and systems of solidarity
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and ‘equalisation’ in terms of financing (see section 1.3.d).67 In 1998, the Czech 
government produced Resolution no 235 on the new principles of regional policy. 
This resolution outlined the principles of regional policy, the need for programming, 
the role of regional public administration in the implementation of regional policy, 
and explicit coordination and fimds administration roles for the Ministry of Regional 
Development. The new principles build on the sectoral approach, administered by the 
ministries. However, they emphasise that the national sectoral programmes need to 
address directly regional disparities and contribute to accomplishing the objectives of 
regional policy. The aim of the resolution was to remedy the defects of the previous 
incomplete regional policy of 1992 and incorporate the basic elements of European 
Union regional policy. This regional policy consisted of: the programming aspect; 
partnership; deconcentration; and subsidiarity (MRD 2002, p. 18). This represented a 
major shift in domestic policy planning and implementation among domestic actors, 
driven both by domestic conditions and domestic support at most levels of territorial 
administration to participate in EU funds.
One of the foremost effects of the European Union accession process and indeed the 
PHARE programme before 1997 was the programming aspect. Economic and social 
cohesion programmes required the drafting of regional development plans, which 
would outline the regional development priorities. Based on these priorities, 
programming could take place. The first such exercise encapsulated in Government 
Resolution no. 40 of January 11 of 1999 and Government Resolution no. 714 of July 
14 of 1999 was to set out a regional development plan. Government resolution no. 40 
was aimed specifically at building a financial, administrative, planning, and 
programmatic platform for the utilisation of European Union structural and cohesion 
funds (MRD 2001, NDP p. 5). Advances to come out of these national approaches are 
tools to support regional development such as subsidies, low-interest loans, and 
returnable financial support and definitions of the areas to be supported.
67 By 2002 the Czech government had developed three main tools to support regional development. 
These tools were to support business activities and support to the public sector in selected regions. The 
tools are: 1. subsidies (including labour subsidies); 2. low interest loans or loans with privileged 
maturity; 3. returnable financial support. Subsidies are mostly done on a case to case basis (MRD 2002, 
pg. 20).
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The National Development Plan of the Czech Republic outlines the overall Czech 
strategy based on the identification of regional needs. It follows from the resolutions 
mentioned earlier and is a prerequisite set by the European Commission for European 
Union programming. Resolution no. 714 outlined the sectoral and regional priorities 
of the Czech Republic for the period of 2000 to 2006. The priorities had been grouped 
according to six priority ‘axes’:
• Support for the development of the economic base and competitiveness;
• Development of technical infrastructure;
• Human resource development;
• Protecting and improving the quality of the environment;
• Rural development, and development of multi-functional agriculture;
• Specific priorities of NUTS 2 regions (i.e. cohesion regions)’ (MRD 1999b, p.
9).
Two aspects of regional development planning since 1998 in the Czech Republic 
stand out. First, there is a clear emphasis on planning based on an identification of 
needs, the development of a strategy, and programming. EU regional policy was 
mostly adopted. Secondly, a strong sectoral dimension to regional policy planning 
was introduced. The National Development Plan, the main programming document 
for Structural Funds, consists of 5 sectoral axes. The line ministries not only profiled 
themselves in implementation, but also in the drafting of policy. These sectoral plans 
have also taken resources away from the regional plans. The Regional Development 
Programmes per ‘region’ should give the ‘regions’ a direct input in the formulation of 
regional development on their territory and national development policy affecting the 
‘regions’. However, regions have been very ineffectual in identifying their needs, 
which has hampered national development policy and especially the functioning of 
the cohesion regions (Interview with Jiri Blazek: Prague April 23 2002).
1.3.d Regional Financing
The centralisation of territorial administration up until 2000 basically meant any 
financial autonomy and consistency in the procurement of finances from the central 
level were difficult for the municipalities and regions to attain. Also, budgetary crises
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on the central level filtered down to the local and regional levels. Local and regional 
financing show: 1. state control through ministries and districts; 2. a continued 
reliance on state grants; 3. incentives for municipalities to amalgamate to improve 
basic services provision. This last factor mostly favoured larger urban centres that 
made up the ‘krajs’.
After 1989, when municipalities gained a level of self-government, newly elected 
local officials made a concerted effort to decentralise part of the tax revenues and 
indeed transfer competences from the central government to the municipal level. On 
the other hand, the central state authorities were often intent on keeping control over 
competences and revenues of the municipalities by funding municipalities through 
direct state grants administered by the districts. At the district level, representatives of 
the municipalities then would have to find an allocation rule in the district assembly to 
distribute the funds (Blazek, 2002). Only major urban centres had some direct say in 
the allocation and use of funds (Surazska and Blazek 1996, p.l 1). Between 1993 and 
1995, two measures were taken to assure better ‘equalisation’ between municipalities. 
One was to have municipalities take a share of the personal income tax (state grants 
were cut to the same amount), but assure equalisation and redistribution at the district 
level. The second was to allow small government grants to equalise between districts, 
which had fundamentally different tax bases. However, the continuation of disparities 
and the rise of expenditures for the local administration led to further reform (Blazek, 
1999). These disparities were undermining the basic equal provision of public 
services across the Czech Republic. In 1996, the government decided to change the 
allocation criteria of various taxes between municipalities. The government also 
changed the revenue generating structure by switching part of the revenues of 
municipalities from the personal income tax to the business tax.
The latest reform in 2001 had two main novelties. First, the funding of the 14 new 
regions or ‘krajs’ would first come through the generation of ill-defined ‘regional 
revenues’, but has up to this point been financed through special government grants 
directed by the Ministry of the Interior (Interview with Howard Harding; Prague April 
26 2002). The second novelty was a programme of equalisation, which would give 
about 20.59% (in the case of personal income tax paid by small entrepreneurs living 
in the municipality in question 30%) of selected national taxation consisting of the
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value added tax, personal income tax, business tax to the municipalities on a per 
capita basis (Act on Allocation of Tax Revenues, no. 243 of 2000). This incentive 
system gives small municipalities less taxation than in the previous arrangement and 
favours larger urban centres (Blazek 2000). This arrangement gives them an incentive 
to amalgamate. This amalgamation was a Czech policy aimed at both the 
improvement of services and preparing municipalities to take over the competences of 
district offices.
Central control over budgets allowed the central state to shape the territorial 
administration through tax and grant incentives. Further, central control through state 
grants meant discretion of national actors over the resources and competences of the 
‘regions’. This observation was also true for the newly founded ‘cohesion regions’. 
These regions, at the time of publication, depend largely on government grants 
awarded by the respective line ministries to finance the Czech contribution to regional 
programming (Interview with Jiri Blazek: Prague April 23 2002).
2. Pre-accession Instruments and Implementation of 
Regional Policy
2.1 Introduction
The intention of the following sections is to look at: 1. the development of specific 
implementation channels, coordination, and control in the regional policy field 
associated with the pre-accession instruments over time; and 2. how these 
implementation channels fit into the domestic macro-institutional framework.
2.2 PHARE ESC Implementation
The institutional set-up in the Czech Republic in ESC is characterised by: 1. a 
centralisation of financial control procedures in the National Fund; 2. weak 
coordination mechanisms in the core executive, which have traditionally meant 
greater autonomy to the line ministries; 3. the weakness of the Ministry for Regional 
Development (MRD), which has a coordinating role in the set-up of regional
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development, the PHARE ESC programmes, and the preparation for Structural Funds; 
4. a prominent role in implementation of ministerial agencies; and 5. the limited role 
of regional partners in the cohesion regions and Krajs. On this last point, regional 
partners feel increasingly bypassed in regional development planning, as the MRD 
draws planning and decision-making to the central level and in implementation where 
line ministries bypass the regional self-government bodies (Interview with Jiri 
Eisenhammer: Prague April 23 2002).
This next section focuses on four main aspects of the design and implementation of 
PHARE ESC. The first section focuses on the control of funds distribution. The 
second section looks at the coordination of PHARE ESC and the overall pre-accession 
process, and particularly the role of the MRD in this coordination. The third section 
deals with the implementation channels and particularly the role of the line ministries 
in implementation. A fourth part focuses on the role of regional structures in PHARE 
ESC.
2.2.a Financial Control
The system for the financing of the pre-accession programmes before 1998 relied on 
transfers to the line ministries implementing PHARE through their Programme 
Management Units (PMUs). In 1998, the re-orientation of PHARE changed the 
system. A single flow of funds would flow into the state budget and be distributed 
from there. The infrastructure in the Ministry of Finance has developed since this 
time. The National Fund department within the Ministry of Finance was created in 
1998 as a final account department and has its procedures tested under a self- 
assessment process and the EU accreditation. The audit of its systems is performed by 
external auditors and by the Internal Control Department of the Ministry of Finance. 
Jan Gregor acknowledges that the National Fund is a practical centralisation of funds 
control (Interview with Jan Gregor: Prague September 21, 2001). The 
institutionalisation of the National Fund occurred in the new Budget Law of 2000, 
which replaced the Budget Law of 1990. The new budget law attempted to harmonise 
state budgetary procedures with EU legislation on state aid and pre-accession 
programming. The basic harmonisation consisted of EU funds being treated as state 
budgetary items rather than ‘extra-budgetary* funds. The National Fund manages the
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payment requirements set out in the Finance Memoranda of PHARE and ISPA, and 
the Multi-Annual Financing Agreement of SAPARD.
In terms of managing implementation, the National Fund asks the implementation 
agencies quarterly to provide reports (surveys) monitoring the transfer of funds. Jan 
Gregor points out that the latest EU programmes have become far more demanding in 
terms of audit in light of the nearing accession date (Interview with Jan Gregor: 
Prague September 21, 2001). The audit procedures under the Multi-Annual Financing 
Agreement mandate internal audits in the payment agencies and ministries. This 
requirement has proved to be a significant drain on resources in the relevant ministries 
and agencies. The information on financial flows would then be centrally collected 
and transferred to the European Commission.
The future role of the National Fund after accession is not entirely clear. Part of the 
responsibilities for financial flows could be devolved back to the ministries, leaving 
the Ministry of Finance to concentrate on the management of the state budget 
(Interview with Jan Gregor: Prague September 21, 2001). However, the National 
Fund is a key element in the attempts to consolidate payment functions in pre­
accession implementation. Jan Gregor underlines that proposals exist to limit the four 
or five payment agencies reporting to the MRD to one agency close to the National 
Fund, whereby the Centre for Regional Development (CRD) would remain the 
management authority. Similarly, the seven to eight regional management authorities 
could be reduced to one management authority within the CRD in a bid to harmonise 
the MRD (Interview with Jan Gregor: Prague September 21, 2001). Such moves to 
produce centralisation, especially those proposed by the MRD, are strongly opposed 
by the line ministries and regions
2.2.b Pre-accession Coordination
At the core executive level, there are several coordination committees for dealing with 
European integration issues. The Government Committee for European Integration 
(GCEI) established in accordance with Government Resolution No. 631/1994 in 
November 1994 (MRD NDP CR 2001, p. 156) consists of the line ministries with the 
Prime Minister as chairman and Minister of Foreign Affairs as vice-chairman. The
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Committee addresses issues concerning the preparation for European Union 
membership and sets out the overall strategy for preparation. It set out a broad 
strategy within the ‘Priorities for the Implementation of the White Paper in the Czech 
Republic’ to: a. promote administrative reform; b. create environmental policy; c. 
reform direct and indirect taxation; and d. address social policy (Rovna 2002). The 
Working Committee for the Integration of the Czech Republic in the European Union 
(WCICREU) consists of authorised employees of all the central institutions such as 
the line ministries and central agencies. They have partial responsibility for the 
coordination of adaptation to and implementation of European Union requirements in 
their administrative units. The members of the WCICREU of the Czech Republic also 
made up the delegation during the negotiations on the Agreement on the Accession.
The effectiveness of these committees seems limited and agenda-setting was largely 
dependent on the line ministries and particular ministerial units. The secretariat of the 
GCEI is divided between the offices of the Prime Minister and the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. The description of the WCICREU clearly stresses the consultative 
nature of the body and its partial authority. The WCICREU did seem to play a role in 
the negotiations with the European Union. Still, the negotiations with the EU 
Presidency were mostly run by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
In terms of pre-accession funds, The Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) evaluates all 
the pre-accession aid programmes against the goals stipulated in the Financial 
Memoranda, which formed the base for the pre-accession instruments. Its chairman is 
the National Aid Coordinator, who is based in the Centre of Foreign Assistance 
(CFA) in the Ministry of Finance. The CFA within the Ministry of Finance 
coordinated the inputs from the subcommittees, which set the agenda of the JMC 
(Interview with Jana Hendrichova: Prague September 19 2001). Thus, coordination 
occurs below the core executive level in semi-autonomous ministerial units such as 
the CFA or by deputy ministers. This was a clear characteristic of the overall 
executive coordination in the Czech Republic (see also Smejkal 1998).
68 The Czech institutional set-up actually relied on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
Finance to coordinate the EU pre-accession process. These coordination positions were strengthened by 
nomination of the Foreign Minister and Finance Minister as Deputy Prime Ministers in 1998.
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The coordination of funds also shows a lack of continuity between the pre-accession 
coordination in the CFA and the proposed Structural Funds coordination in the MRD. 
The CFA in the Ministry of Finance was responsible for the overall coordination of 
the pre-accession instruments, as stipulated in Government Resolution No. 275/2000 
from March 2000 ( MRD NDP 2001, p. 153). The MRD would be the responsible for 
the coordination and management of Structural Funds after accession (MRD NDP 
2003).
However, the MRD’s powers in coordination were constrained by the process of 
policy drafting and the effectiveness of the coordination committees it chaired. In 
terms of regional development policy, the MRD is responsible for drafting the 
documents on social and economic cohesion policy (Government Resolution No. 158 
of 1998) and cooperation with the European Communities (Act on Support for 
Regional Development in January of 2000). This social and economic cohesion policy 
concerns the 8 NUTS 2 ‘cohesion’ regions identified by the Czech Act No. 248/2000 
and Government Resolution No. 707/1998. The MRD drafts the regional development 
strategy of the Czech government, a regional development plan, and the NDP upon 
which Structural Funds programming takes place. The NDP is coordinated by a 
department under a deputy minister in the MRD consisting of operational 
programmes drawn from regional priorities and the line ministries69. The sectoral 
operational programmes gave the line ministries a great say over regional policy 
development before accession, both in decision-making and implementation.
Further, the coordination power of the MRD was restrained in the committees it 
chaired. Though there are a variety of committees under the chairmanship of the 
MRD, they mostly focus on consultation rather than coordination. These suffered 
from non-transparent procedures and had little executive power (Interview with Jana 
Hendrichova: Prague, September 2001). For instance, the Managing and Coordination 
Committee consists of representatives of the major line ministries and government 
agencies, officials from towns, districts, and regions, officials from labour unions and 
universities, and a representative from the European Commission. This Committee
69 In the Czech Republic these sectoral programmes are divided in 6 sectoral operational programmes 
covering: 1. Industry; 2. Transport and Communications; 3. Human Resources Development; 4. 
Environment; 5. Agriculture and Rural Development; 6. Tourism.
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organised in March of 2001 provides a consultative forum from which to receive 
inputs in European Union assistance. However, its mandate did not extend beyond 
consultation.
2.2.C Implementation
The organisation and implementation of the PHARE ESC programme reflects the 
relative power of the line ministries and the MRD’s limitations in terms of 
implementation and coordination. These were exhibited in three ways: 1. the central 
role of the Ministry of Finance in the management and coordination of the pre­
accession instruments; 2. the competition between the agencies over implementation 
responsibilities; and 3. the dominance of sectoral programmes in terms of budget and 
scope in overall Structured Funds planning.
The responsibility for the management and payment in the project cycle of PHARE 
national programmes until accession, is situated in the Central Finance and 
Contracting Unit (CFCU), which is based in the CFA of the Ministry of Finance 
(MRD NDP 2001, p. 160) (also see table 9). The CFCU was designed for institution- 
building programmes such as ‘twinning’. However, it plays a crucial role in 
implementation. The tendering of the projects, the conclusion of the contracts, and 
payments related to the projects are the responsibility of the CFCU. It also has an 
audit and financial control function (Interview with Lubomir Madr: Prague, 
September 20, 2001). The line ministries and government agencies give technical 
support to the project cycle. The Senior Programme Officers (SPO) based in the line 
ministries and government agencies select the projects, be it in terms of institution- 
building projects under ‘twinning’ or investment-based projects. Further, the CFA 
plays a coordinating role between the CFCU and the implementation agencies in 
terms of managing the implementation of the ESC programming (Interview with Jana 
Hendrichova: Prague, September 2001). These tasks range from communicating with 
European Commission officials and commenting on the project fiche to consulting on 
European Communities regulations and procedures. Additionally, the Programme 
Authorising Officer (PAO) based in the CFA has to authorise all projects. These roles 
gave the CFA expertise in the management of pre-accession programming and a 
legacy in programming. The roles also offered the Ministry of Finance the
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opportunity to use top-down pressures in financial management to centralise further 
payment functions, as the management functions of the CFA would be reduced after 
accession.
Table 9: Implementation in PHARE in the Czech Republic
Implementation CFCU Czechlnvest NTF NROS CRD
1998 All implementation 
runs through CFCU 
with technical 
partners in ministries 
and government 
agencies. Sub- 
Programmes:
1. Strengthening 
Democratic System
2. Economic and 
Social Cohesion
3. Strengthening 
Institutional 
Capacity
4. Agriculture
5. Justice and Home 
Affairs
6. Environment
7. Management of 
Funds
Democracy 
and Political 
criteria 
projects
1999 Implementation 
same as above-Sub- 
Programmes:
Same as Above
Sub-Project 
Supplier 
Linkage and 
Upgrading 
Programme
Sub-Project 
Support for 
Employment and 
Human Resource 
Development at 
Local, Regional, 
and National 
Level
2000 Implementation 
same as above-Sub- 
Programmes:
Same with new 
inclusion of
1. Internal Market
2. Employment and 
Social Affairs
Sustainability 
of Civil 
Society Sector
NUTS 2 Northwest 
Bohemia and North 
Moravia/Ostrava(grants)
2001 Implementation 
same as above-Sub- 
Programmes:
Same with new 
inclusion of
1. Transport
2. Participation in 
EC Programmes and 
EEA
Strengthening 
Civil Society
Small-Scale Business 
Related Infrastructure Grant 
Scheme in NUTS 2 regions, 
Northwest Bohemia and 
North Moravia/Ostrava
2002 Implementation 
same as above-Sub-
Programmes:
Same with new 
inclusion of 
1. Preparations for 
Structural Funds and 
the Cohesion Funds 
which substitutes for 
ESC
EQUAL
Initiative
Political
Criteria
Sub-Project Agricultural 
Veterinary Border 
Inspections
Source: Ministry of Finance, PHARE Is ational Programmes 1998-2002
A second characteristic of the implementation set-up is the competition at the national 
level between the line ministries through associated agencies over EU management
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and implementation competences.70 ESC of PHARE shows this dynamic. The 
implementation agencies for ESC in PHARE 1998,1999,2000 were (MRD NDP 
2001, p. 160)(see table 9 for implementation responsibilities[1998-2002]):
1. The Centre for Regional Development (CRD) in the MRD;
2. The National Education Fund or National Training Fund in the Ministry for 
Labour and Social Affairs;
3. Czechlnvest, CzechTrade, and the Business Development Agency in the 
Ministry for Industry and Trade;
4. The Independent Foundation for the Development of Civil Society (NROS).
There were three components to this set-up: 1. the position of the MRD in 
implementation; 2. the statutory realignment of agencies linked to the line ministries 
aiming to keep a role in implementation after the PHARE Reforms in 1997; and 3. the 
introduction of Structural Funds after accession.
First, the MRD was only established in 1996 and the Ministry did not have a defined 
implementation role in PHARE ESC. Though the NDP envisions coordination 
responsibilities for the MRD after accession such as the coordination of Structural 
Funds, the administration of European Regional Development Fund, and the 
management of the Cohesion Fund (MRD NDP 2001, p. 164), the NDP might involve 
some wishful thinking on behalf of its drafter, the MRD71. The MRD was under a lot 
of political pressure and its existence is not guaranteed even after the election victory
70 This competition could lead to odd implementation arrangements. The nomination of the Ministry of
Environment as management authority for infrastructure programming under Structural Funds in the
Czech institutional set-up is an example.
71 The NDP of 2003 sees these roles for the MRD as management authority of the CSF:
• ‘developing and administering an information system for the monitoring of assistance from the 
SFs (Monitoring System of the Structural Funds -  MSSF);
• drawing up a general procedure for the system of project administration within the SFs;
• drawing up and, after obtaining the approval of the Monitoring Committee (MC) of the CSF, 
submitting to the EC the annual implementation report;
•  drawing up a methodology ensuring compliance with the Community policies as stipulated in 
Article 12 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/1999, explanatoiy guidelines for those submitting 
projects and a manual describing the mechanism of control of compliance with the Community 
policies;
• ensuring compliance with the obligations concerning information and publicity at the CSF level; 
chairing the MC of the CSF that supervises the implementation of assistance (MRD NDP 2003, 
pg. 222)’
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of Vladimir Spidla of the CSSD in April 2002.72 Potentially, in a cabinet reshuffle, the 
MRD might disappear and its responsibilities taken over by the sectoral line ministries 
(Interview with Jana Hendrichova: Prague September 19 2001). The MRD’s search 
for competences, as will be further described in the SAPARD section of chapter 7 and 
the ISPA section of this chapter, seems to be a function of the MRD’s insecurity about 
its existence and resources. The CRD, its implementation agency, is still in the 
process of fully establishing its competences (Interview with Jiri Horacek: Prague 
September 20 2001). Though the PHARE Management Reforms in 1997 implied 
consolidated management and the more central role of the MRD is acknowledged in 
the NDP (MRD NDP 2001, p. 164), the MRD has not developed competences other 
than the drafting of documents, a general ill-defined coordinating role on the central 
level, and limited implementation in ESC programming through the CRD. Though the 
CRD was set up with PHARE support for assistance in CBC, its mission statement is 
broad (see CRD Mission Statement, 2003). The role of the MRD was limited with 
respect to both decision-making in regional policy and implementation.
Secondly, implementation responsibility even after 1997 has remained with the more 
established line ministries and their agencies (Interview with Howard Harding:
Prague, April 26 2002). Both the Ministry for Industry and Trade, and the Ministry 
for Labour and Social Affairs, play a role in ESC implementation through specific 
implementation agencies. These agencies often think in an expansive way about 
Structural Funds and the European programmes. Agencies show, in the programming 
for 2001-2006, a statutory convergence in their aims in order to maintain their 
respective positions in implementation. Czechlnvest lists in its strategy for 2001-2006 
a desire, among others, to become a ‘development agency’, ‘apply the potential 
positive economic benefits of EDI support when articulating an industrial strategy in 
program documents aimed at the use of EU structural and cohesive funds’, ‘and assert 
[industrial] revitalization program[mes] as one of the priorities for co-financing from 
EU Structural Funds’ (Czechlnvest Strategy Statement, 2003). The National Training 
Fund was started in the 1994 with PHARE aid to support human resource 
development and promote learning, labour market reform and public administration
72 In the ODS election platform for the parliamentary elections of 2002, the MRD would have been 
abolished and its competences devolved to the regional self-government bodies (Hanley Election 
Briefing 2002).
146
reform. Among its newer activities, one also finds preparation for Structural Funds 
and the NTF is involved broadly ‘in a whole range of related activities including the 
direction and coordination of a training programme for individual partners engaged in 
the preparation and operation of the structural funds’ (NTF Activities Statement, 
2003). The Business Development Agency provides business advisory services, 
cooperation mediation between foreign and Czech partners, and consultation, 
preparation and assessment of economic projects and European Union projects (BDA 
About us Statement, 2003). Czechtrade also list preparation and assessment for 
European Union projects, as well as consultancy service cooperation mediation, and 
advisory services to foreign and Czech partners, in its strategy statement (CzechTrade 
Strategy Statement, 2003). The CRD also lists among its activities consulting services 
and information provision to its patrons. In short, agencies adopted similar statutory 
purposes and mandates around the new focus on SME development in PHARE ESC, 
namely:
• Advise to business;
• Information distribution;
• Consulting services;
• Training programmes.
It is important to note here that in response the European Commission Delegation in 
Prague has been lobbying to consolidate CzechTrade, Czechlnvest, and the Business 
Development Agency into one agency. There is a possibility that a new super-agency 
might be created under a deputy minister, which would simplify ESC implementation 
(Interview with Howard Harding: Prague April 26 2002). This could also be an 
important change of the executive structure towards ‘consolidation’, as this deputy 
minister could be placed close to the cabinet.
Third, an important factor was a shift from region-based programmes to sectoral 
programmes in PHARE 2002 programming. The same shift occurred in the planning 
for Structural Funds. In the National Development Plan, the sectoral programmes 
exist next to the regional programme (8 regional programmes would be consolidated 
into one operational programme) and will take up financing over regional 
programmes at a rate of 65% to 35% in Structural Funds [in 2003 in pre-accession
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programming 62% to 38%] (Interview with Jiri Eisenhammer: Prague April 23 2002). 
Table 10 shows the various sectoral operational programmes and their weight 
compared to the regional operational programme. The strong emphasis on sectoral 
programmes (MRD NDP 2001, p. 155) not only shows an adaptation to a centralised 
structure more capable of implementing EU Structural Funds, but also seemingly 
reverts to practices before the Management Reforms of 1997, when line ministries 
dealt directly with the European Commission. The ministries have almost sole control 
over these sectoral programmes. The ministries with the greatest involvement are the 
Ministry for Industry and Trade, the Ministry for Labour and Social Policy, the 
Ministry of the Environment, and the Ministry of Transport and Communications. 
This positioning also ties into the allocation of managing authorities over operational 
programmes for Structural Funds after accession (see box below). This development 
means that the funds for regional development programming would be divided over 
the priority axes, with tourism the only sole ‘regional’ priority axis. In total, the joint 
operational programme amounted to 40% of total resources across priority axes (see 
table 10). However, the Ministry of Industry and Trade would control about 75% of 
funds (and the ‘cohesion regions’ 25% in joint operational programme) going towards 
increasing the competitiveness of industries and services, the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs about 75% of funds aimed at human resource development, and the 
Ministry of Agriculture about 60% of funds allocated to rural development. Only in 
infrastructure and environment, did the joint operational programme have about 60% 
and 40% of the expendable resources (MRD NDP 2003, p. 224-227).73 These 
resource divisions in the joint operational programme across the priority axes made 
the programme subordinate to the sectoral programmes.
Joint Regional Operational Programme Ministry for Regional Development
OP Industry Ministry of Industry and Trade
OP Human Resources Development Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
OP Infrastructure Ministry of the Environment
OP Rural Development and Multi-Functional 
Agriculture Ministry of Agriculture
Source: Resolution of the Government of the Czech Republic No. 102/2002 and No. 149/2003
73 The ERDF accounts for about 65% of projects, the ESF 23%, and the EAGGF and FIFG about 12% 
in the Czech Republic.
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Table 10: Allocation of Structural Funds among Operational Programmes (in 1999
prices)
% Currency 2004 2005 2006 Total
OP Industry and Enterprise 15.0% million EUR 45.889 64.439 81.957 192.285
million CZK 1,422.556 1,997.603 2,540.676 5,960.835
OP Infrastructure 13.5% million EUR 41.300 57.995 73.762 173.057
million CZK 1,280.301 1,797.842 2,286.609 5,364.752
OP HR Development 21.0% million EUR 64.244 90.214 114.740 269.199
million CZK 1,991.579 2,796.644 3,556.947 8,345.169
OP Rural Development and 
Multi-Functional Agriculture 12.0%
million EUR 36.711 51.551 65.566 153.828
million CZK 1,138.045 1,598.082 2,032.541 4,768.668
Total JROP(Joint Regional 
Operational Programme) 38,5 %
million EUR 118.855 166.901 212.275 498.032
million CZK 3,684.519 5,173.929 6,580.528 15,438.977
Total OP 100.0%
million EUR 307.000 431.100 548.300 1,286.400
million CZK 9,517.000 13,364.100 16,997.300 39,878.400
Source: European Commission data and Ministry for Regional Development calculations,
February 2003
2.2.d Regional Partnership
In terms of the ‘partnership’ requirements of implementation, national administrative 
actors resisted wholesale decentralisation. One way of doing so was to limit territorial 
decentralisation through for instance provisional structures74, constitutional controls, 
or specifically unclear division of territorial competences as mentioned in section
1.3.b. Other avenues, given the lack of capacity in the regions to formulate adequate 
policy and resist centralisation, were: 1. the development of parallel executive 
structures at the regional level; and 2. the consolidation of the regional operational 
programmes.
The lack of regional capacity is a function of the dependence on the central state in 
terms of resources and competences and the relatively recent territorial reforms, 
which did not allow institutionalisation of ‘cohesion regions’. At the regional level, 
the Regional Managing and Monitoring Committees from 1999 until 2000, 
coordinated the preparation of the regional components of the NDP, prepared the use 
of Structural Funds at the regional level, and coordinated the ESC component of 
PHARE at the regional level. They were replaced in the Act No. 248/2000 ( MRD 
NDP 2001, p. 158) by a Regional Council and Regional Development Committee. 
The Regional Council manages the implementation of regional programmes while the
74 The new structure as pointed out has also raised the issue of effectiveness of cohesion regions where 
2 or more NUTS 3 regions have to work together and sometimes subordinate their interests to the 
interest of other regions (Interview with Michal Lehocky: Prague, April 2002).
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Committee monitors the implementation. The Act On Regional Development Support 
of 2000 divided the managing and monitoring component into two units on the NUTS 
2 level. The main problem seems to be the ability of the regional governments and 
specifically the Regional Councils to identify their needs and contribute to the design 
of a regional strategy (Interview with Jiri Eisenhammer: Prague April 23 2002).
The development of regional ministerial networks has led to the duplication of 
activities not only among the ministerial agencies but also between the agencies and 
regional bodies (Interview with Howard Harding: Prague, April 26 2002). The 
tendency is for the agencies to build up regional networks such as for instance the 
Business Development Agency with its Regional Advisory and Information Centres 
(RAIC) and Business Innovation Centres (BIC), which exist next to the regional self- 
government bodies. Hesse (1995) points out how the government agencies had taken 
advantage of the absence of intermediary government to build a presence at the 
regional level. Diner (1998, p. 21) adds that the lack of regional self-government 
before 2000 also led to the ‘excessive etatization of the public sphere’. Some 
ministries might also see this expansion as a compensation for the loss of their 
regional offices in the reforms of 2000. The National Training Fund has been noted to 
be ‘clever and tricky’ in obtaining access to European Union programmes, finding 
new competences, and developing regional networks and partners (Interview with 
Howard Harding: Prague, April 26 2002). Even the newly founded CRD has 
established regional executive units to establish its competences. It is stiU unclear 
whether the Regional Councils and their secretariats wiU get a supervisory role over 
these units (Interview with Jiri Eisenhammer: Prague April 23 2002).
A further point is that the proliferation of executive networks in the regions has 
undermined the position of the Regional Development Agencies (RDA), in which the 
Krajs or larger municipalities are shareholders and which are bottom-up projects both 
as beneficiaries of ESC programming, and in the case of Ostrava (The Moravia- 
Silesia region) as sole implementation agencies. It is now thought the RDAs might fill 
a preparatory role in the project cycle, rather than perform actual implementation. 
Support in the PHARE pilot projects had shifted from bottom-up initiatives such as 
the setting up of the RDA in Ostrava in 1993 to the aiding of RDAs in drafting the 
regional operational programmes and their input in the joint operational programme.
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Jiri Blazek points out that it is even conceivable that the CRD through its experience 
and good contacts might find a new mission as an ‘umbrella’ organisation over the 
RDAs (Interview with Jiri Blazek: Prague April 23 2002).
A third factor involves the abandoning of the 8 regional operational programmes in 
favour of a joint operational programme in PHARE 2002. Regional operational 
programmes were drawn up for the cohesion regions by specifically established 
RDAs. There were two options under consideration: 1. to have one programme with 
the regional operational programmes being sub-programmes; 2. to have a unified 
programme with input from the regions (Interview with Jiri Eisenhammer: Prague 
April 23 2002).75 The Czech Republic chose option number 2, thus eliminating a 
direct programming role for the regions, thereby also angering regional officials 
(Interview with Jiri Blazek: Prague April 23, 2002). The Czech Republic, with input 
of the European Commission, made this choice for two reasons, namely to have a 
more unified programme addressing the national strategy for regional development 
and to address the problems the regions were having in terms of co-financing and 
programming capacity. Table 11 shows the relatively small role of regional and local 
co-financing (5% of total funding; 22% of total state funding) in the Structural Funds 
from 2004-2006 compared to the involvement of the private sector at 27% of total 
funds, state agencies such as the Czech railways (about 3.5% of total funds), and 
central state contributions at 62% of total state contributions and 14.1% of total funds. 
This co-financing is also a reason for the strong emphasis on sectoral programmes, as 
ministries have a greater share of the national budget, which they can use to co­
finance the programming. Further, sectoral programmes allow the ministries to 
maintain resources and competences after accession. The consequence is that for the 
Regional Councils theory does not correspond to practice and their participation in the 
pre-accession programmes is minimal (Interview with Marie Stankova: Prague April 
26 2002). Moreover, politics also seemed to promote an even distribution of funds
75 Pilot projects in PHARE programming also show a desire of the European Commission to move to a 
‘one target’ area, whereby the social and economic cohesion component of PHARE becomes more 
integrated in the requirements of the Structural Funds (MRD NDP CR 2001, pg 84; EC DG for 
Enlargement 2002b, pg. 3); 2. This integration and consolidation have meant that programmes aimed 
particularly at the NUTS 2 areas of the Northwest, Moravia around Ostrava, and Central Moravia (as 
mandated by Government Resolution no. 714 of July 1999) would be drawn up between the MRD, the 
Ministry for Industry and Trade, and the Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs in cooperation with the 
Ministry for Education Youth and Sports rather than continuing with separate projects in the various 
ministries.
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between the regions (with the exception of Prague), rather than a focused or needs- 
based approach.76 Special attention must be paid to co-financing from the municipal 
budgets. There might be problems in this area, as the indebtedness of the 
municipalities at the end of 2001 reached a total of CZK 48 billion. The share of 
metropolitan cities in the total indebtedness of municipalities accounts for 
approximately the half of total debt (MRD NDP 2003). This point also refers to the 
system of regional financing and its implications for implementation given the 
requirements of EU co-financing.
Table 11: Perceived Co-financing of EU Structural Funds-operational programmes
and joint regional operational programmes combined from 2004-2006
Priority Axis
Total
Funding
a+b+g
EUco-
Financing
a
Czech co­
financing 
b=c+d+e+ 
f
Central
Funds
c
Regional
Funds
d
Local
Funds
e
Other
Funds
f
Private
Funds
g
1. Increasing Competitiveness of 
Industry and Business Services 351,50 115,60 70,65 62,34 4,98 3,33 165,24
2. Development of Transport 
Infrastructure 138,53 91,59 40,57 5,00 2,57 9,20 23,79 6,38
3. Human Resources Development 186,54 136,53 45,66 37,30 4,01 4,36 4,35
Total ERDF related 25,40 16,97 7,27 2,12 2,47 2,69 1,16
Total ESF related 161,14 119,56 38,39 35,18 1,54 1,67 3,19
4. Protection and Improvement of the 
Environment 101,16 59,83 29,73 0,55 14,08 15,11 11,59
5. Rural Development and Multi- 
Functional Agriculture 192,39 91,06 32,87 26,05 2,36 4,45 68,46
6. Development of Tourism 101,57 38,08 23,52 18,06 3,34 2,12 39,97
Technical assistance 21,61 15,67 5,94 5,27 0,28 0,40
TOTAL CSF 1093,29 54836 248,94 154,56 17,53 37,54 39,30 295,99
% 100% 50.2% 22.7% 14.1% 1.6% 3.4% 3.5% 27%
Source: Ministry for Regional Development and to inistry o:* Finance 2003; Own
Calculations
76 The regional divide in the distribution of funds was as follows (MRD, NDP, 2001):
Cohesion Region % of funds
Northwest 15.7%
Ostrava 15.4%
Southeast 13.7%
Central Moravia 13.7%
Northeast 12.4%
Central Bohemia 12.1%
Southwest 11.7%
Prague 5.4%
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2.2.e Overview of Implementation Set-up for PHARE ESC
Type of EU 
program
Implementation
Agency
Implementation Task Link to Ministry Regional
Network
Statutory Purpose
Phare ESC 
and CSC
Business
Development Agency 
(BDA)
CzechTrade
Czechlnvest
National Training 
Fund (NTF)
CRD
Implementation of 
PHARE 2000 ESC 
Production Sector 
Investment Fund-SME 
Development
Implementation of 
Phare ESC in particular 
non-financial export 
support-Goal to become 
involved in structural 
funds
Co-financing of Phare 
ESC-specifically 
support for the 
development of 
industrial zones- Goal to 
become involved in 
structural funds
Implementation agency 
for employment and 
human resource 
development 
components of Phare 
ESC(the vocational, 
education, and training 
reform programme) as 
well as Leonardo da 
Vinci -strategy to 
become agency 
responsible for such 
programmes in ESF
Implementation of 
Phare CBC and Phare 
infrastructure projects 
under Phare ESC and 
two pilot projects in 
North Bohemia and 
South Moravia NUTS 2 
areas G-goal 
implementation agency 
of European Regional 
Fund.
Government 
Agency of 
Ministry of 
Industry and Trade 
(MIT)
Government 
Agency of MIT
Government 
Agency of MIT
Foundation 
established by 
Ministry for 
Labour and Social 
Affairs 
(MLSA)
Government 
Agency of 
Ministry for 
Regional 
Development 
(MRD)
Two Regional
Networks
-35 Regional
Advisory and
Information
Centres
(RAIC)
- 5 Business 
Innovation 
Centres (BIC) 
Central body 
aiming to have 
branches 
abroad-some 
reliance on 
RDA’s for 
regional 
partners
Central Body 
with reliance on 
RDA’s as 
regional 
partners
Central Body 
with reliance on 
information 
centres in 
RDA’s
Several 
attached 
agencies such 
as NTF 
Information 
Centre,
Initiative Equal, 
National 
Observatory for 
Training and 
Employment, 
Social Welfare 
Initiative Fund, 
the Pro-Active 
Labour Market 
Intervention 
Fund.
3 regional 
offices in 
Olomouc, 
Chomutov and 
Ostrava
(BDA) est. 1995 Advisory services 
provided by BDA are focused on 
the following basic areas:
-business advisory services 
(economic and financial analyses, 
business plans, controlling); 
-mediating co-operations between 
Czech and foreign partners 
including verification of both 
parties;
-consultation, preparation and 
assessment of economic projects in 
cases of applications for bank 
services including Czech and 
Moravian Guarantee and 
Development Bank, a.s.; 
-consultation, preparation and 
assessment of EU projects.
(CzechTrade) est. 1997 Promotion 
of trade, consulting services and 
advise function for domestic as 
well as foreign firms
(Czechlnvest) est. 1993 Promotion 
of Czech Republic abroad and 
specifically to attract foreign direct 
investment into the country. 
Services include facilitation, 
advise, information distribution, 
incentives, aftercare, and 
consulting. Goal to transform from 
marketing agency to development 
agency.
(NTF). Est. 1994 
-to support the transformation of 
society and the economy through 
human resource development, 
particularly by supporting the 
private sector and industry 
-contribute to the development of 
life-long learning through support 
to all levels of further education 
-support the process of European 
Integration with an emphasis on the 
development of public 
administration
(CRD) est. 1998 1 a. by providing 
methodological assistance to 
Regional Development Agencies 
and other entities in order to 
prepare and realise development 
programmes b. by providing its 
patrons with information and 
consulting services(also on Czech 
companies, business parks etc.) c. 
acts as the PMU for the Phare- 
Regional Development Fund and 
IMU for the Cross-Border Co­
operation Phare programme (CBC 
Phare) of the Eurooean Union.
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2.4 ISPA, Coordination Issues and Division of Competences
ISPA implementation shows: 1. the involvement of the CRD in implementation; 2. the 
absence of capacity in the Ministry of Environment; and 3. the problematic 
coordination role of the MRD.
Three ministries are involved in the administration and implementation of ISPA in the 
Czech Republic: the Ministry of the Environment (MoE), Ministry of Transport and 
Communication (MTC) and the MRD. The drafting of the national ISPA strategy and 
the selection of individual projects by the ISPA Working groups occur in the line 
ministries (MRD NDP 2001, p. 162). The ISPA national programme also has to 
address the priorities of the National Development Plan. This is where the 
coordination role of the MRD starts. The ISPA Coordination Committee, consisting 
of officials involved with the administration of ISPA on the national and regional 
levels, coordinates the implementation of projects in both sectors and monitors 
whether the ISPA national strategies addresses the NDP and the Regional Operational 
Programmes. The MRD chairs this Committee.
In the MTC, a new implementation unit has been set up to coordinate the 
identification of projects with the specialist agencies, organise contacts and project 
cycles with Brussels and the Delegation in Prague, as well as manage the 
implementation of projects with the specialist agencies. The CRD in the MRD still 
implemented the environmental projects in the year 2000. The State Environmental 
Fund (SEF) in the MoE will take over some responsibility over environmental 
projects in the later programming cycles. The PAOs in the two line ministries (MTC, 
MoE) provide monitoring over the implementation of ISPA and the management of 
payment. The State Fund for Transport Infrastructure and the budgets of municipal 
authorities will provide the 25% co-financing required in ISPA programming for 
transport. In a similar way, the SEF and the municipal budgets should provide 25% of 
co-financing for environmental projects. The MRD in this set-up would be the partner 
for the ISPA Management Committee in Brussels.
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The institutional set-up for ISPA in the Czech Republic reflects a degree of horizontal 
fragmentation of policy competences. The CRD in the MRD, under pressure from 
sectoral ministries in the PHARE ESC, has been prominently present as an 
implementation agency in ISPA. There are three main reasons for this presence: 1. the 
central role as coordinator envisioned for the MRD in the administration of Structural 
Funds; 2. the fight by the MRD for competences, as its existence is under threat and 
its role has been diminished by the stronger sectoral line ministries (Interview with 
Jana Hendrichova: Prague September 19 2001); and 3. the preference by the 
Commission to work with known administrative units with established contacts in 
Brussels (Interview with Michal Lehocky: Prague, April 24 2002).
Officials in the MRD stress that the role of the CRD is also temporary (Kapralova, 
Durovcova, and Pravda, Counsellors in Ministry for Regional Development, Prague 
September 19 2001). In some ways, the use of the CRD is a way to ‘hold down the 
ISPA fortress’, until the other agencies outlined above can familiarise themselves with 
ISPA procedures (see interviews with Kapralova, Durovcova, and Pravda: Prague, 
September 19 2001). Arrangements grew out of a context where the Czech Railways, 
the SEF, and the Directorate for Roads and Highways did not have extensive 
experience with national or regional development policy, let alone EU pre-accession 
procedures. Though the CRD, as stated earlier in the section on PHARE ESC, also 
suffers from administrative weakness, it was designed and developed with PHARE 
support (Interview with Ctibor Kocman: Prague, April 23 2002). On the other hand, 
the SEF’s relative inexperience with procedures has meant a lack of clarity in setting 
norms of assessment for project identification and the absence of an overall 
development strategy (Interview with Ctibor Kocman: Prague, April 23 2002).
Additionally, for the MoE and the SEF, one main problem was that they relied on 
regional partners to bring in environmental projects. These project fiches were often 
too poor to be considered in Brussels (Interview with Ctibor Kocman: Prague, April 
2002). The ISPA implementation unit in the MTC did not have these problems. It 
relied on specialised agencies as beneficiaries, which had clearly defined needs. 
However, problems with the quality of environmental projects meant that the 
previously agreed distribution of funds, a split of 50% of funds going towards the 
environment and 50% towards transport, were re-adjusted to 60% of fimds going to
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transport and 40% towards the environment (Interview with Ctibor Kocman: Prague 
April 23 2002). This competition over funds is played out in the ISPA Coordinating 
Committee, which is chaired by the MRD. In the coordination and comparison of 
projects, the MRD should be a mediator, balancing the MoE and MTC. However, its 
involvement in implementation through the CRD has meant that the MRD was not a 
reliable coordinating partner for either the MoE or MTC. This situation has meant 
increasingly poor relations and indeed problems in the coordination of projects 
between the MoE and the MTC in terms of the NDP and the national and regional 
strategies (see both interviews with Ctibor Kocman: Prague April 23 2002 and with 
Michal Lehocky: Prague, April 24 2002).
3. Conclusion
The adoption of EU regional policy in the Czech Republic shows two patterns of 
institutional change: the adjustment of sectoral institutional arrangements, and the 
persistence of the macro-institutional configuration.
On the sectoral level, the ‘misfit’ between EU regional policy and the 
conceptualisation in the Czech Republic of regional policy as part of industrial policy 
has been overcome. The Czech Republic has largely adopted EU regional policy. 
There were two main reasons why this sectoral ‘misfit’ was overcome. First, EU 
regional development policy broadly ‘fit’ the Czech executive’s desire to reduce 
disparities across the country and more importantly with the EU average. The 
reduction of these regional disparities had become important after the economic crisis 
of the mid-1990s. It was even feared in some parts of the executive that the economic 
problems in Moravia, similar to the break-up of Czechoslovakia, could lead to a 
secessionist movement there (Interview with Jiri Blazek: Prague April 23 2002). 
Further, the administration of Zeman, given the ‘Opposition Pact’ with the ODS, had 
few options in economics policy. Regional policy was one of them. Aside from the 
support of the national executive, regions and municipalities lobbied for the adoption 
of regional policy. The larger provincial cities in particular had lobbied for the 
development of a regional policy since 1992 (Interview with Pavel Cemoch: Prague 
April 22, 2002). This support was boosted by the greater budget and wider
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distribution of funds, which actors expected from EU funds. Executive actors at the 
national executive, in terms of the management of EU funds, could expect additional 
competences and resources. At the regional level, regions, municipalities, and SMEs 
at the least could expect to be beneficiaries. Secondly, as the next paragraphs will 
explain, the adoption of EU policy did not substantially change the existing executive 
structure, or macro-institutional configuration. These two factors help explain the 
substantial change in the sectoral institutional arrangements. As shown in sections
2.2.a, 2.2.b and 2.2.c, this involved the adoption of financial control procedures, the 
integration of EU coordination requirements in the executive, and the statutory 
alignment of implementation agencies.
As claimed in the last paragraph, the EU challenges to the macro-institutional 
configuration, implied in EU regional policy and the templates for the pre-accession 
instruments, dissipated and were averted, as the moment of accession came nearer. 
The Czech Republic averted major shifts in the institutional set-up by continued 
reliance on sectoral administration and limiting EU-specific regionalisation to 
‘provisional’ regions and EU coordination to the relatively weak MRD.
First, the most immediate EU pressure on the executive structure of the Czech 
Republic was for the creation of a middle-tier level of administration and self- 
government. Secondly, after the PHARE Management Reforms of 1997, the 
European Commission in the pre-accession templates challenged the domestic macro- 
institutional configuration on three further levels: 1. the notion of ‘partnership’, or the 
need to develop regional partners; 2. a reduced role for the line ministries in 
implementation; 3. an emphasis on central coordination; and 4. a reduction of the 
number of implementation agencies. All four could potentially change the domestic 
macro-institutional set-up, characterised by: 1. a vertically centralised executive 
system; 2. ministerial autonomy in executive coordination and implementation 
(fragmentation of implementation); and 3. a legacy of a proliferation of central 
agencies, involved with development-related policy across most levels of territorial 
administration.
In the case of the creation of a middle-tier administration, the lack of specificity of the 
‘acquis’ allowed executive policy-makers discretion in the reform of territorial
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administration. This reform consisted of: 1. the creation of provisional ‘cohesion 
regions’; 2. limiting the devolution of state competences to the competences of the 
disbanded district offices; 3. constitutional controls on the delegation of competences;
4. central control over regional budgets and finance; and 5. building ‘smaller’ 
provinces (krajs) than desired under NUTS qualifications. In this way, the formation 
of the krajs might have been inspired by the EU, but was very much shaped by 
domestic executive actors and endogenous reform processes.77 Krajs and ‘cohesion 
regions’ had ill-defined competences and lacked resources to establish their place in 
the institutional configuration. This limited decentralisation can also be understood in 
the inherent biases of the pre-accession templates (as established in chapter 4). To 
improve absorption, the European Commission often favoured implementation of EU 
programmes in established agencies at the national executive level. This preference 
often superseded the promotion of administrative decentralisation and regional self- 
government. Moreover, the vague definition of ‘partnership’ allowed national 
discretion in the organisation of the management of EU funds. The national 
interpretation of ‘partnership’ could range from an extensive role for regions in the 
implementation of EU funds to only a consultative role for regions in the project 
cycle. The Czech Republic chose a limited and provisional regional consultation on 
NUTS 2 level.
Secondly, the reduction of the role of the line ministries in the implementation of EU 
funds was averted by the introduction of sectoral programmes in PHARE 2002. For 
the programming cycle of 2000-2006, these sectoral programmes, administered by 
line ministries, had a much larger weight in the NDP than the joint regional 
operational programme. This joint regional programme represented a consolidation of 
the 8 regional programmes, which before the changes in PHARE 2002 would have 
formed the base of EU programming. Overall, the regional plan(s) in EU 
programming became less important. The sectoralisation of programming, agreed to 
by the European Commission and the Czech government, was a reaction to the need 
to absorb funds (this Commission priority is also seen in ISPA programming).
Sectoral programmes cemented the place of the sectoral line ministries in EU funds 
management, at least until 2006.
77 As stated earlier, the formation of ‘krajs’ was part of the 1992 Constitution of the Czech Republic.
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Thirdly, the sectoral approach to EU funds management also mediated the pressure to 
strengthen central coordination. Coordination of regional policy remained limited. 
Coordination was characterised by a lack of continuity, from the role of the CFA in 
the pre-accession period to the coordination responsibility of the MRD in the post­
accession period. Moreover, the MRD was a weak ministry. This weakness again 
stressed the role of other line ministries.
Fourth, the sectoral approach to EU funds management also mediated the European 
Commission pressure to reduce the number of implementation agencies. Government 
agencies attached to the better resourced line ministries, such as Czechinvest, the NIF, 
and the BDA, have been ‘clever and tricky’ in maintaining and gaining competences 
in EU funds implementation (Interview with Howard Harding, Prague: April 26 
2002). This also meant the statutory alignment of their respective missions. This 
process was further facilitated by the frequent changes in PHARE programming, 
which had initially allowed these agencies to maintain a role in implementation at the 
expense of regional structures and the newly formed CRD. The fragmentation of 
implementation also weakened the MRD, the coordinator of EU funds after accession, 
still further.
The most pronounced effects in the macro-institutional configuration relate to 
institutional enhancement. The institutional positions of the sectoral line ministries 
and their implementation agencies were enhanced. Furthermore, the Ministry of 
Finance through the CFA and the National Fund managed to use ‘top-down’ EC 
financial control procedures and the void in funds coordination to enhance its 
institutional position and build a central role for itself in the administration of funds 
(Interview with Jana Hendrichova, Prague: September 19 2001).
Finally, as stated in section 2.2.c, the European Commission has maintained pressure 
on the Czech Republic to reduce the fragmentation in implementation of EU 
programmes, despite the agreed sectoral approach. A shift away from ‘sectoralisation’ 
might see the creation of a super-agency close to the Prime Minister’s Office. In this 
case, the Prime Minister might be asserting himself in the management of EU funds. 
At this moment, this institutional change of the executive structure is speculative and
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should be seen in the context of other (mostly failed) attempts of Prime Ministers 
Zeman and Spidla to enhance their positions and improve central coordination in the 
pre-accession process.
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Chapter 6: The Development of Regional Policy and 
the Administration of the EU Pre-accession Process in 
Poland 
1.Regional Policy in Poland
The European pre-accession process would challenge the Polish state, similar to the 
Czech Republic, in terms of three ‘misfits’: 1. the formation of a regional policy; 2. 
the introduction of a middle-tier of administration, consistent with the management of 
Structural Funds; 3. and the need for effective administration capable of coordinating 
and implementing regional policy. Again, point 1 seems to imply a substantial change 
in sectoral institutional arrangements, whereas the next two points imply that the 
sectoral adoption of EU regional policy will challenge the domestic macro- 
institutional configuration.
The main difference between Poland and the Czech Republic would be the differences 
in the domestic macro-institutional set-up. This statement pertains particularly to the 
reform of the core executive, started in 1997. Sections 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 outline the 
reforms of territorial administration and national administration until 1998. Section 
1.4 will then outline the EU-inspired reform of territorial administration. Section 2 
will outline the set-up for the pre-accession funds in Poland.
1.1 Communist Legacy and the Reforms of the Early 1990s
The reform of territorial administration in Poland after the transition in the period of 
1989-1990 had its roots in the reform of public administration in 1972 and 1975. In 
1972, the gromads or municipalities were amalgamated and re-divided in 247 towns 
or miasta, 1549 rural communities or gminas and 527 small towns, which were also 
known as miasta-gminas (Wollman 1998). In 1975, new smaller units were created at 
the regional level, which was divided in 49 voivodships or regions. In some ways, the 
creation of smaller-sized sub-national administration was a response to the social 
unrest of the early 1970s. The socialist regime under Edward Gierek wanted: a. to
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bring the administration closer to the people; and b. quash the regional power bases in 
the voivodship structures of stronger party officials (Kuklinski and Swianiewicz 1993, 
p. 182). There was never a transfer of political power. In the 1980s, under pressure 
from Solidamosc, new acts on local self-government and socio-economic planning 
such as the ‘Law on the System of People’s Councils’ and the ‘Law on Local Self- 
Government’ of 1983 came about. This process acknowledged the competences of 
elected local councils. Regional planning became a bargaining process between the 
central and local levels. These concessions did not amount to the end of the 
dominance of the central party structures over state and society. Regulska (1997) 
argues that the devolution of power and the decentralisation of administration were 
used in a calculated way to retain political control at the centre of government.
The negotiations at the roundtable discussions in 1989 between Solidamosc and the 
communist regime produced predictable results. Solidamosc called for greater 
autonomy of local government . Solidamosc hoped that stronger local structures 
would reform the state from the bottom-up. This view was very much in line with a 
liberal perception that empowering municipalities would be beneficial to local people, 
who would buy into democratic reform and consequently help to reduce the 
democratic deficit inherited from communism (Blazek 1997; Zsamboki and Bell1997; 
Smith 1985; Dahl 1961; Pateman 1980). On the other hand, communist officials and 
later communist successor parties wanted to adhere to the centralised administrative 
structure of the state. The ‘Local Self-Government Act’ of 1990 granted local 
autonomy and delegated certain functions to the communes and gminas, such as: 
property administration and territorial planning; property ownership of communal 
areas; public order and safety; management of communal infrastructure; organisation 
of local services such as social assistance; sport, culture etc.; primary school 
education; and public utilities and tax collection powers (compiled from Grochowski 
1997 and Sigma 1999). The communes in 1990 attained, be it on a temporary basis, 
revenue-raising rights from their own properties, civil law liabilities and tax-raising 
rights from local taxes such as the property tax and stamp duty. Further, the 
communes benefited from 15% of the personal income taxes and 2 to 5% of the
78 Jerzy Regulski (2003), chief negotiator of Solidamosc on territorial reform in 1989, provides a 
definitive overview of the negotiations and the evolution of municipal government from 1990 to the 
present
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corporate taxes raised in their territory, as well as the possibility of state subsidies 
(Suraszka and Blazek, 1996). Moreover, though the municipal budgets are strictly 
regulated in terms of budget deficits [municipalities officially cannot run them] and 
audited at the central level, general grants were awarded directly to the gmina from 
the Ministry of Finance. An amendment to the Polish constitution included guarantees 
to the self-government of localities. The Law reconstituted the original municipalities 
or the gminas that had been amalgamated in the reforms of the 1970s.
However, the new territorial organisation was basically a single-tier system and did 
not extend such autonomy to the districts (powiats). Autonomy on the municipal level 
stood in contrast to the strongly centralised state administration. The institutional 
legacy of communism meant the continuation of an organisation, consisting of 49 
voivodships, in which the Voivod or governor represented the state administration. 
The Voivod ensures conformity with government policy. Though the municipalities 
were represented in a council or Sejmik elected by the municipal bodies, the function 
of the Sejmik was merely consultative. In addition, districts now called rejony were 
reconstituted based on the pre-1972 powiat organisation. These sub-prefectural units 
further represented the intent of the central government to work through its own 
administrative units in the regions rather than with local self-government (Cielicka 
and Gibson, 1996). In this sense, neither a multi-level system of self-government nor 
a clear task delineation existed. This vagueness is also present in the 1992 
Constitution, which on local and regional self-government merely outlines that local 
municipalities have a broad range of competences, except those which legally fall 
under the state administration (SIGMA 1999). In short, the central government 
dominated territorial administration, and did not extend self-government beyond the 
municipalities.
Whereas under the Solidamosc-led coalition of non-communist parties of Prime 
Minister Mazowiecki regional administrative structures had been further consolidated 
and a single-tier system of local self-government established, subsequent broad 
coalition governments, under Bielecki from January 1991 to October 1991, and later 
the Suchocka coalition, from August 1992 to May 1993, examined proposals for a 
two-tier system to eliminate the political vacuum between the central and local 
government levels (Regulska, 1997). Bielecki, a liberal reformer, prioritised economic
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reform (liberalisation and stabilisation). His government’s view outlined that reform 
was best produced through strong regional state administration. Under the Olszewski 
government, which governed from December 1991 to June 1992, and later during the 
Suchocka government, the reform of territorial administration was taken up. Wollman 
(1998) lists the creation by Hanna Suchocka of a governmental plenipotentiary for
7Qadministrative reform as an important component in the debate at the national level. 
This debate included: how many regions Poland should have; what their functions 
should be; which functions should be devolved to lower levels of government and 
government; and whether the administrative functions of the regions should be 
supported by more extensive self-government at the sub-national level. In September 
1993, Suchocka transferred several tasks, such as secondary education, health, and 
road construction among others, from the rejony and voivodship level to the larger 
cities as part of a pilot scheme. This decentralisation was funded under a system of 
VAT compensation and government grants.
After the elections of October 1993, an alliance of former communists, the 
Democratic Left (SLD) and Peasant Party (PSL), formed a majority government 
coalition under the leadership of Waldemar Pawlak (PSL). Pilot projects, the re­
organisation of territorial administration, and the partial granting of fiscal autonomy 
to local government (cities), which had occurred during the Suchocka administration, 
were suspended. This suspension came in the context of continuous bickering over: 
revenue-sharing between the central administration, the Voivod and the cities, the 
irregular transfer of state funds to the cities, problems in the procedures and 
mechanisms of transfer, and the inadequacy of the level of funds available to finance 
the city administration (Glowacka-Mazur and Zaremba, 1994). Regulska (1997) notes 
that the coalition partners did not even fully agree on the drafts of the coalition 
agreement on territorial reform. The PSL was far more pronounced in bypassing 
territorial administration than the SLD. The SLD took the unexpected move of 
producing a policy document broadly in favour of regional self-government and the 
creation of a “citizens’ society”. However, the intention of the SLD was to reform the 
territorial administration from the top-down rather than from the bottom-up, thus 
exposing a fundamental, even ideological difference, with the previous Suchocka
79 This plenipotentiary was led by Michal Kulesza, an academic in favour of reforms.
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government. Still, despite the earlier suspension of the Suchocka proposals, the 
transfer of competences from the Voivod to the larger cities, proposed in 1993, was 
largely implemented in 1994 and 1995. However, the reform of territorial 
administration did not necessarily transfer autonomy to the regions, cities or 
municipalities. Under the Minister of Finance and Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko 
(successor to Marek Borowski in April 1994) in the Pawlak administration80, local 
self-government would be excluded from any role in economic planning and regional 
development. Larger gminas were basically shut out of VAT compensation and thus 
lost their fiscal autonomy. Jablonski (2000, p. 139) comments that a lack of political 
consensus over the shape and degree of devolution hindered further decentralisation 
of administration.
The internal considerations in the PSL-SLD coalition governments exposed this lack 
of consensus. The PSL wanted a continuation of the existing system of 49 regions, 
which would have limited autonomy and be overseen by a Voivod, who was 
appointed by the central government. It was against the re-introduction of the powiats. 
The main reason for this position was the local power base of the PSL in the rural 
communities, which could be threatened by a far-reaching territorial re-organisation 
(Wollman, 1998). The PSL therefore had traditionally been more favourable to 
granting more municipal authority (Regulski 2003). The SLD, more in the spirit of 
reform, wanted a smaller number of voivodships and the reform of the powiats 
(districts). The formation of districts around the main cities would offer them an 
administrative base closer to their obvious constituencies. It was clear the PSL would 
block any reform in this direction, even though the SLD was a coalition partner. 
Regulska (1997) comments on this period that the short duration in office of most 
governments, due to the fragmentation of parties in parliament and the existence of 
coalitions with a highly tenuous parliamentary support, meant an often incomplete 
implementation of the governments’ proposals for territorial reform. This lack of 
implementation was amplified by the cohabitation between a Prime Minister and 
President from different political parties. The President could block government 
proposals for reform. This cohabitation ended in 1995, when President Lech Walesa 
lost the presidential elections to Aleksander Kwasniewski of the SLD. Lech Walesa
80 Kolodko in two subsequent cabinets would stay Minister of Finance until the formation of the Buzek 
government at the end of 1997.
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had in the Solidamosc tradition lobbied for bottom-up reform of territorial 
organisation.
1.2 Drafting Regional Development Policy
Blazyca et al (2002, p. 268) paraphrase Gorzelak in saying that the centralisation in 
regional planning in the 1990s descended into ‘voluntarism’. Sectoral policies still 
dominated regional policy, but the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in its 
attempts to slow unemployment was the only ministry actively involved in regional 
development policy. The ‘Procedural Principles of Regional Restructuring 
Programmes’, prepared by the Central Planning Office (CPO) and approved by the 
Council of Ministers in 1990, set out a policy to address structural problems at the 
regional level. Examples of these structural problems are the general economic 
recession in the North, agrarian unemployment in the Southeast, and industrial 
restructuring in Katowice (Task Force for Regional Development 1996, p. 32). The 
document stressed that the identification of regional needs, expressed through 
regional initiatives, should be the driving force behind regional programming and 
economic restructuring. The central government in this set-up would be a facilitator, 
by giving administrative support and disbursing financing to local initiatives, which 
would exclude state officials at the drafting stage (CPO, 1990). Nonetheless, regional 
policy was not given priority in the first programme documents of the Mazowiecki 
government. The relative lack of regional disparities at the outset of transition seemed 
to undermine regional development policy. However, as the socio-economic impact of 
transformation processes became clear, there was a need to build the foundations of 
such a policy (Pyszkowski and Kozak, 1999). In this way, the central government and 
the sub-national actors became convinced of the benefits of regional development 
policy.
Three main factors affected bottom-up regional development: 1. the central drafting of 
policy; 2. the frequent institutional reforms; and 3. the proliferation of government 
and ministerial agencies. First, the drafting of policy was initiated within the CPO, a 
body responsible for national economic planning, whose then Director was a cabinet 
minister. This body, in the ‘Law on Spatial Development’ in 1994, also became
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responsible for regional development policy. Studies, organised by the Minister for 
Housing and Spatial Economy in the early 1990s, recommended an end to the 
‘dominance’ of the central government and the inclusion of the voivodships in policy 
planning. However, regional policy initiatives remained top-down. The dominance of 
the central government in the process of policy planning was also associated with the 
lack of administrative capacity at the voivodship level. This observation is present in 
the ‘Report on Regional Policy and the Principles of State Regional Policy’, prepared 
by the CPO and approved by the Council of Ministers in 1995. Describing the current 
situation in regional programming in 1995, the report stresses an increase in regional 
development activity, with most voivodships commencing programming work. 
However, a ‘systemic vacuum’ at the regional level limited bottom-up regional 
development. This vacuum consisted of: 1. the problematic information exchange 
between the voivodship and central government; 2. the absence of procedures and a 
clear reference framework in obtaining central funds; and 3. the absence of the 
capacity to implement policy at the voivodship level (CPO, 1995). A similar 
document, adopted in 1994 by the Council of Ministers, seems to stress a more 
advisory role for the voivodships. It stresses the responsibility of the Voivods or state 
representatives in the regions to ensure regional programming is compatible with state 
policy and law. The approval of the Voivod is a precondition for any application by 
the voivodships for central funds.
Secondly, the repeated re-alignment of the institutions involved with regional 
development policy, as Pawel Samecki explains, has contributed to a sense of 
uncertainty over the drafting, programming, and implementation procedures. In some 
cases, such re-alignment has increased the information barrier between the different 
levels of territorial administration (Interview with Pawel Samecki: Warsaw 
September 28, 2001).
Third, the proliferation of administrative units and agencies, within the country, 
regions and even districts, was a characteristic of the implementation of regional 
development policy in Poland. This proliferation undermined the role of the 
voivodships in regional development programming. In the mid-1990s, the Task Force 
for Regional Development in Poland identified 42 special-purpose administrative 
units at the national level, 20 at the voivodship level, and 14 at the supra-gmina or
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district level (Task Force for Regional Development 1996, p. 40). Of these, 48 are 
state institutions involved with regional development. The Task Force finds a 
‘puzzling.. .lack of effective co-operation between Voivods and special-purpose 
administration institutions’ and concludes that ‘the development of special-purpose 
administrations reflects the centralisation of power and the limitation of the Voivod’s 
responsibility for issues which, by their very nature, should fall within their scope’ 
(Task Force for Regional Development 1996, p. 40). Further, special administrative 
bodies such as police, courts, and inspectorates had units operating in territories larger 
than the gmina and smaller than the regions (Glowacki 2002, p. 107). Even after the 
reform of 1998, the Ombudsman drew attention to the ‘lack of transparent legal 
regulations and efficient instruments of supervision and control of local government 
authorities’ and that ‘the changes enacted in 1999 brought to light problems caused 
both by inconsistency of the provisions regulating the powers of different levels of 
local government and poor co-operation between the state administration, 
decentralised state administration and local government bodies’ (quoted in OECD
2002, p. 20).
In conclusion, there was a centralised approach to regional policy planning. 
Implementation was fragmented and occurred mostly in various government agencies 
and state bodies. Frequent reforms, the dominance of the central government, and the 
limited capacity of regional administration undermined the role of the voivodships in 
the management of regional development policy.
1.3 The 1996-1997 Reform of National Administration
A feature of the executive structure was the weakening of presidential powers in the 
1992 constitution and the 1997 constitution. This weakening of presidential powers 
meant an enhancement of prime ministerial competences. The constitution of 1992 
reduced the presidential powers to dissolve parliament and those powers pertaining to 
the presidential discretion in the nomination process during the cabinet formation. The 
President did retain powers to control the nominations of the Ministers of Defence, 
Foreign Affairs, and Home Affairs. In 1997, the new constitution took any 
presidential control over portfolios away and thus the presidential right to influence
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cabinet policy-making. The appointment of cabinet ministers became the sole 
prerogative of the Prime Minister. Equally, the power of the Prime Minister, in 
relationship to the parliament, was enhanced. The 1992 constitution constrained the 
way parliament could dismiss the cabinet (Zubek, 2001). The evolving competences 
of the Prime Minister, in relationship to the President and the parliament during the 
1990s, also directly led to the overall reform of national administration in the period 
of 1996-1997 and the reform of regional development administration.
However, administrative reform had been on the agenda of the government before. 
Szlachta (1999) comments that the problems in the administration of regional 
development policy seemed to be addressed by reinforcing the ‘negative features of 
the present institutional set-up’. Szlachta means that reform normally involved 
tinkering with the institutional set-up, rather than constituting a drastic overhaul of the 
executive structure. He comments on how problems in the diagnosis of regional 
development problems in 1995 were seen only in the context of the reform of the 
Government Economic Centre. In 1996, the CPO, which was part of this Centre, 
would lose its economic planning responsibilities to the cabinet and the line 
ministries. The newly established Government Centre for Strategic Studies would be 
responsible for the support of policy initiatives and studies. This brought regional 
policy planning to the centre of government (Blazyca et al, 2002). However, as Zubek 
(2001, p. 922) notes, the Government Centre for Strategic Studies never lived up to 
the role of policy developer.
Nonetheless, there were two important reforms in the mid-1990s: 1. the creation of 
regional policy coordination at the core executive level; and 2. the re-alignment of the 
line ministries.
The establishment of the Sub-committee for Regional Policy and Rural Areas 
Development in 1995, affiliated to the Economic Committee of the Council of 
Ministers (KERM), was a clear attempt at the Council of Ministers level to coordinate 
regional policy issues far more effectively. This Sub-committee included two 
provisions to prepare Polish regional policy for EU membership and for the 
management of EU funds. Both could help with the reduction of regional disparities 
and the transformation of rural areas. In 1998, the Regional Policy and Sustainable
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Development Committee became a standing Committee of the Council of Ministers 
for tasks relating to the preparations for Poland’s EU pre-accession process (SIGMA, 
1999). Its tasks would be backed up by the Polish Council for Spatial Economy, an 
advisory body of the Council of Ministers. The Committee was responsible for the 
drafting of the National Strategy for Regional Development, with as aim to achieve 
compliance between state regional development policy and the sectoral policies of 
specific ministries (MRDC, National Strategy for Regional Development 2001-2006, 
2000 p. 37). Other signs of the importance of regional development in the national 
policy setting were the development of the State Council for Regional Policy, the 
Prime Minister’s advisory body on regional development, and the establishment in 
1995 of the extraordinary Committee on Regional Policy (later a standing committee) 
in parliament (Task Force for Regional Development 1996, p. 38).
Combining the functions of the Office of the Council of Ministers headed by a cabinet 
minister and those of the Prime Minister’s Office was an important simplification of 
the policy advice structure in regional policy. The Office of the Council of Ministers 
had been an administrative body from communist times, which had survived more or 
less unchanged through post-communist governments. The Office provided 
administrative assistance for the Council of Ministers and was responsible for state 
and local administration. Regional policy advice to the Prime Minister’s Office had 
come from various bodies and in particular the State Council on Regional Policy. The 
re-organisation eliminated this dual structure and produced an integrated Prime 
Minister’s chancellery in 1996. Under the subsequent Buzek government, the 
functions of supporting the Council of Ministers and Prime Minister were initially 
broken up into two pillars, one for the Prime Minister and another for the Council of 
Ministers. However, a re-integration occurred shortly after. In 1999, these functions 
were broken apart again into four pillars, serving respectively, the Prime Minister, the 
Deputy Prime Ministers and ministers without portfolio, the cabinet, and the Council 
of Ministers. Under the new SLD government of Leszek Miller, these functions were 
again integrated, as one body serving all respective institutional actors. In this way, 
Miller finalised a protracted re-organisation of policy coordination close to accession. 
For regional policy, these re-organisations meant that the Department for Regional 
Policy, established in 1999 next to the previously existing Economic Affairs 
Department, was merged again with the Economic Affairs Department.
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A concentration of EU competences within the Polish administration also took place 
in terms of the coordination and negotiation of the accession process. The 
establishment in 1996 of the inter-ministerial Committee for European Integration 
(CEI), with its own executive office, was part of the Polish reaction to the EU’s 
Agenda 2000. The Office would have coordinating powers to: a. assist parliament in 
adjusting Polish legislation to the ‘acquis’; b. coordinate the drafting of policy 
documents required by the EU pre-accession process; and c. coordinate the 
management and implementation of financial assistance and the pre-accession 
programmes. The chief negotiator of Poland’s accession to the EU was situated in the 
Office of the Prime Minister, which gave him access to the key ministers and the 
Prime Minister.
A reconfiguration of the line ministries had been on the political agenda since the 
administration of Suchocka.81 However, proposals until 1996 fell short of 
implementation. Previously, in 1989, a number of ministries had been amalgamated in 
a move to reduce the number of ministers at the time of transition. The economic 
problems in the middle of the 1990s gave rise to a further call for a reconfiguration of 
the ministries involved with economic policy. A new instrument for administrative re­
organisation was the power of the Council of Ministers to assign ministerial 
responsibilities and configure ministries by an executive decision, rather than an act 
of parliament82. The rationalisation, under the Cimoszewicz PSL-SLD coalition 
government, created a super-ministry in the shape of the Ministry of Economy, which 
included the former Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Ministry for Foreign 
Economic Relations, the Ministry for Housing and Spatial Development and the 
competences of the CPO (Zubek, 2001). The competences of the Ministry of Finance 
were reduced to the supervision of fiscal and budgetary state policy (Jablonski 2000). 
Further, responsibilities over state assets were taken away from the line ministries and
81 Suchocka’s proposals formed the basis of reform. They focused on: 1. administrative reform as a 
precondition to enhance the efficiency and legitimacy of the state; 2. the establishment of a cohesive 
centre of government; 3. local government reforms; 4. the reform of the middle-tier of government, 
through the reduction of the number of regions; 5. the creation of a civil service law (Jablonski 2000, 
pg. 132).
82 The new laws also laid out the uniform framework for the functional organisation of ministries, 
which had to include a European integration unit.
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put in the newly created Ministry of the State Treasury, previously located as a unit 
within the Ministry of Finance.
In 1999, under the ‘Law of Government Administration Sections’ a ‘regional 
development’ section was set up. Regional policy and development competences 
moved to the Ministry of Economy. These competences remained there until June 
2000, when the AWS-UW government of Prime Minister Buzek decided to reverse an 
earlier decision and place the relevant departments into a newly created Ministry for 
Regional Development and Construction. It was felt at that time that a dedicated 
ministry would be better adept at coordinating the implementation of the pre­
accession funds and later Structural Funds. However, this process also was a function 
of the struggle Jerzy Buzek had to establish more effective central coordination. This 
struggle was visible in the fractious relationship between the Prime Minister and his 
parliamentary caucus and the relationship between the Prime Minister and the more 
powerful line ministries, such as the Ministry of Economy. This struggle was also 
visible in the frequent re-organisations of the chancellery.
The Ministry for Regional Development and Construction was consequently re­
organised back into the Ministry of Economy in September of 2001, after the election 
victory of Leszek Miller of the SLD . Insiders say this amounted to little more than 
the Department for Regional Development Programming and the later created 
Department for Voivodship Contracts and Assistance Programmes being moved 
around and folded back into their old ministry (Interview with Jaroslaw Orlinski: 
Warsaw July 17 2002 jointly with Iwona Brol and Agnieszka Kapciak). However, 
Adam Sadownik at the Office for the Committee for European Integration (OCEI) 
points out that the initial re-organisation did not produce the participation of the then 
Ministry of Regional Development and Construction in the preparation and 
programming of the EU pre-accession funds. Many responsibilities fell to the OCEI 
(Interview with Adam Sadownik: Warsaw September 27, 2001). Wojciech Kowalski 
seems to corroborate this point. He makes the argument that the low capacity in the 
Ministry for Regional Development and Construction ultimately led to less
83 The Miller government pursued an agenda aimed at limiting non-ministerial administration through 
consolidating such administration and by placing administration under the control of the Prime 
Minister or ministries.
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programming and that the European delegation was not unhappy about the 
consolidation (Interview with Wojciech Kowalski: Warsaw, January 23 2002). John 
O ’Rourke further points out that half the budget of the Ministry came from PHARE 
funds (Interview with John O’Rourke: Warsaw, January 21 2002).
More recently in January of 2003, the Ministry of Economy has merged with the 
Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs. Moreover, in late 2003 State Treasury 
functions were temporarily incorporated in the Ministry of Economy to create a super­
ministry for economic policy under Minister and Deputy Premier, Jerzy Hausner. This 
move was not only a response to the immediate economic and budgetary problems in 
the period of 2002-2003 in the run-up to accession, but also due to clashes between 
modernisers and traditionalists on social spending within the SLD (See Maksymiuk in 
RFE/RL 2003a, 2003b, and 2003c). The response of the government was to 
concentrate powers close to the core executive.
Though the pressure of EU accession sped up executive reform, this reform was an 
endogenous process. It had been an agenda point since the administration of 
Suchocka. The most immediate reason for the start of reform had been the economic 
crisis in the middle of the 1990s. This reform involved the consolidation of 
coordination competences at the core executive level and the concentration of 
ministerial authority. In the late 1990s and in 2001, both Jerzy Buzek and Leszek 
Miller would use the management requirements of EU funds to legitimate and 
enhance the reform process. Buzek, on one hand, created a specific ministry for 
regional development policy to reduce the power of the Ministry of Economy and 
allow him a greater say in funds administration. Miller, on the other hand, 
concentrated competences within the Ministry of Economy and strengthened the core 
executive. The Ministry of Economy became the dominant player in economic 
management, including regional development policy and indeed Structural Funds 
preparation. The prime-ministerialisation in Poland allowed such concentration. EU 
requirements enhanced this concentration.
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1.4 The 1998-1999 Reform of Territorial Administration
The parliamentary election in September 1997 was won by a tentative conglomerate 
of groups centred around the Solidarity Trade Union, namely the Solidarity Electoral 
Action (AWS). This group comprised of the main parties to have emerged on the 
post-Solidarity right, including the Christian National Union, the two factions of the 
Confederation for an Independent Poland, the Centre Agreement and after January of 
1997 a new conservative group, the Conservative People’s Party, which was formed 
by defectors from the Freedom Union (UW). The AWS had a relatively strong 
organisational cohesion, which other right-wing groupings had lacked (Szczerbiak,
1999). They formed a majority coalition with a party that also had emerged from 
Solidarity, the UW. In June 2000, the UW left the coalition and the AWS under Jerzy 
Buzek continued as a minority government. The issue of territorial decentralisation 
was part of an ambitious AWS-UW coalition agreement, which hoped to complete the 
aims of Solidamosc set out at the time of transition. The coalition programme also 
included the restructuring of the pension system, a reform of the health service, 
education reform and, as the centrepiece of the programme, the reform of local 
government. This policy would include a tight budgetary control over government 
spending. This macro-economic policy framework was developed by the UW leader 
and Minister of Finance, Leszek Balcerowicz84. Another major factor in the reform of 
territorial administration was the ‘way in which matters [related] to EU accession 
suddenly emerged from the shadows of political life’ (Blazyca and Kolkiewicz 1999, 
p. 131). The basis for the draft on regional reform would be the adjustments required 
in the Polish regional organisation to facilitate full participation in the EU funds. 
However, reform would take place in the context of the three-tier system that had 
existed in communist times. The regional reform would be highly influenced by the 
interests of not the current regions, but the 17 regions that existed before 1975 
(Glowacki 2002). Moreover, the regional reform would only in a limited way affect 
the centrist relationship between the central state and the voivodships.
84 The Ministry of Finance throughout the 1990s was very opposed to the decentralisation of public 
finance, mostly because it believed in the central administration of funds. Balancing the budget would 
also often mean cuts in subsidies to the local government (Regulski 2003).
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The issue of territorial decentralisation exposed clear ruptures within the AWS, 
particularly between the parliamentary caucus and the executive85. Two groupings, 
the Patriotic Camp of the Confederation of an Independent Poland and 8 deputies 
from the smaller ‘Polish Family’ Association, were opposed to territorial reforms, 
because they felt reform undermined the integrity of the Polish state. They voted 
against the government on the number of new provinces in June of 1998 (see also 
Ferry 2003, p. 1106). Regionalisation showed ideological ruptures between and 
within the parties on the importance of central state implementation. The debate on 
the type of decentralisation also offered opportunities for parties to defend 
constituencies and score political points by stressing their commitment to the Polish 
state.
Due to the breakdown of internal party discipline of the AWS, the SLD profiled itself 
in opposition, as the driving force of regional reform (Bokajlo 2000). The SLD first 
blocked reform by insisting on compensation for those medium-size cities losing their 
administrative status. Also, the PSL, in opposition to attempts to reform middle-level 
government and especially to create district administration, was no longer a restricting 
force on the SLD. The initial attempt by the AWS to create 12 regions was 
abandoned. The new proposals called for 14 regions. A presidential veto on the bill, 
which could not be overturned in parliament, meant two further regions were created. 
President Kwasniewski took advantage of the divisions over this issue in parliament 
and within the government coalition to put his own stamp on territorial reform. It also 
meant the SLD held the political high ground for those people, who feared their 
regions and local communes would be subsumed in larger voivodships (Bokajlo
2000). This proved popular in the regional elections. The PSL, meanwhile,
85 Buzek had been nominated as Prime Minister by Marian Krzaklewski, the chairman of the AWS. 
Krzaklewski stayed outside the government to control the AWS coalition from parliament. Zubek 
points out that ‘the ultimate shape of policies tended to be decided in parliamentary committees and 
plenaries, where the opposition was quick to exploit the government’s divisions.’ (Zubek, 2001, pg. 
920)
86 The results of the elections of 1998 across communes, districts and provinces produced an across the 
board reinforcement of the existing alignments at the national level, with a right-wing bloc focused on 
the AWS, a left-wing bloc in the shape of the SLD, and centre parties like the UW and Social Alliance 
including the PSL. The AWS won 33% of the share of the seats, the SLD 31%, and the UW and Social 
Alliance each about 11 % roughly in line with the parliamentary elections of 1997. The SLD did gain in 
larger cities becoming the largest party in 29 out of 49 (These larger urban centres conform more or 
less to the 46 cities used in the pilot scheme of territorial administration under the administration of 
Jozef Olesky) and those provinces created largely by President Kwasniewski’s efforts(Szczerbiak, 
1999). The PSL not surprisingly did well in rural counties.
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maintained a populist agenda, which outiined the EU-ification of the Polish state and 
the creation of so called ‘German’ regions.
On June 5 of 1998, the Act on Regional Self-Government was adopted to produce a 
new territorial administration. This Act came into force on January 1,1999. The new 
division of the Polish state included 16 voivodships rather than 49, the re-introduction 
of 380 powiats of which 64 are based around a large town or city, and the re­
organisation of some of the municipalities. The reforms had the following 
components: 1. the creation of a three-tier complementary system of territorial 
administration, whereby the two lowest tiers are self-governing and the regions would 
maintain some element of state administration; 2. the emphasis on the unitary nature 
of the state; 3. a system of district government in which districts should cover an area 
with which local people identify; and 4. a regional subdivision in which regions
O '!
would be geographically large enough to generate income from taxes (also see 
Glowacki 2002). Most important for regional policy was the reduction of the number 
of voivodships. Kosarczyn (2001) points out that the structure of 49 voivodships 
seemed too small to meet the demands of globalisation and European integration. The 
European Union had been unwilling to classify the regions as NUTS 2 regions 
without a reduction in numbers. The new structure created a dual regional 
administration. The Voivod represents the State Treasury, controls and monitors the 
regional finances, and supervises regional development policy. At the national level, 
the Ministry of Interior and Public Administration, through its Department of 
Monitoring of Public Administration Reform, oversees and monitors the work of the 
Voivods (OECD 2002). Sectoral ministries can direct the Voivod on issues of sectoral 
delegation. The Voivod is appointed by the Prime Minister. On the other hand, the 
institution of Sejmik, consisting of 40 to 80 members at the voivodship level, was 
elevated to a self-government structure, which deals with the programming of 
regional policy. Its executive body is the Voivodship Management Board, with at its 
head the Marshal (Marszalek). The Marshal is responsible for regional programming, 
‘creating an environment for regional development, shaping the regional labour 
market, developing regional infrastructure, financial engineering of projects, 
education and R&D, environmental protection, and culture (Kosarczyn 2001, p. 8)’.
87 It was assumed the smaller districts would have to be subsidised. This was also compensation for the 
smaller cities, which lost some autonomy in the reforms.
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Another innovation is that the Marshal prepares a regional development strategy for 
foreign funds planning.
Within the new framework, state budget resources can be allocated for: a. the 
development of enterprise; b. creation of jobs; c. the development of local and 
regional infrastructure; d. administrative development; e. environmental protection; f. 
education and culture; and g. research (Kosarczyn 2001). The Voivodship 
Management Board applies for funds, stating the objectives and tasks to be covered 
by support. Based on this application and negotiations between the Management 
Board and the central government, a voivodship contract is signed. The Council of 
Ministers and the Sejmik need to approve the contract. The first 16 contracts were 
signed in July of 2001. The ‘voivodship contract’ guidelines and procedures are 
derived from the procedures of the EU Structural Funds and use matching funds, 
similar to the pre-accession funds (Interview with Jaroslaw Orlinski: Warsaw July 17 
2002 jointly with Iwona Brol and Agnieszka Kapciak; MoE 2000). Financial 
assistance from the central government is only available, where the programme 
specifically addresses the national strategy (MRDC, NSRD 2001-2006, 2000 p. 38). 
There is a strong EU-inspired aim for convergence between regional programmes, 
government support, combined efforts such as ‘voivodship’ contracts and national 
strategies. The ‘voivodship contracts’ also ensured financing was directed at and 
dependent on this convergence.
Aside from direct control over regional finances by the Voivod, there were two 
further restraining factors on decentralisation: 1. the resistance of national 
administrative actors; and 2. the allocation of finances to the regions.
There was resistance from both local officials and central administration officials, 
who would stand to lose competences, resources, and possibly jobs, if a new level of 
government was created. Also, the ministries would lose the power of nomination 
over those devolved institutions such as the police. As Regulski mentions, protests 
took on the shape of blocking highways, threats, and petitions (Regulski 1999). Ferry 
(2003) notes that the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Labour and Social affairs 
had been the dominant forces in regional development policy and especially objected. 
Kolodko, the Minister of Finance, also objected to the additional budgetary costs.
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Decentralisation, as Regulski comments, remained the ‘hobby’ of several national 
political actors (Regulski 1999). After 1998, this opposition also led to the 
enhancement of the supervisory roles of the Voivod, the Ministry of the Interior and 
the line ministries.
In the allocation of finances, the voivodship self-government, the newly formed 
districts or powiats and the communes or gminas gained concessions from the central 
government on the decentralisation of public finances. The administrative reforms 
assigned a share of the personal and corporate income tax receipts, collected within 
the boundary of the self-government entity. However, these shares were very low, up 
to 1.5% of personal income tax and 0.5 % of company taxes. Table 12 shows both the 
dominance of the contributions of the central government in regional and district 
revenues and the relatively small shares in territorial expenditures of the districts and 
regions. This dominance was also enshrined in law, as all EU funds had to pass 
through the national budget from which they would be distributed. The composition 
of the funds in the ‘regional contracts’ (see table 12) shows a complete dependence on 
central and EU funding.
A new amendment on public finance of the Buzek government in 2001 meant that the 
total amount of funding in the ‘regional contracts’ was not ring-fenced and could be 
withdrawn at any moment. This amendment was not only geared to reduce the 
operational risk in the implementation of funds, but also to allow greater ministerial 
discretion in the distribution of funds. The voivodships were often expected to fill the 
deficit through revenue-raising activities. A complicating factor, limiting the activities
o q
of the voivodships, was that these regions could not run deficits (Bokajlo 2000) . 
Thus, the budget was often only sufficient to implement national programmes on 
health and education, rather than develop regional policies (Ferry 2003). With the 
exception of a few functions, local administration and services provision fell mostly 
under the responsibility of the communes and the districts, while regional 
development programmes would be prepared and implemented at the voivodship level
88 The financial independence of the regions and their ability to pursue effective operations at the 
regional level became a fierce topic of debate in the national parliament. This debate also included 
electoral reform. Electoral reform focused on whether regions or powiats should form the base for 
parliamentary constituencies and whether the regions should form the base for the composition of the 
senate.
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(see Sigma 1999, p. 23). Moreover, the overall state contribution, as a percentage, was 
reduced through the incorporation of commercial revenues and private contributions 
in the overall budget for regional development policy. Again, this allowed the state 
budget to limit its budgetary exposure to operational risk. The control over the 
allocation of finances at the central level meant both a central control over regional 
policy and limits on the exposure of the state budget to risk.
Table 12: Public Finance Reform
Expenditures 
before the 
reform
Expenditures 
after the 
reform
Composition 
of Regions’ 
Revenues
Composition 
of District 
Revenues
Composition of 
Funds in Regional 
Contracts(2001- 
2002)
Central
Government
76% 55% 36% taxation 
and
commercial
revenues
34%
government
subsidies
30%
government
grants
4% taxation 
49%
government
subsidies
47%
government
grants
30% central 
budget
14.6% EU pre- 
accession 
32.4% relevant 
ministry
13% municipality 
1.4% districts 
2.1% regions
Regions 2%
Districts 7%
Municipalities 24% 24%
Source: Compiled from Regulski (1999; 2003); Glowac d (2002); anc Moscicki as
presented in Ferry (2003)
1.5 Regional Development Policy
The ‘Law on the Rules of Supporting Regional Development* came in force on July 
14, 2000. This law stipulated the exact procedures for the preparation and 
implementation of regional programmes. The National Strategy for Regional 
Development (NSRD) for the period 2001-2006 was adopted by the parliament on 
December 28, 2000. The NSRD is a ‘reference for planning the amount and direction 
of expenditures from the state budget, including foreign funds, for the implementation 
of the ‘voivodship contracts’ as well as other tasks related to regional development, 
advisory, information programmes as well as pilot undertakings’ (Ministry for 
Regional Development and Construction 2000, p. 7). Various medium-term strategies 
were then used to draft a preliminary National Development Plan (NDP) for the 
period of 2000-2002, which lists measures to be co-financed within the three pre­
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accession programmes: PHARE ESC; SAPARD; and ISPA.89 The final NDP for the 
period up to 2006 will also include measures to be co-financed with appropriations 
under the Cohesion Funds and Structural Funds. Similarly, the preliminary NDP 
incorporates the short-term priorities in the Accession Partnership, concerning 
administrative procedures and the EU financial intervention and evaluation 
mechanisms. The NDP is the action plan for the realisation of the priorities drawn up 
in the National Programme of Preparation for Membership (Committee for European 
Integration, NDP 2002).
The six priority axes of the NDP are (in brackets the % of financing they will get, 
followed by the % of national co-financing of Community funds for these axes): 1. 
the improvement of the economy’s competitiveness through modernisation and 
structural adjustment of industry and services (1% of total financing-36% of 
Community funding); 2. structural changes in agriculture, fishing, and rural 
development (24%-54%); 3. the integration of Polish economy through modernisation 
and enlargement of transport networks (27%-32%); 4. the creation of the conditions 
for balanced and sustainable development through modernisation and development of 
environmental infrastructure (20%-43%); 5. human resource and employment 
development (2%-26%); 6. the strengthening development potential of regions and 
counteracting marginalisation of certain areas(25%-42%) (CEI NDP 2002). These 
figures show a weight in the implementation of funds from 2002-2003 on rural 
development, transport, and regional development, where also the national co­
financing is at its highest compared to the other priority axes. Further, the NDP shows 
a focus in the distribution of resources, where regional development is the lowest. 
Priority axes would initially provide the largest regional envelopes to the 6 Eastern 
provinces, Lubelskie, Podkarpackie, Podlaskie, Slaskie, Lubuskie, and 
Zachodniopomorskie. The NDP also points out that, given the five fold increase in the 
average annual allocation of funding, it will become necessary to involve territorial 
self-government resources, have a broader utilisation of public/private partnership
89 Two remarks are important here: 1. the OCEI took the lead drafting the document, due to 
ineffectiveness of the Ministry of Regional Development and Construction; 2. the initial NDP covered 
a period of 2000-2002, rather than the more customary period of 2000-2006.
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mechanisms, and redirect a greater share of the national budget to regional 
development (CEI NDP 2002 p. 106)90.
The full effects of the ‘Law on the Rules of Supporting Regional Development’ are 
not yet clear. The reliance on ‘voivodship’ contracts, which have their base in the 
NSRD means that a very specific domestic system exists for regional development, 
which could possibly exist next to the framework for EU funds, the NDP. Within 
these contracts, the sectoral ministries have much discretion in outlining the strategy 
and implementing it. Moreover, the Voivod’s role in these contracts is reduced from 
authorising payments to supervising financial flows, which means that this 
responsibility for payments and monitoring will most likely reside in the sectoral 
ministries and less likely in the regional self-government (Hausner and Marody 2000). 
For EU funds, most resources, as the priority axes above show, are for sectoral 
programmes in rural development, transport, and environment. Further, the Ministry 
of Economy would be responsible for all regional policy planning. Regional 
development planning clearly maintains the sectoral role at the national level in the 
programming of funds.
Still, the adoption of EU regional policy was quite comprehensive. This point also 
stresses the support of the executive in formulating a regional development policy 
after the economic crisis in the mid-1990s.
90 The estimated EU funds contribution in mio. euro to the implementation of Poland’s structural 
policy objectives in Poland from 2004-2006 (source European Commission 2003) (% of total EU funds 
available):
Structural funds in total -  67.2 % (7635.3), including:
-European Regional Development Fund -  60,9 % (4652.8);
-European Social Fund -  22,9 % (1748.9);
-Guidance Section of the European Agricultural Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund -  13,8% (1055.0);
-Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance -  2,4 % (178.6);
Cohesion Fund -  32.8 % (3733.3).
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2. Pre-accession Instruments and Pre-Accession 
Implementation Channels for Regional Policy
2.1 The Pre-accession Management System
The National Strategy for Integration in 1997 acknowledges the importance of the 
development of adequate management structures to deal with the absorption of aid. It 
states that ‘the degree of development of institutions implementing this policy, on 
both the central and local levels, is the condition of meeting one of the fundamental 
criteria of EU structural policy, i.e. the partnership between the Union, central 
government and regions in the planning and implementation of aid programmes.’
(CEINSI1997, p. 26) This strategy encompasses the facilitation of decentralised 
financing through the development of regional institutions, capable of designing and 
implementing aid programmes, the training of civil servants, creation of financial 
procedures and audit departments in line ministries. The National Programme of 
Preparation for Membership in the European Union states further that ‘the efforts 
towards regional development should concentrate on [the] creation of an efficient and 
effective system in which, at the regional level, governmental and local administration 
would overtake national government control over the use of Structural Funds.’ 
(Council of Ministers NPPME 1999)
These strategy statements point to the focus in EU programming on decentralisation. 
Decentralisation would mean limiting the roles of the central government in 
coordination and implementation. National ministerial actors would attempt to 
mediate this redistribution of competences and resources. Paradoxically, the absence 
of a clear EU template on decentralisation and the PHARE management Reforms of 
1997 with its focus on more effective absorption would allow them to concentrate not 
only decision-making at the national level, but also maintain a sectoral approach to 
regional development. The following sections will look at: 1. the consolidation of 
funds coordination near the core executive and Minister of Economy; 2. the 
centralisation of financial control; and 3. the consolidation of ESC implementation in 
a government agency, attached to the Ministry of Economy. Such consolidation was
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also proposed for ISPA environmental projects. In this way, sectoral adaptation 
remained with the context of the executive structure.
2.2 Coordination
Coordination shows a lack of continuity in the bodies involved in the coordination of 
funds management from PHARE to Structural Funds. Moreover, the management of 
PHARE evolved during the pre-accession period. However, the coordination style, 
which focused on central coordination, remained very similar in these periods and 
was strengthened close to accession. Further, as stated earlier, the Council of 
Ministers played an important role in policy drafting and planning.
The OCEI coordinates the pre-accession programmes. In PHARE ESC, the OCEI’s 
role has evolved from hands on implementation tasks to a more consultative role on 
projects fiches and a liaising role with the European Commission. The administrative 
weakness in regional development policy implementation, in terms of the capacity of 
the Ministry for Regional Development and Construction (MRDC) during its 
existence, meant that the OCEI primarily checked project fiches and assisted in the 
management of programmes (derived from an interview with Adam Sadownik: 
Warsaw September 27, 2001).91 In terms of drafting the NDP and National Strategy 
for Regional Development, the input of the line ministries and the OCEI was 
substantial, often at the expense of the MRDC. The more consultative role of the 
OCEI has also grown out of the integration of regional development policy into the 
Ministry of Economy. For ISPA, the OCEI is the National ISPA Coordinator (NIC). 
The NIC coordinates the management of EU funds in the Ministry of Environment 
and the Ministry of Infrastructure. This is an important role in the particular set-up of 
ISPA. For SAPARD, the coordinating role of the OCEI is very minimal. Moreover, it 
is not clear what will happen to the expertise and capacity built up in the OCEI after 
accession, with the introduction of Structural Funds.
91 This point is also confirmed for ‘Twinning’ by interview comments from Zuzanna Kierzkowska: 
Warsaw September 27, 2001.
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The Ministry of Economy, as managing authority, will assume most coordination 
functions associated with the Community Support Framework. This role consists of: 
the delivery of implementation data to the European Commission on the progress of 
implementation of the operational programmes; preparing the operational 
programmes; arranging mid-term and ex-post evaluation; ensuring that all authorities 
participating in the management of assistance maintain a separate accounting system 
for Community funds; ensuring financial control and correctness of financial 
procedures; preparing an annual irregularity report; and ensuring that Community 
rules on public contracts are adhered to (CEI NDP 2002, p. 100). Additionally, 
through the operational programmes, the Ministry maintains an important
QOimplementation function. On the broader relationship with the regions, the Minister 
of Economy according to ‘Act on Regional Development Support’ coordinates all 
requests, regional strategies, and voivodship programmes with the national strategy. 
The Minister signs the specific financial assistance contract with the territories. The 
monitoring and evaluation of the support programmes and the voivodship contract 
implementation takes place in the National Monitoring Committees. The Minister is 
the chair of this Committee.
In short, the institutional set-up for decision-making on Structural Funds was 
consolidated within the Ministry of Economy, with a minimal say for the regions. For 
instance, the Regional Steering Committee, an institutionalised form of social 
participation93, was late in being constituted and met very infrequently. Moreover, 
consultation at the national level was also limited. Agnieszka Kapciak points out the 
national steering committee for PHARE regional development does not exist as yet 
and therefore has never met (Interview with Agnieszka Kapciak: Warsaw July 17 
2002).
92 In Structural Funds, the Ministry of Economy would be responsible as managing authority for the 
‘Integrated Regional Operational Programme’, ‘technical assistance’, the sectoral operational 
programmes on ‘the improvement of competitiveness of the economy’ and through its Labour and 
Social Affairs mandate for the sectoral operational programme on ‘human resource development’. The 
remaining sectoral operational programmes, namely the programme on ‘restructuring and 
modernisation of the food sector and development of rural areas’, the programme on ‘fisheries’, and the 
programme on ‘infrastructure’ would be managed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (first two) and by the Ministry of Infrastructure respectively (CEI NDP 2002, pg. 98).
93 It consisted of local administrative units, such as the gminas and powiats, economic and social 
partners, and representatives of regional administration.
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2.3 Exercising Financial Control
A second centralising component in EU programming was the financial control 
requirement. There are two main parties in managing the flow of funds in regional 
development grants, the Ministry of Finance at the national level and the Voivod at 
the regional level. In the case of the pre-accession funds, the National Fund, an 
administrative department in the Ministry of Finance, controls the flow of financing. 
The National Fund was created in 1997 to support the National Authorising Officer 
(NAO), a Deputy Minister of Finance. Previously, the NAO, though based in the 
Ministry of Finance, was independent in the government plenipotentiary for EU funds 
transfer. After October of 2001, the NAO was integrated within the Ministry of 
Finance and supported by the National Fund. The National Fund aims to improve the 
financial procedures, in terms of financial control, and to manage absorption of 
foreign aid.94 The National Fund contains three units: a transfer monitoring unit; an 
absorption unit making transfers; and an accounting unit.
Before 1997, there was no legislative framework for the management of foreign aid. 
Agnieszka Kazmierczak, Deputy Director of the National Fund, points out that 
foreign aid was not recorded in the public budget, as it had a tax-exempt status 
(Interview with Agnieszka Kazmierczak: Warsaw, December 22 2002). Moreover, 
various tax laws had different definitions on how foreign funds should be treated. In 
1998, the ‘Law on Public Finance’ defined foreign funds as public funds and placed 
them in the budget. This was also facilitated by the system of co-financing that the EU 
introduced, whereby the national or regional budgets would have to contribute part of 
the funding of programmes. However, EU funds had different procedures from other 
public funds, due to the differential treatment of diverse grants within the different 
departments of the Ministry of Finance.
94 The consolidation of payment functions within the Ministry of Finance has also been acknowledged 
by the nomination of the Ministry as the sole payment authority in the institutional set-up for the 
implementation of Structural Funds after 2004. It is expected the Ministry of Finance will devolve 
some payment functions, which will require the setting up of independent payment units within the 
ministries and voivodships (CEI NDP 2002, pg. 100)
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The creation of the National Fund has had effects on budgetary processes. Though 
there are different procedures for EU funds and the Polish budget, National Fund 
procedures have initiated the consolidation of the four levels of the state budget. The 
problem was nobody really knew how much money there was (Interview with 
Agnieszka Kazmierczak: Warsaw, December 22 2002). Consolidation has also 
occurred in grant-giving procedures. Dariusz Szewczyk points out the difficulties for 
the Polish Agency for Regional Development (PARR) before October 2001 to work 
with 80 different sources of financing, often having different procedures (Interview 
with Dariusz Szewczyk: Warsaw, January 22 2002).
However, Szewczyk also points out that changing requirements of EU funds (50 to 60 
requirements were new in the 2001-2002 PHARE ESC programming cycle) not only 
make it difficult for the regions to comply, but also create incompatibilities between 
the programming requirements and the Polish financial regulations in which they 
should be embedded.95 Kazmierczak notes financial procedures in the project cycle 
have the clear potential for straining relationships with the implementing agencies 
(Interview with Agnieszka Kazmierczak: Warsaw, December 22 2002).
This potential came out in the dispersal of funds. The foreign funds, agreed to in the 
Financing Memorandum, are kept in the National Fund account under the NAO. From 
there, they are dispersed to the current account of the state budget. For PHARE ESC, 
they are then dispersed under supervision of the Programme Authorising Officer 
(PAO) to a cluster of projects. The implementation agencies normally submit a report 
in advance to apply for funding. Before 1997, this request had to be filed 6 months in 
advance, whereas the Polish budget only demands 10 days for such requests. A 
compromise solution of 1 month is now in effect. However, implementation agencies 
often have liquidity problems in the current system, as ad hoc needs do not always 
correspond to the system of financial transfers. In ISPA, there are sub-accounts 
created in the state budget, over which the Sectoral Authorising Officer (SAO) has 
authority. Funds are directly transferred from there to the project accounts of the 
beneficiaries. For SAPARD, funds are transferred from the National Fund to the
95 Piotr Dudek points to the many accounting systems for different grants the regional authorities have 
to operationalise as a main problem in implementation (Interview with Piotr Dudek: Krakow July 19 
2002).
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ARMA (Agency for the Restructuring and Modernisation of Agriculture) and then 
distributed in zloty to the farmers. The ARMA makes monthly reports listing the 
projects and amounts paid to individual farmers (Compiled from an interview with 
Beata Kudcza: Warsaw, January 22 2002). Three characteristics are problematic for 
implementation agencies: the centralisation of the system without intermediaries; 
frequent changes in procedures; and the lack of flexibility in the application for 
funding.
Finally, audit became a key element of financial management. Audit procedures 
required an amendment to the ‘Act on Public Finance’, also because there is no 
difference in the Polish language between ‘audit’ and ‘control’. The new amendment 
mandated the creation of audit units at all levels of government (Interview with 
Agnieszka Kazmierczak: Warsaw, December 22 2002). Audit would be organised 
using central guidelines, but leave freedom to the agencies and ministries in setting up 
the audit. Some agencies would be exempt. Those agencies are nominally not in the 
public sector. Obviously, the absence of audit units in certain implementation 
agencies remains a problem for the European Commission. The Commission 
preferred to have such units excluded from the project cycle (see the Cooperation 
Fund in ‘twinning’ in section 2.6). Audit is coordinated in the Ministry of Finance 
with help of the Chief Accountant. It is estimated 13,000 employees will be needed to 
provide audit capacity.
The EU preference in financial control is obvious. Commenting on the central role of 
the Ministry of Finance, Kazmierczak reports, ‘European auditors prefer to have their 
reports in Warsaw, outside of Warsaw it gets too wild’ (Interview with Agnieszka 
Kazmierczak: Warsaw, December 22 2002). These preferences allowed the Polish 
executive to centralise the implementation of regional projects. At the regional level, 
as stated earlier, the Voivod is responsible for monitoring the management of foreign 
funds. Moreover, central agencies would take over more implementation tasks, as 
these agencies had more capacity to deal with the complex EU requirements.
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2.4 PHARE ESC Implementation
2.4.a Consolidation of Implementation within the PAED
The Polish Agency for Enterprise Development (PAED) was a transformation of the 
Polish Foundation for Small and Medium Enterprise Promotion and Development, 
which operated from 1996 to 2000. The PAED was formed in 2001 and is 
subordinated as a government agency to the Minister of Economy. In October 2001, 
the main national development agency, the PARR, was incorporated within the 
PAED. This development was in line with the consolidation of economic 
management, which also saw the incorporation of the MRDC within the Ministry of 
Economy(see section 1.3). The new wider mandate for the PAED would be to 
implement ‘economic development programmes, especially in the areas of small and 
medium-size enterprise development, exports, regional development, job creation, 
human resources development and counteracting unemployment, as well as promotion 
of modem technologies’ (taken from PAED 2003). Activities of the Agency are 
financed from the state budget and European Union funds. The consolidation of the 
implementation agencies not only fit into the preference, expressed by the European 
Commission in the PHARE Management Reforms, to limit the number of 
implementation agencies and to integrate implementation agencies closer to 
ministerial budgetary resources, but also to develop a more limited programming 
focus on economic and social cohesion programming, through the introduction of 
PHARE ESC in 2000. About half of the total 340 million euro allocation of PHARE 
2002 will be taken up by the human resource and SME development programmes. 
PHARE ESC put human resource and SME development at the forefront of regional 
development. The PAED was better placed to administer these programmes (EC, 
Regular Reports 2002, p. 14).
The PARR was a treasury foundation, set up under a mandate of the Minister of the 
Treasury in 1993. From 1996 to 2000, the OCEI was the supervisory body for the 
PARR. Oversight from 2000 until October 2001 was provided by the Ministry for 
Regional Development and Construction (MRDC). Its mandate was to:
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• assist and promote all types of initiatives launched for the benefit of the 
economic development of regions;
• support the development of information on regional development;
• participate in the establishment of financial institutions promoting 
regional development ( PARR ‘About Us’ 2001).
The PARR, an independent treasury foundation, had experience in implementing 
Strader programming.96 It took control over PHARE ESC implementation. The 
PARR had as mission to ‘set up an entire institutional system for implementing 
regional development policy in Poland, according to the criteria established by the 
European Union, and complying with the requirements of Structural Funds’ (PARR 
1999, p. 78). However, this coordinative function was difficult without the support of 
a central agency or ministry to draft national regional development policy and to 
coordinate the partners on the national and voivodship levels. The agency functioned 
further as a unit that gave relevant ministries and local government advice and 
information on regional development policy (functions derived from interview with, 
Dariusz Szewczyk: Warsaw, January 22 2002). Its set-up was a reflection of the 
fragmented nature of regional development policy coordination and implementation 
before the PHARE Management Reforms.
The coordinative and advice functions of the PARR had been a reaction to a vacuum 
in regional policy planning. However, this vacuum had been addressed in 1995-1997. 
The creation of responsibilities in the Council of Ministers in regional policy 
coordination and the emergence of the Ministry of Economy, the main authority in the 
coordination of Structural Funds, filled this vacuum. This evolution was also obvious 
in the differences in the composition of the supervisory boards between the PARR 
and the PAED. For the PARR in 2001, The Ministry of the Treasury appointed the 
Management Board after a motion by the Minister for Regional Development and 
Construction. The PARR’s board aimed to involve all governmental stakeholders in 
regional development. The upside of the inclusion of a broader group on the board is 
the possibility of wider coordination. By giving the ministries a stake in the 
management of the PARR, the coordination between the ministries concerning 
regional development policy might prove easier. On the downside, giving more actors
96 PHARE Strader was a precursor to PHARE ESC programming(see PARR 1999 and PARR 2000)
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a say could also lead to a fragmentation in the national set-up with competences of 
cross-sectoral bodies curtailed. The close involvement of the Ministry of Economy 
and the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy went at the expense of the competences 
of the MRDC in the drafting and monitoring of policy (Interview with Adam 
Sadownik: Warsaw September 27, 2001). In contrast, the PAED’s supervisory board 
consisted mostly of representatives of the Ministry of Economy. However, a novelty 
is that local representatives and employer and employee representatives are also 
included (see list PAED ‘Supervisory Board’ 2003). This development, though a 
consultative arrangement, seems to be in line with the ‘partnership’ requirement of the 
European Commission.
In ‘partnership’, the question was to what extent the project cycle97 could rely on the 
regions (voivodships). The identification of projects was mostly a regional 
competence. However, decentralised competences in policy planning, monitoring and 
coordination lessened with subsequent programming cycles in PHARE ESC. PHARE 
ESC 2000 worked primarily on the voivodship level, whereby each voivodship 
submitted an operational programme. This operational programme broadly set out the 
guidelines for ESC implementation. The programme had ranges for its priorities of 9 
to 14% on the development of human resources, 24 to 42% on assisting 
manufacturing, and 48 to 66% on infrastructure development (CEI NDP 2002 p. 72). 
PHARE ESC 2001 focused on the 8 most disadvantaged voivodships. These 8 
voivodships submitted operational programmes, focusing 50% of funds on SME
97 Marshal offices on the voivodship level receive the project applications from municipalities or 
enterprises. This process is responsible for 90% of applications. The departments process the 
applications and forward these to the Voivodship Management Board. The Voivodship Management 
Board signs off on the criteria, if they meet the needs of the regional development plans of the 
voivodship. These project proposals are forwarded to the Ministry of Economy by way of the PAED, 
where the PAO for regional operational programmes is based. The proposals or project fiches are 
scrutinised against the procedures outlined by the Commission and against the strategy identified in the 
National Strategy for Regional Development and the NDP. Dariusz Szewczyk, then CFO of PARR and 
now assistant to the CEO of the PAED, comments that aside from dealing with the lack of quality of 
some project applications, the PARR used to assist in aiding regional self-government in trend-spotting 
of EU preferences in programming (Interview with Dariusz Szewczyk: Warsaw, January 22 2002). It 
is estimated that in the current database for the Integrated Regional Development Operational 
Programme and the Cohesion Fund only 200 out of 600 proposed projects are properly prepared 
(Grosse and Olbrycht 2003a). Once the European Commission approves the project cycle, the PAED 
takes on the implementation responsibilities in terms of contacts with beneficiaries, tendering, 
payments, and monitoring. Financial control at the regional level for all programmes and Voivodship 
contracts rests with the Voivod. A representative of the Voivod’s office is the Deputy PAO. This 
representative authorises payments and monitors the utilisation of aid.
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development and the other 50% on the development of human resources.
Interestingly, PHARE ESC 2001 also had a provision that a national programme for 
regional development would be implemented by the then Ministry of Labour and 
Social Policy. PHARE ESC 2002 was different for two reasons. First, it relied more 
heavily on sectoral programmes (implemented by the line ministries) and introduced 
one integrated regional operational programme, rather than the 16 different 
voivodship operational programmes. The two additional sectoral programmes were 
compatible with the two priority axes in the NDP, human resource development and 
the enhancement of the competitiveness of the economy. Secondly, the programming 
cycle was multi-annual indicative rather than annual. This move provided some 
additional continuity in the programming cycles. It also meant that PHARE ESC 2002 
would be the template for Structural Funds.
Both changes in PHARE 2002 programming were directly related to a choice of 
programming structure, which more directly reflected the institutional features of 
Structural Funds. The NDP is quite direct on this level stating, ‘it is important to 
introduce the same types of operational programmes that will be implemented after 
Poland’s accession to the EU, use similar arrangements for their implementation, 
monitoring, control etc..’ (CEI NDP 2002, p 73) The management of sectoral 
programmes occurs in the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs (now one ministry). In both cases, the PAED is responsible for 
implementation as an intermediary body. A PAO is appointed in both ministries and 
this PAO chairs the respective sectoral monitoring committee. Officials in the 
Ministry of Economy indicate the one integrated regional operational programme is 
easier to manage and control than 16 different regional programmes (Interview with 
Jaroslaw Orlinski: Warsaw July 17 2002 jointly with Iwona Brol and Agnieszka 
Kapciak). However, local officials feel that the regional input function in national and 
sectoral programmes has diminished in favour of a more prominent role for the 
respective departments in the Ministry of Economy and the PAED (Interview with 
Piotr Dudek: Krakow July 19 2002). The prominent role of the central units might 
also be explained through John O’Rourke’s observation that regions’ capacity for DIS 
(the Decentralised Implementation System) had never been tested (Interview with 
John O’Rourke: Warsaw, January 21 2002). The Polish answer was to use the 
discretion in the set-up of PHARE and Structural Funds to attach more weight to
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sectoral programmes and diminish the role of regions in the drafting and 
implementation of programming. PHARE programming only reinforced this 
tendency.
The tension between regional actors and the PAED is further exhibited by the creation 
of regional networks by the PAED to support its activities. Early PHARE 
programming had been more inclusive of regional partners and in many cases relied 
on bottom-up initiatives. The PAED’s predecessor, the PARR, mostly worked with a 
network of 10 regional labour offices for help with implementation. The PARR 
coordinated not only the 4 main sectoral ministries, but also about 25 institutions on 
the voivodship level (Interview with Dariusz Szewczyk: Warsaw, January 22 2002). 
The PAED limited involvement to two regional networks. The first network is the 
National SME Services Network (KSU). This is a group of 150 co-operating 
business-counselling centres all over the country. Most of the member-organisations 
are regional and local development agencies, business support centres, industrial and 
commercial chambers, and local associations. Constituents are not-for-profit entities, 
providing services directly to SMEs. These entities operate under an accreditation 
system, which guarantees the maintenance of high standards in their advisory, 
training, information, and financial services. The second network is the system of 
Regional Financing Institutions (RFI). These are mostly regional development 
agencies. The PAED has nominated one RFI per voivodship for PHARE ESC 
programming (Interview with Pawel Czyz: Warsaw, July 17 2002). These networks 
are defining new roles for local and regional agencies involved in business advice and 
regional development. Clearly, these RFIs limit the role of the regional development
Q Q
agencies. The RFIs will help in the identification of projects, write proposals, or 
advise on project applications. However, the RFIs cannot be beneficiaries of PHARE 
programming. This limited role brings problems for organisations, whose statutory 
roles often include the pursuit of commercial activities such as lending, property 
management, and consulting. Further these are organisations that are often 
beneficiaries of not only PHARE but other assistance programmes (Interview with
98 Regional development agencies were mostly capitalised in the early 1990s by the Industrial 
Development Agency (IDA), a combination of bankers, chambers of commerce, and a variety of 
economic and social associations. They are non-governmental organisations linked to the voivodships, 
with the aim to produce regional development and assist the public executive in regional development 
programming (Kozak 2001).
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Malgorzata Kos: Krakow July 19 2002). In essence, the development of the PAED 
network, which incorporates the regional development agencies, limits the core 
activities of the regional development agencies. This observation also fits into views 
of officials at the Ministry of Economy, who see the role of regional development 
agencies mostly as giving ‘support’ and ‘advice’ in programming (Interviews with 
Jaroslaw Orlinski: Warsaw July 17 2002 jointly with Iwona Brol and Agnieszka 
Kapciak).
2.4.b Characterising the Institutional Set-up
Centralisation of implementation was a pattern in the process of preparing for 
Structural Funds implementation. In this preparation there existed an emphasis on 
sectoral programmes, which account for 70% of the budget," and on the reduction of 
regional operational programmes from the 16 regional programmes to one integrated 
programme (see also DG Enlargement, PHARE Review 2000, 2000). The ‘PHARE 
2000 Review’ concedes that ‘a mix’ of national ministries or agencies can implement 
regional programmes (DG Enlargement, PHARE 2000 Review, 2000). Hausner and 
Marody (2000, p. 105) comment that the regional development plans, drawn up by the 
regional self-governments, were remarkably similar and showed a dependency on EU 
funds, as they only addressed the five priorities of Structured Funds and did not plan 
beyond 2000-2006, the current EU budgetary cycle. These regional programmes 
presented little more than a ‘wish list’ or aped EU documents, rather than present an 
integrated or forward-looking development policy. Budgetary processes were often 
independent of the programming components, due to the compromises between a 
large number of actors (Interview with Pawel Samecki: Warsaw September 28, 2001). 
Thus, financial flows, already compromised by ill-defined financial procedures, not 
always followed programming needs and priorities.
99 Distribution of the funds within the respective Sector Operational Programmes from 2004-2006 in 
mio. euro (source: European Commission 2003): % of total EU Funds available (7635.3 in total) 
-Increased Economic Competitiveness SOP -  17.8 % (1300);
-Human Resources Development SOP -  17.3 % (1270.4);
-Transport and Maritime Economy SOP -  8.6 % (627.2);
-Food Sector Restructuring and Improvement and Rural Areas 
Development SOP -  14.4 % (1055,0);
-Fishery and Fish Processing SOP -  2.4 % (178.6)
-Technical Support SOP -  0.3 % (20).
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The development of a more centralised approach to implementation was also a 
function of the problems with the absorption of funds. In terms of the absorption of 
EU funds, PHARE uptake had been particularly slow. In 1997, only 17% of funds 
allocated for inter-regional cooperation were used (Glowacki 2002). In 1998, PHARE 
funds were reduced by 34%. PHARE 1998 was not fully used up, when the new 
programming cycle under PHARE 1999 would have started. PHARE 2000-2002 
included the creation of capacity to absorb Structural Funds. Delays not only 
hampered EU projects aimed at administration-building, but also led to the 
irreversible loss of funds in 1998 (34 million euro) and in 1999 (Kaczorowska in 
Warsaw Voice, 16/12/2001). This fact produced closer attention of the European 
Commission to the project cycle. Both the Polish executive and the Commission 
focused on finding ways to ensure administrative capacity existed to manage EU 
funds (Interview with Jaroslaw Orlinski: Warsaw July 17 2002). This effort initially 
focused on the core executive and the Ministry of Economy.
The more centralised role of the Ministry of Economy, in drafting the Integrated 
Regional Development Operating Programme, was seen as a way to address the 
deficiencies in regional planning. The regional partners (for instance the RDAs) found 
themselves incorporated in new networks, which limited their involvement in the 
implementation of the pre-accession funds. Regional partners retained their role in 
project selection, but this role was defined and financed by the central state. 
Additionally, the emphasis on financial control has further consolidated the 
management of financial flows in specialised departments within the Ministry of 
Finance.
In co-financing, territorial self-government would have to adjust its expenditure to 
fulfil its co-financing requirement, estimated at 1 billion euro (see also table 12). To 
this end, initiatives at the central government to boost limited regional resources 
included: awarding a larger share of the income tax to the regions; allowing the 
municipalities to increase their budget deficit; and the extension of 6 billion zloty in 
state guarantees by the Ministry of Finance to help the co-financing of the regions 
(Grosse and Olbrycht 2003a). However, enterprises are also expected to contribute to 
co-financing, despite their limited budgets. Further, the 11.2 million zloty earmarked
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for expanding the civil service’s personnel by 600 administrators for dealing with 
funds does not extend to the regions, which have to finance their own capacity 
planning. In all, there was a limited desire among national administrative actors to 
share national budgetary resources. Hausner and Marody (2000) comment that with a 
lack of decentralisation of public funds and centralisation of the application of funds, 
regions would struggle to meet the requirements for EU funds implementation. The 
Polish government effectively centralised the management of EU funds.
2.5 ISPA: Consolidation Perhaps?
In ISPA, a consolidation of implementation responsibilities remains possible. For 
ISPA implementation, the Polish executive aims to set up two separate 
implementation tracks in the Ministry of the Environment, Natural Resources and 
Forestry (MOE) and the Ministry of Transport and Maritime Economy (MTME), 
from October of 2001 part of the Ministry of Infrastructure (Mol). The OCEI 
functions as the National ISPA Coordinator (NIC). The SAOs are responsible for 
implementation and the supervision of implementation (CEI PNDP 2002, p. 92). The 
OCEI, in the case of environmental projects brought forward by the MOE, checks and 
forwards the decision on project applications to the European Commission. For 
transport projects, aside from the functions described for environmental projects, the 
OCEI also gives an opinion on the application (for regulations see EC ISPA 
Programming and Implementation in Poland, Working Document of Office of the 
CEI, 2001, p. 10)
The implementation track in the MOE has the following characteristics. Under the 
Agreement of the September 3,1999 on the National Fund of Environmental 
Protection and Water Management (NFEP), the Minister of Environmental Protection, 
Natural Resources and Forestry (Minister of Environment) defers responsibilities on 
dissemination of information on ISPA, evaluation of project applications, collection 
of documentation in applications, assessing and checking applications against national 
selection criteria and European Union regulations, and implementation of projects to 
the National Fund for Environmental Protection (NFEP) (OCEI, ISPA Programming 
and Implementation in Poland, 2001, p. 5). The NFEP receives the application from
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the beneficiary, normally a commune or local authority and gives an opinion on the 
application. This opinion is forwarded to the Department of Foreign Funds and 
Management within the MOE and to the Steering Committee (OCEI, ISPA 
Programming and Implementation in Poland, 2001, p. 6). Transport projects tend to 
have a different implementation structure. The final beneficiaries are also the 
implementation agencies. This situation also seems to improve the quality of 
applications, compared to the environmental track (Interview with Pawel Samecki: 
Warsaw September 28, 2001. The selection criteria, in terms of requirements and time 
schedule, are decided by the Minister of Infrastructure in consultation with the top 
transport management of the Mol and the sectoral implementation agencies. The 
Department for Finance and Economic Analysis in the transport section of the Mol 
processes the applications from the sectoral agencies.
Concerning the future of ISPA, Pawel Samecki believes that the NFEP will be phased 
out regardless of the timeline of accession in 3 years (Interview with Pawel Samecki: 
Warsaw September 28, 2001). He sees this shift of competences as a wider 
programme of consolidation of agencies, funds, and foundations aimed at using the 
capacity of sectoral ministries built around a PAO or SAO. At this point, the PAO is 
based within the OCEI. Most views seem to indicate that the PAO should leave the 
OCEI (Interview with Pawel Samecki: Warsaw September 28, 2001, September 2001; 
Interview with Zuzanna Kierzkowska: Warsaw September 27, 2001). The options are 
placing the PAO outside of public administration (Interview with Zuzanna 
Kierzkowska: Warsaw September 27, 2001) or placing the PAO into the sectoral 
ministries (Interview with Pawel Samecki: Warsaw September 28, 2001). The reason 
behind the first option is to create a fully independent PAO with a separate capacity. 
The second option highlights a need to incorporate the line ministries more closely in 
the project cycle. This discussion is in line with similar considerations involving 
PHARE ESC. Samecki acknowledges this last change would be a more logical 
institutional set-up, whereby implementation is again based in the sectoral ministries 
much like the initial phases of PHARE, be it in a smaller number of sectoral 
ministries. Two issues remain: a. whether the EC will find such an organisation 
acceptable; and b. how to organise the consolidation on the core executive level. One 
plan being investigated is to build a consolidated super-ministry of agriculture that 
could incorporate the NFEP and other agencies.
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2.6 Overview of PHARE ESC Implementation
Type of 
EU
program
Implementation
Agency
Implementation
Task
Link to 
Ministry
Regional Network Statutory Purpose
PHARE 
ESC and 
CBC
Polish Agency for 
Enterprise
Development (PAED) 
is a merger of the 
Polish Foundation for 
Small and Medium 
Size Enterprise 
Promotion and 
Development 
(PFSMEPD) est. in 
1996 and the Polish 
Agency for Regional 
Development (PARD) 
est. 1993
Some consultation and 
task- sharing with 
other agencies Polish 
Agency for Foreign 
Investment est. 1992 
and Polish Industrial 
Development Agency 
est. 1990 (linked to 
Ministry of Industry 
and Trade now part of 
MG)
Agency for Cross- 
border Cooperation
CFCU in Cooperation 
Fund with 
coordination and 
project evaluation 
provided by OCEI
The Task Force for 
Training and Human 
Resources in 
Cooperation 
Fund(TFTHR)
TFTHR was 
incorporated in the 
Cooperation Fund in 
1990 from the 
Ministry of National 
Education
Agroline in 
Cooperation Fund 
(separate from 
SAPARD)
Implementation of 
all ESC components 
of PHARE-PHARE 
SME Development 
till 2001 was in 
PFSMEPD and pilot 
projects and other 
ESC regional 
development 
programming in 
PARD
Cross-border 
cooperation 
component of 
PHARE
Civil society 
development 
programmes of 
PHARE
Training
programmes under 
Phare
Agricultural Training 
programmes under 
PHARE
State
Treasury
Foundation
with Link to
Ministry of
Economy
(MG)
Link to 
Ministry of 
Economy 
(MG)
Independent
foundation
Same as 
above
Same as 
above
Network of SME 
Services Networks 
of approximately 
150 business 
contact points 
throughout Poland
Network of 
Regional Financing 
Institutions which 
are regional 
implementation 
units consisting of 
Training Refund 
Centre (PRS) and 
the Consulting and 
Advisory Point 
(PKD).
Networks in target 
regions
Regional contact 
points
Same as above 
including National 
Observatory for 
vocational 
Education and 
Training
Same as above
(PAED) est. 2001 The 
objectives of the 
Agency include now 
implementation of 
economic development 
programmes, especially 
in the areas of:
1. Small and medium- 
size enterprises 
development; 2. 
Exports; 3. Regional 
Development; 4. 
Promotion of modem 
technologies; 5. Job 
creation, human 
resources development 
and counteracting 
unemployment.
Cooperation Fund est. 
1990, CFCU est. 1996 a 
Polish non-profit 
foundation, which 
supports democratic 
transformation and 
fosters economic 
development. The Fund 
design and implements 
development 
programmes financed 
by foreign
governmental and non­
governmental sources.
It also provides 
administrative support 
to the OCEI
Same as above
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3. Conclusion
The adoption of EU regional policy in Poland showed two patterns of institutional 
change: a substantial change in sectoral institutional arrangements and a change in the 
executive structure.
On the sectoral level, the process of adoption in Poland was similar to the Czech 
Republic. The ‘misfit’ between EU regional policy and the conceptualisation in 
Poland of regional development as part of industrial policy has largely been 
overcome. The reasons for this adaptation were similar to those in the Czech Republic 
as well. The economic crisis of the mid-1990s had put pressure on the Polish 
executive to address regional disparities and structural problems. These issues, as 
stated in section 1.2, had been neglected in regional development planning since the 
early 1990s. Moreover, regional actors, after the territorial reform of 1998, became 
more vocal in their demands for regional programming (see Regulski 1999). The 
support of regional and executive actors, enhanced by the prospect of a greater and 
wider availability of funds, seemed to facilitate the adoption of EU regional policy 
and the adjustment of sectoral institutional arrangements, be it in coordination, 
financial control, and implementation (see sections 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4). However, 
similar to the Czech Republic, this sectoral adaptation occurred within the context of 
the Polish executive structure.
However, this observation on sectoral adjustments does not explain the change of the 
executive structure. Before 1997, the main challenge of the European Commission to 
the Polish macro-institutional set-up came in terms of the reform of territorial 
administration or decentralisation. After the PHARE Reforms of 1997, which focused 
on raising the impact of programming, the Commission demand for wide territorial 
reform weakened. Rather, the Commission and the EU templates referred to 
decentralisation as the implementation of EU funds in regions compatible with NUTS 
2 classification. Moreover, after the PHARE Reforms, the pre-accession templates 
produced two other challenges: a focus on central coordination in EU funds 
management and the reduction (or consolidation) of implementation agencies.
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In terms of decentralisation, the national administrative actors aimed to limit a 
domestic distribution of power to the regions and reduce the operational and 
budgetary costs of EU programming. Domestic administration had discretion in the 
process of adaptation, because of a lack of clear prescription in the EU templates on 
what territorial administration should look like. The ‘acquis’ was not specific. The 
NUTS 2 requirements are guidelines for classification, rather than specific 
requirements. Further, the EU’s focus on the absorption of funds meant a reliance on 
more established administration. This reliance was enhanced by the introduction of 
financial procedures (co-financing and DIS and EDIS) that favoured central 
administrative units, such as the PAED. These were units with the experience and 
expertise to administer these complex programmes. In short, temporal factors further 
increased the domestic discretion in shaping administration and consequently 
decreased the potential ‘misfit’ between the EU requirements on regional policy and 
the Polish territorial administration. These factors played a role in the Polish regional 
reform of 1998.
The regional reform in 1998 under the Buzek government amounted to a limited 
decentralisation. Furthermore, the reform was a fulfilment of a constitutional 
undertaking. The EU inspired the reform, but its vague templates allowed domestic 
actors to shape it. Limited decentralisation had five characteristics: 1. the role of the 
Voivod in the regions gave the line ministries financial control over regional 
development in the voivodships; 2. the ‘voivodship’ contracts institutionalised state 
grants from the Ministry of Economy to the regions; and 3. a limited decentralisation 
of resources meant reliance in EU co-financing on the central government, which had 
discretion in the disbursal of EU funds to the regional partners; and 4. the role of the 
regions was reduced to a consultative role in the drawing up of priorities and 
programmes. In this way, the EU challenge to the Polish territorial administration 
dissipated and was averted. Decentralisation was limited.
In terms of the horizontal of organisation of the executive, a major consolidation took 
place in October of 2001 after the SLD-UP election victory. This process consisted of 
a consolidation of pre- and post-accession regional development policy coordination 
within the Ministry of Economy and the consolidation of implementation and regional 
networks in the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development. In terms of coordination,
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Pawel Samecki remarks that the integration of EU pre-accession functions in the 
shape of the PAOs and SAOs back into the line ministries (in this case the Ministry of 
Economy) was an agenda point in September 2001 (see for instance ISPA in section 
2.5). This idea was also introduced to decrease fragmentation in implementation and 
also to connect programming to budgetary resources (Interview with Pawel Samecki: 
Warsaw September 28, 2001). A consolidation would also transfer the role of the 
OCEI in the management of the pre-accession funds to the Ministry of Economy. The 
coordination of EU regional policy would take place in the Ministry of Economy, 
which was responsible for sectoral and the integrated regional plans. The Ministry of 
Finance coordinated funds transfers. The allocation of resources in Structural Funds 
remained chiefly with the national ministerial actors. This was amplified by the move 
towards sectoral programmes within the programming of PHARE ESC in the period 
of 2000-2002 and within the planning of Structural Funds for the period of 2004- 
2006. These sectoral programmes reduced the emphasis on regional programming and 
amplified the central role of the Ministry of Economy (and its associated agency, the 
PAED) in coordination and implementation.
At first sight, this consolidation seems a substantial institutional change of the 
executive structure. This was not expected in a policy sector that the research had 
assumed would provide a ‘moderate challenge’ (see chapter 3). However, this 
institutional change can be explained through looking at processes of domestic 
administrative reform. This consolidation was in fact a continuation of the 
administrative reform started in 1997. As explained in section 1.3 of this chapter, the 
administrative reforms of 1997 were a reaction to longstanding calls for portfolio 
reform and to the economic crisis of the mid-1990s. This process involved the 
strengthening of the coordination competences of the Council of Ministers and the 
Prime Minister and the re-alignment of the ministries. In this way, the reform of the 
executive structure in the period of 1996-1997 was largely an endogenous process.
The reform of 2001 was a continuation of this process. However, in this case, the EU 
requirements (public finance reform) and focus on absorption were used by executive 
actors to promote and enhance these reforms.
The main effect on the macro-institutional configuration was the institutional 
enhancement of executive actors. The Prime Minister and the Minister of Economy,
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also a Deputy Prime Minister, achieved control over the costs of EU programming 
through the centralisation of the management of EU funds. Moreover, the top-down 
centralisation of financial procedures strengthened the role of the Ministry of Finance 
in funds management, in particular its National Fund unit. The regions, given the 
centrist nature of the state and the unclear and evolving EU template, proved to have 
little ‘capacity’ in taking advantage of the opportunities associated with EU funds.
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Chapter 7: The Management of Agricultural Reform 
and the Administration of the Pre-accession Process 
in the Czech Republic 
1. Introduction
The EU challenge to the Czech agricultural administration was twofold. First, Czech 
administrators had to adopt a dense regulatory policy, while the post-transition 
agricultural policy had focused mostly on liberal policies under Vaclav Klaus. This 
was a substantial ‘misfit’. These liberal principles were also in reaction to the 
relatively limited structural problems, in terms of both the size of farms and the 
structure of agricultural production in the Czech Republic, compared to other CEECs. 
The adjustment to a more interventionist policy not only meant an expansion of the 
instruments to be distributed and administered under CAP and SAPARD, but also an 
expansion of the domestic budget.
Secondly, the adoption of this intervention policy also meant a challenge to the 
macro-institutional context. The challenge involved the formation and transformation 
of domestic administration to support the dense regulatory and interventionist policy 
of the Common Agricultural Policy. This challenge could affect the macro- 
institutional configuration and the institutional position of various national executive 
actors.
Section 2 will look at the reform of Czech agriculture in the post-transition period and 
the development of an agricultural support administration (in section 2.4). Section 3 
will look at the development of an EU-specific administration in the context the 
systems of market intervention, direct payments, and SAPARD.
2. Post-transition Agricultural Reform
There are three main periods of domestic reform and associated administrative 
development: 1. the immediate response to the problems of transition; 2. the liberal
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policies pursued by Klaus starting in 1991; and 3. the redirection of agricultural policy 
in 1997.
2.1 A Response to Transition
The main aim of agricultural policy in the period of the early 1990s was to safeguard 
farmers’ income and overall agricultural production from the effects of transition. The 
major instruments were (compiled from Csaki, 1999):
• Price support measures with fixed and guaranteed prices coupled to export 
subsidies;
• Financial support for newly established private farms;
• Direct payments to farmers in less favoured areas to encourage specific 
production.
In the 1990s, the Czech Republic had a rather modest level of agricultural support, 
with the exception of the transition period of 1990-1991. In this period, pre-transition 
intervention, such as the extension of soft credits, prevailed (Doucha et al, 1999). 
Moreover, the government relied on direct support to farms, mostly in the form of 
grants. Market intervention and subsidy support programmes had been administered 
by the respective state ministries of agriculture in the Federation and in 1992 by the 
federally created Federal Fund of Market Regulation in Agriculture. The Czech 
Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) percentage100 in 1990 was 48, similar to the EU. 
However, by 1997, the PSE had fallen to 10 compared to the EU’s 38 (OECD, 1999). 
Similarly, the Czech Republic had relatively low custom tariffs compared with other 
transition and EU countries, as the Czech Republic had implemented its World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) commitments in 1995. In the 1990s, the Czech Republic’s 
average tariffs were 2.5 times lower on average than those of the EU (Doucha et al 
1999). Agricultural support measures decreased during the 1990s in the Czech 
Republic. Liberal policies had abolished most direct subsidies and tariffs.
100 The Producer Subsidy Equivalent gives the percentage of all support measures in the final 
production price of an agricultural producer.
203
2.2 Post-transition Liberalisation under Klaus
From 1991 onwards, liberalisation and macro-economic stabilisation programmes 
dominated agricultural reform. There existed within this economic transformation a 
degree of consensus among major parties about how property and the agricultural 
sector in general should be reformed. The Civic Democratic Party (ODS) of Vaclav 
Klaus rejected a policy of permanent grants, subsidies, and protection from 
international trade. Klaus did not see the agricultural sector as being different from 
other sectors. In the early 1990s, the ODS wanted to introduce liberal prices in the 
agricultural sector by resolving privatisation issues, creating private management, and 
reversing the centralisation of price-setting. The fixing of prices had led to high costs 
and low production quality. The reforms aimed to produce an incentive system and 
market framework for producers, processors, and traders. Further, the reforms aimed 
to facilitate the privatisation of the means of production and create the basis for 
regulation and institutions to enhance the structure of the market (Csaki et al, 1999). 
To this end, the ODS envisioned a stronger rural economy, through decentralised 
decision-making and bottom-up support for rural development. However, the market 
and private property were central. The ODS was the natural enemy of local 
monopolies, the collective farms and the bureaucracy that supported this collective 
farming sector (Pospisil 1994).
After the parliamentary election of 1992, following the break-up of the Czechoslovak 
Federation, the early coalition partner of the ODS, the Christian and Democratic 
Union (KDU-CSL), provided the Minister of Agriculture until 1997. This post was 
filled by the influential Josef Lux. The basis of the agricultural policy of the Czech 
Republic came out of this party’s platform (Pospisil 1994). The main tenets were 
privatisation through the restoration of ownership, the transformation of collectives, 
subsidies for rural development and mechanisation, and marketisation in the sector. 
Regulation primarily supported the setting up of markets. The general policy of the 
KDU-CSL for agricultural reform was for ‘family farms’ to exist next to transformed 
cooperatives.101 It was clear that the agricultural support network would only rely on
101 The KDU/CSL was more explicit in its support for family farms than the ODS (Pospisil 1994).
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minimal market intervention through price support, trade protection and tax 
redistribution. Lux advocated a balance between the interests of consumers and those 
of producers, rather than extensive protectionist policies (Hathaway and Hathaway, 
Conclusion, 1997). In 1995, the ‘Agricultural Policy of the Government of the Czech 
Republic up to 1995 and for a Further Period’ affirmed how the government viewed 
agricultural support:
‘The government is aware of the need for a continuing policy of financial 
support for agriculture. Government subsidies will be targeted in such a way 
as to support transformation of agriculture in the direction of quality and a 
market of production which is genuinely saleable, and not to preserve the 
current survival of non-profitable agricultural production in a number of 
agricultural concerns and areas (MoA 1994)’.
The reform had three main consequences: 1. a relatively fast land reform that 
safeguarded the management of agricultural land102; 2. a policy of price liberalisation 
that failed to address farm indebtedness and contributed to the decrease of farmers’ 
income in real terms; and 3. an ad hoc approach to agricultural support, due to a 
limited budget and lack of continuity in intervention.
Land reform was started in 1992. Reform targeted the collectives and state-owned 
farms. In communist times, large consolidated farms represented a local monopoly, 
through which a farm would virtually control a local village (Doucha et al, 1999). 
Collectives were reformed by 1993 and state farms by 1994. The two main 
instruments of reform were restitution and compensation (Chaplin 2001). For 
collectives, memberships had to be cancelled or compensated for. State farms were 
privatised in two phases in 1992 and 1994. Restitution would come first, followed by 
further privatisation of non-land assets. The state concentrated the state agricultural 
assets in a Land Fund, as part of the Fund of National Property under the competency 
of the Ministry of Agriculture, to facilitate faster dispersal of state assets (Doucha et 
al 1999). Land reform in the state-owned sector was complete in 1995. In 1995, 
collectives occupied 43% of the total agricultural area in the Czech Republic 
compared to 61% before transition. State farms occupied 2% of land in 1995 
compared to 38% before transition. The difference was made up by company
102 The Czech Republic had a structural advantage, in terms farm size and the management of land, 
compared to the other CEECs
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structures, such as joint-stock companies and private farmers (source: DG Agriculture
1998).
The result was that the average size of farms in the Czech Republic remained quite 
large, about 75% of land is occupied by farms above 1000 hectares (ha.) (Csaki et al
1999). In cases of restitution and sale to private buyers, ownership tended to be quite 
fragmented. However, even here the fragmentation of average farm sizes has not 
occurred. The KATO project in 2000 showed a remarkable continuity in land 
ownership and the management of agricultural land for the Czech Republic, also 
driven by the prominent role of the state (KATO Project 2000). Part of this continuity 
is the prevalence of collectives, with between 40- 44% of agricultural land. These 
collectives have barely been restructured in terms of management. Even, where 
ownership was fragmented, management persisted. Foreign ownership was not 
allowed and limited in lease structures from the Land Fund.103
Further, a policy of liberalisation did not address the level of indebtedness in the 
agricultural sector. Slaisova (1996, p. 2) points to the level of indebtedness and the 
absence of a system of using land as a collateral for mortgages. This was part of a 
wider institutional failing in the development of an adequate land market.104 Many of 
the transformed collectives and newly privately held farms are still burdened by the 
loans from the communist era. These loans were often granted as soft credits. The 
claims on these loans were initially held by the Consolidation Bank, a special 
government body. In 1999, this debt was estimated at 50 billion CZK (Csaki et al 
1999, p. xvii). An important contributing factor to the indebtedness was the Klaus 
government’s support of trade and price liberalisation. This liberalisation initially 
produced a cost/price squeeze, where input prices rose far more quickly than output 
prices.
103 The salience of domestic ownership as a political issue has come to the foreground more recently, as 
much of the ownership of the processing industry has fallen in foreign hands. In response, the state 
conducted a voucher privatisation scheme in the early 1990s, whereby the state held on to strategic 
stakes of 20 to 25%. These stakes were then later in 1994 transferred through the Fund of National 
Property to the Support Guarantee Fund for Farmers and Forestry (SGFFF).
104 For a more comparative and comprehensive view on credit problems and policies during transition 
in the CEECs, see Swinnen and Gow, 1997.
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Finally, the Klaus government, in contrast to the Polish government in the next 
chapter, only introduced limited intervention programmes. These were mostiy credit- 
related or grants, rather than price intervention in input markets. Price intervention, 
through price support and quota setting, focused on ad hoc intervention in the beef 
and dairy sectors.105 In terms of credit problems, the government instituted a 
guaranteed loan scheme to ease the debt burden. However, no systematic rural 
development programme was drawn up.
2.3 A Redirection of Agricultural Policy
After the ODS-led coalition of Vaclav Klaus resigned in 1997, the initial period of 
liberalisation ended. The government policy statement of the Klaus government in 
1996 had focused on: increasing competitiveness, liberalisation of trade (protection 
from subsidised imports), support for rational agricultural activities, subsidies and tax 
relief for investments, modernisation through the Support and Guarantee Fund for 
Farmers and Forestry (SGFFF), stabilisation of ownership structures and support for 
private initiative in agriculture (ODS, ODA, KDU-CSL Government Policy Statement 
1996). Two factors changed agricultural policy. First, the worsening of the macro- 
economic climate in the mid-1990s undermined liberal policies. Secondly, it was clear 
that government proposals were insufficient for farmers’ groups, which felt that the 
interests of farmers were not systematically represented in the Czech government. In 
October 1998, the liberal policy came under pressure as the Czech Agriculture 
Chamber organised protests (a strategy copied from Polish farmers) against the rising 
domestic food prices, the high level of farm imports that threatened farmers’ 
livelihoods (Weinstein, Prague Post, 11/11/1998) and the levels of indebtedness in 
Czech agriculture. This strategy targeted the end of liberal policies, by putting 
pressure on the policy agenda of the caretaker government of Tosovsky and later the 
new minority government of Milos Zeman.
The CSSD government under Milos Zeman redirected agricultural policy and 
expanded the budget available for the market intervention and support network. The
105 Some production support through market regulation bodies such as the SFMR in the wheat and beef 
sectors remained necessary in the early to mid-1990s, mostly due to political pressures (Swain 1994).
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agricultural programme of the CSSD in the early 1990s had been in favour of 
privatisation and modernisation, but was altogether more interventionist106 and based 
on ‘equalisation’. ‘Equalisation’ for the CSSD meant that all forms of ownership in 
farming should be treated equal by the state, thus aligning itself more closely with the 
agricultural cooperative sector. This sector had been under pressure from the ODS 
coalition government. The differences between the CSSD platform and other parties’ 
were part of the ‘redistribution’ versus the ‘market’ cleavage between these parties 
(Krause 1996). The CSSD policy also bridged a gap between the liberal reformers and 
the more conservative agricultural parties that supported collectives and opposed 
wholesale privatisation.107
The CSSD-led Zeman government sought to complete the tasks of transition, as well 
as redistribute resources to farmers. In terms of liberal policy, it proposed: 1. to 
further privatise state-owned assets; 2. to improve competitiveness of agriculture; and 
3. to consolidate state farms. Secondly, the Law on Agriculture of 1997 did not 
produce an integrated rural development programme, but produced interventionist 
policies, which drew on the instruments designed in the early 1990s. The CSSD 
policy defined intervention, not primarily as support to the development of the market 
and an aide to privatisation, but as redistribution. The Law of 1997 facilitated flat 
payments to nearly all farms. Thus, the major tools for support in the agricultural 
sector remained: market intervention; credit support; direct payments; and preferential 
taxation108 (Csaki 1999). The major differences were an increase in the budgetary
106 The intervention ideas consisted of guaranteeing prices through cheap credits, tax relief on property 
and inputs, transfer of subsidies from the environment to agricultural production, and protectionist 
measures in international trade.
107 The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) supported the collectives in the early 
1990s and small to medium size businesses affiliating themselves with these cooperatives. 
Interestingly, the KSCM was in favour of introducing EU-style subsidies early in transition in terms of 
supporting farmers’ income. The KSCM also contained nationalist elements from both Bohemia and 
Moravia. Further, several agrarian platforms were mostly ‘policy-statements’ (Pospisil 1994, pg. 21). 
The Agricultural Party (SZ) together with the greens and Czechoslovak Socialist Party formed the 
Liberal Social Union (LSU), which won 18 seats in 1992. The primary platform of the LSU was to 
oppose voucher privatisation and support the cooperative farms. Agricultural parties, as the party 
system has become more clear and stable, have lost parliamentary seats (for party systems in the Czech 
Republic see Kitschelt 1994; Kopecky 2001; Wightman 1994; Kostelecky 2002).
108 Farmers pay land, property, personal income taxes and in the case of incorporation a share of 
corporate taxation. Given farmers’ income and profits, taxes are low. Moreover, preferential taxation 
schemes for land and income significantly reduce the tax burden.
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i nolevel of support in 1998 . The main instruments to support farmers in order of 
magnitude were price intervention, followed by direct payments, with the share of 
credit support through cheap credits decreasing significantly. In 1998, the support 
increased 36% nominally compared to 1997 (Csaki 1999, p. 5). The PSE increased 
from 10% in 1997 to 24% in 1999 (OECD 1999; IAMO 2003).
The more recent coalition agreement (2002) of the Spidla government reflects a more 
interventionist approach and a balancing act between, on the one hand, compliance 
with EU regulations and policy and, on the other, the continued restructuring of the 
agricultural sector, while safeguarding farmer’s lifestyles110. Further, the budget 
increased again, mostly due to the demands of EU accession and the institutional 
framework surrounding CAP and SAPARD. In all, the CSSD produced a more 
expansive and interventionist agricultural policy than the ODS-led coalition 
governments. This policy, started in late 1997, constituted a major sectoral reform.
109 Budgetary increase in the period from 1997 was still below the equivalent support to the sector in 
the period from 1991 to 1993 (Chaplin 2001). Additionally, the increase in the agricultural budget was 
initially checked by the ‘Opposition Pact’ with the ODS.
110 Agenda points were:
- ‘the "Countryside Revitalisation Programme", to encourage a harmonic development of rural areas, 
including regional and local specificities;
-a system of subsidies and other measures, to enable fair competition of Czech farmers in the European 
competitive environment;
-harmonisation of Czech laws required for the full-fledged entry of Czech agriculture to the European 
Union in the first wave;
-production quota in respect of separate commodities and equal treatment in allocation of direct 
payments and resources for development of rural areas;
-support to primary agricultural production in production and marginal areas in accordance with the EU 
joint agricultural policy;
-support to food and processing industries in terms of the maximum safety of food products to the 
consumer;
-adoption of measures designated to support agricultural exports;
-support primary agricultural producers in their sales cooperatives and organisations;
-complete restitution and transformation processes in agriculture, restore and gradually stabilise 
ownership relationships in agriculture; to accelerate implementation of land adjustments and the 
process of sale of state-owned agricultural land; to use the agreed transition period for the transfer of 
agricultural land to Czech entities farming such land and with the possibility of long-term repayment 
and agricultural land used as collateral. For purposes of achieving this goal, to establish a “land bank”; 
-to preserve versatile agriculture on the entire area of agricultural land with significant support to 
landscape and environment quality maintenance; to encourage non-food utilisation of agricultural 
production and increase production of renewable sources of energy’ (Policy Statement CSSD and 
coalition KDU-CSL Democratic Union and Freedom Union 2002).
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2.4 Administrative Management of Agriculture
The changes in agricultural policy and the reliance on market intervention and credit 
support were also reflected in the institutional set-up in the 1990s. Agricultural 
agencies were independent state funds, rather than agencies of the sectoral ministry. 
This set-up allowed such funds to pursue commercial activities, extend preferential 
credits, manage the privatisation of land, and operate outside of the national budget. 
However, independence was relative, as sectoral actors, the Minister of Agriculture, 
and the Prime Minister all vied for influence over the foundations. This dynamic will 
become clearer in the reforms of the statutes of these funds towards EU accession and 
especially in the administration of ‘direct payments’.
In 1993 after the break-up of the federation, the State Fund for Market Regulation 
(SFMR) was created in the Czech Republic to replace the Federal Fund of Market 
Regulation. Its functions included (compiled from Csaki et al 1999):
• Selecting products to be regulated and time period during which regulation 
applied;
• Setting floor prices for selected commodities and setting quantities of specific 
quantities to be purchased by the government;
• Export subsidies;
• Licensing of imports and exports.
The SFMR was initially only active in certain markets. In the period of 1994 to 1996, 
the SFMR was active in wheat and dairy products. After the CSSD election victory in 
1997, the SFMR became active in a much wider area covering wheat, dairy, beef, and 
other arable crops. Also, the SFMR would from 1997 onwards provide interest rate 
subsidies for the export of a similar range of agricultural commodities. Csaki 
estimates the intervention expenditures of the Fund increased by a factor of 2.3 from 
1997 to 1998, almost exclusively in the fields of price support and direct payments 
(Csaki et al 1999, p. 15; Csaki 1999). The budget for export subsidies stayed more of 
the less constant. Slaisova (1998) argues that the SMFR was, in this period, 
functioning as a credit support system through direct payments, rather than just a 
regulatory agency. The limitations on the national budget also meant that these
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intervention programmes would come at the expense of rural development 
programmes.
In 1994, the Support and Guarantee Fund for Farmers and Forestry (SGFFF) was 
created to improve farming’s access to short and longer-term credits. Credit problems, 
as explained earlier in section 2.2, were a major constraint on investment in the 
agricultural sector and depressed farmers’ incomes. The Czech reaction was to open a 
fund in 1994, capitalised with 5 billion CZK. This amount included the shares of food 
enterprises, which were transferred from the National Property Fund to strengthen its 
portfolio. A part of the shares had been sold in coupon privatisation to farmers, who 
sold them on mostly to foreign investors. The SGFFF would deal with the remainder 
of the shares on the open market (Doucha 1996). The timing of the creation of the 
SGFFF in 1994 coincided with the privatisation of the non-land state assets in 
agriculture. The SGFFF was also seen as a vehicle to encourage the emergence of 
more efficient successor farms to the cooperative farms.
The credit programme of the SGFFF adopted some of the commercial practices 
proposed by Nallet and van Stolk (1994), whereby commercial banks play a role in 
the decision to extend a loan or guarantee to a farmer or enterprise and the SGFFF 
provides a guarantee for that loan. However, this scheme, in contrast to Nallet and van 
Stolk, did not solely aim to use land as collateral or even was tied in to a land market, 
outside of privatisation schemes run by the Land Fund. The SGFFF would typically 
guarantee loans up to 80% and give out interest subsidies on loans up to 70% of the 
interest on the loan (Chaplin 2001). Moreover, the SGFFF, similar to the SMFR, has 
also promoted exports through extending interest rate subsidies on export programmes 
for specific commodities. These loan guarantee and credit subsidy schemes, worth 60 
billion CZK between 1994 and 1998, have slowly replaced the interest free loans as 
vehicles for investment and modernisation in agriculture (Doucha et al 1999).
The Law on Agriculture of 1997 meant a further reduction of credit-related policy. 
This reduction was coupled to a further decrease in interest free loans. The reasons for 
scaling back the activities of the SGFFF were the overly complex system for credit 
subsidies and guarantees and the potential future exposure of the national budget to 
this type of financial risk. Financial risk in the SGFFF came from: 1. the fund being
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extra-budget; 2. the absence of criteria or caps on interest rates for participating 
banks; 3. the absence of a reserve fund for losses; 4. a lack of guidelines for lenders;
5. the commercial investments; and 6. a lack of guidelines from the government on 
the activities of the fund (World Bank, 1998). It was estimated that guarantees, 
indirect debts, soft credits, and quasi-liabilities of the Czech National Bank might 
amount to 13% of GDP in 1998 (Barta, PHARE-ACE Project 1999). Further, the 
SGFFF was promoted by the ODS as an investment vehicle to produce incentives for 
farmers to modernise. This priority was not necessarily shared by the CSSD.
3. The EU and Reform of Administration and Policy
The EU requirements would have three direct effects on the sectoral institutional 
arrangements: 1. the alignment of market intervention tools; 2. the expansion and 
redirection of the agricultural budget; and 3. the introduction of a rural integrated 
development policy under SAPARD.
The agricultural budget unlike the expansion of the budget in 1997 of the CSSD 
government, which had mostly augmented existing intervention tools and thus 
reinforced institutional arrangements, concentrated resources (1998-2003) on the two 
pillars of CAP, market intervention and rural development. This expansion had two 
results: 1. greater sectoral resources for agriculture; and 2. greater resources for those 
bodies involved with pillar 1 and 2 of CAP. CAP not so much challenged domestic 
intervention, but superseded such intervention. Secondly, sectoral competences 
showed expansion and transformation. A change in the procedures of market 
intervention would necessarily lead to a transformation of the SFMR. An integrated 
rural development policy would imply the creation of purpose-built administration, 
rather than using the SGFFF. Further, implementation of market intervention and 
rural development would mean the alignment of non-budgetary agencies within the 
national budget (EU funds were distributed through the national budget). This change 
would also mean a budgetary actor such as the Ministry of Agriculture would 
potentially gain more direct control over the agencies, as the previous fragmented set­
up could become more consolidated. Finally, the required capacity for implementation 
of a very procedural policy coupled the emphasis of the EC on ‘domestic ownership’
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in EDIS, which meant the transfer of operational and budgetary risk in 
implementation, also indicated that an expansion of competences would necessarily 
be focused in specialist units or agencies, rather than show a more diffuse 
implementation across policy sectors and within wider sectoral administration.
In these ways, the sectoral adjustments could affect the executive structure. The 
Czech executive structure persisted through: 1. the transformation of the SFMR into 
the SAIF, which remained an independent fund; 2. the placement of the payment 
agency and IACS in the SAIF; 3. derogations in the direct payments system; 4. 
limiting the role of the SAPARD Agency to rural development (or isolating the 
SAPARD Agency) and assigning rural development competences to the MRD.
3.1 Transformation of the Administration of Market Intervention
For the Czech Republic, it became a question to what extent the patchy institutional 
framework could facilitate accession. Both the SMFR and the SGFFF proved 
respectively poor foundations for the development of a common market organisation 
capable of supporting CAP-based market intervention (pillar 1 of CAP) and 
performing management and payment functions for rural development programming 
(pillar 2 of CAP).
First, in the Government Act 256/2000 of 2000, the scope of activities of the SFMR 
was transformed. The SFMR was renamed the State Agricultural Intervention Fund 
(SAIF). The activities of the SAIF were defined as: ‘intervention purchases; sales of 
agricultural products and foodstuffs purchased within the framework of intervention 
purchases; organisation of market by means of production quotas; intervention and 
compensation subsidies; and financial subsidies support’ (compiled from the SAIF 
‘About Us’ 2003). These financial support subsidies can relate to increasing 
consumption, subsidising storage and sales of agricultural products, humanitarian aid, 
and environmental products.
Despite its mandate, the SAIF initially maintained a limited regulatory scope. In 2000 
and 2001, only two commodities, sugar and food wheat, were classified for market 
intervention. In 2000, the SAIF did not place any limits on production. In 2001, it
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introduced a voluntary set-aside policy for agricultural land and a quota for milk 
production. Since, the SAIF has received additional competences by decrees, 
providing for market intervention authority in relation to a number of commodities 
(EC, Regular Report, 2001). Compensation payments for milk have been instituted 
since 2001. Further, after much legal wrangling in the Constitutional Court, a 
minimum price and production quota for sugar was put into place in 2000, covering a 
period until 2005 (IAMO 2003). The introduction of sugar and milk quotas was an 
example of the direct adoption of CAP mechanisms.
The creation of the SAIF did not produce a total harmonisation of intervention 
standards with the EU requirements (EC Regular Report on the Czech Republic 
Progress on Accession 2002, p. 70). The main immediate issue is that, under the terms 
of accession, the SAIF cannot hold stocks of agricultural commodities by May 2004, 
reducing the period in which it can release stocks to the market. This has made the 
SAIF reluctant to intervene in the wheat and pork markets, given overall budgetary 
cutbacks in the Czech Republic and a loss of 1 billion CZK on intervention in 2002 in 
the wheat sector alone (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2003).111 So, operational 
risks and budgetary constraints have prevented the SAIF from operating with the 
breadth of intervention that the agency would be expected to deploy under CAP.
Secondly, the transformation of the SAIF, in terms of its institutional position in the 
administrative set-up, was limited. The SAIF became a tool to halt the consolidation 
of competences in the Ministry of Agriculture and within the independent SAPARD 
Agency. On the first point, the SAIF remained an independent fund under the 
supervision of a presidium chaired by the Minister of Agriculture112, rather than a 
ministerial agency (see table 13). Its director is appointed by the Czech cabinet. 
Consequently, the Prime Minister retains control over the direct management of the 
fund. The fund structure allowed it to augment its funding by the state budget with 
other credits (EU and other state funds) and revenue-generating commercial activities 
(mostly market-related). Of its budget totalling 9.3 billion CZK in 2002, about 4.7
111 This position also became a bone of contention between the SAIF and agricultural groups, which 
faced limited market intervention in 2003.
112 The presidium has to approve the proposals for intervention prices, subsidies, and commercial 
activities. The presidium also includes the Deputy Minister of Finance as deputy chairman, the Deputy 
Minister of Industry and Trade and two representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture. The remaining 
four members come from non-governmental organisations (SAIF ‘About Us’ 2003).
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billion CZK was contributed by the state budget. The SAIF structure was in 
contradiction to the European Commission’s preference. The Commission required an 
end to the revenue-generating activities of the SAIF, which were an additional way of 
funding.
Consolidation showed, on the one hand, an initial move to concentrate competences 
around the capacity created in the SAPARD Agency (see section 3.3) and, on the 
other, a move to maintain state funds such as the SAIF and expand their competences. 
This consideration was also a debate between ‘traditionalists’ and ‘modernisers’. The 
SFMR had been a structure, where interests of farmers’ groups had been channelled in 
decisions on market intervention. The SAIF was a repository of agricultural officials 
of the former communist regime (Interview with Milena Vicenova: Prague September 
19, 2001). The SAPARD Agency was staffed with ‘modernisers’.113 Further, the 
debate on consolidation was one that pit the sectoral minister against the cabinet, and 
more importantly the Prime Minister, who favoured the SAIF set-up and the 
persistence of the previous executive institutional arrangements.
The initial Czech plan was to have one management and payment agency for both 
CAP activities, be it market intervention or rural development (EC Regular Report on 
the Czech Republic Progress on Accession 2002). Initially, there were concrete plans 
in the Czech Ministry of Agriculture for the expansion of the competences of the 
SAPARD Agency. These competences would include the preparation for CAP, in 
terms of market intervention and direct payments. Market intervention was at that 
point the domain of the SAIF. The plan was to combine three activities in the 
SAPARD Agency. These activities were: market intervention through price-setting 
and transactions (buying primarily); rural development, which will lead into 
Structural Funds; and direct payments per acreage to the farmer (Interview with 
Milena Vicenova: Prague September 19, 2001). This consolidation was done out of 
the bureaucratic self-interest of the Ministry of Agriculture. As a sign of consolidation 
in sectoral agricultural management, a new department for the SAIF was established 
in the Ministry of Agriculture in April 2001. However, these plans aimed at 
concentration within the Ministry of Agriculture changed soon afterwards. In 2001,
113 Vicenova points out these differences come out in personnel characteristics in terms of university 
degree, ability to speak a foreign language, and length in the civil service.
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the government decided on three agencies: the SAIF, the SAPARD Agency, and an 
Agricultural Payment Agency (APA) in the MoA. In 2002, it was decided in the ‘Act 
on Budgetary Rules’ of January 2001 that the APA will be established as a part of the 
SAIF. This Act aims to fully align payment procedures to Community rules (EC 
Regular Report 2001, p. 55). The agricultural payment unit, previously a unit in the 
Economic Affairs Department of the MoA, could, in the plans published in 2003, be 
integrated within a more general agrarian payment agency within the SAIF (EC, 
Regular Report on the Czech Republic Progress on Accession 2003). To this end, the 
Independent Market Information System, previously managed by the Research 
Institute of Agricultural Economics, has been put under the responsibility of the SAIF. 
The staff of the SAIF has been expanded by 20 experts in 2002 (EC Regular Report 
2002). Though the SAPARD Agency would gain a role in preparing the register for 
the Integrated Administrative and Control System (LACS), it was clear that the SAIF 
had been affirmed by 2003 as the leading implementation agency in direct payments 
and market intervention. Though sectoral administrative procedures were transformed 
and changed, the executive set-up persisted. Further, the possible effect of the 
SAPARD Agency on the executive structure had been isolated.
T able 13: T ask D elineation  in C A P and SA P A R D
Im plem entation Status Coordination Supervision P olicy
Drafting
Market
Intervention
SAIF Independent
government
agency
Agency 
board: 
Chairman, 
Minister of 
Agriculture
Prime
Minister
MoA
Rural
Development
SAPARD Agency 
with 16 regional 
offices; some 
implementation 
tasks with MRD 
and MoE; some 
consultation with 
regions;
Independent
ministerial
unit
Agency 
board: MoA
Deputy 
Minister of 
Agriculture
MRD
with
MoA
Direct
Payments
Agricultural 
Payment Agency
Ministerial
unit
To be
incorporated 
from MoA  
into SAIF
Prime
Minister
MoA
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3.2 Agricultural Budget and a System for Direct Payments
Though CAP intervention instruments had not been fully adopted, the agricultural 
budget shows a redirection of resources in the period of 1997-2001 to European 
Commission priorities. More recently (2002-2003), the budget shows a substantial 
expansion, but the central government has attempted to cap this expansion through 
moving EU funds around and using a derogation114 on the implementation of direct 
payments. This moderation of spending was also in reaction to the cap member-states 
put on the extension of full direct payments to the Czech Republic and domestic 
budgetary problems (see Lazarova Radio Prague 29/9/2003).
The Czech agricultural budget was in the period 1997-2001 directed to the following 
posts (DG Agriculture, 2002c):
•Market oriented (pillar 1, export subsidies, set-aside, direct income support 
(coupled), input subsidies);
• Rural development oriented (Least Favoured AreafLFA] payment, agro- 
environmental programmes, renewable energy resources, afforestation);
• Investment support to agriculture;
• General support (research, information, training);
• Disaster payment.
An overview in table 14 of the Czech agricultural budget specifies this redirection 
(MoA 2000). Overall, the agricultural budget has increased by about 100 million euro 
since 1995. Further, investment support decreased in favour of rural development 
programmes. Market intervention stayed more or less at the same point, as did general 
support. The European Commission noted that in the compensation the Czech 
Republic pays to the Least Favoured Areas (LFA) the emphasis was still more on 
production than on actual rural development (DG Agriculture 2002c, p. 27). In the 
same way, the Czech Republic in its investment support, such as the provision of
114 There are limited transitional periods in the Accession Treaty, excluding topics such as direct 
payments and land ownership. These measures affect mostly veterinary controls in the poultry, egg and 
dairy sectors, where Czech Producers not yet accredited by the European Commission to deliver to the 
common market have until the end of 2006 to comply with regulations. These concern 44 meat 
establishments, 1 egg establishment, and 4 fish establishments. The European Commission will update 
this list on an annual basis. The Czech Republic will update the European Commission each year on 
progress and has the full burden of compliance (EC, Accession Treaty 2003, Annexes).
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interest-free loans, had in 2000 not yet differentiated between post-transition 
restructuring and more CAP-related programmes, such as programmes focusing on 
food quality and safety, environmentally safe manure management, animal welfare, 
and on-farm processing. These programmes were implicit in investments, rather than 
investments being directed at them, as would be likely under pillar 2 rural 
development programming. It is important to note that the increase in the domestic 
budget and the redirection visible in table 14 are significant in outlining shifts in the 
domestic budget. These shifts mostly followed CAP-specific priorities in the 
management of agricultural support, even if the redirection of these funds has not yet 
been fully completed.
Table 14: Agricultural B udget 1995-20 00  (m io euro)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Market oriented, Pillar 1 118 104 85 90 130 121
Rural development oriented 73 78 67 104 109 124
Investment support to Agriculture 47 69 84 81 70 57
General support 63 65 60 61 61 68
Total 304 327 349 373 384 409
Source: Report on the State of Czech Agriculture in 2000, MoA December 2001
In the latest budget cycle of 2003 and 2004, The Ministry of Agriculture will receive 
almost 60% more funds in 2004 at 22.88 billion CZK than in 2003, when the budget 
was 14.4 billion CZK (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2003). This increase came 
after the budget had remained stable in the period of 2001-2002, as the CSSD 
government aimed to halt budgetary expansion. This expansion was particularly 
aimed at the introduction of direct payments in which the state would have a 
substantial co-financing requirement.
First, the Czech government moderated an expansion of the agricultural budget by 
using a concession on the use of Structural Funds. This concession was obtained in 
the accession negotiations by the Polish government.115 As a consequence, 300 
million euro will be redirected to the national budget from the EU allocation for 
Czech Structural Funds from 2004-2006. The current proposal suggests topping up 
EU agricultural subsidies from their introductory level at 25% of total EU subsidies to 
member-states. The Czech government has suggested an increase to the level of 45%.
115 The loss by the CSSD-led coalition in 2003 of a one-seat majority in parliament gave the ODS 
leverage over the budgetary process and expansive budget items such as agriculture.
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The cost of a 20% increase is 4 billion CZK. The Ministry of Agriculture has asked 
for 55% with a top-up from the national budget of 30%. The Ministry argues that 
other accession countries have already approved the full level (55%) of subsidies (e.g. 
Hungary) allowed under the financial framework agreed to with the EU and that the 
Czech farmers would not be competitive under the current proposed funding scheme. 
The case was also strengthened by farmers’ demonstrations. The government is 
currently working on a reform of the state budget and plans to reduce its deficit, so it 
is still unclear if Czech farmers will receive more than 45% of subsidies.116
Secondly, the Czech Republic will not introduce the ‘standard’ system of direct 
payments. The Czech Government will adopt a system similar to the CAP’s 
decoupled payment system. Adoption of the simplified system was decided by the 
Ministry of Agriculture in June of 2003, after consultation with Franz Fischler, the 
EU Commissioner for Agriculture. Fischler pointed out that the Czech Republic will 
not be ready to use the EU’s current system of payments, as it does not have the 
necessary structures, such as the APA or the LACS, in place yet. All farmers had to 
register their areas with the LACS by August of 2003. The Czech Republic will 
distribute direct payments on 3.8 million ha. of agricultural land. This ‘simplified’ 
system means that subsidies will be paid out on hectares farmed, not on commodities 
planted. This payment system anticipates future CAP reforms. The system is closer to 
the proposals for CAP reforms on decoupling and addresses problems in 
administrative capacity by delaying full convergence with the IACS and payment 
procedures.
3.3 Integrated Rural Development Policy and SAPARD
In rural development policy there existed a vehicle, SAPARD, to both ensure 
compliance in rural development and Structural Funds procedures. Further, unlike in 
market intervention and direct payments, the Czech Republic had, with the exception 
of credit subsidies, not formulated an integrated rural development policy before
116 In September of 2003, the CSSD-led government of Vladimir Spidla survived a vote of ‘no 
confidence’ to proceed with the reform of the state budget (Lazarova, 29/9/2003). A veto by President 
Vaclav Klaus on the raising of VAT was overturned by the coalition in parliament (Bouc, 4/12/2003).
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1997. Implementation of SAPARD meant both the creation of a rural development 
policy and the SAPARD Agency.
3.3.a Drafting of Policy
Rural development policy was only formulated after 1997 and seems in function of 
EU accession. The tenets of rural development policy were developed in: the 
SAPARD Plan, drafted by the Ministry of Agriculture in conjunction with the 
Ministry of Regional Development; the National Programme for the Adoption of the 
Acquis (NPAA), which later was elaborated into the Implementation Strategy; the 
Accession Partnerships; the National Development Plan (NDP) of 1999; and the 
‘Departmental Policy in the Pre-Accession Period of the Czech Republic to the 
European Union’. These documents showed: 1. a planning dimension emerging in 
Czech agriculture, driven by the European Commission; and 2. a convergence of 
priorities across policy documents.
The SAPARD programme from 2000-2006 focuses on three priority axes (see table 
15): 1. ‘to strengthen the competitiveness of agriculture and the food processing 
industry....; 2. ‘to achieve sustainable rural development, including opening up of 
new local employment opportunities to help counter rural de-population’; and 3. ‘to 
ensure the full potential of the programme is reached, notably by providing new types 
of vocational training and technical assistance’ (EC SAPARD Programmes 2000- 
2006: Czech Republic, 2000).
The prioritisation of SAPARD played directly on the priorities outlined in the 
NPAA117. The NPAA and the Accession Partnership, similar to SAPARD, focused on 
rural development planning and the administrative capacity for implementation. The 
Accession Partnership of 1999 identifies the reinforcement of the CAP management 
mechanisms and administrative structures, the phytosanitary and veterinary controls,
117 NPAA outlined 9 priority areas: 1. the adoption of veterinary and phytosanitary controls; 2. import 
checks and border controls; 3. full compliance in animal welfare and zoo-technical legislation; 4. die 
alignment of less favoured area status in the Czech Republic to EU NUTS qualifications; 5. 
amendments to the forest laws; 6. the establishment of management system for common market 
organisation (see pg. 401 and pg. 402 of NPAA); 7. the alignment of aquaculture and fisheries policy 
legislation; 8. the adjustment of crop and livestock production; 9. structural and regional measures 
preparing for SAPARD and implementation of National Development Plan (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, National Programme for Membership of the European Union, 2000).
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and the modernisation of meat and dairy plants as medium-term priorities (Czech 
Republic Accession Partnership 1999). The NDP would focus solely on rural 
development policy. The NDP, prepared in 1999, contains within it the Sectoral 
Operational Programme on Agriculture. This Programme has three priority axes: 1. 
the sustainable development of rural regions; 2. the development of multifunctional 
agriculture in regions, including diversification of rural activities; and 3. the 
increasing the competitiveness of agriculture and forestry (MRD, National 
Development Plan 2001; MRD/MoA 2000, p 6-9).
Planning showed a great continuity from the pre-accession to post-accession 
documents. This continuity stresses how the Czech government mostly deferred to the 
European Commission in developing the priority axes (Interview with Radka Sarova 
jointly with Renata Hola: Prague September 21, 2001). Additionally, the European 
Commission had more leverage over the financial allocation in SAPARD than other 
programming, as table 15 shows. The European Commission was the largest 
contributor. Consequently, the budgetary exposure of the Czech state was limited. 
Moreover, the Czech Republic relies quite heavily on private contributions, which 
amount to 37% of total financing. Private contributions further limited the exposure of 
the Czech state. Total expenditure for the period 2000-2006 will be at 323 million 
euro, with the EU contributing 154 million euro, the national budget 50 million euro 
and applicants 118 million euro (MRD/MoA 2000, p. 192). Another point, also 
outlined in chapter 5, is the reliance on the central state contribution in Czech co­
financing. Czech co-financing does not include regional co-financing with the 
exception of measure 2.1.a, where regional funds contribute 60% of the total state 
contributions (MRD/MoA 2000). Measure 2.1.a is administered by the Ministry for 
Regional Development.
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Table 15: SAPARD Allocation per Priority for the Period 2000-2006+
Measures Total Cost ( Contributions +-: EU 47%-Czech 
state budget 16% [+-33% of EU contribution]- 
Private37%)
Priority 1 (60.5% of funding)
1.1 Investments in agricultural holdings 66.27
1.2 Improving processing industry and marketing 
of products
67.91
1.3 Improving the structures for quality control 
and consumer protection
36.73
1.5 Land improvement and re-parcelling 41.34
Priority 2 (34.3% of funding)
2.1a Renovation and development of villages 21.88
2.1b Rural infrastructure 10.94
2.2 Development and diversification of economic 
activities
66.08
2.3 agricultural production methods designed to 
protect the environment and countryside
6.11
Priority 3 (3.1% of funding)
3.1 Vocational training 4.41
3.2 Technical assistance 2.15
Total 323.83
Source: European Commission 2000
3.3.b The SAPARD Agency
The SAPARD Agency incorporates both management and payment functions. The 
regional offices of the SAPARD Agency mostly support these activities. The payment 
function deals with the distribution of funds. The internal audit division of SAPARD 
performs financial control and the National Fund within the Ministry of Finance 
supervises these activities (taken from MoA ‘SAPARD’ 2002).
The Agency is based in the Ministry of Agriculture, but operates independendy as a 
programme-specific unit. The SAPARD agency in the hierarchy of the Ministry of 
Agriculture stands direcdy below the Minister of Agriculture, under the supervision of 
a Deputy Minister. By guaranteeing the independence of the Agency from political 
appointees, the Agency hopes to stay clear of direct political intervention within the 
Agency (Interview with Milena Vicenova: Prague September 19, 2001). This 
incorporation occurred in September of 2001. This structure was similar to a 
ministerial agency, but different to a state fund such as the SAIF, which is placed 
under the authority of the Prime Minister.
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The independence of tasks and reporting is a major concern of the accreditation 
process and seemed the overriding issue in the setting up of the SAPARD Agency in 
the Czech Republic. Independence refers to the clear separation of payment, project 
selection, and monitoring functions. This separation of competences was outlined in 
the ‘Agreement on the main rules of SAPARD Programme Management in the Czech 
Republic’ of 21 November 2000. Accreditation was completed at the end of 2002 
(Interview with Milena Vicenova: Prague September 19, 2001). Also, the 
independence of tasks came to be seen as a way of implementing, free of political 
intervention. The only member of staff in the SAPARD Agency with a cross-over 
function in the Ministry of Agriculture is the Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs, 
who is the National Authorising Officer (NAO) of the SAPARD programme. Though 
he/she has to approve the projects, the NAO’s function is a formality as he/she cannot 
reject projects that have procedurally been approved for funding by the Programme 
Authorising Officer (PAO), the Director of the SAPARD Agency. This PAO in 
principal does not block the projects approved by the National Steering Committees.
There are two consequences of the concentration of rural development competences 
in the SAPARD Agency. First, non-sectoral ministries have sought out competences 
in rural development to counter this concentration. As stated earlier, in the absence of
1 1 Q
a central coordinating body at the sectoral or core executive levels between the 
ministries, it seems the case that ministries compete over competences. Milena 
Vicenova oudines the interference of other government agencies and ministries in the 
implementation of SAPARD as very problematic (Interview with Milena Vicenova: 
Prague September 19, 2001). Further, because rural development was essentially a 
new concept in the Czech Republic, administrative capacity was required. Extra 
capacity was found in other line ministries. Finally, SAPARD implementation was 
especially salient, given that Structural Funds will flow through the Agency much in 
the same way as projects in rural development are financed under the current outline 
of the SAPARD programme.119 Secondly, SAPARD reduced the role of the regions 
in administration.
118 Vicenova sees shortcomings in task delineation in the management of pre-accession instruments, 
due to a lack of a framework to manage such authorities in the core executive (Interview with Milena 
Vicenova: Prague September 19,2001).
119 SAPARD showed continuity where other pre-accession fimds had not. This continuity was also 
obvious in policy setting (see 3.3.a).
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In the conception of SAPARD, four ministries were involved: the Ministry of Finance 
through the National Fund; the Ministry of Agriculture; the Ministry for Regional 
Development, due to its expertise in setting up the agency at the regional level; and 
the Ministry of the Environment, due to possible connections with environmental 
projects through the Environmental Impact Analysis (EIA).
The Ministry of Regional Development has institutionalised its involvement with 
SAPARD in the ‘Agreement on Co-operation of the Mo A and the MRD’ of May 12, 
1999, by assigning two officials of the nine man teams within the regional 
implementation offices of SAPARD Agency. Further, the Ministry for Regional 
Development, in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture, prepares the 
Agricultural Development Plan for the period of 2000-2006, participates in the 
preparation of SAPARD selection and monitoring indicators, and is responsible for 
co-financing for projects on village development and local economic diversification 
(MRD/MoA 2000, p. 196). This task-sharing was concluded at the level of First 
Deputy Ministers under the ‘Agreement on the main rules of SAPARD Programme 
management in the Czech Republic’ on November 21, 2000. The Head of the 
SAPARD Agency, Milena Vicenova, sees this compromise as a political decision 
(Interview with Milena Vicenova: Prague September 19, 2001). The compromise in 
her mind is due to the battle for competences by a not very well established Ministry 
for Regional Development, which was uncertain about its survival under the Zeman 
government.
The Ministry of the Environment is said to be now no longer involved, because 
environment and transport is solely the subject matter of ISPA (Interview with Jiri 
Horacek: Prague September 20, 2001). However, the manual of the Czech 
government outlining the SAPARD Plan again shows a clear role for the Ministry of 
the Environment in terms of preparation of the Agricultural Development Plan, 
participation of monitoring and selection procedures, and the development of 
SAPARD project assessment system in terms of the environment (MRD/MoA 2000). 
However, the role of the Ministry of Environment is more specified and limited. This 
observation also applies to the Ministry of Finance. The CFA within the Ministry of
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Finance also does not have a central coordinating role in SAPARD. Its role is more in 
an advisory capacity.
Secondly, SAPARD in terms of procedures and funds administration means a vertical 
centralisation of rural development policy. EU rural development policy is a policy 
administered at the national level. However, there were other factors meaning a more 
centralised approach was taken. First, the complexity of the procedures and changing 
requirements meant that the flow of project applications was slow. For instance, local 
recipients first of all read litde English and find the application forms exceedingly 
difficult (Interview with Radka Sarova jointly with Renata Hola: Prague September 
21, 2001). There are two main risks associated with this problem. First, there will be a 
bias in the dispersal of funding due to the level of comprehension or contacts 
necessary to propose a project. Secondly, local officials of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, who provide help in filing out the proposals (as the SAPARD Agency 
does not have this capacity) could control the process from the bottom-up. Problems 
with such regional capacity were initially responsible for the setting up of SAPARD 
offices in the 8 regions and reducing the role of the regional actors and the regional 
self-government in the institutional set-up to a more consultative role in the selection 
and monitoring committees.120
4. Conclusion
The adoption of EU agricultural policy in the Czech Republic shows a substantial 
change of sectoral institutional arrangements and the persistence of the macro- 
institutional configuration.
On the sectoral level, EU CAP and SAPARD challenged the liberal policy style of the 
Czech Republic. Given the additional challenge of the adoption of EU agricultural 
policy to the macro-institutional configuration in the Czech Republic, one would
120 Regional selection and monitoring committees were set up in the 8 regions aside from their 
respective national counterparts. The National Selection Committee determines the selection criteria, 
coordinates the use of financial resources with the multi-annual financing agreement, and comments on 
and scores the applications while the monitoring committees monitor implementation. Regional 
committees and the national selection committee build on a cross section of society (e.g. NGOs) and 
officials on the national and regional levels of government (MoA and MRD SAPARD Plan April 2000, 
Pg. 196).
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expect only limited change of sectoral institutional arrangements. Nonetheless, the 
Czech Republic has largely adopted CAP and SAPARD policy and sectoral 
institutional arrangements. The transformations of procedures in the SAIF and APA 
are examples. Sections 3.1 and 3.3 of this chapter further elaborate. There are two 
explanations for this change in sectoral institutional arrangements. First, the adoption 
of the European rural development policy can be seen in the light of this policy not 
substantially altering the precarious domestic budgetary situation. Within this neutral 
budgetary framework, sectoral reform was easier. When sectoral reform required an 
expansion of domestic budgetary resources, as in the system for direct payments (see 
section 3.2), sectoral adaptation was more incomplete. Aside from the budgetary 
factor, the main factor in the change of sectoral institutional arrangements, as pointed 
out in section 2.3, was the re-direction of the domestic agricultural policy in 1997 (the 
‘Law on Agriculture’). This redirection aimed to: 1. address the macro-economic 
crisis of the mid-1990s; 2. complete the aims of transition in the agricultural sector; 
and 3. build a systematic rather than ad hoc support framework for farmers. The 
reform of 1997 moved Czech policy closer to CAP. Further, it proved that wider 
sectoral reform was possible within the macro-institutional context. This executive 
set-up would remain stable and was even reinforced by the sectoral adaptation.
In terms of the effects on the macro-institutional configuration, the implementation of 
CAP and SAPARD involved the creation of agencies, as in the case of SAPARD, and 
the transformation of agencies in the cases of the SAIF and the APA. The independent 
foundations such as the Support and Guarantee Fund for Farmers and Forestry 
(SGFFF) and the State Fund for Market Regulation (SFMR) were offshoots of a 
liberal agricultural policy under Prime Minister Klaus. These agencies had limited 
capacity and provided limited support in terms of interest free loans and market 
intervention in the wheat and dairy sectors. Moreover, these agencies were extra- 
budgetary agencies, which did not incorporate liabilities and assets directly into the 
state budget. The EU challenged the macro-institutional configuration by: creating 
competences and a sectoral policy scope, expanding sectoral resources, focusing on 
the political independence of administrative tasks as in SAPARD, and requiring the 
incorporation of competences and budget (as in the case of the SAIF) left outside of 
civil service administration after transition back into the executive structure. In this 
way, the EU seemed to empower sectoral administrative actors at the expense of
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national executive actors such as the Prime Minister and the cabinet. Moreover, as 
seen in SAPARD, the consolidation in rural development meant a vertical 
centralisation of rural development policy. Before 1997, the limited rural development 
initiatives undertaken by the European Commission had a strong regional and local 
dimension. Thus, the European Commission aimed to concentrate the previously 
fragmented approach to implementation closer to the Minister of Agriculture (MoA) 
or the independent SAPARD Agency within the MoA. This more centralised 
approach was more compatible with the Czech executive structure. However, it raised 
questions on the horizontal organisation of coordination and implementation. In the 
process of adaptation to EU requirements, there was a domestic debate whether 
agricultural agencies and more particularly funds management fell under the control 
of the MoA, the Prime Minister, the cabinet or whether these agencies would gain 
independence outside of the executive or within a ministry.
There are two ways in which the consolidation and expansion of resources and 
competences near the MoA were mediated. First, the potential for sectoral 
consolidation of CAP management and payment competences in the independent 
SAPARD agency had been halted. The SAPARD Agency, as mentioned earlier, was 
an independent unit in the MoA. Rather, the MoA proposed a consolidation of CAP 
functions under a Deputy Minister in the MoA. This proposed consolidation by the 
MoA was effectively overturned in 2003. Rather, these competences were 
incorporated in the SAIF. The shift of the APA from the MoA to the SAIF gave the 
SAIF control over direct payments. This also maintained the institutional balance 
between the Prime Minister and the sectoral ministry. The SAIF, formerly the SFMR, 
stood under supervision of the Prime Minister, who appointed its director. Any 
weakening of the SAIF would reduce the ‘say’ of the Prime Minister in agricultural 
policy. Farmers’ groups also had connections to the SAIF and their support reinforced 
the SAIF’s position in the institutional configuration. This re-affirmed the position of 
the SAIF in the management of EU funds. The isolated position of the SAPARD 
Agency mitigated wider effects on the domestic executive structure. Its functions 
pertained solely to the administration of rural development initiatives. As a 
consequence, the national executive structure was by and large maintained.
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Secondly, non-sectoral ministries managed to stake out a claim in rural development 
policy. The increase of the development mandate in agricultural policy invited 
participation of the MRD and Ministry of Environment. These ministries countered 
the potential institutional enhancement of the Ministry of Agriculture and the 
SAPARD Agency. This mediation was a direct result of the absence of formal 
coordination at the core executive level, as mentioned in chapter 5. Further, the 
continuity of SAPARD and rural development policy gave domestic actors an 
incentive to determine their institutional position at the beginning of programming. 
The potential of any major changes in the administrative set-up in ‘development’ 
policy was thus dissipated.
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Chapter 8: The Management of Agricultural Reform 
and the Administration of the Pre-accession Process 
in Poland
1. Introduction121
The EU challenge to the agricultural administration in Poland was twofold. On the 
sectoral level, EU templates entailed a re-orientation of the domestic intervention 
instruments and the ad hoc intervention style defined in the state agricultural policy of 
1994.
Secondly, on the macro-institutional level, the EU templates also implied a 
redefinition of the competences and place in the executive of the agricultural agencies 
and the wider executive administration. The re-orientation of agricultured policy, 
which meant a transfer of domestic competences on decision-making in agricultural 
policy to Brussels, was problematic for farmers, who feared foreign ownership and a 
loss in subsidies. It was also problematic for the political actors, who either 
represented farmers or opposed any transfer of sovereignty. Similarly, the redefinition 
of administration was opposed by the agricultural agencies and their supporters, 
noticeably the farmers’ lobbies, which feared a change in the representation of their 
interests in the administration, and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), which feared the 
loss of a natural power base in the agricultural administration. On the other hand, after 
2001, the Prime Minister was in favour of sectoral consolidation. This move could be 
seen both as an assertion of the national executive actors in agricultural management 
and similar to regional policy the minimisation of operational and budgetary risk in 
the implementation of CAP and SAPARD.
121 The term Ministry of Agriculture will be used in this chapter. The complete name of the Ministry is 
the Ministry for Agriculture and Food Economy (or Food Industry) used until October 2001 and the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development more recendy.
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Section 2 will give an overview of the development of agricultural policy in Poland in 
the period after transition. Section 3 will detail the adaptation to the EU requirements, 
on both the sectoral and macro-institutional levels.
2. Transition and Agricultural Reform in the 1990s
2.1 Liberalisation and Privatisation at Transition
The transition in the beginning of 1990 was dominated by the market reforms of the 
Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz in a new Solidarity-led government under 
Prime Minister Mazowiecki. Shock therapy was based on: the liberalisation of prices, 
the withdrawal of subsidies, interest rate liberalisation and currency convertibility, 
and the privatisation of state-owned assets. For agriculture, the ‘Medium Term Sector 
Adjustment Plan’, introduced in 1992, was a document stressing the importance of: 
the stabilisation of prices of agricultural products, the introduction of an appropriate 
liberalised trade policy, the privatisation of state-owned industry and quasi-cooperate 
entities, and the provision of incentives for the private sector to become involved in 
the processing and marketing of agricultural products (OECD 1995, p. 11 and 
Mertens in Goetz et al (eds.) 2001, p 223). However, the ‘intent’ of reform in 
planning did not foreshadow implementation (Ingham et al, 1997). Nalewajko (1998) 
notes that the agricultural sector was excluded from most reforms by the Solidarity 
government. The ‘Act on Social Security and Pensions’ of 1990 became the 
framework for lessening the social costs on farmers, by granting farmers favourable 
pensions with minimum contributions, benefits and tax relief.
Price liberalisation primarily targeted input prices. The communist government in 
1988 and 1989 had previously liberalised consumption prices, while maintaining 
input prices. This liberalisation had initially boosted farmers’ revenues, but 
subsequently in the early 1990s revenues came under pressure. This pressure 
continued with the cost/price squeeze farmers experienced. Moreover, minimum 
prices for strategic crops, such as wheat and rye, were retained and price support also 
occurred on an ad hoc basis. Whereas overall Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) fell 
to 15% in 1995 compared to the low 30s for the EU, Poland increased its price
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support as a percentage of PSE substantially over the 1990s from 69% in 1988 to 81% 
in 1995 (Ingham et al, 1998). Though overall support for agriculture declined in the 
1990s, the reliance on price support in overall support increased.
Trade liberalisation could have severe consequences for domestic markets. Before 
transition, the domestic industry was protected mostly through import controls. As 
Polish agricultural prices adjusted to lower international prices and the increase of 
input prices (cost/price squeeze) due to trade, the farmers’ lobbies made calls for 
government support. In 1994, the PSL-led government of Prime Minister Pawlak 
decided to reinforce border measures through raising tariffs and instituting quotas 
(DG Agriculture 1998).
Most agricultural exports went to the EU (about 52% before transition [OECD 1995]). 
Despite the ‘Europe Agreement’, signed in 1991, and the subsequent ‘Association 
Agreement’, much of Polish agricultural export to the EU was subject to tariffs, which 
raised prices to the EU average. Moreover, trade required export authorisation to 
guarantee quality. In 1997, for instance, the EU banned the importation of all Polish 
milk out of quality concerns. This ban affected not only the relationship between the 
EU and Poland, but it also called for reciprocal trade protection. The late 1990s saw a 
variety of import controls appear on an ad hoc basis. In 1999, Franz Fischler, 
European Commissioner of Agriculture, proposed scrapping customs duties and 
export subsidies on agricultural goods (Golden, July 12 1999). In September of 2000, 
a trade pact named the ‘double zero’ agreement meant customs duties were eliminated 
on 91% of EU exports to Poland and 48% of Polish exports to the EU. The agreement 
withdraws tariffs on various commodities and negotiated duty-free import quotas for 
pork, poultry, milk, dairy products, and wheat (USDA 2003) (Warsaw Business 
Journal, 6/4/2001). In 2003, the ‘double profit’ agreement, a one year transitional 
measure towards accession, further liberalised trade. This agreement eliminated duties 
worth 170 million euro.
In terms of privatisation, the predominance of private farms in the South and on the 
central plains meant that the consolidation of farmland mostly occurred between
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private farmers (Ingham et al, 1998).122 A 1990 amendment to the civil code allowed 
farmers to partition their farm land further. In the period of 1998-1996, average farm 
size actually decreased (Glebocki and Rogacki, 2002). In addition, a special law on 
the privatisation of agricultural property, following the Great Privatisation Act of 
1990, included an aim to ‘make farmland available to strengthen family farms’ 
(Mertens in Goetz et al (eds.) 2001, p 230)’.
For the state-owned farms in the Northwest and East of Poland, transition brought 
substantial unemployment (Glebocki and Rogacki, 2002). Agricultural employment at 
27% of the total work force changed little from 1995 to 2001 (OECD 2002, p. 17). 
The privatisation of state-owned farms was also compromised by the absence of a 
government policy on restitution, given most state-owned farms were formed on land 
formerly owned by ethnic Germans (Lindemans and Swinnen, 1997). Several laws 
sought to address this issue. A government draft law on re-privatisation in 1991, 
during the government of Bielecki, only provided for land to be returned to former 
owners that was taken illegally by the state. Secondly, the Decree on Agricultural 
Reform in 1994 legalised the ‘Polish’ confiscation of ‘German’ agricultural land 
smaller than 50 hectares. Finally, the law of 1999 on agricultural land ownership 
attempted to liberalise the market for land. An innovation was that land was seen 
more as a tradable commodity. Still, foreign ownership was limited and all deals 
above 100 hectares would require approval of the Agricultural Property Agency of the 
State Treasury (APA or AWRSP[Polish Acronym])123. In the processing industry a 
backlash occurred against foreign ownership. In 2001, a law passed the Sejm banning 
foreign ownership of the remaining unsold assets in the sugar industry and grouping 
all these remaining state-owned sugar mills in one national holding, Polski Cukier.
122 The communist authorities in Poland compared to other CEECs had been largely unsuccessful in 
implementing a collectivised system of agricultural production. Attempts in this direction were finally 
abandoned following the passage of the Constitutional Act of 1956 (Ingham et al, 1998). This 
production structure meant that the private sector accounted for 75% of Polish production, mostly 
organised as small farms.
123 The APA also known as the Agency for Agricultural Fiscal Property is a State Treasury foundation 
created under the ‘Law on the Management of Agricultural Real Estate of the State Treasury’ dated 
October 19,1991. It has as mandate to exploit or privatise all state-owned farmland and farmland 
placed in the National Land fund, which consists of land abandoned mostly by small family farmers. 
This exploitation consist of transferring the land free of charge, selling the land, bringing it into a 
company, leasing the land, discharging the right of use in other ways, and placing it into other 
administration (see APA Mission Statement 2003). The APA is a self-financing agency. About 70% of 
the land under management came from state-owned farms. In terms of exploitation, 25% has been sold 
with 60% leased out (source: APA 2003). Foreign ownership runs through lease structures of the APA, 
which have to be renewed after medium length periods of time (around 10 years).
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Foreign claims and ownership were still interlinked with limits on privatisation of 
land and the subsequent liberalisation of the market for land.
2.2 State Agricultural Policy of 1994
After the initial liberal steps by the Solidarity government of Mazowiecki, the main 
directions of state agricultural policy were only set out in 1994 by the PSL124-led 
coalition government of Waldemar Pawlak. Its main electorate remained the small 
private farmers or ‘family farm’ owners, who were loyal to the former communist 
party. This situation differed from other Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEECs), where collective units remained loyal to the communist successor parties, 
but peasants were generally more reform-minded. Initially, the influence of the PSL in 
government meant agricultural reform linked to the Balcerowicz economic reforms 
stalled. In fact, the PSL and other parties with agrarian agendas posted political gain 
by opposing the liberalisation policies of the Solidarity governments (Nalewajko 
1994).125 The party platform of the PSL in 1993 focused on rural employment. The 
logic was that increased investment in the agricultural sector would promote demand 
for labour. They linked this view of transformation to views of social equality 
(Nalewajko 1998). The 1994 government platform set out to: bring efficiency and 
modernisation to agriculture; provide a regulatory framework; maintain family farms; 
and build up a support network covering subsidies, regional development and market 
risks. These policy changes were implemented by the PSL Minister of Agriculture 
Janowski in the Suchocka government. The platform implied: more protectionist 
measures such as import levies and compensating charges; extension of loans;
124 In 1989 United Peasant Party (UPP), responsible for ensuring the input of peasants in national 
agricultural policy in communist times, used its considerable organisation to reorient itself as a post­
communist political party (Sokolovsky, 1990). It re-branded itself under the pre-communist name, the 
Polish Peasant Party (PPP or PSL [Polish acronym]), which had had a strong anti-communist inter-war 
reputation. It derived legitimacy by merging with a democratic peasant party. The PSL was part of a 
coalition from transition to the present, with the exception of the Bielecki government in 1991 and the 
AWS Buzek government from 1997 to September 2001.
125 Agricultural parties have tended after the transition to move to both sides of the political spectrum. 
The PSL has adopted a centre-left orientation more in line with its leftist traditions. Some have adopted 
a right-wing platform and have adopted a nationalist stance such as Samoobrona. Samoobrona or Self- 
Defence set up after the market reforms of Leszek Balcerowicz in 1992 under the leadership of Andrzej 
Lepper (see Piasecka, 2001). His approach was different from the PSL, as his movement tried to exact 
political influence through mass meetings, rallies, stay-in demonstrations and blockades (also see Kelly 
WBJ 1998). Lepper also has built a platform out of the transition periods the EU demanded for the full 
introduction of subsidies claiming the EU does not see Poles as equals (BBC, January 30 2002.
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minimum producer prices (Ingham et al, 1998); and generous cash inducements to 
farmers mainly through pensions. Such payments were controversial, considering the 
initial fiscal austerity in transition and budgetary crises through the 1990s (Nalewajko 
1994). Despite splits in the PSL between ‘traditionalists’, such as Pawlak, and 
‘modernisers’, such as Jagelienski, who favoured larger farms rather than family 
farms and focused on the efficient delivery (mostly through low interest loans) and 
redirection (to rural development) of funds through updated agencies, the general 
protectionist agenda of the PSL showed continuity in the 1990s.126
The implementation of the 1994 state policy occurred on three levels; 1. a focus on 
debt relief and the extension of loans to farmers through the creation of the Agency 
for the Restructuring and Modernisation of Agriculture (ARiMR or ARMAfEnglish
197acronym]) ; 2. the establishment of a state infrastructure capable of intervening in 
agricultural markets, mostly through the Agricultural Market Agency [AMA] (this 
agency was also part of the ‘Association Agreement’ between Poland and the EU)128;
126 In 1996, Jagielinski as PSL Minister of Agriculture developed plans for fuel subsidies, a loan 
guarantee fund, and foreign ownership limitations. These proposals sparked a major crisis in its 
coalition with the SLD (Nalewajko 1998). Additionally, in violation of the ‘Association Agreement’ 
with the EU, the PSL blocked a proposal by the SLD to eliminate the import tax on agricultural 
products.
127 The ARMA was founded in January 1994 to replace the FRiOR. The FRiOR itself had been 
founded in 1992 to stimulate modernisation and aid credit repayment. Its primary occupation was on its 
second activity, credit repayment. Individual farmers would sell their debt to the FRiOR and would 
receive a more preferential interest rate. The FRiOR was suspended in 1993 after several administrative 
irregularities and the ARMA came into existence shortly after. The ARMA would distribute 
preferential credit at about 20% fixed interest (Ingham et al 1998). The evaluation of credit extensions 
for modernisation and debt restructuring would now be done by commercial banks. The ARMA 
provides aid in the following ways: 1. through interest rate subsidies; 2. financing or part-financing 
(grants); and 3. credit and loan guarantees to private farmers. Mostly, the ARMA is responsible for the 
subsidised credit, in the way that it pays the differential between the commercial interest rate and the 
rate paid by farmers (Latruffe 2003).
128 The AMA is the government agency responsible for agricultural markets and the price support 
system. It was founded on June 7,1990 under a government act. The main activities of the AMA 
comprise of:
‘-intervention purchase and sale of unprocessed and processed agricultural products on national and 
external markets,
-subsidies to purchase prices,
-storage aid,
-export refunds,
-permissions for import and export of agricultural products from the Polish customs area,
-production quota system for certain agricultural products,
-aid for processing and sale of products at lowered prices,
-compensatory payments for potato producers and potato starch producers, 
withdrawal of agricultural products from the market,
credit guarantees, except investment credits granted, to entrepreneurs fulfilling tasks commissioned by 
the AMA (see AMA Mission Statement 2003)’
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and 3. the general expansion of the organisation and administration of the state in the 
agricultural sector.
These agencies not only offered a political power base to the PSL, but control of the 
intervention instruments could be used as a political tool. In 1996 and 1997, PSL 
Minister of Agriculture Jagielinski advocated stronger agencies to aid transformation, 
simplify the management of funds, and align more with EU requirements for CAP and 
SAPARD. Those proposals also would mean a more central role for these agencies in 
the dispersal of EU funds and in the process of domestic transformation. The PSL, as 
main architect of agricultural policy, controlled the Ministry of Agriculture and these 
state agencies for most of the 1990s. In September 2002, the SLD-PSL coalition 
government under Leszek Miller was reprimanded by the European Commission for 
the alleged coalition deal to replace civil servants with political appointees in these 
state agencies and divide up the regional offices of the ARMA, and staff them with 
supporters (RFE/RL September 5 2002).The SLD and PSL had been previously 
accused of colonising the machinery of the state in the drafting of civil service law 
and the setting of employment criteria for the civil service, which clearly favoured the 
old nomenklatura (Jablonski 2000).129
Secondly, the instruments of the agencies have often been used for ‘lobby-supporting’ 
activity (Nalewajko 1998, p. 27). A favourite intervention tool used by the PSL is the 
pre-paid purchase of wheat before the harvest. Pre-paid purchases are similar to the 
state guaranteed contracts proposed by Pawlak in 1996. The farmer sells the grain to 
the AMA at a pre-arranged price, regardless of quality, unless the market price is 
higher. In that case, the farmer sells to the market and pays back the AMA. In 1997, 
the Minister of Agriculture Jagielinski resigned over this issue to be replaced by a 
supporter of pre-paid intervention. More recently, in August 2002, the PSL Minister 
of Agriculture, Jaroslaw Kalinowski proposed a major intervention in grain purchases 
of about 700,000 tons through the AMA after a difficult harvest and problems at grain 
elevators (RFE/RL 5/8/ 2002). Additionally, the PSL controlled the cooperative Food 
Economy Bank (Bank Gospodarki Zywnosciowej). This bank channelled state 
budgetary resources to loans and preferential compensating charges for farmers.
129 The introduction of civil service law was postponed because of these reasons until after the election 
victory of the AWS and UW in 1997.
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Politicians from the PSL had on a number of occasions prevented the bankruptcy of 
this institution. It was reformed under PSL Minister Janowski in 1994 to operate on a 
commercial basis, with cooperatives incorporated in a regional network of 9 banks 
controlled by the Food Economy Bank.
2.3 The Buzek Government between Farmers’ Lobby and the EU
The AWS-led Buzek government elected in 1997 continued on with many of the same 
intervention tools instituted by the PSL. The reasons were: 1. the success of farmers’ 
groups and the PSL in shaping a relatively vague AWS agricultural policy agenda; 2. 
the ambiguous AWS’ platform on Europe.130
The AWS’ election programme had been quite general on major issues:
‘We support the modernisation and restructuring of the Polish agricultural sector which will 
be based on family farms. Lending, intervention, and price policy will support the 
development of farms, investments regarding agricultural services and food processing as well 
as restructuring the ways of thinking. We will ensure the protection of the Polish agricultural 
sector against unfair international competition.’ (AWS platform quoted in Nalewajko 1998, p. 
16).
The vagueness of the agenda opened the AWS up to criticism that the government 
was neglecting rural issues in favour of reforms in social security, health and 
education, and territorial administration (Hermann, Central European Review 1999). 
Farmers’ groups exploited this weakness by organising road blockades and protests in 
1998 and 1999. The government reacted in a similar way to previous governments by 
using intervention instruments as a political tool. It made 180 million euro available 
for further price stabilisation (floor prices) in the market and mandated that the AMA 
make payments directly to the farmers, rather than to a middle man or market-maker 
(Golden WBJ June 7,1999). Moreover, the AWS, with support of the PSL, sponsored 
legislation to extend further preferential loans to the poorest farms. Overall, the 
budget for price support in agriculture increased 23% in 2001.
130 Though the position of the AWS coalition was generally pro-European, the election platform called 
for a ‘slowing down’ of the process of integration (Stadtmuller 2000, pg. 33). The ambiguity on Europe 
within the AWS was also caused by splits between its constituent factions. Some of these factions, such 
as the Catholic League of Families, were quite ‘euro-sceptic’.
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On the prospect of EU membership, the AWS performed a balancing act between 
further integration and appearing to defend national interests. In 1999, the government 
made a commitment presented in Brussels to spend 6 billion euro over 3 years to 
reform Polish agriculture and facilitate its inclusion in the CAP by promoting 
modernisation and building the required regulatory framework (Golden WBJ, 
29/11/1999). At the same time, the AWS angered the European Commission in 1999 
by suggesting that Poland could opt out of CAP131 altogether. Further, in 1998, the 
government raised the import tariffs on beef. The 1999 EC Regular Report comments 
on the worrying protectionism and price support programmes of the government 
drawing resources away from where they are needed (EC Regular Report on Poland’s 
Progress towards Accession 1999, p. 73).
3. The EU and Agricultural Reform
Given the sectoral ‘misfit’ between EU policy and domestic policy, sectoral 
adaptation in Poland became a balancing act between, on the hand, implementing 
CAP to facilitate accession and, on the other, gaining exemptions and budgetary 
concessions to make accession possible, without excluding a major number of family 
farms (By cutting domestic agricultural programmes) or creating an additional 
budgetary imbalance. In the run-up to accession, the real debate was to what extent 
and under which system Poland would share in CAP direct payments and what special 
budgetary transition facility Poland would receive. In return, Poland had two 
bargaining chips: the access of EU nationals to Polish land; and further trade 
liberalisation. The intransigence of the Polish government was also linked to the 
presence of the PSL in the coalition government after 2001. The strategy was to limit 
budgetary expenditure and maintain as many farms as possible in the domestic 
support framework.
131 Jerzy Plewa, then Deputy Minister of Agriculture, points out the exclusion of over 1 million farms 
from CAP should not be an impediment to integration and the implementation of CAP. In Italy 1 
million of 2.5 million farms are excluded (Jerzy Plewa quoted in FT, Poland 2000 Report). A 
preference existed in Poland that a large number of agricultural producers should exist outside of CAP, 
while maintaining domestic support networks for as many farms as possible. This point refers to both 
the efficiency of farmers producing at higher fixed prices (Hunek in Hunek and Rowinski 2000, pg. 32) 
and the impact on the production process of the adoption of phytosanitary and veterinary regulations (it 
is estimated by the ARMA that 9000 beef farmers will lose their licence over the EU regulation on the 
separate housing of pigs and beef [Interview with Iwona Lisztwan: Brussels October 15 2003]).
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Further, adoption of CAP and SAPARD implied a challenge to the executive 
structure. This process involved the restructuring of agricultural agencies to integrate 
them in sectoral budgetary resources. Samecki calls this process the consolidation of 
the programmatic and budgetary resources (Interview with Pawel Samecki: Warsaw 
September 28, 2001). Restructuring would lead to a process of sectoral agencies 
resisting consolidation and the Council of Ministers and Prime Minister promoting 
consolidation. This promotion, as stated earlier, also aimed to limit operational and 
budgetary risk upon accession, as capacity remained low. The 2002 Regular Report 
raises the bar and notes ‘efforts need to be substantially stepped up’ (EC Regular 
Report on Poland’s Progress towards Accession 2002, p. 73).
The next section (3.1) will look at the outcome of the negotiations in terms of the 
budgetary concessions, foreign ownership and a simplified direct payment system, 
which enabled the continuation of domestic agricultural programmes. Secondly, in 
section 3.2,1 will look at the process of consolidation of administration and determine 
whether this process has changed the executive structure or the macro-institutional 
configuration in Poland. This analysis will also include a look at SAPARD, which as 
a pre-accession fund had a history of implementation.
3.1 The Miller Government and EU Negotiations132
The imminence of EU accession facing the SLD-UP-PSL coalition in September 2001 
highlighted the domestic administrative deficiencies. The SLD had traditionally given 
discretion to the PSL in respective coalitions to shape agricultural policy. The SLD 
placed more emphasis than the PSL on: rural job creation, education, the 
consolidation of farms, more limited and temporary protection of agriculture, the 
multi-functional development of agriculture, and a more limited role of the state in 
domestic intervention. Unlike most other parties, the PSL took a very top-down state- 
centred view in agriculture. Within the coalition, the debate on agricultural politics 
revolved mainly around whether Poland should adopt a tough or facilitating posture
132 For a systematic view of the positions on Europe of the major political parties in the 2001 
parliamentary elections, see for instance Szczerbiak (2002).
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during the ongoing negotiations (Taggart and Sczcerbiak, 2001)133, with the SLD 
offering a more facilitating view towards integration.134
The PSL was a reluctant reformer and though nominally supportive of EU 
membership, it believed the AWS had created an ‘asymmetry in Poland’s relationship 
with the EU to its disadvantage’ (Szczerbiak 2002, p. 17). The PSL advocated full 
inclusion in CAP, with the full extension of direct payments. Under this demand, 
Poland would receive the same payments as the member-states. Moreover, it 
advocated a transition period of 18 years on foreign ownership of agricultural land 
and a re-examination of foreign ownership of strategic assets. The government faced a 
difficult balance in working towards EU accession and adhering to the domestic rural 
objectives of the PSL, especially on halting the liberalisation of agricultural trade with 
the EU and limiting foreign ownership of land.
This balance was disrupted in 2003. In early 2003, Leszek Miller asked the PSL to 
leave the government coalition over its objection to a toll scheme for public roads (see 
Maksymiuk RFE/RL 2003b). The concessions made by the coalition government on 
agriculture to the EU, though defended by PSL chairman Kalinowski, not only 
clashed with the PSL’s positions before negotiations, but also put the party’s position 
as the defender of agrarian interests at risk. Szczerbiak (2002) argues that the handling 
of Polish concessions to the EU in the parliament meant that the SLD-UP quickly lost 
goodwill with the relatively pro-Europe key opposition platform, PO, and strained 
relations with its coalition partner, the PSL.
The main priority of the negotiations was the inclusion of as many ‘family farms’ as 
possible in agricultural support. There were two main components: 1. a ‘simplified’ 
system of direct payments; and 2. budgetary concessions.
First, Polish sensitivities existed that foreign ownership would be similar to a 
backdoor restitution based on pre-war ownership (Krushelnycky 2002 or Famam
133 Stadtmuller (2000) sees this line of thinking first developing in the AWS government of Jerzy 
Buzek.
134 Los-Nowak (2000, pg. 19) comments that though fears existed the SLD was fully committed to EU 
membership, especially after the election of Aleksander Kwasniewski as President in 1995, both in and 
out of government the SLD has been the most ‘whole-hearted’ supporter of the EU in the Polish 
parliament
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2001). In the negotiations, a transition period for foreign ownership of Polish land of 
up to 12 years after accession was agreed between the EU and Poland. On the sale of 
land to foreign leaseholders, the PSL managed to change the three-year transition 
period to a seven-year transition period for farmers in the eight Western Polish 
provinces. This ownership concession was linked ‘quid pro quo’ to a transitional 
period for the phasing-in of direct subsidies to Polish farmers. The European 
Commission proposed 25% of direct subsidy payments and a phasing in period of 10 
years. For direct payments, the national budget in the first year could top this amount 
up by 30% to 55%. Part of this 30% could be taken out of the EU rural development 
funds. Further, the European Commission and Poland agreed to a simplified scheme 
of direct payments. The non-land transition periods in the Accession Treaty were part 
of this system135.
Secondly, budgetary concessions aimed to avert the increase in agricultural spending 
in CAP and SAPARD and continue domestic programmes that were not included in 
CAP. These were government schemes, such as the soft credits in rural finance (see 
the ARMA), the fuel and lime subsidies, the state guaranteed contracts through the 
AMA, the differentiated income and company taxation for farmers , as well a 
pension scheme for farmers (KRUS), which is funded at 93% by the government.137 
The resistance to reform of KRUS came not only from farmers’ lobbies, but also the 
Ministry of Agriculture. KRUS, unlike the AMA and the ARMA, was an agency of 
the Ministry, which stood to lose in terms of funds and competences in any budgetary 
reform. The overall Polish aim was to limit sectoral reform.
135 Most non-land and non-payment transition periods deal with the introduction of veterinary and 
phytosanitary regulations (See EC Accession Treaty 2003). The basic tenet of the discussion is that 
production facilities, which do not comply with EU standards, will get a transitional period of 3 to 5 
years. This transitional period means that those producers can only market their products in the Polish 
market until they are in line with EU rules. This ruling affects 332 meat establishments, 113 milk/dairy 
establishments, 40 fishery establishments (EC Report on the Results of the Negotiations 2003).
136 Farmers do not pay income or company tax. Rather, they pay land tax and some input taxes. 
However, this description does not include other tax or VAT concessions. The Ministry of Finance puts 
support to farmers from differentiated taxation at 10 billion Polish zloty (Ministry of Finance, 1997).
137There are two schemes in KRUS: a pension and disability scheme; and a maternity and health 
insurance scheme. The state budget supplements the small amount of premiums (Piskorz et al, 1998).
In 2002 KRUS constituted 76% of the agricultural budget (see table 16).
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3.1.a A System for Direct Payments
On the EU side, the simplified scheme, focusing on the size of arable land rather than 
a production indication, means that there is less demand on the Polish administration 
to meet a deadline for the full introduction of the Internal Accounting and Control 
System (LACS). Secondly, the EU internally, as chapter 3 explained, may be moving 
to a more simplified system of decoupled payments through the national envelopes 
and modulation. So, the continuity of policy, next to the maintenance of support to as 
many farms as possible, was also direct factor in the Polish choice.
The absorption of funds and the competitiveness of Polish agriculture are the two 
issues that dominated the negotiations on the system for direct payments in Poland. 
Absorption in a simplified system would be easier to accomplish through a deferment 
on the introduction of the LACS. The Polish proposal, brought forward by Prime 
Minister Miller and Minister of Agriculture Kalinowski, was to boost spending on 
direct payments (pillar 1 of CAP) to its farmers with 50% taken from rural 
development funds (pillar 2 of CAP) (Guba 2002). This transfer between budgetary 
headings would also mediate the pressure on Polish administration to fully absorb 
rural development funds. The EU placed a limit of 30% on these top-up amounts. Part 
of the reason for the Polish insistence on 50% was to boost their farmers’ 
competitiveness compared to EU farmers in the member-states. A 50% boost would 
have given them support levels at 75% of the EU average, given the 25% of member- 
state payments given to the candidate countries in the first year of accession. 
Competitiveness also matters in terms of specialisation. Most Polish farms, as stated 
earlier, are not specialised and the ‘standard’ scheme supports specific production. 
Therefore, more farms will be included in the ‘simplified’ scheme. This was 
important given the structure of Polish agriculture (FAPA 2002).
3.1.b Direction of the Agricultural Budget
Secondly, budgetary concessions were important in the maintenance of agricultural 
spending, particularly on KRUS, given the redirection of resources to CAP and
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SAPARD. Stressed overall budgetary conditions increased the salience of these 
concessions. KRUS remained the biggest post in the agricultural budget. However, 
more funding has been shifted to rural development initiatives through the credit 
subsidies and grant-giving of the ARMA. In the period 2000-2002, co-financing 
requirements for SAPARD were already anticipated in the budget (DG Agriculture 
2002d, p. 27). Other inflationary pressures in 2002 and 2003 were a rural early 
retirement programme in 2002 and the introduction of a system of direct payments in 
Poland. The ARMA’s budget is also strengthened by funds from World Bank 
schemes and subsidies from the Employment Fund138. Moreover, in the 2003 budget, 
a scheme was introduced that would allocate excess income from customs duties to 
the ARMA, if these duties would exceed a certain level (Warsaw Voice, 2/12/2002). 
These funding schemes are also a reflection of the overall budgetary problems and the 
pressure to maintain support for rural development, as accession nears (the budget 
deficit in 2003 was 38.7 billion zloty down from 40 billion zloty in 2002-projections 
for 2004 are for a budget deficit of 45.5 billion zloty [source: Ministry of Finance 
2003]). The AMA’s budget has remained more or less the same, as it heavily 
intervened in the cereal and pork markets, where prices in 2002 exceeded the import 
prices of EU commodities.
Poland received a concession from the EU for a total of 6 billion PLN in 
compensation for the period of 2004-2006. This concession consisted of a mix of 
funds. These funds aimed to offset the costs of entering the EU, as a one-off payment 
to fend off any liquidity problems within the Polish state budget. Further, funds 
served, as an upfront payment for Structural Funds (about 1 billion euro in total from 
2004-2006) (Warsaw Voice 31/1/2003). Structural Funds payments normally arrive in 
totality in the budget a couple of years after implementation. In the years 2004-2006, 
Polish agriculture will receive around EUR 7.2 billion from the EU budget for direct 
payments, intervention in the agricultural market and export subsidies, rural 
development and Structural Funds. Ironically, the pressure to spend on agriculture 
clashes with the public debt and budgetary requirements of the Maastricht criteria139.
138 This also explains why total budgetary spending on ARMA fell in the period 1996-1998, while the 
overall budget rose.
139 The Public Finance Law in anticipation of the Maastricht criteria, which set public debt at a 
maximum of 60% of GDP, has within it escalating budgetary restrictions, if public debt exceeds the
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This budgetary pressure is also aggravated by the fact that the EU membership fee 
must be paid by the central budget, while Structural Funds mainly go to local and 
regional governments. The membership fee is 1.58 billion euro in 2004, 2.43 in 2005 
and 2.49 in 2006 (source: EC 2003). EU total funds provision will amount to 12.5 
billion euro over the period.
Table 16: Agricultural Budget (1996-2001)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
1. Progress in agriculture* million € 253 274 256 125 116 104
2. ARMA** million € 114 128 144 229 288 481
3. AMA*** million € 86 105 83 118 184 174
4. Other**** million € 394 428 409 234 293 430
Total (1-4) million € 847 935 892 706 880 1,188
5. Agricultural Social 
Security Fund 
million € 2,302 2,549 2,715 3,150 3,530 4,303
Total (1-5) million € 3,149 3,483 3,607 3,857 4,410 5,492
1. Progress in agriculture* in % of total 8,0 7,9 7,1 3,3 2,6 1,9
2. ARMA** in % of total 3,6 3,7 4,0 5,9 6,5 8,8
3. AMA*** in % of total 2,7 3,0 2,3 3,0 4,2 3,2
4. Other**** in % of total 12,5 12,3 11,4 6,1 6,6 7,8
Total (1-4) in % of total 26,9 26,8 24,7 18,3 20,0 21,6
5. Agricultural Social 
Security Fund 
in % of total 73,1 73,2 75,3 81,7 80,0 78,4
Total (1-5) in % of total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: European Commission (2002) based on BERiGZ, Analiza produkcyjno-ekonomicznej sytuacji 
rolnictwa i gospodarki zywnosciowej w 2000 roku -  various issues, MARD, Informacja o projekcie 
budzetu na 2001, European Commission calculations
Note: * - biological progress, extension services, plant protection veterinary services, other services 
** - subsidies to credits channelled by ARMA, in agriculture, food processing and other investments in 
rural
areas aimed at modernisation, job creation and infrastructure development
*** - market support and market stabilisation measures implemented by AMA
**** - agriculture related expenditures by local governments and other expenditures on rural
development
3.2 Administrative Management of Reform
The reduction of operational and budgetary risk in the implementation of CAP and 
SAPARD implied a consolidation of the state administration. The main impetus was 
the consolidation of agencies, which partly depended on the integration of non-
50%, 55%, and 60% hurdles ranging from debt reduction or the prohibition to mn a deficit (Warsaw 
Voice 18/9/2003). The 2004 budget deficit will mean the 50% hurdle will have been passed.
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budgetary resources into the national budget. EU funds would flow through the 
national budget. The consolidation of agricultural agencies directly challenged the 
macro-institutional configuration. This EU template for the implementation of CAP 
and SAPARD challenged: 1. the control over these agencies; 2. the independence of 
these agencies; and 3. the budgetary resources allocated to these agencies. A 
consolidation, given the issues of administrative capacity in implementation140, also 
indirectly meant that: 1. competences would be allocated to those agencies with a 
capacity for implementation; and 2. the centralisation of implementation. This last 
point is a characteristic of SAPARD. Finally, the European Commission would prefer 
implementation in agencies free of direct political intervention (see section 2.2).
Resistance to such consolidation would come in the shape agencies maintaining their 
autonomy and domestic systems of implementation, and agencies using their capacity 
to encroach on other agencies’ competences or ministerial responsibilities.
3.2.a Redirection of Administration
The pattern in the administrative management of agriculture in the early 1990s in 
Poland has been the setting up of State Treasury foundations and independent 
government agencies to manage the process of transition. There are three main 
foundations in the agricultural sector involved respectively with land use, agricultural 
production and markets, and rural development. These are the APA, the AMA, and 
the ARMA. The ARMA and the AMA were designated as CAP implementation 
agencies. The ARMA, similar to the AMA, is a state foundation under the supervision 
of the Prime Minister, who appoints its president. The APA is a State Treasury 
Foundation. Since the administrative reforms of 1996 and 1997, the APA was directly 
supervised by the then created Ministry of the State Treasury. Other agencies that play 
a role in the regulatory framework for agriculture are central offices controlled by the 
Ministry of Agriculture, as opposed to the different structure of foundation under the 
supervision of an executive actor. Mostly, these foundations would be funded extra­
budget from their own activities, such as through the extension of commercial credits,
140 Jean-Marc Trarieux points the shortage of trained personnel in agricultural agencies. In April of 
2001, AMA had 426 employees, has plans to expand to 800-1,000, but for CAP is estimated to require 
12,000. ARMA would have to increase numbers from 516 at the end of 2,000 to about 11,500 at 
accession (Interview with Jean-Marc Trarieux: Warsaw, September 27 2001).
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the management of land or state assets, or the implementation of foreign funds. 
Revenue could exceed costs in these agencies (see table 17)
Table 17: Costs and Revenue of Agencies in 2000 (in billion zloty in 2000 prices)
Agency Costs Revenue Personnel
AMA 1,85 1,67 349
ARMA 1,22 1,42 111
APA 0,81 0,85 10.276
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Nature, and Food Quality of the Netherlands 2000
The implementation of CAP and SAPARD would mean the adoption of EU funds 
procedures. This process was helped along by the ‘Law on Public Finance’ of 1998, 
aimed at consolidating the definition of various grants, types of funds and tax- 
exempted funds, which defined foreign funds as public funds and placed them in the 
budget (Interview with Agnieszka Kazmierczak: Warsaw, January 22 2002). This 
redirection meant a reduction of monies and types of grants. For instance, for the 
ARMA, this redefinition meant the share of the national budget decreased from 1 
billion zloty to 833 million zloty from 1996 to 1998 (source: Ministry of Agriculture 
1999). In this period, 40 lines of credit were reduced to 8, with more emphasis being 
put on structural inputs, such as restructuring and modernisation (DG Agriculture 
1998). Moreover, this process directly questioned the place of these agencies in the 
executive.
The institutional position of these agencies produced a heated debate across party 
lines in parliament between proponents of independent administrative capacity, with a 
specific development mandate outside of government, and those in favour of a more 
integrated executive, either under the control of the Prime Minister or the Ministry of 
Agriculture. This debate also focused on substantial budgetary resources placed in the 
State Treasury foundations, The controversial re-alignment of proceeds from the APA 
into the state budget, after new regulations on the settlement of the APA with the state 
budget (Warsaw Voice, 31 July 2003). is an example. The mandate of the APA was 
changed on July 16, 2003, when the Act of April 11, 2003 on the Formation of 
Agricultural System (Journal of Laws, No. 64, item 592) came into force. The Act 
only nominally changed the APA from a State Treasury foundation into a trust agency
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of the State Treasury, with mostly the same competences. However, this move does 
place the responsibilities, not directly related to State Treasury property, under the 
Minister responsible for rural development. This consolidation represents an integral 
change in the way agencies operate. Further, in overall administrative reform in 2003 
the State Treasury, which was only established in 1997, was temporarily integrated 
into the Ministry of Economy, which obtained a wider mandate (Maksymiuk RFE/RL 
2003c). Thus, a second ongoing issue in the debate is the type of executive 
integration. This debate focuses on: 1. the functional distribution of the competences 
and the budget between the agencies; 2. the consolidation of the agencies within the 
sectoral ministry; and 3. the relationship between sectoral agencies and the Prime 
Minister. In the cases of the ARMA and the AMA, the Prime Minister direcdy 
supervises the agencies (see table 18). Here, prime ministerial discretion in the 
organisation produces more horizontal decentralisation in the executive.
Table 18: Task Delineation in CAP and SAPARD
Implementation Coordination Status Supervision Policy
Drafting
Market
Intervention
AMA with 16 regional 
offices
Agency board Independent
government
agency
Prime
Minister
MoA
Rural
Development/
Direct
Payments
ARMA with 16 
regional offices; some 
consultation from 
regions
Agency 
board; MoA
Independent
government
agency
Prime
Minister
MoA
Making any reform of agricultural agencies a difficult proposition was the political 
control mentioned in section 2.2. Though administrative reform would appear to 
become easier after the PSL left the government, agricultural reform stalled. The 
SLD-UP as a minority government had limited leverage in parliament. Adam Tanski, 
an independent and former Minister of Agriculture, was installed as Minister of 
Agriculture to produce reform. Tanski quit after three months, citing political 
infighting over his attempt to purge the machinery of funds administration and a lack 
of political support in the Sejm to build a registration system for farmers to receive 
EU direct payments. A PSL-led initiative in the ‘Standing Committee on Agriculture 
and Rural Development’ of the Sejm had voted in favour of a ‘no confidence’ motion 
in Tanski. Tanski’s resignation came after 11 attempts in the last 4 years to come to a 
final determination on a registration system that was required under the procedures of 
the LACS. This lack of reform undermined Poland’s ability to grant EU direct
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payments. At the same time, Jerzy Miller, the President of the ARMA, resigned after 
he had shown a list of officials employed in the ARMA, who for political reasons 
could not be fired. These resignations evoked protests from the European 
Commission, which described the registration problems in Poland as ‘catastrophic’ 
and re-iterated earlier concerns over the political influence over agencies (Kliphuis, 
Wereldomroep, 27/6/ 2003). A relatively inexperienced SLD State Secretary in the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Tanski confidant, Wojiech Olejniczak, succeeded Tanski. 
Next, the Director of the AMA quit citing the administrative and budgetary cost of 
transition to CAP.141 Despite these setbacks, the presence of the same senior 
management in the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and the appointment of a Tanski 
confidant in Wojiech Olejniczak142 show: 1. a willingness of the government to 
continue reform; and 2. a consolidation of sectoral management closer to the Minister 
of Agriculture and the cabinet. However, it seems obvious that the pressure from the 
PSL in opposition as well as the resistance to adaptation of the domestic 
administration produced institutional persistence, on both sectoral and macro- 
institutional levels, close to accession.
Institutional Persistence
The roots of this persistence lie in the independence of the agencies outside of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, which means coordination of these agencies in the 
agricultural sector is difficult. This continued independence has led to: 1. agencies 
with capacity attaining additional competences; and 2. agencies maintaining domestic 
support structures outside of CAP or next to CAP.
The APA started to expand its competences outside of its statutory mandate of land 
management. The reasons for such a shift are twofold: 1. a reduced need for land 
management after the privatisation process (despite the foreign ownership question 
and subsequent lease structures); and 2. the use of the capacity (mostly personnel [see 
table 17]) and resources that the APA has built up in the regions. The APA runs about
141 The costs of EU accession have become clear, as the AMA is obliged to clear the accounts before 
May 2004 through dumping its stocks in dairy, grains, and pork at a loss on the world market.
142 The other option to the Miller government was to draft the Peasant-Democratic Party of former PSL 
minister, Roman Jagielinski, into the coalition government and nominate him Minister of Agriculture. 
This would have guaranteed more parliamentary support for the government, but would have provided 
little continuity in the key sectoral posts.
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12 major regional offices in pre-dominantly agricultural areas. In 1997, the 
Employment Activation Fund, supplemented by the apdy named ‘Complementary 
Fund’, was created within the APA and distributed in subsidies by the APA for job 
creation schemes. From 1998 onwards, the APA aims to manage a preferential credit 
scheme created by the European Fund for Rural Development. These cover the whole 
of Poland and aim to restructure the former state farms and state agricultural property. 
The APA provides the credit guarantees. New credit schemes have also been created 
within the APA to create jobs for former employees of the state-owned farms (see 
Ministry of Agriculture, SAPARD Operational Programme for Poland 2002, p. 49- 
51). Programmes in job creation and unemployment have been linked directly to 
APA’s core activities of land management.
This expansion of competences in the APA has gone at the expense of the ARMA. 
The assertion by the APA is evident in the budget of the ARMA between 1997 and
1998. In 1998, total ARMA investments in farming, food processing, and agricultural 
services were 972 million zloty. The composition of investments represents less 
emphasis in 1998 on job creation (23 million zloty in 1998 compared to 77 million in 
1997), infrastructure (125 million zloty in 1998 compared to 416 million zloty in 
1997), and training (16.5 million zloty in 1998 compared to 70.5 million zloty in 
1997) (source: ARMA’s reports Warsaw various years). Despite this redirection of the 
budget and assertion of the APA, the ARMA in 1998 concluded an agreement with 
the National Employment Office to draw loans on the Employment Fund. These loans 
aimed to help the rural unemployed.143 This agreement shows the freedom of the 
agencies to develop their competences and negotiate with other parts of the domestic 
administration, resulting in a diffusion or fragmentation of implementation tasks in 
the employment aspect of rural development policy.144 This diffusion makes the 
consolidation of agencies in the sectoral ministry, implied in EU templates, even 
more unlikely.
143 The Employment Fund runs preferential credit schemes. These schemes cover costs associated with 
vocational and professional training, provide interest rate reduction on loans, and refund social security 
payments.
144 Such diffusion also existed in market intervention. The ARMA also managed procurement credits, a 
statutory activity of the AMA.
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Secondly, as Jean-Marc Trarieux points out, the AMA shows the persistence of 
national practices, such as the pre-paid purchases and trade tariffs (Interview with 
Jean-Marc Trarieux: Warsaw, September 27 2001). The AMA had as aim to stabilise 
farmers’ income and preserve the strategic reserves of Poland. It did this through two 
mechanisms: price intervention and procuring at prices that do not take into account 
storage costs (storage costs are at the AMA’s expense). It was the designated market 
agency in CAP.
AMA’s practices resisted EU implementation in several ways. First, as the United 
States Department of Agriculture points out, the mandate of the AMA is much more 
extensive than the average EU intervention agency in CAP. The AMA plays a role in 
procuring strategic reserves, financing companies buying grain, and commercial 
activities (mostly sale of products and banking transactions). The AMA has wide 
flexibility in determining when intervention takes place (USDA Agricultural Outlook
1999. Both procurement activities were often mixed and thus the market intervention 
schemes are impossible to disentangle from procurement aimed at the strategic 
reserves (Safin, 2000). The AMA freely extended loan guarantees to enterprises 
involved in grain intervention purchases, accounting for 90% of all loan guarantees 
extended in agriculture (Latruffe 2003). Further, the state influences improvements in 
the procurement through reducing interest rates in credits for procurement of 
agricultural products. This subsidy comes from the national budget. Secondly, the 
market interventions of the AMA have suffered from ad hoc non-transparent quotas, 
which emerged within the newer tariff systems. These quotas were in potential 
violation of new World Trade Organisation (WTO) commitments (Interview with 
Jean-Marc Trarieux: Warsaw, September 27 2001). Some activities of the AMA in the 
field of export subsidies have been linked directly with other government measures, 
which limit trade. A 1998 government decision to allow the AMA to subsidise beef 
exports was accompanied by new high tariffs on beef imports (Warsaw Business 
Journal, October 12 1998). Finally, minimum prices are negotiated between the 
farmers’ trade unions, the Ministry of Agriculture and the AMA. These prices were
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frequently above EU levels.145 Lobby groups had a direct influence on prices and 
resisted strongly the transfer of price-setting to Brussels.
The ARMA showed a different pattern. Here SAPARD and CAP implementation, as 
accredited units, were separate from agency structures implementing domestic support 
programmes. This separation had two consequences: a set-aside capacity for CAP and 
SAPARD; and a continuity of the administration of domestic programmes (Interview 
with Iwona Lisztwan: Brussels 15 October 2003). In this way, implementation of 
SAPARD produced little sectoral adaptation and was isolated within the executive 
structure.
Allocation of CAP and SAPARD Competences
The allocation of competences is detailed in table 19. The ARMA’s capacity in 
managing payments to farmers meant it gained responsibility for direct payments 
under CAP. The accreditation process of SAPARD had tested the financial and 
payment procedures of the ARMA. Therefore, these procedures were known to be 
acceptable to the European Commission. Moreover, the ARMA’s familiarity with 
commercial credit decisions meant that it had relatively rigorous financial procedures. 
The AMA was not actively considered for direct payments. The AMA’s market 
intervention and price support procedures were in the past not only divergent to the 
EU intervention system, but the view existed widely that the AMA had become 
politicised in terms of activities and staffing. Also, there were questions on its internal 
controls on operational activities. The ARMA was given the task to manage and 
implement the LACS. The ARMA built on the expertise gained during SAPARD 
accreditation in terms of administrative capacity and procedures (Interview with Alan 
Wilkinson, Head of SAPARD Unit of DG of Agriculture: Brussels, August 29 2001). 
The ‘Bill on Payments out of the EAGGF’ of May 6 2003 has put forward the ARMA
145Recently, some concessions have been made. In 1998, the intervention system in the grain market 
was modified and direct payments were implemented. Minimum prices were lowered and direct 
payments for cereal producers were introduced to compensate for this reduction (ANIMO 2003). In 
1999, the AMA eliminated its dual price structure, whereby the minimum price it set was indicative 
and the actual intervention price negotiated with producer groups was frequently above the world price 
level, in favour of a ‘minimum price’ boosted by a per ton supplement (USDA 2003). In 2001, both 
sugar and milk quota systems were brought in alignment with CAP.
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and the AMA as payment agencies for the respective sections of the EAGGF, 
contingent upon accreditation
The FAPA’s146 experience with technical assistance and training under PHARE 
means it has responsibility over measures 6 and 7 in SAPARD (Interview with Alan 
Wilkinson, Head of SAPARD Unit of DG of Agriculture: Brussels, August 29 2001).
Table 19: CAP and SAPARD implementation
AMA ARMA FAPA
SAPARD No responsibilities -Setting up of payment 
agency;
-Coordination and 
implementation of first 
two priority axes(measures 
1 through 5).
-Preparation of SAPARD 
Operational Programme; 
-Coordination and 
implementation of 
measures 6 and 7 of the 
SAPARD Programme.
CAP -Setting up of payment 
procedures;
-Expansion of tools of market 
intervention to cover 23 
commodity groups regulated 
by 50 mechanisms.
-Setting up of payment 
agency to make direct 
payments;
-Setting up of Integrated 
Management and Control 
System corresponding to 
IACS;
-Market activities;
-Role in implementation of 
EAGGF;
-Job creation and 
unemployment policy 
shared with APA.
-No responsibilities
Source: FAPA 2002
3.2.b SAPARD and Rural Development
The next section will look in more detail at the implementation of SAPARD, the pre­
accession instrument in agriculture. SAPARD implementation shows: 1. the limited 
budgetary risk in the implementation of SAPARD; 2. the dynamic of the 
consolidation of SAPARD competences and resources in the ARMA, with the 
associated debate on the place of the SAPARD Agency in the executive; and 3. the 
vertical centralisation of competences in SAPARD.
146 The Foundation for the Assistance Programme for Agriculture was created in 1993 by the Minister 
of Agriculture as a unit within the Ministry of Agriculture for the administration and implementation of 
PHARE agricultural programmes. It also provides the Ministry with technical analyses assisting in the 
integration with the EU (FAPA, Agriculture and the Food Economy in Poland 2002, pg. 66).
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Implementation of Rural Development Policy
SAPARD goals are represented in three priority axes (Ministry of Agriculture, 
SAPARD Operational Programme for Poland 2002, p. 29). The first priority axis 
consists of two measures: 1. ‘the improvement in processing and marketing of food 
and fishery products’ (1); 2. ‘investments in agricultural holdings’ (2). The second 
axis consists of a further two measures: 1. ‘the development of rural infrastructure’ 
(3); 2. ‘diversification of economic activities in rural areas’ (4). A complementary 
axis supports the two axes. It consists of three measures: pilot projects on the 
environment (5), training (6), and technical assistance (7). These goals fit into the 
jointly agreed strategy between the Polish government and the European Commission 
for SAPARD in Poland:
• ‘to improve the economic viability of Polish agriculture and to be able to meet 
new opportunities on the domestic and international markets;
• to adapt the agri-food sector to EU standards in respect of hygiene, quality and 
animal welfare;
• to encourage multi-functional rural development (EC, SAPARD Programmes 
2000-2006: Poland, 2000).’
This programme was consistent with the Coherent Strategy for Agriculture and Rural 
Development the Polish government adopted in 1999. This document identified the 
following priorities:
• ‘creation of adequate working and living conditions in rural areas so to allow 
rural people to achieve economic, educational, cultural, and social potential;
• restructuring of the agricultural sector by putting in place conditions for the 
adaptation of agriculture to the changing economic and social situation;
• sustainable development of rural areas, protection of natural environment and 
cultural heritage (Ministry of Agriculture, Coherent Strategy for Agriculture 
and Rural Development 1999, p. 1).’
The Coherent Strategy is a fulfilment of a NPAA commitment to draft such a policy 
and forms the base for SAPARD implementation. Moreover, it formed a platform 
together with the NDP for the identification of structural aid projects. The Sectoral
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Operational Programme on Restructuring and Modernisation of the Food Sector and 
Rural Development of the NDP forms the base for the Community Support 
Framework. These priorities will be co-financed by the EAGGF. The goals of the 
NDP are broadly similar to SAPARD. Interestingly, the Strategy names the new 
territorial structures with their share of public funds as a significant additional source 
for rural development. Regional authorities also check their regional development 
plans against national strategies.
Table 20: SAPARD Total Expenditure for the Period 2000-2006 (mio euro)
Measure EU
Contribution
National
Contribution
Private 
Contribution 
(% of total)
Total
Expenditure
%of
Measure in 
total
Expenditure
1. Improvement 
o f  marketing o f  
agricultural 
products
468.784 156.261 625 (50%) 1250
46%
2. Investments in
agricultural
holdings
222 74 296.108 (50%) 592.216
22%
3 . Development 
o f technical 
infrastructure
355.120 118.373 9.663 (2%) 483.155
18%
4.
Diversification 
o f economic 
activities
131.086 43.695 174.781 (50%) 349.561
13%
5. Agri-
environmental
measures
22.92 7.64 0 (0%) 30.560
1%
6. Vocational 
training-
25.610 8.536 0 (0%) 34.147
1%
7. Technical 
Assistance
4.990 1.247 0 (0%) 6.238
0%
TOTAL 1230.591 409.781 1105.599(40%) 2745.970
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 2002
Table 20 shows that the weight of adaptation resides in the measures for the 
improvement of agricultural marketing and investments in agricultural holdings. 
Moreover, the private contributions at 40% are substantial. The SAPARD Plan has 
them rising from 34% in the first year to 42% from 2002 onwards. EU contributions 
are 75% of the total before private contributions, with the exception of technical 
assistance. In this case, the EU contributes 80%. So, the budgetary risk to the Polish 
state was very limited. The state contributes the remaining 20-25%. This point also
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explains the adoption of rural development policy by administrative actors, be it in an 
isolated way.
At the time of publication, there was no indication in the national plan whether 
measures would receive co-financing from regional resources or budgets. However, 
the budgetary allocation included a budgetary ring-fencing for regions to: a. ensure 
that regions would have an envelope to independently administer programmes in a 
decentralised way; and b. to ensure that all beneficiaries would have fair access to 
funds, rather than more affluent regions spending the bulk of the money. Nonetheless, 
SAPARD allocation had to take into account the potential uptake of the funds (see 
Lisztwan 2003). It was not logical to allocate equity to regions that would not use it. 
Still, as the next section will show, the existence of regional envelopes did not equate 
to decentralised implementation.
SAPARD and the Consolidation of Implementation
The initial role of the ARMA in rural development policy was quite small, due to the 
fact that the implicit decentralisation of rural development policy in EU programmes 
had indicated a larger role for the communes in allocating resources and designing 
programmes. This decentralisation was similar to the implementation of World Bank 
programmes on the commune level. The territorial reforms of 1998 had paved the way 
for regional implementation, by putting those structures in place. In the distribution of 
competences after the PHARE reforms of 1997, it was decided to keep the existing 
central agencies. However, the establishment of payment agencies, as indicated in the 
National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis and the focus of the institution- 
building component of PHARE, meant a greater degree of specialisation on the 
central level within the existing agencies. This trend was further emphasised under 
SAPARD from 2000 onwards, which centralised procedures in the project cycle147.
147 The project cycle (source: ARMA diagram 2002) of SAPARD starts with an appropriation based on 
the multi-financing agreement within the Directorate General for Agriculture. It releases funds at set 
intervals in euro into the National Fund of the Ministry of Finance, which puts the money in a 
SAPARD account in zloty, held in the National Bank of Poland. The SAPARD programme Managing 
Body, which holds general management oversight, meets in the Ministry of Agriculture. The co­
financing of SAPARD comes out of the allocation given to the Ministry from the national budget.
From there, both the funds in the account at the National Bank of Poland and the amount appropriated 
by the SAPARD Programme Managing Body are transferred. The ARMA deals with payment and 
implementation. The beneficiary files his application through a regional branch and upon approval
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SAPARD as a programme put all ‘the eggs in one basket’ and reduced the roles of the 
regions to ‘zero’ (Interview with Iwona Lisztwan: Brussels October 15, 2003). In the 
Polish case, the ARMA assumed both payment and management functions, mainly 
upon the insistence of the Minister for Agriculture.
The organisation of implementation showed a consolidation of functions in the 
ARMA. This consolidation was controversial. Alan Wilkinson comments that a 
coupled management and payment function might draw in more poor projects, 
inadmissible for EU funds. Such a development would mean an additional demand on 
the Polish budget and a lack of absorption of available EU funds (Interview with Alan 
Wilkinson Brussels: August 29 2001). Further, the ARMA had a dual executive 
structure, whereby the Prime Minister oversees the ARMA and the Minister of 
Agriculture is responsible for the coordination and drafting of rural development 
policy. The coordination of SAPARD policy occurs in the Department of Rural 
Development in the Ministry of Agriculture. The role of the OCEI is limited. The 
OCEI functions as an advisory body, sits on the monitoring committee, and negotiates 
and signs all financing agreements (Interview with Tadeusz Kozek: Warsaw 
September 28, 2001). This split of responsibilities fragmented executive control over 
the ARMA. However, the set-up of the ARMA was entirely consistent with the Polish 
executive structure.
Management issues were particularly important, given the political sensitivity of 
implementation delays. Both farmers’ groups and the European Commission put 
pressure on the Polish government to speed up implementation (see Kaczorowska 
16/12/2001). Accreditation, scheduled to be completed in 2000, had to wait until 
2002, even though the EU funds were allocated (Warsaw Business Journal, 6 April 
2001). These delays were mostly caused by the Polish government’s delay in naming 
a rural development agency. Ironically, the Polish government had asked for a special 
aid fund as early in 1999 to combat specific development issues in Polish agriculture 
and to compensate for the partial inclusion of Poland in CAP (Wagstyl, FT, June
receives payments through the ARMA. Based on the Steering Committee recommendations, the 
ARMA selects the best applications. The National Steering Committee recommends a ranking list of 
projects proposed, determines the content-related scope of trainings, and makes a recommendation to 
the Ministry of Agriculture on the division of funds between the Voivodships for measures relevant 
(Ministry of Agriculture, SAPARD Operational Programme for Poland 2002. pg. 56).
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2001). In terms of delays, the ARMA has admitted 2,096 applications for assistance 
under the SAPARD programme, for a total of PLN 1.2 billion. Areas of most interest 
include the modernisation of the meat processing sector, crops diversification and 
road improvement. Close to accession, the SAPARD contracts for 2000 and 2001 
were being implemented, whereas the contract for 2002 had not been signed yet. 
Negotiations were still underway concerning the extension of the implementation 
cycle of all contracts until 2004 (source ARMA 2003). The deadline for 
implementation will probably shift to 2004 and 2005.
These problems in implementation have also led the ARMA to adjust the 
requirements for projects to qualify for SAPARD funding (Interview with Iwona 
Lisztwan: Brussels October 15, 2003). In 2003, they included: funding for industrial 
plants utilising animal waste at 50% co-financing; training and advisory programmes 
at 12% co-financing; co-financing for the purchase of tractors (previously excluded); 
costs of erecting buildings with specific agricultural functions; part refund of VAT; 
and investment project completion. These measures were predominantly aimed at 
increasing the pool of projects. SAPARD also evolved to 50% co-financing of total 
eligible costs for investments in processing and sustained growth, which have the 
same level of contribution under the requirements of the EAGGF. Moreover, under 
measure 2 on investment in agricultural holdings and measure 4 on rural 
diversification for private farmers, farmers can receive 50% back on their total 
investment in the project. However, under SAPARD rules, the farmer has to 
contribute fully to the investment, before receiving the 50% back. The initial 
investment cannot be covered by a preferential credit. Therefore, the commercial 
cooperatives have set up a low interest rate-S APARD-bridge-credit to help the farmer 
cover the initial investment (Latruffe 2003). As problems in implementation were 
large, both the European Commission and the Polish government showed a 
willingness to relax certain requirements on project admission within ‘the spirit of 
SAPARD’ (Interview with Iwona Lisztwan: Brussels October 15, 2003).
The expansion of the ARMA also required a greater allocation of resources (as table 
17 shows, its personnel was 177 in 2000, and over 2000 now). The ARMA had grown 
from a modest agency to an agency, which was central in EU rural development 
programming. This institutional set-up has drawn criticism in light of the problems
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with the absorption of aid (see for instance Golden WBJ 9/4/2001 and Kaczorowska 
16/12/2001). Administrative capacity is a main concern in the operation of SAPARD. 
The European Commission is primarily concerned about the number of employees 
and their expertise. The Delegation of the European Commission in Warsaw 
calculates that from a level of 516 employees in December of 2000 the ARMA will 
have to employ 5,300 full-time employees, 3,900 seasonal labourers, and 2,300 
interim staff just to implement its rural development plan and administer SAPARD 
(Interview with Jean-Marc Trarieux: Warsaw, September 27 2001). Concerns about 
administrative capacity also extend to the set-up of regional capacity. Though the 
regional structures are developing, the SAPARD branches in the 16 Voivodships are 
not yet fully at the point of implementation of SAPARD.
Hausner and Marody (2000, p. 103) see the implementation through regional offices 
of the ARMA as a de facto sectoralisation and departmentalisation of rural 
development policy at the expense of the regions. The regional structures or 
voivodships, which had been created with an eye on the decentralisation in EU 
programming, did not have a direct function within the context of implementing 
SAPARD. For instance, the functioning of the Regional Steering Committees has not 
been formalised. The National Monitoring Committee sets the criteria for selection 
and the budgetary allocation. SAPARD allows a great deal of discretion for the 
national agency to involve the regional representatives and devolve implementation to 
them. The particular procedural structure under EDIS also meant a certain automatic 
process within the implementation and the evaluation of projects. This was done to 
both make programming more transparent, but also limit the degree of political 
discretion in the project cycle. A side effect was that the monitoring and steering 
committees set up to involve local and regional actors were more or less bypassed.
Lisztwan acknowledges this trend, but also notes that the European Commission sees 
rural development policy as a sectoral agricultural policy, rather than a regional 
development fund. This indicates an implicit preference for central implementation. 
The centralisation within the ARMA therefore may not be a bad legacy to take 
forward to the next stage of EU funds, namely Structural Funds of the EAGGF
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(Interview with Iwona Lisztwan: Brussels October 15, 2003)148. This statement seems 
true. However, EU programming mandates that only one priority axis was to be 
centrally coordinated, while the other priority axes were to be regionally coordinated. 
More recent programmes have devolved payment functions to the regions, especially 
on water management. However, the EU, as of yet, has not provided resources for 
rural development within the regions. This European Commission position also fit 
into a picture of the general lack of resources within these regions. SAPARD 
workshops on programming, which included the regions, produced a remarkable 
result, namely the regions all listed the same needs and priorities in terms of 
programming. This result produced a lack of differentiation in rural development 
policy based on a lack of differentiation of needs, even though regional disparities can 
be large (see Lisztwan 2003)149. The fact that the PHARE and SAPARD programmes 
use similar project templates means a simplification of the management procedures 
but also a standardisation in project identification. The regions seem to have followed 
the EU ‘logic’ in the application process.
SAPARD implementation provides a direct example of the pressures on the Polish 
administration to implement EU funds. These pressures in SAPARD produce a 
centralisation of competences and a relaxation of EU regulations and selection criteria 
to allow for some domestic discretion in promoting absorption. EU regulations also 
seem to promote vertical centralisation, despite a focus on region-based programming. 
This is an inherent paradox in CAP and SAPARD implementation, which becomes 
exposed when there is pressure to absorb on the domestic administration. Similarly, 
the SLD since 1995 actively supported bottom-up approaches to agricultural 
development through the setting up of local Chambers and Voivodship Advisory 
Centres, only in view of accession to attempt to consolidate most implementation 
under the supervision of the Prime Minister.
148 However, the SAPARD plan also contains an emphasis on rural human resource training under its 
operational programming. Such training crosses over into the regional development plan in Structural 
Funds, normally administered under the ESF. A subsequent devolution of these responsibilities from 
the ARMA on the introduction of Structural Funds could prove difficult.
149 Lisztwan links the divergence between needs and strategy to a lack of regional identity and absence 
of transfer of the regional preferences to outcomes in national programming. This divergence is 
strengthened by the tightness of the budgetary resources. She lists the regions of Wielkopolskie and 
Malopolskie as exceptions in this process (Lisztwan 2003).
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4. Conclusion
The adoption of EU agricultural policy in Poland shows a persistence of both sectoral 
institutional arrangements and the macro-institutional configuration.
On the sectoral level, there was a significant sectoral ‘misfit’ between EU policy and 
Polish agricultural policy. Adoption of EU agricultural policy would require a 
redirection of domestic policy. The re-orientation of policy became a debate on: 1. 
how to maintain domestic policy (see for instance KRUS) and include as many 
‘family farms’ as possible in agricultural support next to CAP under the current 
budgetary framework; and 2. how to gain exemptions and transition periods on both 
the budget and direct payments, which became linked to foreign ownership. The 
Polish government had to consider how to maintain expensive and specific domestic 
interventionist programmes, such as credit subsidies, loan guarantees, and export 
subsidies next to EU CAP and SAPARD implementation. The ARMA and the APA 
showed few changes in their domestic programmes. EU procedures and programmes 
were accommodated next to domestic initiatives. Adoption of EU administrative 
procedures, where they occurred, remained isolated within the domestic 
administration. Moreover, KRUS was not substantially altered, despite the effort at 
budgetary reform of 2003. The process of adaptation was somewhat aided by 
budgetary concessions in EU negotiations, veterinary transition periods, and a 
‘simplified’ system for direct payments. In rural development policy, the limited 
budgetary contribution of the state budget to programming mediated the ‘misfit’ in 
policy, as it limited the redistribution of resources. Further to these concessions, there 
were the practical measures to improve absorption in SAPARD, such as the relaxation 
of project selection criteria and the abandonment of the development of regional 
programmes in SAPARD. However, even in these circumstances, the effects were 
limited and isolated in the executive structure. Domestic executive actors could 
therefore avert some of the direct costs of adaptation through transition periods and 
resist wholesale reform of procedures within the agencies through the separation of 
EU funds units from the ‘domestic’ agency units.
Furthermore, sectoral resistance was strengthened by the challenge EU templates 
posed the domestic macro-institutional configuration. The preferences of the
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European Commission had initially, as in SAPARD, focused on the independence 
from political intervention of administrative tasks. This point stressed in the 
accreditation process of implementation agencies seemed compatible with the 
fragmented implementation set-up that had developed in Poland since the transition 
period, whereby foundations operated next to the executive. However, the 
Commission’s preference was really for independence of the agencies within the 
ministry, such as in the case of the SAPARD Agency in the Czech Republic 
(Interview with Alan Wilkinson, Head of SAPARD Unit of DG of Agriculture: 
Brussels, August 29 2001). Closer to accession, EU regulations meant extra- 
budgetary administration had to be integrated into the national budget to participate in 
EU funds. This represented a significant ‘misfit’ with the Polish set-up. This ‘misfit’ 
could potentially change the national executive structure, as independent agencies had 
to be integrated in and coordinated by the executive.
The debate within the executive in Poland dealt with: 1. whether such independent 
administration should exist next to or should be consolidated within the line ministries 
or closer to the Prime Minister; and 2. whether there should be any vertical 
decentralisation. The institutional template for the management of agricultural 
development policy in Poland traditionally left drafting of policy within the Ministry 
of Agriculture and relied on State Treasury foundations for implementation. These 
foundations were overseen and coordinated by a number of executive actors, the 
Prime Minister, the Minister of Agriculture and the Minister of the State Treasury. 
This fragmentation meant that reform of administration could alter the institutional 
balance between executive actors. This reform was made more difficult by the 
political control over these agencies of especially the PSL and SLD. Sectoral 
consolidation did occur to some extent. However, there were divisions between the 
Prime Minister and the Minister of Agriculture in terms of the supervision over the 
agencies. The Minister of Agriculture had hopes that the ARMA and the AMA would 
become ministerial agencies. However, management dualism remains in for instance 
the ARMA and the AMA (see table 18). For the ARMA, the drafting of rural 
development policy occurs with the Department of Rural Development, but the 
ARMA responds to the Prime Minister, who also appoints its chief executive. Here, 
there were strong competing interests between the Minister of Agriculture and the 
Prime Minister over who would control EU funds. This competition was somewhat
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mediated, when the PSL left the administration in 2003 and Prime Minister Miller had 
discretion to nominate an ally in this crucial position. Sectoral consolidation was no 
longer a threat to the role of the Prime Minister in the overall coordination of 
agricultural funds. This development raised the prospect of agencies being more 
closely aligned with the Minister of Agriculture. Nonetheless, at the time of 
completion, the basic macro-institutional set-up between the Minister, sectoral 
agencies, and the Prime Minister was maintained.
Secondly, the move towards consolidation, as clearly seen in SAPARD 
implementation, would lead to the vertical centralisation of competences and 
resources. In this case, a possible ‘misfit’ with EU templates through the 
decentralisation of rural development policy was moderated both by the focus of 
domestic actors and the EC on absorption issues and the inherent sectoral and central 
approach of the SAPARD and CAP rural development templates. Moreover, the 
strong procedural approach in SAPARD, aimed to limit any domestic discretion in 
programming, also meant regional actors were bypassed. This safeguarded the 
traditional centrist relationship within the executive structure.
Two further factors help explain the patterns of institutional change. First, the 
farmers’ groups were an important force behind the maintenance of the existing 
macro-institutional set-up and the isolated sectoral adjustments. Farmers’ groups were 
threatened by a cut in domestic support programmes, the transfer of price-setting 
competences to Brussels, and for instance the more limited consultation with sectoral 
groups in the procedures of SAPARD, which aimed to keep national discretion over 
programming at bay (Interview with Wladyslaw Piskorz: Brussels September 25, 
2000). Any move on the macro-institutional level to decrease sectoral autonomy 
would be resisted.
Secondly, the independence of the agencies, coupled to the need for administrative 
capacity that was present in these agencies, meant that these agencies could resist 
adaptation as in the case of the AMA, quarantine adaptation as in the ARMA, or that 
competences remained somewhat fluid. The APA’s involvement in employment 
programmes also reflected its superior administrative capacity and linkages with 
sectoral ministries such as the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. Capacity, in the 
absence of direct sectoral coordination from above, could dictate the allocation of
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competences. This pattern of adjustment represented a continuation of the macro- 
institutional set-up, whereby the agencies had sectoral autonomy.
262
Chapter 9: A Cross-Policy and Cross-Country 
Comparison 
1. Introduction
This chapter aims to develop a comparative analysis of the empirical findings 
presented in chapters 5-8. This comparison follows the levels of analysis set out in 
chapter 3. The first part of this chapter will give a brief overview of the main 
differences between policy sectors. The second part of the chapter will link the degree 
and magnitude of institutional change to the causal framework. A third part will 
examine whether ‘convergence’ of administrative outcomes occurs in light of EU 
interaction.
2. Policy Comparison
2.1 Policy and Temporal Factors
As stated in the introduction, agricultural and regional policies have important 
similarities. Before the implementation of SAPARD, starting in 2000, PHARE 
structures incorporated regional development and rural development programmes. 
Associated administrative effects were therefore similar across the two policy sectors. 
These effects centred on the diffuse and fragmented coordination and implementation 
of policy on both the horizontal and vertical levels of the executive through 
Programme Management Units (PMUs), central agencies, various state bodies, 
regions, districts, and Regional Development Agencies (RDAs). The effect of the EU 
template was to encourage a wide participation. Diffuse implementation was also a 
function of the decentralised executive that characterised the institutional set-ups of 
most post-communist countries after the transition.
Similarities remained in the pre-accession period after 1997. These similarities are 
visible in the mechanisms of ‘europeanisation’. Both policy areas eventually
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incorporated the Extended Decentralised Implementation System (EDIS) mechanism 
in the ‘downloading’ of templates. SAPARD was set up according to EDIS principles. 
Regional policy was slower in this adoption and first relied on DIS. EDIS and DIS 
both emphasised central coordination, financial control, and implementation in fewer 
accredited administrative units. As the pre-accession process progressed, the EU 
initiatives would incorporate fewer actors. The allocation of resources from 1997 
onwards was more targeted according to priority axes and was compatible with 
Structural Funds. Again, the allocation was less diffuse across ministries and 
implementation agencies after the reforms of 1997. The EU policy templates in 
regional and agricultural policy towards accession not only challenged the domestic 
institutional configuration, but also the allocation of competences and resources in the 
initial PHARE programming before 1997. Misfits’ for the Czech Republic and Poland 
arose out of the EU requirements. In regional policy, they were: 1. introducing a re­
distributive regional policy; 2. decentralised implementation; and 3. a horizontal re­
organisation in coordination and drafting. In agriculture, EU requirements were: 1. 
adopting CAP rather than domestic intervention policies; 2. a horizontal re­
organisation in implementation and coordination; and 3. the transfer of competences 
to the European Commission. This first challenge solely refers to the change in 
sectoral institutional arrangements to manage EU development policy, whereas the 
last two challenges for each policy were challenges to the macro-institutional set-up.
These challenges were augmented by both a limit on the allocation of resources and 
the procedures of EDIS. The limit refers to the ceilings the EU budgetary framework 
put on transfers to the candidate countries. This cap would stop the expansionary 
spending by the EU on the CEECs, at least until 2006. Thus, changes in the EU 
budgetary allocation would likely mean a domestic redistribution of resources.
Further, budgetary procedures meant that member-state contributions to the EU would 
come from the national budget, while EU funds distribution is mostly in regional and 
agricultural policy. This budgetary allocation was in fact a redistribution of resources 
at the national level. However, on the vertical level, this redistribution indicated 
differential effects. The national line ministries in regional policy stood to lose out to 
regions, as implementation and thus resources were decentralised. In agricultural 
policy, this trend was reversed, as rural development initiatives, which had been often 
administered and funded in an ad hoc way on the regional or district levels, were often
264
re-centralised. Finally, the domestic administration had to be integrated in the national 
budget to support EU programming, as EU funds would flow through the national 
budget. This point seems obvious. However, the integration of programming in the 
national budget was a challenge to the institutional set-ups of the Czech Republic and 
Poland. As previous chapters showed, these countries relied on extra-budgetary 
agencies to implement and even coordinate policy in these sectors.
Despite this commonality in the EU pre-accession approaches across regional and 
agricultural policy areas, important differences exist between the two policy areas. As 
stated in chapter 3, these differences reside in policy and temporal aspects. These 
mediating aspects also determine the domestic discretion to shape adaptation or 
reduce the ‘misfit’150. The policy aspect is inherent in the ‘acquis’ or the management 
guidelines for EU funds. The temporal aspect refers to the continuity between the pre­
accession template and the ‘acquis’. Following the five categories outlined in section 
3.3 of chapter 3, table 21 shows the main differences in the policy areas observed in 
the empirical chapters.
Table 21: Policy and Temporal Factors in EU Agricultural and Regional Policy
Agricultural
Policy
1. Dense ‘acquis’;
2. Rural development with atomised beneficiaries (farmers);
3. Sectoral policy;
4 Transition periods in core CAP areas: direct payments, veterinary and 
phytosanitary standards;
5. Continuity in templates (SAPARD to CAP).
Regional Policy 1. Shallow ‘acquis’;
2. Regional development with diverse state beneficiaries (state agencies, 
regions, companies, and municipalities);
3. Cross-sectoral policy;
4. Some minor transition periods in funds management;
5. Lack of continuity in PHARE with no direct successor after accession to 
Structural Funds/ Continuity in ISPA to Cohesion Fund.
The density of the ‘acquis’ determines the clarity of the administrative requirements 
in a policy sector. In a policy area, where the ‘acquis’ is less prescriptive, such as 
regional policy, administrative requirements can be inherently paradoxical. This 
absence of a clear template in EU policy to promote vertical decentralisation in the 
member-states was also noted by Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon (2004). EU regional
150 For the cases in the thesis, a reduction of a ‘misfit’ means a ‘moderate’ rather than a ‘fundamental’ 
challenge
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policy to paraphrase from Borzel (2002a) places the ‘say’ with national executives 
and the ‘pay’ with the regions. Thus, decentralisation for member-states means 
decentralised implementation, but not necessarily decision-making. However, the EU 
template does not determine what kind of decentralisation should take place. As stated 
in chapter 3, EU regional policy after the reforms of 1999 relied on shared overall 
decision-making and monitoring of programming between the European Commission 
and national governments. These governments had the freedom to organise national 
coordination and implementation of EU regional policy. In the absence of a 
prescriptive EU model on territorial administration, such administration, much like in 
France, could be a system of devolved state administration, void of direct regional 
input.
On the other hand, agricultural policy did have a dense ‘acquis’ and distinct models of 
administrative management in CAP and SAPARD. In this case, despite recent reforms 
aimed at increasing national discretion (modulation; cross-compliance and rural 
development initiatives), decision-making largely remained with the European 
Commission and the EAGGF Management Committee. Coordination occurred in the 
Ministry of Agriculture of the member-states. Implementation was conducted in the 
associated agricultural agencies. Ex-post monitoring and control occurred in the 
European Commission and the European Court of Auditors.
The organisation of implementation is also dependent on whether a policy area is 
confined to one sector or not and on the type of beneficiaries, which exist within a 
policy sector. Regional policy is a cross-sectoral policy area and has diverse 
beneficiaries. In regional policy, it is likely that many administrative units or 
ministries have a ‘capacity’ that is beyond that of the regions, in terms of resources 
and competences. These units seem to have an advantage in the allocation or 
execution of implementation tasks. Secondly, dealing with diverse beneficiaries also 
means a segmentation of administration in regional policy, according to which units 
have the best access to respective beneficiaries. The fact that many beneficiaries are 
state actors or regional bodies makes the administrative hurdle less great and EU 
requirements less specific (see ISPA). In SAPARD, the sectoral perspective reduces 
the prospect of executive fragmentation. Further, with atomised beneficiaries 
(farmers), the focus on ‘administrative compliance’ is much greater.
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Fourth, transition periods were negotiated close to accession. Transition periods 
mostly occurred in policy areas such as CAP, where the ‘acquis’ was dense and thus 
difficult to implement. Some transition periods were practical. For instance, transition 
periods relaxed the project selection criteria in SAPARD to enhance the uptake of EU 
pre-accession funds. Others were practical and political. Transition periods in direct 
payments, as stated in chapters 4, 7 and 8, reflected both the problems in the 
achievement of domestic compliance with EU requirements and the protracted 
negotiations on the EU contribution to the candidate countries, which was linked to 
the liberalisation of foreign land ownership in the candidate countries.
Moreover, as noted in chapter 4, the European actors seek compromises with their 
domestic counterparts. Such compromises reflect the inherent conflict between the 
two EU pre-accession priorities, the building of administration in the pre-accession 
period and administrative compliance. The weakening of the concept of 
‘administrative compliance’ was easier in policy areas with a less dense ‘acquis’. This 
compromise would normally involve additional domestic discretion. For instance, a 
compromise between the European Commission and the domestic administrative 
actors on the use of sectoral operational programmes led to the weakening of the 
requirement for decentralised implementation in the Czech Republic and Poland (see 
chapters 5 and 6). This compromise produced more domestic reliance on those 
national executive actors, already operating in a cross-sectoral environment. As the 
pre-accession period progressed, the need to improve absorption meant an increased 
reliance on and a direction of pre-accession funds towards established domestic 
administration with an administrative capacity to absorb (also see ISPA uptake in 
chapter 4). Territorial decentralisation took a backseat to this dynamic. The 
expression of this compromise was evident in the frequent changes in the pre- 
accession templates. The template changed from a fragmented decentralised approach 
in the ‘early accession’ period to a template that after the PHARE Management 
Reforms focused more on centralised independent specialist agencies and central 
coordination. These implementation agencies were required to be integrated in the 
national budget. Shortly after accession, the pre-accession funds would be replaced by 
the membership funds. Though agricultural policy saw a similar evolution in the pre­
accession template to regional policy (PHARE before 1997 indeed incorporated rural
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development), the European Commission pushed for agricultural agencies to be 
integrated in the budget. SAPARD showed continuity in programming and its 
administrative requirements over the pre-accession period. Moreover, it required 
much less subsequent adaptation upon membership than PHARE.
These points lead us into the final temporal aspect in EU templates. The main 
difference between regional and agricultural policy in the pre-accession period is the 
greater continuity of agricultural policy. I make this assessment, despite the transition 
periods and exemptions in agricultural policy at the time of accession. However, these 
derogations had fixed timelines and conditions attached. The main reason for this 
greater continuity is the transition from SAPARD to CAP. Whereas ISPA will form 
the base for the Cohesion Fund, PHARE does not have a successor programme at 
accession. Moreover, as detailed in chapter 4, PHARE would see almost annual 
changes in programming and an extensive redirection in 1997. The administrative set­
up of PHARE underwent two major changes in the pre-accession period: the 
abandonment of the PMUs and the shift from DIS to EDIS close to accession. 
Regional policy in the pre-accession period was caught up in an air of changeability, 
which affected the stability of the prescribed administrative arrangements and the 
allocation of budgetary resources. This temporal variability was much less in 
agriculture.
In overall terms, agricultural policy offered a great deal of prescription through 
SAPARD and CAP. Only temporal factors, in the shape of transition periods with 
fixed timelines, implied a domestic discretion. In regional policy, both policy and 
temporal factors mediated the level of ‘prescription’ the EU projected to the candidate 
countries. This differentiation would affect the challenge the EU could pose to the 
candidate countries.
2.2 EU Challenges to the Domestic Institutional Configuration
The section above has direct consequences for the study of the effect of the European 
pre-accession process on the candidate countries. As stated earlier, the sectoral misfits 
are high in all policy areas. The study of these sectoral ‘misfits’ seems insufficient to
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explain the different patterns of institutional change. To further the analysis, the study 
proposed to look at the challenge these sectoral adjustments might pose to the macro- 
institutional configuration. In cases of sectoral ‘misfit’, the challenge posed by the EU 
template to the macro-institutional configuration might further explain the strength of 
institutional resistance or the pattern of change. In both countries, adaptation to EU 
templates has the potential to change the macro-institutional context, namely the 
executive structure. In agricultural policy, these challenges are: the integration of the 
agricultural agencies within the domestic budget and executive; the transfer of 
sectoral competences in price-setting to Brussels, with a greater role for the cabinet in 
this process; the procedural and automatic aspects in the project management of 
funds, which largely eliminate both regional and sectoral inputs. In regional policy, 
the most direct challenges were: the prospect of a territorial decentralisation in these 
centrist states, and the emphasis on central coordination in a traditionally sectoral 
policy field. These challenges were amplified by budgetary redirections to these 
policy sectors within a capped budgetary framework.
How do the policy and temporal factors affect the EU challenge? Though transition 
periods exist in agricultural policy, prescription is high. The EU presents a 
fundamental challenge to the macro-institutional context. In this case, one expects 
little institutional change, on both the sectoral and macro-institutional levels. In 
regional policy, the prescription is less. Both policy factors and temporal factors, such 
as the continuity (or lack thereof) of the pre-accession templates, mediate the adaptive 
pressure. This means the challenge to the macro-institutional configuration is largely 
moderated. However, the discretion in implementation allows the domestic 
administrative actors to shape the process of administrative adaptation from the 
‘bottom-up’. In this case, the possible sectoral institutional changes are within the 
range permitted by the national executive structure. The study of domestic reform 
processes in both cases will enhance the explanatory capacity of the framework.
3. Institutional Change
This section will link institutional change observed in the empirical chapters to causal 
explanations. These causal explanations vary between an ‘institution-based’
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perspective, when there is a fundamental challenge to the domestic institutional 
configuration, and a more ‘agency-based approach, when the challenge is moderate. A 
first question is how institutional change can be linked to ‘prescription’ in the EU 
template.
3.1 A Fundamental Challenge to the Domestic Institutional 
Configuration
In agricultural policy, the adoption of an EU intervention policy, consistent with CAP 
and SAPARD, presented a significant challenge to the executive structure, with few 
policy and temporal factors mediating adaptive pressure. SAPARD and CAP 
challenged the institutional relationships within the executive and those between the 
executive and sectoral actors. This pressure increased after 1997. In agricultural 
policy, demands on the domestic administrative structure only started in 1997, with 
the introduction of SAPARD. The ‘Association Agreements’ had had some 
administrative demands in terms of a market intervention agency, but these were not 
overly prescriptive. SAPARD represented a move toward an independent sectoral 
capacity that was integrated in the national budget. The pressure on the domestic 
administration was not only to create an adequate ‘administrative capacity’, 
independent of political intervention, but to consolidate this administration in the 
overall coordination of agricultural policy and sectoral budgetary resources.
In Poland, the EU template challenged the horizontal organisation of the state. The 
‘misfit’ was produced by the requirement on the integration of agricultural 
foundations in the national budget. Such consolidation could alter the institutional 
relationships within the executive and between the national executive and sectoral 
actors. The consolidation of agencies within the budget pits the autonomous agencies 
against the Minister of Agriculture, and the Prime Minister. Agencies sought to 
maintain their independent status, rather than become sectoral ministerial agencies or 
have the Prime Minister exert additional influence over agricultural policy (Interview 
with Iwona Lisztwan: Brussels October 15 2003). Agricultural policy implementation 
has seen the continuation of a dualism in the Polish set-up, whereby the main 
implementation agencies in agriculture, the Agency for the Restructuring and
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Modernisation of Agriculture (ARMA) and the Agricultural Market Agency (AMA) 
are independent government agencies with foundation status, which fall under the 
supervision of the Prime Minister, who appoints the president of these agencies. The 
Minister of Agriculture is in charge of overall policy coordination and the drafting of 
EU funds plans. The result is a limited the consolidation of agencies, whereby 
changes in the institutional arrangements have been incremental, as in the Agricultural 
Payment Agency (APA), to give the Minister of Agriculture more ‘say’ over 
agricultural agencies. Crucially, the APA, the AMA, and the ARMA maintained their 
foundation status and relative independence in the institutional set-up (see the way the 
APA negotiates its competences and arrangements with other sectoral actors in 
section 3.2.a of chapter 8).
This limited institutional change should also be seen in tight of two actors in 
agricultural policy, the Peasant Party (PSL) and farmers’ groups. These groups saw 
these agencies as their power bases, because of their independent power to implement 
agricultural policy outside of the core executive and indeed sometimes the sectoral 
Minister. Agricultural policy was for long periods in the 1990s and close to accession 
the domain of the PSL, a party that supported the domestic intervention policy at all 
levels of administration. Further, the farmers’ groups could exert great influence over 
these agencies. The Polish institutional set-up had formally coordinated and 
negotiated intervention prices and support levels with the producer groups. In CAP, 
such consultative processes take place on the European level. Though it is generally 
assumed farmers’ groups would benefit from European membership (see Green 
Cowles and Risse Kappen 2001, p. 229), in Poland the farmers’ groups and 
agricultural parties perceived the effect of membership as a decrease in domestic 
‘say’. These fears also arose out of the limited consultation process with sectoral 
actors that developed in SAPARD programming. These factors help explain the 
resistance to the consolidation of agencies.
The observations above would indicate a limited sectoral adjustment. Underlying this 
sectoral resistance to adaptation was the sectoral ‘misfit’ between CAP and domestic 
policy. CAP challenged the domestic distribution of budgetary resources and the 
extension of domestic intervention instruments. The redirection of agricultural 
spending would inevitably mean the downsizing of the agricultural support network
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and especially KRUS, the farmers’ pension system. This downsizing had limited 
political support in parliament (Maksymiuk RFE/RL 2003c). Similarly, any 
substantial agricultural budgetary redirection would limit the extension of preferential 
credits, input subsidies and credit subsidies that were issued by foundations. In the 
adjustment of intervention tools, there were two trends: 1. an outright resistance to EU 
policy style and procedures; 2. an accommodation of such policy style, isolated from 
the domestic intervention instruments. Resistance to EU policy style was most 
pronounced in the AMA. The AMA also had the closest links with producer groups. 
At publication, signs were that the AMA under the immediate pressure of EU 
accession was undergoing a limited transformation to align procedures with the EU 
market intervention mechanisms. Accommodation was the most pronounced in the 
ARMA, where domestic support programmes were isolated from EU-related 
administrative units. This isolation also meant that in the EU units of the domestic 
administration adjustment could be substantial, but effects were contained. The 
survival of the domestic programmes was aided by the introduction of a ‘simplified’ 
direct payment scheme and the budgetary concessions in the negotiations with the 
EU.
Table 22: Sectoral Institutional Adaptation in Agriculture
Rural development Market Intervention Payment Function
Czech
R epublic
Creation of SAPARD  
Agency as independent 
agency within the 
Ministry of
Agriculture/Adoption of 
EU administrative 
procedures
Transformation o f SFMR 
into SAIF, a purpose-built 
administrative unit/ Adoption 
of EU administrative 
procedures
Accommodation of
payment function 
within the SAIF
P oland Accommodation of
SAPARD intervention in 
existing unit o f the ARMA 
next to units dealing with 
domestic policy 
(separation of 
EU-related and domestic 
administration)
Initial resistance/ Some 
Accommodation within 
AMA. Some adaptation of its 
procedures and intervention 
instruments
Accommodation of
payment function 
within the ARMA
In agricultural policy, the Czech Republic after 1997 faced a ‘misfit’ between the 
administrative requirements of the EU and the horizontal organisation of domestic 
administration. However, in contrast to Poland, this ‘misfit’ involved the building of 
sectoral capacity through the establishment of the implementation agencies to
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implement SAPARD and CAP. The sectoral focus in administration-building 
mandated by the EU also had the potential to change the institutional balance between 
the core executive and the sectoral ministry. First, the creation of the SAPARD 
agency boosted sectoral capacity. Consequently, a debate among political actors was 
held whether the SAPARD structure should be expanded to include direct payments 
and market organisation or whether separate agencies should be created (Interview 
with Milena Vicenova, Prague: September 19 2001). However, the independent status 
of SAPARD was not attractive to the Minister of Agriculture. The Minister of 
Agriculture was in favour of consolidating both CAP management and payment 
functions under the Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs of the Ministry of 
Agriculture. The Agricultural Payment Agency (APA) was incorporated in the 
Economic Section of the Ministry of Agriculture after deliberation with the European 
Commission, which preferred the separation of these functions. However, this 
consolidation did not address the institutional balance of competences between the 
Prime Minister and the sectoral ministry. In 2003, this decision was reversed and it 
was decided to integrate the payment functions of the APA including rural 
development payments into a transformed foundation, the State Agricultural 
Intervention Fund (SAIF) (EC Regular Report 2003, p. 28). The CAP payment and 
market intervention systems were consolidated in the SAIF. The SAIF, formerly the 
State Fund for Market Regulation (SFMR), had been the active interventionist agency 
since the time of transition and traditionally stood under the supervision of the Prime 
Minister. Moreover, the SAIF benefited from support from farmers’ groups that had 
close links to this agency since transition. The consolidation of competences in the 
SAIF was an indication that after the debate on institutional adjustments major 
institutional patterns in the horizontal organisation of the executive would persist. The 
creation of the SAPARD Agency had proved to be an isolated event. Thus, 
institutional changes in the executive structure were subtle and isolated.
The pattern of institutional change also shows the limited ability of the executive to 
allocate competences and resources. The sharing of coordination responsibility for 
rural development policy between the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry for 
Regional Development (MRD) is an example. This limited coordinative ability in the 
executive meant a fluidity in the allocation of competences and resources, until close
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to accession an institutional equilibrium similar to the original equilibrium was 
reached.
Similar to Poland, the empirical observations above would indicate a very limited 
sectoral adaptation. However, there was a transformation of the liberal agricultural 
policy in the Czech Republic. The adjustment in the Czech Republic consisted mostly 
of creation and transformation. These comprehensive adjustments aimed to align 
procedures and intervention styles with the ‘acquis’ and CAP requirements. Though 
legislative harmonisation sometimes provided unwelcome parliamentary amendments 
to domestic laws151, the adjustment of policy and sectoral administrative procedures 
was comprehensive.
In agricultural policy, the sectoral adoption of the EU template challenged the macro- 
institutional contexts in Poland and the Czech Republic. In terms of the organisation 
of the institutional relationship between the national executive and sectoral 
administrative actors, institutional change in both countries was limited, as more or 
less the horizontal organisation of administration persisted despite EU pressures. In 
the Czech Republic, the creation of the independent and isolated SAPARD Agency, 
though a significant sectoral change, did not particularly alter the organisation of the 
executive. In this case, sectoral actors had pushed for a reform of the executive set-up, 
through the creation of an independent SAPARD Agency. These actors envisioned 
that this SAPARD Agency would attract EU funds management and market 
intervention competences. However, executive actors such as the Prime Minister and 
Minister of Agriculture reacted to this sectoral challenge by re-affirming the executive 
structure that had existed previously. This structure stressed the role for the Ministry 
of Agriculture and the SAIF. The adoption of EU rural development policy remained 
isolated within the domestic macro-institutional configuration. Both these cases of 
institutional change are consistent with institution-based views, which anticipate 
institutional change to be limited.
151 The Veterinary Law of July 1999 built a platform for the protection of animal and public health and 
set customs fees to the same levels of the EU but was not in line in the ‘acquis’ on measures to block 
imports and subsidise farmers for outbreaks of disease (EC Regular Report on the Czech Republic 
Progress on Accession 1999, pg. 30). Similarly, some measures of the SAIF such as the subsidising of 
storage costs proved beyond the scope of EU market intervention
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However in terms of interventionist procedures, there were some significant sectoral 
changes. For instance, market intervention policy administered within the AMA in 
Poland is changing. However, at the moment, the research can only conclude that this 
change, similar to the adaptation of the ARMA, is being accommodated within the 
agency, remains isolated in the executive structure, and has not transformed the AMA 
or sectoral arrangements. This situation is different in the Czech Republic. The Czech 
Republic has adopted most EU procedures for sectoral implementation, coordination, 
and financial control, in spite of liberal policy traditions. Here institution-based 
accounts offer less explanatory capacity. The question remains how we can explain 
these sectoral changes within the context of a fundamental challenge.
3.1.a Sectoral Institutional Change in the Case of a Fundamental 
Challenge to the Domestic Configuration
An additional explanation is required when substantial sectoral change occurs when 
there is a fundamental challenge to the national executive set-up. Substantial sectoral 
changes, as in the case of the Czech Republic, can be explained within the macro- 
institutional context. This context often allows more than one sectoral outcome. In the 
Czech Republic, a change in government in 1997 was the main impetus to 
endogenous policy change (see section 2.3 in chapter 7). This sectoral change reduced 
the sectoral ‘misfit’ with CAP. However, the overall executive set-up, which did not 
fully conform in terms of horizontal organisation to the CAP and SAPARD 
requirements, remained more or less the same. Institutional change was confined.
In agricultural policy in the Czech Republic, the changes of sectoral institutional 
arrangements can be explained through institutional reform started in 1998 by the 
CSSD minority government of Milos Zeman. This reform aimed to transform liberal 
agricultural policy formed by Vaclac Klaus in the post-transition period and build 
systematic market intervention and rural development policy. National reform of 
administration and policy had reduced the ‘misfit’ with European CAP and SAPARD 
requirements before adoption of SAPARD and CAP commenced in the period 1999- 
2000. As explained in chapter 7, this adoption was also facilitated by the limitations 
on the budgetary impact of both SAPARD and the system of direct payments in the 
Czech Republic.
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Institutional reform also opened up opportunities for sectoral groups to influence 
administrative and political decisions. The support by the farmers’ groups for the 
SAIF is an example. This support also helped explain the Czech Republic retaining 
the executive institutional set-up in agriculture. In this sense, farmers’ support and 
sectoral institutional change reinforced the national executive structure.
3.2 A Moderate Challenge to the Domestic Institutional 
Configuration
As indicated in chapters 2 and 3, institution-based accounts have limits in their 
explanatory capacity. For instance, these accounts offer little explanation for cases 
where the EU challenge to the macro-institutional context is limited. A limited 
challenge might mean the ‘misfit’ is minor or, as shown in this thesis, the 
‘prescription’ in the EU templates is mediated by temporal and policy factors. Such 
mediation is particularly visible in regional policy. In this case, as chapter 3 argued, 
agency-based approaches might explain better the pattern and magnitude of 
institutional change, especially on the sectoral level. In this case, any sectoral 
institutional changes remain within the range permitted by the national executive 
structure
In regional policy, the emphasis before 1997 on decentralised implementation on both 
the horizontal and vertical levels was replaced by a rationalisation of administration in 
1997, with an increased emphasis on financial control and central coordination. This 
move produced pressure to consolidate the coordination and implementation of EU 
policy on the horizontal and vertical levels of the respective executive structures. 
Interestingly, the EU template had helped to create the ‘misfit’ before 1997 that the 
PHARE template in 1997 aimed to address. Close to accession, the Structural Funds 
templates would signal a transfer of competences from implementation agencies to 
the line ministries. Implementation agencies would remain as intermediate bodies.
Before 1997 in the Czech Republic, diffuse PHARE implementation strengthened the 
fragmented ministerial institutional set-up in which the line ministries had significant
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autonomy in their institutional relationship with the core executive and the regions. 
However, the adoption of EU policy also challenged the territorial organisation of the 
state. The Czech Republic chose to postpone territorial reform under Klaus. Post- 
1997, the PHARE Reforms, in reducing the number of implementation partners and 
promoting concepts such as central coordination, reduced the ‘misfit’ in the territorial 
structure, but on the horizontal executive level challenged the role of the line 
ministries in the coordination process and of ministerial agencies in the 
implementation of PHARE. First, the Czech Republic instituted provisional ‘cohesion 
regions’. In this choice, the Czech government was aided by a lack of specificity in 
the EU regional policy template on regional implementation on the NUTS 2 level. 
Moreover, the European Commission, focusing on the absorption of funds rather than 
‘administrative compliance’, preferred those administrative units with high absorption 
capacity. The regions had very limited capacity in terms of resources and 
competences, as they were recently established in a centrist state. In a cross-sectoral 
policy environment, this preference also meant a greater role for the line ministries 
and the associated implementation agencies. Secondly, given the lack of specificity, 
domestic administrative actors in the Czech Republic managed to avoid centralisation 
at the horizontal level by placing very specific coordination responsibilities in the 
weak MRD and placing regional implementation responsibility in its agency, the 
Centre for Regional Development (CRD). The line ministries and their 
implementation agencies could largely avoid the consolidation of sectoral 
implementation agencies, as neither the MRD nor the CRD could easily establish their 
competences. This lack of institutional power of the MRD also comes out in the 
implementation of ISPA. Further, the line ministries managed to expand the resources 
allocated to the sectoral programmes. They had this distribution instituted in the 
Structural Funds template until 2006. This move effectively sectoralised regional 
policy and limited direct decentralised regional implementation. The coordination in 
the MRD was mainly a gathering of sectoral operational programmes. The CRD is 
aiming to establish a role in the coordination of the regional development agencies.
Given the lack of specificity and frequent changes in the EU templates, domestic 
actors could avert any substantial changes to the domestic executive organisation, 
both on the horizontal and vertical levels. Institutional change did occur through the 
creation of ‘krajs’, ‘cohesion regions’, and the MRD. However, these changes did not
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substantially alter the executive structure, but were designed within the context of this 
executive organisation. A good example was the creation of provisional ‘cohesion 
regions’. Moreover, the European Commission’s focus on ‘administration-building’ 
favoured administrative actors with established ‘capacity’ to absorb EU funds. These 
actors could strengthen their institutional position. The sectoral line ministries and the 
associated implementation agencies filled a regional implementation vacuum.
Before 1997 in Poland, diffuse PHARE implementation strengthened the ministerial 
and central agencies operating in the regions. Moreover, the EU challenge to the 
territorial organisation produced a territorial decentralisation in the shape of the new 
16 amalgamated ‘voivodships’. After 1997, PHARE Reforms challenged the 
fragmentation of implementation in the ministries, agencies, and regions. This 
challenge produced a consolidation of implementation in the Polish Agency for 
Enterprise Development (PAED) and a consolidation of coordination in the Ministry 
of Economy, whose Minister Jerzy Hausner was a key ally of Prime Minister Miller. 
In ISPA, the Polish cabinet pursued a rationalisation of administration through the 
proposal for the creation of a super-agency. The PHARE Reforms also reduced the 
‘misfit’ in territorial decentralisation. ‘Voivodship contracts’, the role of the Voivod, 
and the allocation of resources meant a de facto ‘recentralisation’ of any constitutional 
concessions to the regions. When the role of Voivod was modified in the ‘voivodship’ 
contracts, it was not to devolve this authority to the regions but to draw financial 
authorisation within the Ministry of Economy. Sectoral dominance of the Ministry of 
Economy in coordination and implementation was also instituted in the set-up of 
Structural Funds until 2006, as the Ministry of Economy drafted all but two sectoral 
operational programmes and drafted and implemented most priority axes of the joint 
regional operational programme. The PAED would retain competences as an 
intermediate body, with responsibility for implementation in SMEs and human 
resources.
In Poland, a pattern of cautious vertical centralisation occurred after the PHARE 
Reforms of 1997 and in particular the PHARE reforms of 1999. This process was 
similar to the process in the Czech Republic. However, this process consisted more of 
re-centralisation given the reform of territorial administration of 1998. The Polish 
government had chosen a more substantial territorial reform than the Czech
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Republic.152 Again, lack of specificity in the EU template, frequent changes in the EU 
pre-accession template, and the focus of the European Commission on administrative 
capacity to absorb explain how national actors limited decentralisation in the domestic 
institutional configuration. However, where in the Czech Republic lack of specificity 
in the EU template produced little change in the institutional configuration, in Poland 
horizontal re-organisation was substantial. Both the Prime Minister and Minister of 
Economy asserted themselves in the regional policy field. The question remains how 
to explain this change in the executive structure in light of the moderate challenge the 
EU template posed. Section 3.2.a will expand.
In terms of changes of sectoral institutional arrangements, the temporal and policy 
factors in EU templates, which allowed a strong sectoral approach to regional 
development, mediated the challenge to the executive structure. Policy adjustment 
would not necessarily imply a challenge to the national executive structure. Moreover, 
the sectoral ‘misfit* between EU regional policy and the conceptualisation in the 
Czech Republic and Poland of regional policy as part of industrial policy had 
mediated. Regional development policy broadly ‘fit’ the government’s desire to 
reduce disparities across the territory and more importantly with the EU average. The 
reduction of these regional disparities had become important after the economic crisis 
of the mid-1990s. There was broad administrative and political support for regional 
development policy. This support was boosted by the greater budget and wider 
distribution of funds that actors expected from EU funds. Administrative actors were 
quick to exploit the new opportunities in the administration of EU funds. 
Implementation agencies after the reforms of 1997 were quick to absorb EU regional 
policy style of the ‘new’ PHARE ESC in their statutory mandates. Statutory 
alignment of these agencies meant a ‘strategic’ positioning of these agencies for the 
eventual distribution of Structural Funds. Similarly, coordination and financial control 
procedures were adjusted in both countries. Though PHARE ESC was not a transition 
facility to Structural Funds, it offered a strong base for Structural Funds, which had 
lacked before 1997. Such procedural alignment was also visible in the specifically
152 The reason why the Czech government chose ‘provisional cohesion regions’ was the assumption 
that the Czech Republic would only qualify for Objective 1 status, which requires NUTS 2 
implementation for a short period of time after accession. Thus, ‘krajs’ as NUTS 3 regions would 
receive the bulk of the funding thereafter. In Poland, objective 1 status would in all likelihood remain 
much longer and this helps to explain the institutionalisation of ‘voivodships’.
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created units such as the MRD in the Czech Republic and EU departments of the 
Ministry of Economy, such as the Department for Regional Development 
Programming and the Cooperation Fund in Poland. These sectoral adjustments were 
relatively comprehensive, but were fully in the context of the executive structure.
Table 23: Sectoral Institutional Adaptation in PHARE ESC
PHARE ESC and Regional Policy
Czech
Republic
-Absorption of EU procedures within the domestic procedures of NTF, 
BDA, CzechTrade and Czechlnvest
Poland -Absorption of SME procedures and policies in PAED
3.2.a A Challenge to a Domestic Institutional Configuration undergoing 
Endogenous Macro-institutional Reform
The analysis above presents us with one unexplained pattern of institutional change, 
namely the adjustments in Polish regional policy. Here, one has to explain a change in 
the macro-institutional configuration or the national executive set-up, when no 
fundamental challenge occurs to this set-up. This institutional change can be 
explained by looking at the endogenous processes of reform within the executive 
structure.
In the case of Poland, national administrative reform in 1997-1998 consisted of the 
strengthening of the core executive and key ministries such as the Ministry of 
Economy (see Zubek 2001). In regional policy, a consolidation, through the reduction 
of implementation agencies on the horizontal level, seemed an extensive change of 
the executive set-up. However, it was a function of ongoing reform of the domestic 
administration. The strengthening of core executive coordination and sectoral 
implementation in regional development were prominent features of these reforms. 
Moreover, administrative actors, such as the Prime Minister and the Minister of 
Economy, a Deputy Prime Minister, had discretion within the templates to use the EU 
requirements. In this way, the EU requirements were used to solidify domestic
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processes of reform of the core executive. This pattern seemed to have occurred under 
the administration of Leszek Miller in 2001.153
It could be logical to think this reform of the executive should have affected the 
Polish agricultural sector as well. In agriculture, the Polish Prime Minister was 
similarly interested in the consolidation of implementation agencies and adoption of 
EU intervention style (Interview with Iwona Lisztwan: Brussels October 15 2000). 
However, domestic reform did not occur, given the challenge to the institutional 
autonomy of agencies and vested interests in terms of farmers’ groups that favoured 
the status quo in terms of the relationship between sectoral actors and the executive. 
Further, the ability of the core executive to coordinate agricultural policy was limited 
(see for instance the role of the APA in section 3.2.a of chapter 8). Political 
management was difficult, given the role of the PSL within the cabinet up until 2003. 
After the PSL left the coalition government close to accession, Prime Minister Miller 
had enough leverage to attempt further reform of the agricultural agencies. However, 
the PSL maintained a blocking role in parliament towards the proposals of a weak 
minority coalition government.
3.2.b A Variation in the EU Challenge over Time
Temporal factors were already included in the EU pre-accession templates, which 
challenged the candidate countries. However, it could be of interest to analyse 
possible institutional changes right after accession.
How would accession change the process of institutional change? In our institution- 
based approach, the reform of CAP might mediate the ‘misfit’ between the candidate 
countries and the EU template and increase in the domestic ‘say’ in implementation 
(Interview with Iwona Lisztwan: Brussels October 15 2003). However, in the cases 
above it is important to note that most temporal factors that refer to CAP reform, such 
as transition periods and exemptions, were already included in the EU pre-accession 
template that the candidate countries resisted. This point qualifies a point raised by
153 In contrast, administrative reform in the Czech Republic in 1996 further emphasised informal core 
executive coordination and ministerial autonomy. This reform limited the possibility for greater 
institutional change linked to EU regional policy implementation in the Czech Republic.
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Goetz (2002a) that countries would postpone reform and institutional change until 
after accession, when they attain a better strategic position.154 The prospect of wide 
institutional change after accession seems unlikely in agriculture, unless CAP is 
substantially reformed after accession.
However, in the empirical evidence here, the most tangible example of the effect of 
accession on institutional change was not the possible mediation of templates after 
accession, but the ‘bottom-up’ use of EU requirements by executive actors. In 
regional policy, administrative actors did not only have to avert redistribution in 
competences in the pre-accession period but prepare themselves for the period after 
accession. This fact explains why the line ministries in the Czech Republic and the 
Ministry of Economy in Poland were keen to institute their positions in 
implementation and coordination in Structural Funds. In fact, these actors became 
more pro-active, as accession neared and the links between the pre-accession 
instruments and EU funds became clear. In the Czech Republic, there are signs that 
the Prime Minister in regional policy might use the EU requirement on the reduction 
of implementation partners upon accession to restructure the implementation agencies 
and gain a more direct ‘say’ over the implementation of funds in regional policy. This 
would also increase the ability of the core executive to coordinate. This possible 
change to the executive structure is probably best explained in light of the Prime 
Minister seeking opportunities to assert himself over the specific line ministries. The 
reform of the core executive has been an ongoing debate in the Czech Republic. 
Again, the EU requirements might enhance an endogenous reform process.
4. A Framework for Institutional Change
The main findings are set out in table 24. When linking institutional outcomes to 
explanations, it was clear that it was first necessary to differentiate between policy 
areas, where the ‘misfit’ and prescription was substantial and those policy areas that 
had less prescription. In a ‘fundamental misfit’ analysis using institution-based views,
154 Ability to ‘upload’ is mediated by three factors. First, there remains a difference in power between 
the core member-states and the periphery (see Featherstone and Kazamias 2001 for this point on 
Southern enlargement). Secondly, the willingness to participate in funds management was documented 
earlier. Third, there is an inherent risk that in postponing reform to wait for a better strategic position or 
future EU policy reform adaptive pressure or potential costs of adaptation will increase.
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the research expected limited change, both on the macro-institutional and sectoral 
levels. In this case, institutional arrangements would likely persist. Polish agriculture 
shows that the challenge to the executive organisation that was present in EU 
templates strengthened sectoral institutional resistance to the adoption of EU policy. 
This is an important observation, as a sectoral ‘misfit’ in these policy areas alone does 
not offer a good explanation for sectoral institutional persistence. Sectoral adjustment 
in regional policy is the case in point.
Moreover, the case of Czech agriculture showed sectoral changes can be 
accommodated within the macro-institutional framework. In this case, there was a 
substantial adoption of EU management requirements (implementation, coordination, 
and financial control). The thesis argued that the ongoing sectoral domestic reform of 
agricultural policy and intervention procedures reduced the sectoral ‘misfit* in the 
Czech Republic, thus explaining a more substantial sectoral adaptation. This reform in 
1997 was an endogenous process. Importantly, this change did not affect the macro- 
institutional configuration.
Table 24: Degree of Institutional Change across Policy Sectors
EU Challenge Sectoral Change Change in Macro-institutional 
Structure
1. Polish
Agricultural
policy
Fundamental
‘Misfit’
Limited and isolated 
accommodation
No change/resistance
2. Czech
Agricultural
policy
Fundamental
‘Misfit’
Substantial change in
institutional
arrangements
Limited change/affirmation of 
executive organisation
3. Czech 
Regional Policy
Moderate
‘Misfit’
Substantial change in
institutional
arrangements
Persistence of executive
organisation/Limited
decentralisation
4. Polish 
Regional Policy
Moderate
‘Misfit’
Substantial change in
institutional
arrangements
Substantial change on horizontal
level/Limited decentralisation
As far as patterns of institutional change in ‘moderate misfits’ are concerned, once 
again it is important to consider the difference between a ‘fundamental misfit’ and a 
‘moderate misfit’. Given that the ‘misfit’ in regional policy is mediated by temporal 
and policy factors, the challenge to the macro-institutional context largely dissipated. 
In the Czech case, the horizontal and vertical organisation of the executive persisted. 
In this case, it seems logical that those actors with resources and competences to lose 
in European integration will resist a redistribution of competences and resources and
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will attempt to safeguard their institutional position. The Polish example does show a 
substantial change in the macro-institutional context. However, in this case EU 
requirements and pressures were mainly used by executive actors to support the 
ongoing endogenous reform of domestic administration. In Poland, the Prime Minister 
and Minister of Economy used EU pressures to support endogenous reform aimed at 
the consolidation of implementation and coordination in regional policy. This process 
served both to enhance core executive coordination and strengthen the institutional 
position of the Ministry of Economy close to accession. This reform also aimed to 
reduce the costs of non-absorption, given the budgetary problems in Poland (see 
Warsaw Voice 18/9/2003). Secondly, as stated in section 3.2.b of this chapter, when 
interaction with the EU is more dynamic in terms of prescription and continuity over 
time, it seems obvious actors will have to anticipate future developments in the EU 
templates or ‘prescription’. This refers to the point I made earlier about the possibility 
in the near future of a substantial change of the macro-institutional context in the 
Czech Republic, driven by the Prime Minister. This could be another example of EU 
requirements being used to legitimate and strengthen ongoing endogenous reform.
In terms of sectoral institutional adaptation, actor-based explanations seem to have 
more explanatory capacity in the case of a moderate challenge to the domestic 
institutional configuration. Next to the institutional enhancement of certain 
administrative actors in regional policy (through gaining a role in EU funds 
management), sectoral changes were substantial. At first sight, the institutional 
arrangements of EU regional development would clash with domestic industrial 
policy in the Czech Republic and Poland. However, due to changing preferences 
among executive actors in both countries after the economic crisis in the mid-1990s 
towards the development of a regional policy, the incentive of EU funds, the support 
of regional actors, and the option of a sectoral approach in EU templates that would 
not alter the executive set-up, the ‘misfit’ was substantially mediated. This allowed 
for a substantial sectoral change of institutional arrangements, governing the 
management of regional policy. However, this institutional change did not 
substantially affect the macro-institutional configuration.
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5. The Degree of Institutional Change
5.1 A Stronger State and Weak Regions: Limited Effects on 
Executive Structure
The executive organisation to coordinate and implement regional and agricultural 
policy in the Czech Republic and Poland shows two main similarities, the assertion of 
the state in implementation and coordination in view of EU accession and the 
weakness of the regions in asserting themselves in policy implementation. National 
actors not only resisted more cooperative and multi-level forms of government (see 
Hooghe and Marks 2001; Kohler-Koch 1998), but also used their position to enhance 
their competences and resources. This enhancement was visible in the implementation 
of regional and rural development policy, which had before been fragmented and had 
taken place in various bodies at the various levels of territorial administration.
Further, lack of decentralisation is logical in agricultural policy, which by nature is a 
centralised sectoral policy rather than a regional policy. However, the fact that rural 
development policy had been framed in PHARE programming before 1997 meant that 
the implementation of SAPARD in both countries had a re-centralising effect as the 
pre-accession period progressed. This observation is by itself interesting as a 
comment on the effects of the EU pre-accession templates on the domestic 
institutional configuration. Though the endogenous regional reforms drew inspiration 
from the EU templates (see Cemoch and Jacoby 2002), the effects of EU templates, 
similar to observations in the member-states, occurred within the context of the 
macro-institutional configuration. This configuration decisively shaped the process of 
decentralisation. For the post-communist candidate countries, many analysts 
(including Pavel Cemoch) had expected more widespread institutional reform, namely 
territorial decentralisation.
The assertion of the state is also noticeable in other facets of the management of EU 
accession. The dominance of the executive in EU law-making in both Poland and the 
Czech Republic comes through the control of the executive over the legislative 
process. This executivisation of harmonisation was also a factor of: 1. the scope and 
time scale of harmonisation of the ‘acquis’, 2. the technical nature of much of the
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‘acquis’, which required expertise mostly beyond the parliament, 3. the exact 
transposition of legislation, which limited the right for deputies to submit or amend 
legislation. This has produced a strong role for the core executive in law-making and 
policy-making, respectively the Prime Minister’s office in Poland and the 
Government Office in the Czech Republic (see OECD 2001; OECD 2002). In the 
Czech case, this role is more a control function and the initiation of laws is left to the 
ministries. Zubek (2001; 2002) similar to Lippert et al (2001) sees the process of 
‘acquis’ implementation as a reinforcement of the core executive.
Further, administrative units, which were responsible for EU pre-accession policy 
coordination and implementation, were strengthened by these roles. Moreover, they 
often worked in isolation from the state administration and political actors. Agh 
(2002) has noted this potential dualism in the state administration with EU-specific 
agencies becoming ‘islands of excellence’, a term first used in Goetz (2001a). Goetz 
(2002a) also noted the ‘personalisation’ of such administration. The approach in the 
candidate countries was almost like a ‘deus ex machina’ to have particular 
administrative units drive the process of accession, free from the inefficiency and 
ineffectiveness plaguing the overall state administration. In coordination, the Centre 
for Foreign Assistance in the Czech Republic and the Office of the Committee for 
European Integration are examples.
The question remains how much the European Commission drove this process. As 
explained in the empirical evidence, the preference of the European Commission to 
create independent administrative capacity reinforced an institutional pattern of extra- 
budgetary agencies and independent executive bodies existing next to state 
administration that had characterised the institutional set-ups of both the Czech 
Republic and Poland since transition. However, the subsequent European requirement 
that these agencies be integrated in the national budget created significant ‘misfits’ 
between the EU requirements and the respective institutional configurations. Only in 
Polish regional policy implementation has this ‘misfit’ been fully resolved through the 
consolidation of competences within the PAED, which is associated with the Ministry 
of Economy. For CAP, these ‘misfits’ have not been resolved. The fragmentation in 
the executive became a problem for the European Commission. For instance, this
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isolation, as in SAPARD implementation in Poland and the Czech Republic,155 also 
served to limit the effect of the EU instruments on domestic intervention policy. Thus, 
the reduction of implementation partners and the reliance on implementation partners 
with capacity might have mostly reinforced the existing fragmentation in the domestic 
executives.
The main observation is how limited the effect of the EU on the executive 
organisation is in both policy sectors. In agricultural policy, where policy discretion is 
low, this conclusion is not surprising, given the likelihood of more incremental 
changes in institution-based approaches. In regional policy, temporal and policy 
factors in EU templates mediated fundamental ‘misfits’. On the horizontal level, 
rationalisation of implementation had diverse effects. In the Czech Republic, the 
national ministries were effective in resisting change in their competences and 
institutional positions, though the MRD was created. This process was helped by the 
increased role of sectoral ministries in Structural Funds’ implementation. In Poland, 
consolidation was a significant change in the administrative structure that had been 
traditionally horizontally decentralised. However, this consolidation was the result of 
the endogenous administrative reform of the executive structure started in 1997, rather 
than EU pressures alone. EU management requirements in this case had allowed 
domestic actors to promote and legitimate an ongoing domestic reform. Finally, the 
focus within the EU on administration-building next to administrative compliance 
also meant that implementation favoured those administrative actors with established 
resources and competences in the institutional set-up. This focus mediated the need 
for regional consultation or the decentralisation of administrative tasks.
The main effects were the institutional enhancement of certain national administrative 
actors. The Prime Minister and Ministry of Economy in Poland are examples. Specific 
line ministries in the Czech Republic saw their institutional positions enhanced 
through the institutionalised links to Structural Funds implementation. Further, in 
both the Czech Republic and Poland, the consolidation of financial control meant an 
enhancement of the institutional position of the Ministry of Finance that had ‘top- 
down’ audit and funds distribution responsibilities. In the Czech Republic, where
155 This isolation was amplified in cases of sectoral resistance, as in agricultural policy.
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Klaus had left a legacy of a strong ministry, this enhancement was part of a strategy in 
the ministry to use top-down pressure to enhance its competences, as for instance it 
had done with the CFA. In Poland, where the power of the Ministry of Finance had 
been curtailed in the reforms of 1997 through the creation of a Ministry of the State 
Treasury, this was almost an accidental empowerment. It is important to note that 
within these ministries it was often the specialised units that were enhanced.
5.2 Effects on Policy
One can make the assumption that the policy effects will be similar to the changes in 
the sectoral institutional arrangements. Indeed, Knill (2001) seems to equate these two 
effects. This research does not really argue against the point made by Knill. When one 
sees a substantial change in the sectoral institutional arrangements as in for instance 
the statutory alignment of implementation agencies in regional policy in the Czech 
Republic and Poland, one can assume that EU regional development policy has been 
adopted.156 This point seems to confirm the conclusions of many ‘europeanisation’ 
studies, which show that the most noticeable effects are found in public policies, 
rather than in the executive organisation of a country (see Dyson and Goetz 2003, p. 
352). However, at the same time, this thesis does not aim to comment on the delivery 
of policy or link the delivery of policy or the quality of policy to specific institutional 
settings.
6. Convergence or Divergence
In terms of the adjustments in the macro-institutional context in these candidate 
countries, it is clear that interaction with Europe does not directly lead to convergent 
outcomes. Given the persistence of the macro-institutional setting, domestic 
institutional determinants, namely the vertical and horizontal organisation of the 
executive, determine the commonalities and differences between countries. Further, it 
is also logical to assume there might be greater convergence on the sectoral level, 
especially in sectoral institutional arrangements and policy over time, given the
156 It is important to differentiate between the adoption of policy and the planning of the adoption of 
EU policy. As seen in the empirical chapters, actual planning documents often were inconsistent with 
the actual outcomes.
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incentive-driven EU policy templates. Regional development policy would seem to 
suggest this point. In agriculture, it is not yet clear whether the expansion of EU- 
related competences of the ARMA and the limited accommodation of EU 
requirements in the AMA might signify a greater sectoral change over time. At this 
moment, sectoral institutional change remains limited and isolated within the 
executive structure.
A final question here is whether we can anticipate any substantial macro-institutional 
change in the candidate countries and convergence of these executive organisations 
between countries (Wessels and Rometsch 1996b). In the two policy areas, there are 
suggestions that strategy changes could occur in the candidate countries due to the 
future costs of imminent accession. These costs primarily relate to the minimisation of 
the costs of non-absorption. In the Czech Republic, the proposal to consolidate 
implementation agencies involved with the sectoral operational programmes in 
regional development into a super-agency under a Deputy Minister is being 
considered as a way to make ‘Structural Funds’ implementation less fragmented and 
more effective. This ‘simplification’ had been promoted by the European Commission 
during the pre-accession period (Interview with Howard Harding: Prague April 26
2002). Such consolidation of the executive structure and the potential assertion of the 
cabinet in the implementation of ‘Structural Funds’, as the Deputy Minister could be 
placed in a secretariat supporting the cabinet, would be a change from the previous 
‘sectoralisation’. Deputy Ministers in the Czech Republic set the agenda for inter- 
ministerial coordination. In this case, similar to Poland, EU pressures could be used 
by executive actors to enhance and promote endogenous administrative reform.
This previous observation, though somewhat speculative, raises an important point 
about accession. As raised many times in the thesis, efficiency in implementation was 
a key feature of the PHARE Reforms in 1997 both in programming and absorption. 
Absorption often meant reliance on administrative units with capacity regardless of 
whether the administrative configuration was the most ‘optimal’ or directly in line 
with ‘acquis’ requirements. However, efficiency considerations evolve over time. 
Indications above, as in the Czech Republic, seem to hint at a ‘consolidation’ in the 
horizontal executive organisation close to accession, which would bring Czech
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strategy closer in line with Polish executive organisation.157 This effect at first glance 
seems to be occurring out of ‘efficiency’ considerations (similar to Hall and Taylor 
1996; Harmsen 1999 p. 84) The theoretical argument is that administrations in a 
shared environment will increasingly grow similar as they adopt procedures and 
systems, which are the most successful or the most rewarding. This last observation is 
of particular importance, given the rewards of the efficient implementation of EU 
funds.
It is clear that the conclusions on institutional change will require further study over 
time. It would be interesting to link future organisational adaptation to the various 
mechanisms. Not surprisingly, ‘coercion’ and strategic actor-based accounts, in terms 
of the ‘downloading’ of the EU policy templates, have featured heavily in a study on 
the pre-accession period. Other mechanisms would relate more to how administration 
operating in a shared environment would evolve. Here, ‘mimicry’, as coined by 
Dimaggio and Powell (1991), might be informative. The clearest example of the 
mechanism of ‘mimicry’ in the thesis is the statutory alignment of Czech 
implementation agencies in PHARE ESC.
Finally, I do not wish to discount the validity of the application of ‘socialisation’ and 
‘policy learning’ approaches (see Harmsen 1999). However, as Jan Gregor argues in 
an interview, it is probably ‘too early in the pre-accession period’ to establish diffuse 
cognitive and social effects in the candidate countries (Interview with Jan Gregor: 
Prague September 21, 2001). Gregor was speaking on the interaction with EU 
officials and ‘learning effects’ associated with financial management. Marta von 
Mauberg commented on the establishment of ‘policy communities’ that there still
157 ‘Consolidation’ was promoted by core executive actors, especially the Prime Minister in the Czech 
Republic, as it would enhance their power and profile. Moreover, it would give these actors control 
over funds management in a budgetary climate, which had great political costs. Prime Minister Spidla 
in 2003 connected his political future to an important austerity package that included passing the 
budget, increasing government revenue and wider public finance reform. In Poland, the high budgetary 
costs of the preparation for EU membership and the Maastricht budget criteria left the SLD-UP 
coalition of Prime Minister Miller politically weakened in 2003. High costs of adaptation emerged as a 
cleavage between the governing SLD-UP minority coalition and parts of the opposition. The opposition 
saw clear political gain in a high-stakes game so close to accession in opposing a weak minority. Polls 
in early 2004 seem to indicate the SLD-UP would face electoral meltdown if elections were held then 
(RFE-RL, 18/3/2004). This view seems to indicate that ‘europeanisation’ of politics in both Poland and 
the Czech Republic had more to do with short-term opportunities than deep-rooted ideological 
cleavages (see Mudde and Kopecky 2002). This could also explain why oppositions are more euro- 
sceptic than governing parties (similar to Taggart and Szczerbiak 2001; Sitter 2001).
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existed much ‘distrust’ between EU and domestic officials and often a ‘lack of 
commonality in ideas’, approaches and priorities (Interview with Marta von Mauberg: 
Warsaw January 23 2002). Even in the cases of the SAPARD Agency and the 
National Funds in Poland and the Czech Republic, socialisation and the formation of 
policy communities might be isolated in the domestic administration. Again, there 
seems to be a temporal dimension to approaches. However, future research could 
possibly successfully incorporate these approaches.
291
Chapter 10: Conclusion
This chapter consists of three sections. The first section outlines the main findings of 
the empirical research and what these findings mean for the study of 
‘europeanisation’, and the study of post-communist member-states. The second 
section will discuss the place of the Central and East European Countries (CEECs) in 
the EU. A first subsection analyses the internalisation of European integration by 
domestic actors. A second subsection section will compare the member-states and the 
CEECs. Further subsections attempt to generalise on the impact of enlargement on the 
process of European integration and the consequences of enlargement for 
‘europeanisation’ studies.
1. Conclusions from the Empirical Research
The empirical evidence in this thesis showed a range of adaptation, which included 
the persistence or incremental change of the domestic macro-institutional set-up. 
Further, the thesis showed how and under which conditions administrative and 
political actors could strategically use EU requirements and opportunities. Sectoral 
outcomes showed a wide range of adaptation, which stayed within the macro- 
institutional context defined by the executive structure. There are conclusions to be 
drawn in the research for both the conceptualisation of ‘europeanisation’ and 
determination of adaptation effects. These might inform future ‘europeanisation’ 
studies.
This thesis followed Knill’s (2001) analytical framework with important 
modifications. Moreover, this framework built on Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999) by 
looking at different ‘europeanisation’ mechanisms to determine the domestic impact 
of the EU in the member-states. This approach aims to distinguish between 
mechanisms and to use different institutional perspectives next to each other, 
depending on the specific EU challenge in a given policy area. Using different 
mechanisms has important theoretical implications on whether Europe is an 
independent variable in the ‘top-down’ approaches, which take a ‘misfit’ as a
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necessary precondition for change (see Borzel and Risse 2003), or whether Europe 
should be conceptualised as a mediating variable in ‘bottom-up’ processes (Radaelli
2003).
As explained in chapter 2, the thesis made two important modifications to Knill* s 
framework. First, the thesis did not look at administrative traditions as the macro- 
institutional context, but instead looked at the national executive structure. The 
executive organisation in effect presents the core administrative structure of the state. 
This organisation can be analysed along two main dimensions, vertical and horizontal 
centralisation. There were two main reasons for the refinement made in the analytical 
framework. First, the empirical evidence makes the observation that the organisation 
of the executive was of primary importance in determining the level of administrative 
adaptation. Secondly, the concept of administrative traditions is somewhat 
indeterminate and difficult to pin down. Such traditions are often implicit in the 
aforementioned organisation of the executive. For the CEECs, which have recently 
undergone a transition, there exists a difficulty in determining traditions in policy 
style and administrative structure in countries.
The second modification is the use of EU templates and the level of ‘prescription’ 
these EU templates offer.158 Given that both policy sectors in both countries show 
‘sectoral misfits’ and have the potential to challenge the macro-institutional context in 
Poland and the Czech Republic, it is primarily the determination of the level of 
‘prescription’ in the EU templates that will determine what challenge the EU 
templates pose the candidate countries. This is an important observation for studying 
‘europeanisation’ in all post-communist candidate countries and indeed for the wider 
study of ‘europeanisation’. The level of ‘prescription’ is determined by policy and 
temporal factors. This point also refers to how EU actors shape the policy templates. 
When there is a fundamental ‘misfit’ between the EU template and the domestic 
institutional configuration, the EU challenge mediates with the presence of policy 
factors, such as for instance a less dense ‘acquis’, and temporal factors, such as the 
lack of continuity in the pre-accession period. In the process of ‘downloading’ of the 
EU templates, it is important to determine whether fundamental ’misfits’ exist
158 This analysis also includes how EU actors shape the EU template.
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between the EU templates and the domestic executive set-up. When such ‘misfits’ 
exist, the thesis uses an institution-based approach. Here, the research looked at the 
patterns of resistance and limited institutional adaptation. However, this approach has 
limited explanatory capacity when the prescription in the EU templates is less. In this 
case, actor-based ‘bottom-up’ perspectives might offer a better causal link to 
institutional change. In this case, the thesis argues that administrative actors will not 
only attempt to avert costs to them in terms of the distribution of resources and 
competences, but might also make strategic use of the European requirements and 
opportunities to shape the domestic arena and enhance their institutional positions. 
The EU’s focus on absorption favoured those administrative actors with the ‘capacity’ 
to absorb. These were mostly the specialised implementation agencies, the central 
coordination bodies within or close to the Prime Minister, or units with the more 
powerful sectoral line ministries. An example of institutional enhancement from this 
research is how the Polish Prime Minister used top-down pressures after 1997 to 
support and strengthen an endogenous domestic administrative reform and strengthen 
core executive coordination. This strengthening of central implementation and 
coordination functions often went at the expense of sectoral actors. This also affected 
the delivery of development policy, as regional components of programming and 
consultation in programming were cut back. The larger weight given to transport 
projects in ISPA in both countries (a consequence of directing funding to programmes 
[mostly away from environmental initiatives] less dependent on municipalities), the 
limited consultation with regional and sectoral partners in SAPARD, and the 
centralised way of promoting Small to Medium-size Enterprise (SME) development 
in Poland are examples.
On a sectoral level, the support of sectoral actors such as interest groups, sectoral 
administrative actors, and the beneficiaries of EU funds, in the absence of a challenge 
to the national executive organisation (or mediated by the domestic discretion these 
templates allowed), helps explain the level of sectoral adaptation. Both Poland and the 
Czech Republic for regional policy showed that sectoral support could aid sectoral 
adaptation. For instance, regional actors were very much in favour of the adoption of 
EU regional development policy.
294
The two main mechanisms (or dynamics) alone do not explain all adaptation. I 
pointed to factors that enhance the explanatory dynamic, such as a possible ongoing 
domestic reform of the executive as in the case of the executive structure of Poland, 
endogenous sectoral reform in the case of a fundamental EU challenge, and the 
changing strategic considerations in view of temporal factors in the EU templates 
after accession. These factors could help in understanding the magnitude and degree 
of institutional change, especially in the macro-institutional context. The case of 
regional policy in Poland is especially informative. It seems clear that the European 
funds management template coupled to ongoing domestic reform of the executive in 
these four cases produced the largest adaptation in the executive set-up. Interestingly, 
this particular adaptation was primarily a ‘bottom-up’ process. Overall, the potential 
for substantial change in the administrative set-up seems greater, where actors use EU 
requirements in a bottom-up way, rather than where EU templates are highly 
prescriptive. The previous chapter also speculatively raised the possibility of a change 
in the executive structure of the Czech Republic, due to the strategic anticipation of 
future developments in the EU template on regional policy.
In terms of the effects of ‘europeanisation’, it is important to look at the degree of 
change. In this work, I emphasise the relative limited impact of Europe on the 
organisation of the executive. Nonetheless, underlying these statements are important 
aspects of adaptation, namely the adoption of implementation, coordination, and 
financial control requirements in both policy areas. Though change is limited in the 
context of the macro-institutional set-up, administrative units were created and 
transformed, implementation agencies disbanded, and coordination capacity built up. 
These are considerable changes in the domestic polity. There is a wider impact on the 
sectoral level, where both the policy style and sectoral administrative arrangements of 
intervention were adapted, with the exception of the Polish agricultural sector. This 
also raises an important point about analysis in ‘europeanisation’ studies. Sectoral 
‘misfits’ alone cannot explain institutional adjustments within these policy areas. 
Further, as the cases of adoption of agricultural policy in Poland and the Czech 
Republic indicate, the incentive of EU funds is also an insufficient explanation for 
sectoral adaptation. Rather, these sectoral changes have to be explained in the broader 
analytical framework set out in chapter 3.
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These differentiations and conclusions aim to contribute to the overall empirical work 
in ‘europeanisation’ literature, fill in some blanks on the effect of Europe in the first- 
wave accession countries, form a base to extent the debate on the effects in these 
countries, and build a platform to look at consequent waves of enlargement. Given the 
diversity between the member-states and the effects of ‘europeanisation’ across the 
member-states, there is a healthy base for expanding comparative analysis. This 
comparative analysis is the future for the study of the CEECs.
2. The CEECs and Europeanisation
2.1 EU Accession from Driver of Reform to Domestic Contestation
The European effect in many analyses was placed in the context of the domestic 
transition and consolidation ongoing in the post-communist societies in CEE. Europe 
was seen as a force legitimating the domestic reform processes. Domestic political 
actors would internalise the ‘logic’ of EU accession and see it as an opportunity for 
reform or an ‘enabling constraint’. Framing domestic reform in the context of the EU 
also made sense given the broad societal and political support for EU accession in 
both the Czech Republic and Poland. As stated in the previous chapters, major 
ideological splits between parties were limited on the issue of EU membership. The 
EU could therefore be a driver for domestic reform.
However, as the thesis has tried to show, EU accession comes at a price. There are 
costs associated with EU accession in both institutional and policy adjustments. A 
great deal of this research has illuminated how the domestic administrative actors aim 
to minimise the costs of accession in terms of the distribution of resources and 
competences in the institutional configuration. It also made clear that these costs 
evolve. Early PHARE programmes were largely complementary to the aims of the 
domestic transition. Then, EU accession was easier ‘contextualised’ in the aims of the 
domestic transition. PHARE programmes after 1997 were more ‘acquis’-based and 
challenging to the domestic polity. As section 2.2 in chapter 4 shows, programmes 
became ‘defined in detail’ and ‘procedural’ (Interview with John O’Rourke: Warsaw, 
January 21 2002).
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EU accession therefore is not solely perceived as an ‘enabling constraint’ or an 
opportunity by the political leaders, it has become the subject of political contestation. 
This contestation takes place on two levels: 1. attaching blame to EU accession for 
failed or problematic domestic reforms; and 2. arguing that, given the ‘asymmetry of 
power’ in the pre-accession period, the candidate countries in CEE are getting a bad 
deal in the EU enlargement process.
On point 1, in as much as the EU can legitimate reform, EU policy and institutional 
adjustments can also be blamed for difficult domestic reform processes. This tactic 
seemed to be at work both in the Czech Republic and Poland during the budgetary 
debates in 2003. The budgetary crises in both countries were long in the making. 
However, the EU accession forced the hand of domestic policy-makers to commit to 
domestic reform. Given the costs of reform, it was inevitable the EU would be 
blamed. An example is the budgetary reform in Poland. In September 2003, Jerzy 
Hausner, the Minister of Economy, announced that he would seek 3 billion zloty in 
budgetary cuts and initiate a long overdo reform of KRUS, the farmers’ pension 
system. This reform had also been an agenda point of former Minister of Finance 
Kolodko (Warsaw Voice 10/7/2003). Such EU-inspired proposals were opposed 
directly by agricultural parties such as the PSL and Samoobrona. The opposition to 
domestic reform close to accession was part of a trend, whereby opposition parties in 
particular started using the EU accession strategically or opportunistically for political 
gain and to directly undermine the government (see Taggart and Szczerbiak 2001). 
This opportunity was also offered to opposition parties by the often comprehensive 
reform required to ready the candidate countries for accession. The extent of this 
reform was a function of the continuous postponing of costly reform in the pre­
accession period by the ruling political parties.
Such opportunistic use of Europe is not the same as political parties developing 
platforms against European integration. Doubts remain if ideological divisions on 
Europe would take hold in both Poland and the Czech Republic (on ideological 
divisions see Kopecky and Mudde 2002). Nonetheless, many parties adopted ‘euro- 
realist’ agendas, which put clear limits on the amount of integration they wanted in 
Europe or more important for ‘europeanisation’ the extent of domestic adjustment
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they could tolerate. In Poland, ‘euro-realist’ parties were also linked to the strong 
resistance in the agricultural sector. This resistance was a function of the influence of 
farmers’ groups, the main agricultural parties, and the right-wing catholic movements. 
The main ‘euro-realist’ party in the Czech Republic was the ‘Thatcherite’ ODS.
Point 2 also presents a cause of the shifting opinions and party platforms on EU 
accession. The impression was that, given the ‘asymmetry in power’ in the pre­
accession period between the candidate countries and the EU administration and the 
EU member-states, the candidate countries were not getting adequate consideration at 
the EU level or being given appropriate concessions. This impression was 
strengthened by: 1. the ‘homogenisation’ of the negotiations, which did not 
differentiate between countries; and 2. the decision to perform important policy 
reform and set budgetary frameworks before accession, without the input of the 
candidate countries.
The above points would perhaps indicate a relatively militant position of domestic 
political actors towards European integration. A country such as Poland could be 
expected to aggressively assert itself in the EU institutions upon membership, when it 
can ‘upload’ its national preferences, oppose further European integration, or 
postpone important adjustment to the EU as much as possible. There could be a 
dramatic shift as these countries move from solely being policy-takers to joining a 
group of policy-makers. However, there are two qualifying observations, which speak 
to the ability and the need of the candidate countries to assert themselves.
First, at the time of publication, it was not yet clear the extent of power the first-wave 
accession countries would attain in the Council and European Parliament. An 
additional factor in the assertion of the candidate countries in Brussels was the general 
political weakness of the main ruling parties in Poland and the Czech Republic, 
respectively the SLD-UP and CSSD. These parties were predominantly engaged in 
political survival at home. Their assertion at the European level would also be a 
function of this political weakness and their vulnerability in their respective national 
parliaments. It is difficult at this point in time to generalise on possible patterns of 
interaction between the governments in the Czech Republic and Poland and the 
European institutions or indeed the governments of the other member-states.
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Secondly, the empirical evidence in this thesis shows a range of adaptation, which 
included the persistence of the domestic institutional frameworks, but also how 
administrative and political actors might use the EU requirements and opportunities to 
shape the domestic arena. These patterns of adaptation are comparable to the member- 
states. In this sense, an asymmetry in power did in no way imply deeper or wider 
adaptation effects than in the member-states, or from the other extreme, a complete 
lack of adaptation. In this way, the importance or relevance of the ‘asymmetry of 
power’, similar to its use in ‘conditionality’ perspectives, might be overstated. 
Following, the concept of ‘asymmetry of power’, especially in light of an inevitable 
accession, might therefore be of less importance to the positions and motivations of 
the political and administrative actors.
In conclusion, it is too early to determine how political actors will perceive European 
integration upon accession. There are however some hints. It seems clear that 
‘enabling constraint’ views linked to constructivist and transition perspectives, as 
stated in chapter 2, do not adequately take into account the strategic considerations of 
actors, the costs of enlargement, or the contentious nature of aspects of European 
integration to the candidate countries. On the other hand, the strategic and 
opportunistic use of European enlargement and integration by political actors should 
not be confused with the emergence of possible ideological divisions and cleavages 
on issues of European integration, both in society and the political spectrum. Further, 
such use cannot predict whether actors will adopt a militant position towards EU 
institutions and groups of member-states. As stated in the research, the main cleavage 
seems to exist between those participating in the management of EU policy and those 
on the fringes. In the empirical research, this point refers to the empowerment of 
certain national administrative actors.
2.2 Eastern European ‘Exceptionalism’
The question remains how different the CEECs are in the process of 
‘europeanisation’. First some discussion is required on approaches. These approaches 
question: 1. the validity of using the ‘europeanisation’ approach to study domestic
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adjustment in Eastern enlargement in the pre-accession period, as the Nordic 
enlargement showed only gradual effects of ‘europeanisation’ in their pre-accession 
period (on Nordic enlargement see for instance Dyson and Goetz, 2003, p. 369; 
Sverdup 2000); and 2. the extension of neo-institutional theories to the CEECs (see 
Goetz 2002a). A second part of this section will categorise some important 
differences between Poland and the Czech Republic and the member-states. A third 
section will briefly look at the effects of ‘europeanisation’ in the policy sectors and 
countries studied, and the possible extension of the research to other policy sectors. A 
fourth section will discuss the effect of the enlarged Union on European integration. A 
final section will generalise on how these post-communist countries fit into existing 
categorisations in ‘europeanisation’ literature.
2.2.a The Institutional Perspective
There were two main issues to address before starting this research: 1. the 
establishment of a pattern of interaction between the European Union and the 
candidate countries; and 2. the strength or weakness of the institutional frameworks in 
the CEECs. The need to address these issues came from observations and biases in 
respectively enlargement studies and the transition perspective. As noted in chapter 2 
and as argued by Grabbe (2003), there is a need for ‘degreeism’ in the study of the 
effects of European accession in the candidate countries. This means separating 
‘modernisation’, enlargement and globalisation studies from ‘europeanisation’ 
studies. Moreover, there is also a temporal dimension to the analysis. First, the pre­
accession process evolves. Secondly, both Poland and the Czech Republic have 
largely finished the transition of their political, administrative, and economic 
institutions.
On the first point, the main novelty in these policy sectors in the current enlargement 
is the unprecedented pre-accession assistance. Both Northern and Southern 
enlargements did not benefit from these pre-accession instruments, which provided 
increased interaction and pressures for adaptation in the pre-accession periods. This 
interaction was framed by negotiations focusing on the implementation and adoption 
of the ‘acquis’. In this work, it is the pre-accession approach that forms the base for
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change in the candidate countries. As stated in the introduction, both regional policy 
and agricultural policy are in this way ‘extreme’ cases.
The analysis of the pre-accession instruments and the use of ‘extreme cases’ counter 
those studies that question the likelihood of systematic adaptation. Early enlargement 
studies question the existence of a clear ‘path’ for the candidate countries towards 
accession (see for instance Sedelmeier and Wallace 1996; Schimmelfennig 1999). 
Adaptation in the candidate countries in these approaches would have a more fluid 
nature or show anticipated or anticipatory effects. There was no systematic interaction 
or adaptive pressure before accession. More recently, studies (see Goetz 2002a) have 
argued that actors try to avoid the costs of institutionalisation by postponing this 
adaptation until after accession, when these actors have a chance to ‘upload’ national 
preferences. Though it is difficult to evaluate this argument on a general level, it 
seems clear that this argument is harder to make in the management of EU funds, 
where actors have interacted in established frameworks throughout the pre-accession 
period and show some willingness to participate because of the EU incentive. This 
incentive is especially high given the links between the pre-accession instruments and 
EU Structural Funds. Moreover, comprehensive adaptation did occur on the sectoral 
level. The comprehensive sectoral adaptation, as seen in regional policy in both 
countries and in the agricultural sector in the Czech Republic, confirms the point of 
interaction and adaptation. It seems therefore difficult to argue against the systematic 
pressures and incentives to adapt in this research.
Secondly, authors have questioned the validity of taking neo-institutional approaches 
in the study of ‘europeanisation’, given the institutional weakness or changeability of 
institutional arrangements in the post-communist states of CEE (see Goetz 2002a). 
The major argument is that the institutional arrangements have not had time to 
stabilise or consolidate. The thesis has argued against this by questioning the validity 
of the transition perspective and questioning the bias towards defining the institutional 
frameworks in Poland and the Czech Republic as weak. Moreover, the empirical 
evidence in this thesis suggests otherwise. The effect of Europe on the executive 
structure in these countries shows the persistence of the macro-institutional 
arrangements, even under EU pressure. The stickability of the domestic institutional 
arrangements therefore is perhaps greater than expected. This observation is in and by
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itself an interesting comment on the process of institutional change in post-communist 
Europe. From these empirical observations, it seems counterintuitive to argue that the 
institutional frameworks in the Czech Republic and Poland are weak or indeterminate.
Rather than stating that institutions in these candidate countries of CEE are weak, it is 
perhaps more subtle to state that the institutional set-ups are specific or different. This 
difference in the institutional set-ups has been widely noted as an important 
determinant for ‘europeanisation’ effects in studies looking at the adaptation in the 
member-states (see Page 2003, Peters et al 2000, Wright and Hayward 2000, Heritier 
et al 2001). It does not seem farfetched to extend such an analysis to these first-wave 
candidate countries.
2.2.b Differences between Member-States and First-Wave Candidate 
Countries
So, how different are Poland and the Czech Republic from the member-states? They 
are different in six important ways. These ways refer to their participation in EU 
decision-making, institutions, and policies and the diversity these countries are likely 
to bring to the European Union and the process of European integration.
First, the limited length of membership and the nature of interaction with the EU 
through the pre-accession period mean a lack of full participation in EU institutions 
and policy areas. Lack of participation means effects have primarily been linked with 
‘downloading’, rather than the shaping of European integration. Secondly, these 
countries are different from the core EU-12, as they will not participate initially in 
EMU. Further to this point, derogations and transition periods exist in key policy 
areas such as CAP. These pertain to the participation of the new accession countries 
in key policy topics, such as the direct payments in CAP and the rights extended to 
EU nationals in the accession countries. An example is the foreign ownership of 
agricultural land. Member-states also placed bilateral restrictions on the free 
movement of labour. Membership, at least in the short-term, was not a full extension 
of normal rights on both sides. Third, intra-regional cooperation within the Czech 
Republic and Poland and regional cooperation between countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe are minimal compared with the Nordic countries or the core member-
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states of the EU. Fourth, the fragmented nature of the party-political landscape in both 
Poland and the Czech Republic could mean that elections to the European Parliament 
in these countries could produce a fragmented result, similar to the outcome in the 
regional elections in these countries. This could limit the influence these countries can 
project through the delegations in the European Parliament. Such results coupled to 
the weakness of governing parties in the national parliament, mentioned earlier, could 
also limit the way these countries could project national preferences on European 
integration to the European level. Fifth, the CEECs might in general have less scope, 
compared to the core member-states, to project national preferences to the European 
level upon accession. Featherstone and Kazamias (2001) make a similar point on the 
asymmetry of power between the core and the periphery for the Southern member- 
states. Further, restrictions on the participation in core policy areas such as CAP and 
EMU also limit the ability of the CEECs to project national preferences. Such 
limitations have the potential to place these countries at the periphery of European 
integration. Finally, the inclusion of member-states with distinct institutional set-ups 
and policy frameworks could increase the diversity among the member-states. This 
has consequences for both processes of ‘europeanisation’ and European integration.
2.2.c Europeanisation Effects in the CEECs
In terms of effects, important differences exist between groups of countries. For the 
candidate countries of CEE, their partied membership and mostly pre-accession based 
adaptation (in this research) might be difficult to compare with full members or 
founding members. In their volume on Southern ‘europeanisation’, Kazamias and 
Featherstone (2001. p. 16) describe that there is ‘limited scope for generalisations on 
the impact of Europeanization within the region’, rather they emphasise ‘asymmetry, 
fragmentation, and dynamism’.
The research here is limited in scope in terms of the number of cases. It is therefore 
more difficult to make generalisations on the overall ‘europeanisation’ process in the 
post-communist candidate countries and consequently make broad comparative 
assessments. Nonetheless, the research allows for some interesting conclusions.
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First, the empirical evidence shows a limited or incremental adaptation in the 
organisation of the executive in both countries. Substantial change is more obvious on 
the sectoral level. This takes place both in sectoral administrative arrangements and 
policy. In a sense, this analysis fits into what other ‘europeanisation’ volumes have 
shown, namely that the effects of the EU on domestic policy will be more substantial 
than the effects on the domestic polity (see for instance Dyson and Goetz 2003, p. 
352). The organisation of the implementation and organisation in the executive is 
mosdy determined by domestic institutional factors.
In terms of administrative adjustment, there are some further observations. There is a 
fragmentation in administration between those participating in EU policy and being 
strengthened by it and those not. In other words, there is a differentiated institutional 
enhancement. The clearest example of fragmentation is the strengthening of sectoral 
line ministries and associated agencies at the expense of the newly formed regions. 
Despite a possible challenge to the territorial administration of both the Czech 
Republic and Poland, the shallow ‘acquis’ and the focus of the European Union in the 
pre-accession period to work with administration that could absorb funds affirmed the 
centrist administrative culture in both countries. As accession neared, this sometimes 
meant a recentralisation in the institutional distribution of competences, as in regional 
policy in Poland and in SAPARD in both countries. However, fragmentation did not 
only exist in territorial administration.
At the national level, there was a fragmentation between EU-specific coordination and 
implementation units and the rest of the state administration (see also Agh 2000; van 
Stolk 2002). This fragmentation is exhibited mostly in the competences and resources 
of the respective units. Some units operated outside the political and budgetary 
constraints of the executive organisation. Fragmentation is also fostered by the 
European Commission’s desire to work with specialist and independent coordination 
and implementation units. Moreover, some sectoral adjustments, as in the creation of 
the SAPARD Agency in Poland and the Czech Republic, were isolated in the 
executive structure to limit overall institutional change. However, the fragmentation, 
especially between implementation agencies and state administration, is also 
overstated. Both Poland and the Czech Republic had a history of implementation 
through foundations from the time of transition onwards. In this way, the European
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pre-accession process might have confirmed or amplified institutional patterns, rather 
than create new institutional patterns. Moreover, the EU template on the 
administrative organisation of implementation evolved and was also in some ways 
paradoxical. Whereas in the initial phases of the pre-accession process the European 
Commission emphasised independent administration to limit political intervention and 
build capacity next to or outside of the executive159, in the later stages of the pre­
accession period the EU advocated the consolidation of implementation agencies and 
the integration of the implementation agencies in the line ministries and state budget. 
This shift would consequently limit the fragmentation in the executive set-up. 
Increasingly, institutional enhancement would be linked to this consolidation, be it in 
the Prime Minister’s Office and Ministry of Economy in Poland or the specific line 
ministries in the Czech Republic.
Regional policy and agricultural policy are ‘extreme cases’. By this I mean, they are 
core policy areas that have an interaction with the candidate countries that extends 
throughout the pre-accession period. Adaptation in these sectors should draw out 
some conclusions on the adaptation over time in other policy sectors. Whereas the 
development of the executive set-up in these policy sectors is mostly determined by 
domestic institutional determinants, which vary between countries, the sectoral 
adaptation can be more substantial and produce convergence between countries. In 
regional policy in the Czech Republic and Poland, EU regional policy more or less 
confirmed the institutional position of the line ministries and implementation 
agencies, which together with strong sectoral support facilitated the adoption of EU 
intervention instruments. These instruments largely replaced the industrial policy, 
which had characterised regional development policy in the Czech Republic and 
Poland since transition. The same dynamic applies to intervention instruments in the 
agricultural policy in the Czech Republic, where EU requirements solidified 
endogenous sectoral reform. However, the situation is different in Poland, where such 
sectoral intervention policy threatens the institutional position of sectoral agencies, 
farmer groups, and beneficiaries. Here, adaptation occurs, but is quarantined in the 
executive structure and does not displace domestic intervention policy.
159 Foundations outside of state administration could pay higher salaries than the civil service and gain 
extra resources through commercial activities to build up capacity and expertise.
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Though it is difficult to draw conclusions for other policy areas such as EMU, it 
seems clear that enlargement does not necessarily need to affect or undermine 
common policies. However, there is no doubt that the inclusion of more countries in 
the common policies increases the diversity in the EU, both in the executive set-up 
and in the sectoral arrangements. The case of adaptation of agricultural policy in 
Poland is an example. This development can put pressure on common policies.
2.2.d Diversity in the EU
The growth in the number of member-states indicates an increased diversity. At the 
moment, this diversity means: 1. growing social and party systemic cleavages in the 
EU on European integration; 2. variations in participation in policy sectors and pillars, 
and types of participation; and 3. a growing variation in ‘europeanisation’ 
experiences. Diversity could lead to the core founding member-states to attempt to 
continue with deeper integration, while the member-states on the periphery follow, if 
they can or if they wish to do so. This would demand an analysis of the core member- 
states or the relations between the core member-states and the new member-states that 
is beyond the scope and timeframe of this research. Alternatively, European 
integration outcomes could be conceptualised as becoming more of a least common 
denominator, whereby the periphery gains at the expense of the core. In this 
perspective, ‘europeanisation’ effects in the new accession countries would be 
extremely relevant.
The empirical work in this thesis can only partially answer this important question. 
This answer is to be found in two processes: 1. the ongoing policy and institutional 
reform in the EU; and 2. the evolution of the pre-accession template. These processes 
ran concurrent and therefore incorporated similar elements.
The enlargement of the EU meant that it was difficult and undesirable to the member- 
states to continue under the same budgetary frameworks and administrative 
frameworks. The ongoing reform of CAP and regional policy had a distinct theme. 
This theme was the gradual re-nationalisation of regional development policy and 
agricultural policy. This re-nationalisation also meant a reduction of the role of the 
European Commission in these policy areas. In regional policy, a reduction of the
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Community Initiatives in number and budget and the granting of more discretion to 
the national governments to designate objective areas were elements of an enhanced 
role for the member-states. In fact, many of the roles for regions and the European 
Commission in region policy, established in the Maastricht Treaty, were reduced or 
eroded. In CAP, the emergence of concepts, such as modulation and cross-compliance 
and an increased focus on rural development initiatives, was not only a fulfilment of 
the proposed decreases in price support in the MacSharry Reforms, but an assertion of 
the member-states in these common policy areas. There was also a practical element 
to this re-nationalisation. Increasingly, the European Commission found it difficult to 
perform its assigned regulatory and monitoring tasks in these policy areas. Re­
nationalisation also helped to mediate on disagreements on agricultural reform 
between the member-states, mostly between core member-states in favour of the 
status quo, such as France and Germany on one side, and those in favour of reducing 
the scope of CAP, such as the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom on the 
other. While most of the member-states agreed to put a cap on the overall spending in 
the EU, not all the member-states agreed on the redistribution of funds under this cap. 
It was clear that the only way to maintain the budgetary framework, while enlarging 
the EU, was to reduce the overall budgetary support to agriculture. More national 
discretion allowed some governments to boost rural development initiatives, while 
cutting the overall budget of the common policies. Such national discretion allowed 
the continuation of common policies under the same overall budgetary framework. 
However, this discretion also increased diversity in the sectoral arrangements. As 
Swinnen (2003) points out, this diversity among the member-states is likely to 
increase after accession.
Trends towards re-nationalisation were also apparent in Poland and the Czech 
Republic. The introduction of the simplified system of direct payments under CAP is 
probably the best example. This derogation granted to the new member-states might 
also prove a precursor for future reforms of CAP. Sectoral resistance to the adoption 
of EU templates, as in the case of Polish agriculture, was often quite high. Moreover, 
the preferences of the EU also took into account specific national conditions. The 
problems in the absorption of EU funds played a key role in the administrative 
adjustments in the candidate countries. These problems produced a debate in the 
European Commission concerning ‘administrative compliance’ and ‘administration-
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building’ in the pre-accession period. It is of course important, given the absence of 
an overall template on administrative organisation in the European Union, to 
acknowledge the different levels of ‘prescription’ and the preferences of the 
Commission in the two policy sectors. Nonetheless, an emphasis on administrative 
capacity in the absorption of EU funds allowed greater domestic discretion in shaping 
administrative responses than one would expect in the member-states, especially in 
regional policy where templates were not as extensive. Both policy sectors, with their 
inherent varying degrees of prescription, showed examples of specific national 
flexibility. The development of the preferences in the European Commission also 
showed the enlargement process increasingly as a two-way street, whereby both the 
European Commission and the candidate countries needed the make enlargement 
happen under the political timeline decided on for the enlargement process.160 Any 
specific domestic discretion or sectoral resistance again increased diversity in the EU.
The re-nationalisation in core policy areas, the new methods of coordination, the 
varying degrees of participation of member-states in common policy, and the 
emergence of party and social cleavages on European integration seem to indicate 
varying ‘europeanisation’ effects, which in effect mean a ‘peripheralisation’ in the 
process of European integration. The fact that this process, as in the reform of CAP, is 
often purposefully driven by the core member-states only strengthens the impression 
of these varying experiences of ‘europeanisation’ becoming the norm.
2.2.e ‘Four Worlds’ of Europeanisation
The final question in this conclusion deals briefly with how the ‘europeanisation’ 
experiences in these post-communist candidate countries compare to the other waves 
of enlargement and the ‘europeanisation’ experiences of the core member-states? In 
explaining differences in ‘europeanisation’ experiences, it seems that first and 
foremost commonalities and differences in the institutional set-ups between groups of 
member-states and the candidate countries play a role. This seems especially the case, 
when the exceptionalism of the pre-accession process wears off after accession.
160 This view shows the limitations of studies that attach great weight to conditionality mechanisms as 
outlined in chapter 2.
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Further, given the emphasis on the institutional set-ups, one could ask to what extent 
dividing the member-states into groups is logical.
This comparison shows that the vertically centralised and horizontally decentralised 
executive set-ups of the CEECs might show comparisons with the Southern member- 
states. In regional policy, the post-communist countries showed common features in 
administrative structure and policy style. These countries are vertically centralised 
and regional development, given the communist legacy, is seen in the context of 
industrial policy rather than re-distributive policy. These features are also prominent 
in the Southern member-states161, but differ from the core member-states and the 
Nordic countries. These member-states show variety in vertical decentralisation with 
France and Germany respectively being examples of vertically centralised and 
decentralised territorial administration. All have a re-distributive regional policy. 
Moreover, the pre-accession process and the ‘asymmetry of power’ between the 
periphery and the core show similarities between the Southern member-states and the 
CEECs. However, experiences are also different. The pre-accession instruments were 
particular to the CEECs. Moreover, transition periods and exemptions on full 
participation in EU common policy and institutional arrangements also differ from the 
experiences of the Southern member-states. Moreover, these derogations can vary 
between countries as well. The issue of bilateral restrictions on the free movement of 
labour is an example. As stated in the research, these temporal factors are relevant in 
the challenge the EU pre-accession templates pose and consequently in the study of 
‘europeanisation’ East.
Secondly, the post-communist countries shared a commonality in the emergence of a 
decentralised executive after transition. This has a commonality with the Southern 
states with the exception of Spain and Portugal, which showed centralisation in the 
core executive but only selective EU coordination ambition (see Kassim 2003, p. 93). 
Since the initial transition period, Poland and the Czech Republic have developed 
their executives in different directions. Poland strengthened the core executive, while 
the Czech Republic continues to show ministerial autonomy in the executive set-up.
161 Spain has developed a decentralised territorial administration, but it can be argued that 
territorialisation only occurred next to ‘europeanisation’ (Featherstone and Kazamias 2001, pg. 17).
The Spanish state was initially hierarchical and centralised.
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These developments create new commonalities and differences with groups of 
member-states. The executive set-up and in particular coordination in the executive, 
as shown in Kassim (2003), Peters et al (2000), and Wright and Hayward (2000) 
shows variety within groups of member-states. Finally, in agricultural policy Poland 
and the Czech Republic had very different institutional set-ups from transition to 
accession. Poland had a relatively extensive system of domestic intervention, while 
the Czech Republic compared to Poland and CAP had a liberal agricultural policy. 
Here, comparison with the core member-states is difficult, given their respective 
length of participation in CAP. However, the Czech case might be more similar to that 
of Austria and Finland. Poland, given the structural issues and domestic support levels 
in agriculture, is more similar to Spain (see Nallet and van Stolk 1994).
Though important similarities in the pre-accession process and the institutional 
configuration exist between the member-states and the candidate countries, 
‘Europeanisation’ experiences of different groups of member-states might be 
substantially divergent and indicate a growing divergence within the EU. The 
question is not so much as posed in Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2003) whether 
the candidate countries adapt more or less than the member-states, but that the effects 
linked to specific institutional factors and the particularities of the EU templates vary 
across countries and between groups of countries.
This point raises another question about the logic of conceptualising the ‘four worlds’ 
of ‘europeanisation’ (Goetz 2002b). While this thesis does support Goetz’s attempt at 
conceptualising different ‘europeanisation’ trajectories in terms of the four worlds of 
‘europeanisation’, this thesis highlights an important contradiction in Goetz’s 
framework. In Goetz’s framework, the difference between the ‘first’ and ‘second’ 
worlds of europeanisation is based on the differences in ‘fits’ between the domestic 
institutional configurations and the EU templates and on differing degrees of support 
for European integration by national political actors. The distinction between the 
‘first’ and ‘second’ worlds, on one hand, and the ‘third’ and ‘fourth’ worlds, on the 
other, is based on a different principle, namely the relative strength or weakness of 
domestic institutions. The fact that Goetz’s analysis is not based on a single principle 
weakens it. This thesis offers a more consistent approach by focusing on one 
principle, namely the fits between EU templates and the domestic institutional
310
configuration. Moreover, the thesis suggested that institutions in the CEECs are not 
weak but specific. In fact, the persistence of the institutional configuration, faced with 
European pressures, points to institutional strength.
In terms of the classification of the ‘four worlds’ of ‘europeanisation’, this approach 
raises some questions. First, given the commonalities in the institutional 
configurations between the CEECs and countries in the ‘third’ world of 
‘europeanisation’, is it logical to assume that the these countries form different worlds 
of europeanisation, especially as commonalities might increase after the end of the 
pre-accession period? This question also highlights the need to carefully determine 
on which levels, be it polity, politics and policy, one looks at commonalities and 
differences between states. Secondly, given the internal variations of institutional 
configurations between countries within groups, are ‘groups’ a useful and necessary 
categorisation? Indeed, the differential impact of Europe, especially on domestic 
polity, has been a prominent feature in many ‘europeanisation’ studies (Heritier et al 
2001; Knill and Heritier 2000; Knill 2001; Borzel 2002b). However, I believe that 
within a widening European Union with divergent ‘europeanisation’ experiences, it is 
indeed useful to look at groups. I agree with Goetz (2002b) that there are indeed 
important commonalities and differences (see also section 2.2.b of this chapter). This 
thesis comments predominantly on the organisation of the state and sectoral 
institutional arrangements. At this point, one can make two observations on the 
CEECs. First, the pre-accession period and the accession negotiations has given them 
particular ‘europeanisation’ experiences. However, given the institutional 
commonalities with members of the ‘third’ group of ‘europeanisation, it is also likely 
that, as the particularities of the pre-accession templates wear off, these ‘first-wave’ 
candidate countries will increasingly share ‘europeanisation’ experiences with this 
third group. The ‘europeanisation’ process in the candidate countries is still evolving. 
The boundaries in this way could be fading.
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